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OUR RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AMERICA AND HOW TO IMPROVE THEM



By

GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE

Professor of History, Clark University

MARCH, 1914, No. 76

American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
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PREFATORY NOTE

George H. Blakeslee was born at Geneseo, New York, in 1871. After graduation from Wesleyan University he studied at Berlin, Leipzig, and Oxford, and in 1903 received the degree of Ph.D. from Harvard. In connection with his Professorship of History he has organized the annual Clark University Inter-racial Conferences with the aim of helping to create a more intelligent and sympathetic appreciation of other peoples and civilizations. Besides editing the volumes containing the Conference addresses, he is (with President G. Stanley Hall) editor of the "Journal of Race Development." To better understand foreign conditions he has traveled extensively in interior Russia, the Far East, and South America, and has embodied his observations and conclusions in various magazine articles.

THE TRADITION OF WAR

ONE of the most important things that we can learn in regard to this world about us is that ideals and institutions are far less rational than they generally purport to be. And in no field is this more obviously true than in that of war and the preparation for war. There is always a tacit assumption made by militarists that armaments have their origin in an imperative national need, and that the sole reason for their maintenance and increase is the fact that they are the only insurance a nation has against dishonor and ultimate annihilation. The workers for peace are jeered at as sentimentalists who will not see things as they are, and who are trying to substitute impractical feeling and good wishes for the stern exigencies of a practical adaptation to a world of force and fraud. In other words, the constant assumption is made, often by peace-lovers as well as militarists, that militarism is wholly rational, that statesmen and governments have built up their armies and navies in hard-headed practical answers to definite dangers which threaten their country or to the requirements of growing industrial strength or "national dignity." When we consider these needs, however, we shall find certain curious paradoxes that grow out of the rationality of militarism, and we shall be led to believe that there is a large element of the irrational and the naïvely unconscious in the sternest schemes and the boldest poli-

of Commerce delegation, said with friendly frankness: "You come down here just at the time when some writers or politicians think that the ever-increasing American influence is becoming a terrible danger for the Latin Republics. They fear absorption."

One should not exaggerate this feeling. Although dread of United States expansion is common among the masses of the people, it is probably shared by only a minority of the leading men; and while the fear of our supposed imperial designs is acute in some States, it is slight in a number of others. But there is no country in which misunderstanding of the aims of the United States does not exist in some degree; it is latent everywhere and strongly held by many intelligent and influential people.

This distrust is frequently manifesting itself. The recent incident at Guayaquil is typical. This seaport of Ecuador has long been a pesthole, endangering the health of cities both north and south, including those in the Panama Canal Zone. The United States therefore acceded to the suggestion of Ecuador that Colonel Gorgas be sent from Panama to point out how Guayaquil might be put in good sanitary condition. Arrangements were almost completed for carrying out this work under the supervision of engineers from the United States, when such strong opposition developed among the people, due in considerable measure to the suspicion and jealousy of North Americans, that the entire plan has now been temporarily abandoned.

During the revolutionary troubles in Mexico, the greatest interest has been aroused among South Americans over the possibility of intervention by the United States. As one of the Brazilians expresses it, "They

have not been so much concerned over the deplorable conditions in Mexico as over the question whether the North Americans would send troops across the Rio Grande." Intervention in one Latin Republic would establish a precedent which might be followed later in others farther south; besides, it would bring the United States a long stride nearer South America.

The past few weeks, Señor Manuel Ugarte, one of the leading orators of Argentina, has been touring the principal cities on the West Coast, lecturing to large, enthusiastic audiences upon the necessity of union among the Latin Republics to preserve their Latin culture from overthrow by the political advance of the United States. These addresses of Ugarte have been among the most notable recent events in the Pacific Coast countries; and the fact that his views have often been discussed at length in leading newspapers, and sometimes repudiated, shows both the importance with which this issue is regarded and the division of South American opinion upon it.

But how can South Americans have the least fear of a North American conquest, when the idea of extending our sovereignty over any part of their continent has scarcely occurred to any person in the entire United States? This is the query which at once comes to one's mind when one first learns of the reality of this South American delusion. The explanation, however, is not difficult. The fundamental reason for the existence of this suspicion is the consciousness of weakness, especially with the States bordering on the Caribbean and on the Pacific; the knowledge that they are relatively feeble in comparison with the powerful nation which openly claims a leadership of the whole

hemisphere; and the belief that it is a law of nature that strong countries must expand. As one South American expressed it in a confidential talk, "the big fish eat the little ones."

Besides this, the future action of our Government is often forecast by the light of our diplomatic past. It is a far cry to the Mexican War, but the educated men know the character of it, and frequently refer to it as a warning. They point out that this was subsequently followed by the Spanish War, with its conquest of Porto Rico and its Cuban protectorate; later Panama was seized; and in our own time a constant intervention has been taking place in Central American affairs, especially in Nicaragua, while the independence of Mexico is now threatened, and its virtual absorption frequently discussed in our press.

From this point of view the dread of future conquest does not seem so unreasonable. But there is a further and very important factor—this suspicion is constantly stirred up and kept burning by some (we believe a relatively small proportion) of the British and German merchants in South America. Their purpose is clear enough. Trade competition throughout the continent is especially keen, so these British and Germans say to the South Americans, "You had better give us your concessions, railroads and commerce, for we cannot conquer your territory—the Monroe Doctrine stands in the way—but look out for Uncle Sam; if you give him a foothold, he'll soon take your whole country." As an example of this, the day before the Boston Chamber of Commerce delegation reached Buenos Aires, an English newspaper of that city stated in its leading editorial that, in all

probability, the ultimate purpose of this tour was to lead the way to the eventual annexation of South America by the United States.

Aside from this definite question of conquest, the general attitude of South Americans towards us—always remembering that there are great differences of opinion between different countries—combines intense admiration for our national greatness, rapid progress, and the energy and success of our business life, with a feeling that we fail in general culture, lack ideals and are crude and overbearing. A recent author, F. Garcia-Calderon, defines the United States as “a powerful industrial republic, a vast country of rude energies, of the ‘strenuous life.’” A professor in one of the leading universities said, in a recent conversation, “we know that the United States is stronger and greater than we are, but we don’t like to be constantly told of it; we recognize your superior power, but are also conscious of our own superior culture.”

The naturally sensitive and intellectually refined South Americans of the upper classes have had ample justification for this feeling from the conduct and character of many of the citizens of the United States seen in South America. For years there were no extradition treaties with these Southern Republics, with the result that certain leading cities, such as Santiago and Buenos Aires, were favorite resorts of our criminal classes. Then the conduct of our sailors, when on shore leave, was anything but creditable. The action of American railroad construction men, also, has frequently been disreputable; those working in Bolivia, two or three years ago, when building one of the new railroads, used to “shoot up” the town of

Oruro whenever the inclination moved them. The consular service, until the past decade, was filled with men who as a class were discreditable and inefficient. Many an open grafter, drunkard and roué had a United States consular shield over his door. "Ten years ago," says one of the foremost American business men on the West Coast, "we never thought of going to the American consul with any question of mercantile or international law; we always went to the British consul as a matter of course; but now we are getting into the habit of consulting our own consuls." The agents and drummers of our business houses have until recently been raw and crude, so much so that not many months ago one of our most capable consuls advised the State Department that these men actually did American business more harm than good. These are the types which have given to the peoples of the Southern Republics many of their impressions of the United States.

The supervisory attitude of our Government has been resented. "To live on the shady side of the big stick is not pleasant," as someone expressed it the other day. The best example of "the shady side of the big stick" is the settlement of the Alsop claim against Chile about two years ago. The Chileans were then just getting over some of the earlier unpleasantnesses, such as the "Baltimore incident" of 1891, when Secretary Knox suddenly announced to their Government that if, within forty-eight hours, it did not definitely agree to settle this claim—a complicated claim against Chile over certain nitrate concessions in which some Americans were interested—he would withdraw the American Legation from the

country. This summary procedure was keenly and bitterly resented.

The Monroe Doctrine is an almost constant source of irritation to South Americans. It is generally regarded by the people of every country as an unwarranted assumption on our part of guardianship and superiority over them. They do not recognize the need of protection from Europe, and consider themselves capable of managing their own domestic affairs.

"Dollar Diplomacy," at least the public trumpeting of it, has also done us harm, for it has intensified the suspicion that we are merely a money-making people, ready to prostitute all the resources of the Government to obtain trade privileges and concessions. Among the especially anti-American young men, in one section at least, there are many who cannot speak English, who are yet able to repeat in our tongue such phrases as "The Almighty Dollar," "Dollar Diplomacy," and "Make money honestly if you can, but make money." These expressions are considered to be representative of our national aims and character.

There exists, then, a widespread misunderstanding of us and of our attitude toward South America. This hurts us and should be corrected. Of course, not everyone holds these views, but with varying intensity they are general throughout the continent. Neither should we be so conceited as to think that the South Americans spend all their time in worrying about us and our policies. Their men concern themselves primarily with the local price of wheat and beef, coffee and rubber, and the results of the race track, and the ladies with the most recent French novels and the latest gowns from Worth's. When their thoughts do

turn to other countries, it is more frequently to those of Europe than to the United States, for in culture and education, commerce and finance, South America is more closely bound to Europe than it is to us. But when they think about the United States, their ideas are generally incorrect.

The situation, however, has recently improved. Mr. Roosevelt overhauled the consular service when President, with the result that the existing force is relatively respectable and efficient. Our business houses, especially within the last two or three years, have come to send distinctly better commercial agents and representatives, so that in some places, Rio de Janeiro particularly, the members of the American colony are the equals of those from any foreign country. The fear of territorial aggression from the United States, at least so far as the small states are concerned, is probably less keen than it has been in the past, because of their still greater and growing apprehension of danger from their larger neighbors. Some of the newspapers of La Paz, for example, recently stated that the menace to Bolivia was not from the North (the United States) but from the South (Chile or Argentina).

It is also an important advantage for us, in developing a better understanding, that the two leading members of the new national Administration in the United States, President Wilson and Secretary Bryan, have in a surprising degree the general confidence of the people of South America. This may be accounted for in part by the fact that Mr. Bryan made a tour of the continent about two years ago and spoke in many of the leading cities, creating a most excellent impression.

Notwithstanding this improvement already made, one of our most important diplomatic problems is to place our South American relations upon a really satisfactory basis. The South American peoples will be only too glad to have this brought about. They are generous, open-hearted and particularly responsive to approaches of friendship, if made in perfect sincerity and upon a basis of international equality. But how can this be accomplished? First in importance will be the sending of better representatives from both the Government and American business houses, men who speak the local language, either Spanish or Portuguese, are able to meet the native officials and business people upon a plane of equality in their clubs and families, and have the courtesy to follow the dictates of the social code of the country where they are residing. Some of our present diplomatic representatives, two or three in particular, measure up to the highest possible standard, and have won the respect, regard, and even affection of the people to whom they are accredited. It is almost impossible to overestimate the real service they are doing for the United States. These are the men who should be retained in their present positions or else promoted, not dismissed by a new administration as mere pawns in the game of national party politics. A few of our ministers, however, and a larger number of our consuls are not the type of men to represent adequately the United States in the Republics of South America.

Second, we should become better acquainted with each other. It is a striking fact that practically every South American who has resided for any length of time in the United States is an ardent admirer of

our institutions, culture and ideals; while in our own country the persons who have the highest appreciation of South America are those who have themselves visited the great Republics south of the equator. Our colleges and graduate schools should establish scholarships for South American students, to induce a greater number of them to complete their education in our country. Exchange of professorships should be arranged between the leading universities, and visits of representative men should be encouraged. The people of Brazil, to give but one instance, are just now delighted at the cordiality of the reception recently given in different places in the United States to their Secretary of State, Dr. Lauro Müller.

Third, a better press service should be established, which will give the substantial news of one section to the other. At present there is no regular representative of the Associated Press permanently established anywhere in South America.

Fourth, the diplomatic policy and the diplomatic attitude of our Government should be modified to give full recognition to the fact that the leading countries south of the equator are no longer weak, revolution-tossed communities, but are strong, stable, wealthy, proud, self-conscious nations.

Fifth, the claims of Colombia should either be satisfied or the issue be submitted to arbitration, to prove by action to all South America that our people are in reality what they claim to be, a nation actuated by the highest standards of international honesty and fair dealing.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

No. 1-66 (April, 1907, to May, 1913). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

67. Music as an International Language, by Daniel Gregory Mason, June, 1913.

68. American Love of Peace and European Skepticism, by Paul S. Reinsch, July, 1913.

69. The Relations of Brazil with the United States, by Manoel de Oliveira Lima, August, 1913.

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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SPECIAL BULLETIN

THE CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR


AS REFLECTED IN THE AMERICAN PRESS



WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS

SEPTEMBER, 1914

American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City



See Introduction

THE CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR

AS REFLECTED IN THE AMERICAN PRESS

THE moral reaction of the people of the United States to the most appalling event in human history has been both too profound and too subtle for portrayal in words. Reports and letters may tell something of its extent, but no written document will convey its quality to future generations. Only the art that is older than writing and closer to the elemental emotions has been able in part to express it. The cartoonists have caught its spirit. Collectively their work is a document of startling fidelity, and of compelling power.

When the storm is spent and the desolation is complete; when the flower of the manhood of Europe has passed into eternal night; when famine and pestilence have taken their tithe of childhood and age, the exhausted and the beggared that live on will one day care to know what we, who saw the carnage from a far-away safety and sanity,

thought of it. This little book will tell them much that they will not find in more pretentious works.

They will read here not the argued opinions, but the spontaneous feelings, the deepest moral convictions of a people. They will look in vain for praise of glory or of power, for admiration of anything that enters into or comes out of war. They will not be able to detect even the anguish of defeat or the exultation of victory. They will read only that our hearts and minds responded to the deepest notes of the scale of tragedy—in horror, amazement, stupefaction.

What else were possible?

“No death can further desolate

The heart that knows its god was dust.”

The world believed itself civilized, Christian! It was proud and strong and self-respecting. It rejoiced in the triumphs of science, in the mastery of nature, in the amelioration of the human lot. And then, in an hour, when mankind was happier than it ever had been before, disillusion came. The inhibitions had failed. Covenants, laws, moralities, decencies were forgotten. Human-

ity faced about, to rush insensate backwards over "the road to yesterday," to barbarism, to savagery. The rest we know.

Well! The task must be taken up anew. Once more the race must climb the stony road of toil and privation. Again it must try to chain the savage within itself. Will it this time succeed?

One thing we may hope and believe. A part of the energy that has hitherto been spent in producing material gratifications, often beyond all bounds of reason, may now be diverted by the stricken and sobered nations into other channels. With ripened wisdom, and a sterner resolve, the world may set about the work of improving the relations of man to man, of nation to nation. It may value enlightenment now, above riches. It may care, as it has not cared hitherto, for those things that are more than meat, more than raiment, more even than pride and power.

If these things happen, and not otherwise, disarmament may come, and peace.

FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS.



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THE ECLIPSE

Morgan in the Philadelphia Inquirer



BLESS YOU, MY CHILDREN !
Rehse in the New York World



THE REAL PATRIOT
Weed in the New York Tribune



THE MASSES MUST BEAR THE BURDEN
Coffman in the New York Evening Journal



THE MAN WITH THE SWORD


How will it be with kingdoms and with kings—
With those who shaped him to the things he is—
When this dumb terror shall reply to God
After the silence of the centuries?

—*Edwin Markham.*

Cesare in the New York Sun




WAITING
Osborn in the Baltimore News




THE BURDEN OF WAR
Bowen in the Chicago Herald



THE ADMIRAL
Kirby in the New York World.



THE ARMY WORM
Carter in the New York Sun



THE LAST RAG OF CIVILIZATION

Rogers in the New York Herald



THE BEAST IN MAN
Donahey in the Cleveland Plain Dealer



NINETEEN CENTURIES AFTER CHRIST

Harding in the Brooklyn Daily Eagle



MURDER: I LOOK BETTER IN UNIFORM


Fitz in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch



THE WOLF AT THE DOOR
Kessler in the New York Evening Sun



PRO PATRIA
Cesare in the New York Sun




THE MAILED FIST
Weed in the New York Tribune



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


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THE NEXT MOBILIZATION
Minor in the New York Evening World



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Sykes in the Philadelphia Public Ledger

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Nos. 1-66 (April, 1907, to May, 1913). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

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83. Official Documents Bearing upon the European War.

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OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS BEARING UPON THE EUROPEAN WAR


- I THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE TO SERVIA
- II THE SERVIAN REPLY
- III THE BRITISH WHITE PAPER
- IV THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK



REPRINTED THROUGH THE COURTESY OF THE
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OCTOBER, 1914, No. 83

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The Executive Committee of the Association for International Conciliation wish to arouse the interest of the American people in the progress of the movement for promoting international peace and relations of comity and good fellowship between nations. To this end they print and circulate documents giving information as to the progress or interruption of these movements, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have readily available accurate information on these subjects. A list of publications will be found on page 124.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S APPEAL FOR IMPARTIALITY AND RESTRAINT IN DIS- CUSSING THE WAR

MY FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN: I suppose that every thoughtful man in America has asked himself during the last troubled weeks what influence the European war may exert upon the United States, and I take the liberty of addressing a few words to you in order to point out that it is entirely within our own choice what its effects upon us will be and to urge very earnestly upon you the sort of speech and conduct which will best safeguard the nation against distress and disaster.

The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say or do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The spirit of the nation in this critical matter will be determined largely by what individuals and society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and magazines contain, upon what our ministers utter in their pulpits and men proclaim as their opinions on the streets.

The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility; responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its Government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinions, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion, if not in action. Such diversions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend.

I venture, therefore, my fellow-countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.

My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action, a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world.

Shall we not resolve to put upon ourselves the restraint which will bring to our people the happiness and the great and lasting influence for peace we covet for them?

I

SPEECH OF THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR BEFORE THE GERMAN DIET, AUGUST 4, 1914

For 44 years since the time we fought for and won the German Empire and our position in the world, we have lived in peace and have protected the peace of Europe. In peaceable labor we have become strong and powerful, thereby arousing the envy of others. Patiently did we bear it when enmity was raised against us in the East and the West and fetters were forged for us, because Germany was said to wish for war. The wind then sown now has brought forth a harvest of Whitewind. We wished to continue our peaceful labors and like a secret vow the feeling ran from the Emperor down to the youngest soldier: Our sword shall only fly from its scabbard in defense of a just cause!

The day has now come when we must draw it, against our wish, and in spite of our sincere endeavors.

Russia has set fire to the building.

We are at war with Russia and France, a war forced upon us.

Gentlemen, a number of documents, composed during the pressure of these last days filled with hurried events, is before you. Allow me to accentuate those facts which characterize our actions.

From the first moment of the Austro-Servian conflict it was our opinion and aim that this conflict be limited to Austria-Hungary and Servia. All cabinets, especially England, took the same point of view, only Russia asserted that it had to take a hand in the settling of this matter.

The danger of a European crisis arose.

As soon as the first definite information about military preparations in Russia reached us, we informed St. Petersburg in a friendly but pressing manner that military measures against Austria would find us on the side of our ally and that military preparations against ourselves would oblige us to take countermeasures. But mobilization would be close to actual war.

Russia formally assured us of her desire for peace and declared that she was making no military preparations against us.

In the meantime, England, warmly assisted by us, tried to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

On the 28th of July, the Emperor, by telegram, asked the Czar to consider that Austria-Hungary had the duty and the right to defend herself against the pan-Serb agitation which undermined her existence. The Emperor called the Czar's attention to the fact that the interests of all monarchs must be identical in face of the murder of Serajevo. He asked him to personally assist him and to smooth over the divergence between Vienna and St. Petersburg. About the same time and before receipt of this telegram, the Czar asked the Emperor to help him and to induce Vienna to moderate her demands.

The Emperor accepted the rôle of a mediator.

But scarcely had the action begun, according to his orders, when

functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, and, finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

The above-mentioned results of the Magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquility of the monarchy.

To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government sees itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against the monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it undertakes to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its Official Journal of the 26th June (13th July) the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary—i. e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplors the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress."

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the royal army as an order of the day by his Majesty the King and shall be published in the Official Bulletin of the army.

The Royal Servian Government further undertakes:

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;
2. To dissolve immediately the society styled Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;
3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruc

tion, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserves to itself the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy;

6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voijs Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employe, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo;

8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note.

II

REPLY OF SERVIAN GOVERNMENT TO AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE

The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighborly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skupshtina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighboring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which as a general rule escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighboring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial

and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromise the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavor."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of his Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake:

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skupshtina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into Article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present time, at the inquiry at Serajevo, for the purposes of the latter inquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an inquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitz line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime, and which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile toward the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above

heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.

III

"THE WHITE PAPER"

Issued by the British Foreign Office on August 5, 1914

PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE

COUNT BENCKENDORFF	Russian Ambassador at London.
COUNT BERCHTOLD	Austrian Foreign Minister.
SIR F. BERTIE	British Ambassador at Paris.
SIR G. BUCHANAN	British Ambassador at St. Petersburg
SIR M. DE BUNSEN	British Ambassador at Vienna.
M. CAMBON	French Ambassador to Germany.
MR. CRACKANTHORPE	First Secretary in British Diplomatic Service at Belgrade.
SIR E. GOSCHEN	British Ambassador at Berlin.
SIR EDWARD GREY	British Foreign Secretary.
PRINCE LICHNOWSKY	German Ambassador to Great Britain.
COUNT MENSENDORFF	Austrian Ambassador to Great Britain.
SIR ARTHUR NICOLSON	Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
SIR R. RODD	British Ambassador at Rome.
SIR R. RUMBOLD	Of the British Diplomatic Service.
MARQUIS DI SAN GIULIANO	Foreign Minister of Italy.
M. SAZONOF	Russian Premier.
M. SUCHOMLINOF	Russian Minister for War.
COUNT SZAPARY	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Russia.
PRINCE TROUBETZKOY	General attached to the military household of the Czar of Russia.
SIR F. VILLIERS	British Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Belgium.
M. VIVIANI	Premier of France.

No. 1. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, July 20, 1914.

Sir: I asked the German Ambassador today if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia.

He said that he had not but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable.

I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count Berchtold, in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up.

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia.

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial.

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some case that would be made known.

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the great powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable.

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 2. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 22, 1914.

Last night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming Austrian démarche at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries. He had, therefore, considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter. He had, how-

ever, on several occasions in conversation with the Servian Minister emphasized the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing.

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude adopted toward Servia by Austria had, in his opinion, been one of great forbearance.

No. 3. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen

London, Foreign Office, July 23, 1914.

Sir: Count Mensdorff told me today that he would be able tomorrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Servia today by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give me tomorrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia.

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight.

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with, a time limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia. I admitted that, if there was no time limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time limit could always be introduced afterward; that, if the demands were made without a time limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favor of a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed.

Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an inquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909 Servia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighborhood

with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was also-
lutely necessary for Austria to protect herself.

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe—let us say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such an interference with trade that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia.

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other.

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been very favorable recently,

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 4. Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff

(Communicated by Count Mensdorff, Vienna, July 24, 1914.)

(Translation.)

The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade:

I have the honor to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations:

Already printed, see pages 5-7.

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Serbia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members Generals and diplomatists, Government officials and Judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighboring monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom. Individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it incumbent on it to take the slightest step. The Servian Government has thus failed in the duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude toward the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandizement of Servia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed toward the neighboring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government has felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government is convinced that in taking this step it will find itself in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilized nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government holds at the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the imperial and royal representatives accredited to the other signatory powers.

You are authorized to leave a copy of this dispatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

ANNEX

The criminal inquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last, has up to the present led to the following conclusions:

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, one Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabez, with the assistance of Commander Voija Tankosic.
2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez, by the man Milan Ciganovic and Commander Voija Tankosic at Belgrade.
3. The bombs are hand-grenades, coming from the arms depot of the Servian Army at Kragujevac.
4. In order to insure the success of the act, Ciganovic taught Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabez in a forest near the shooting ground at Topschider.
5. To enable Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organized by Ciganovic.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabac (Rade Popovic) and Loznica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbic of Loznica, with the assistance of various individuals.

No. 5. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

Note addressed to Serbia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.

In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia.

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were not the concern of his Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.

Count Mensdorff replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Serbia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; Serbia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Serbia's part.

I said that if Serbia had procrastinated in replying a time limit could have been introduced later; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation.

No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

I had a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless

Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that his Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

In reply to these remarks I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But, supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria?

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably tomorrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to.

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of his Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack upon Servia by Austria would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war, if it did break out; we

should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped his Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria.

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum.

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.

No. 7. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia could not leave Russia indifferent.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 P. M. tomorrow. His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any power.

No. 8. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 24, 1914.

Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Government, who earnestly trust that his Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them.

This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise.

No. 9. Note Communicated by German Ambassador

London, July 24, 1914.

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realize them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last doubts that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed toward the detachment of the southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army.

The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic interference of the great powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity; to its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a great power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfillment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.

The Imperial Government want to emphasize their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the great powers ought seriously to endeavor to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localization of the conflict, because every interference of another power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences.

No. 10. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

London, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

Sir: After telling M. Cambon today of the Austrian communication to Serbia which I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorff upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburg. I would say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it: but if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any power interested in Serbia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Serbia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburg.

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Serbia, for the Serbians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for any mediation.

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Serbia, and Russia then mobilized, it would be possible for the four powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it.

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Serbia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other powers.

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Serbia.

He replied that it was so.

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the subject.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 11. Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Serbia. I understand the German Government is making the same communication to the powers.

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, I had no concern with it; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburg, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take of the situation. I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavor to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Serbia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any power could exercise influence alone.

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favor of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening.

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State.

Prince Lichnowsky said that Austria might be expected to move when the time limit expired unless Serbia could give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands in toto. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that a negative reply must in no case be returned by Serbia; a reply favorable on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria.

No. 12. Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

Servia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests.

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favorably to as many points as the time limit allows.

Servian Minister here has begged that his Majesty's Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments. You should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as expressed above, to Servian Government.

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action.

No. 13. Note Communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25

(Translation.)

M. Sazonof telegraphs to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914:

"The Communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government.

"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna.

"M. Sazonof hopes that his Britannic Majesty's Government will share to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna."

No. 14. Sir Edward Grey to F. Bertie and to Sir G. Buchanan

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

Austrian Ambassador has been authorized to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a *démarche* with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the

time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations.

In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same information at Paris, (St. Petersburg,) you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute.

No. 15. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 25, 1914.

I learn from the Acting Political Director that the French Government has not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government contained in your telegram today.* They have, however, through the Servian Minister here, given similar advice to Serbia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade, of yesterday.†

* See No. 14. † See No. 12.

No. 16. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 25, 1914.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as at Belgrade. He hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favorable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, however, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety.

No. 17. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of today to Paris,* and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassador suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade.†

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is

* See No. 14. † See No. 12.

too late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, that Serbia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Serbia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade and withdraw their forces into the interior while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favor of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Serbia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.

If Serbia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Serbia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your influence in favor of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced on her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.

I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend, who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and warned him that if Russia mobilized Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.

No. 18. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

Your telegram of the 24th July * acted on.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately

* See No. 11.

instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburg. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Serbia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localized. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand and that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favor of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had, in fact, had no such knowledge.

No. 19. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 25, 1914.

I saw the Secretary General this morning and found that he knew of the suggestion that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favor of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Serbia became menacing. In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway.

No. 20. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Language of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of Serbia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced

that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 P. M. today.

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl today to communicate personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes.

No. 21. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible.

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply:

The Servian Government consent to the publication of a declaration in the Official Gazette. The ten points are accepted with reservations. Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of inquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana.

The Servian Government consider that unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.

No. 22. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

I have seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Constantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views.

They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in view of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I have up to now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government.

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government.

No. 23. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

The Austrian Minister left at 6:30.

The Government has left for Nisch, where the Skupshtina will meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the Vice Consul is remaining in charge of the archives.

No. 24. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of his Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported in your telegram of yesterday,* and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government.

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian démarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilized against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate.

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential.

* See No. 6.

No. 25. Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador has been authorized to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilization before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed.

Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilization of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia* and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them.

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but that once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky said, however, that if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it. He expressed himself as personally favorable to this suggestion.

* This is apparently a misprint and should read "Italy."

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Serbia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand.

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilization, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were traveling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not, therefore, be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it.

No. 26. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram, which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"The delay given to Serbia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on Serbia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they found that some of the Austrian requests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to the Powers of any practical meaning."

You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian colleague.

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps.

No. 27. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold, and Sir G. Buchanan

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

I have communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of today.* I have said

* See No. 21.

that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favorable view of it.

No. 28

(Nil.)

No. 29. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

Sir:—The Italian Ambassador came to see me today. I told him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 30. Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

Sir:—The Servian Minister called on the 23d instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary.

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of the inquiry at Serajevo—an inquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy—disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organizing plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction; but if Austria transported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must abandon certain political ideals, no independent State would, or could, submit to such dictation.

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects—Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual.

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch his opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavor to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 31. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Servian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be imminent.

No. 32. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Servian territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over, and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Rumanian, and Persian questions, being brought into the melting pot. France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Servia. One naturally sympathized with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible, according to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other way to Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she required; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Servia, acting as if she made any such claim. As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. He asked whether I had been informed that a pretense of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy

the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilization and retirement of Government from Belgrade.

No. 33. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 26, 1914.

Emperor returns suddenly tonight, and Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on his Majesty's own initiative. They fear that his Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement. Under Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory.

No. 34. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 26, 1914.

Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favorable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram No. 52 of 25th July.

Under Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this.

No. 35. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 26, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference and will instruct Italian Ambassador tonight accordingly.

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration of war.

No. 36. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold and Sir R. Rodd
(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.

Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg could be authorized to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.

No. 37. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.

Berlin telegram of 25th July.*

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four powers if necessary.

* See No. 18.

No. 38. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 27.)

Rome, July 23, 1914.

Sir: I gather that the Italian Government have been made cognizant of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusionings which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success.

I have, &c.,

RENNELL RODD.

No. 39. Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note

(Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27.)

Already printed, see pages 8-11

No. 40. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Telegraphic.)

(Received July 27.)

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

Russian Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant, *(last paragraph).

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Paris† arrived I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being

* See No. 26. † See No. 36.

an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government.

Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support the request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to be taken.

No. 41. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Telegraphic.)

(Received July 27.)

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake, and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of his Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now.

No. 42. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 27, 1914.

Your proposal as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,* is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so.

* Nos. 36 and 37.

No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

Your telegram of 26th July.*

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called

* See No. 36.

together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not, therefore, fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was no intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilizing, but that if Russia mobilized against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilizing against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilized in south, Germany would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.

No. 44. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

Austrian Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution, seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government.

On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had correctly defined the attitude of his Majesty's Government in my

conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant.* I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if she supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer the mobilization ukase for as long as possible and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps toward mobilization could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long.

* See No. 6.

No. 45. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

Since my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram of today,* I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

* See No. 44.

No. 46. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

German Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburg to localize the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.

I have replied that the Servian reply went further than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Serbia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Serbia, it meant that she was determined to crush Serbia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences

that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna.

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localized, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.

No. 47. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

See my telegram of today to Sir E. Goshen.*

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.

We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. I pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments.

* See No. 37.

No. 48. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

Sir:—Count Mensdorff told me by instruction today that the Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Servia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending toward continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many

years endeavored to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbor, though this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Servia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to every one what appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced, and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the southeastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defense. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Servia from being henceforth an element of general unrest, such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localizing the fight, if necessary.

Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Servia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Servia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-defense and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory.

I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Servians had refused the one thing—the co-operation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

I said it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia and at the same time pacify Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburg that the Servian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed

out that our fleet was to have dispersed today, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 49. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

Sir:—The Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson today that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held in London.

As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis di San Giuliano would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German Government, and would inquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 50. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 31.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honor to transmit to you herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Servia.

I have, &c.,

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 50.

Copy of Note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914.

(Translation.)

In order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating from Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government has delivered to the Royal Servian Government a note in which a series of demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which a delay of forty-eight hours has been granted to the Royal Government. The Royal Servian Government not having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial

and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.

Austria-Hungary, who had just addressed to Serbia a formal declaration, in conformity with Article I of the convention of the 18th October, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Serbia.

In bringing the above notice of his Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honor to declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in conformity with the terms of the Conventions of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907, as also with those of the Declaration of London of the 28th February, 1909, provided an analogous procedure is adopted by Serbia.

The embassy is requested to be so good as to communicate the present notification as soon as possible to the British Government.

No. 51. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

Paris, July 27, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honor to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

I have, &c.,

FRANCIS BERTIE.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 51.

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin.

(Translation.)

In a note of the 25th of this month, his Excellency the British Ambassador informed the Government of the Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only possible way of assuring the maintenance of peace in case of the relations between Russia and Austria becoming more strained would be if the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Austria and Russia were to take joint action; and he expressed the wish to know if the Government of the Republic were disposed to welcome such a suggestion.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs ad interim has the honor to inform his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that he has requested M. Jules Cambon to concert with the British Ambassador in Germany and to support any representation which they may consider it advisable to make to the Berlin Cabinet.

In accordance with the desire expressed by the British Government and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie in his note of the 26th of this month, the Government of the Republic have also authorized M. Paul Cambon

to take part in the conference which Sir E. Grey has proposed with a view to discovering a means of settling the present difficulties.

The Government of the Republic is likewise ready to instruct the representatives at St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade to induce the Russian, Austrian, and Servian Governments to abstain from all active military operations pending the results of this conference. He considers, however, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful depends essentially on the action which the Berlin Government would be willing to take at Vienna. Representations made to the Austro-Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about a suspension of military operations would seem bound to fail unless the German Government do not beforehand exercise their influence on the Vienna Cabinet.

The President of the Council ad interim takes the opportunity, &c.
Paris, July 27, 1914.

No. 52. Note Communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914

(Translation.)

The Government of the Republic accepts Sir Edward Grey's proposal in regard to intervention by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, with a view to avoiding active military operations on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and Servia; and they have authorized M. P. Cambon to take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London.

The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions to consult first the British Ambassador in Berlin, and then to support the action taken by the latter in such manner and degree as may be considered appropriate.

M. Viviani is ready to send to the representatives of France in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade instructions in the sense suggested by the British Government.

No. 53. M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff

(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

(Translation.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

The British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the representatives of England, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which I hope may be favorable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossi-

ble, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favorable solution of the conflict.

I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding which might arise from the answer given by the French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador regarding counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial Cabinet.

No. 54. M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff

(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28, 1914.)

(Telegraphic.)

(Translation.)

St. Petersburg, July 15 (28), 1914.

My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favor of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally.

The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient.

This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other power to make another attempt to Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.

No. 55. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

With reference to my telegram of yesterday,* I saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic.

He would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He did not know whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers throughout the conversations that would ensue.

He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Servia in 1908, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers.

I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially of your instructions to me, and inquired whether instead of such a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed. The German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had

* See No. 44.

expressed his personal opinion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria-Hungary.

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.

No. 56. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador had today a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. Petersburg, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible to localize it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Servia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behavior. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 57. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 27, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the confer-

ence, but he had hopes that military action may be practically deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Serbia, but he believes that if Serbia will even now accept it Austria will be satisfied, and if she had reason to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may defer action. Serbia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone.

Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favorably impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he had expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both before and after communication of the note, and again today, that Austrian Government have given him assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from Serbia.

No. 58. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I communicated to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambassador, recorded in your telegram * to Berlin of the 27th July.

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observations to the German Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of peace.

* See No. 46.

No. 59. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs today of your conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday * to St. Petersburg.

He is grateful for the communication and quite appreciates the impossibility for his Majesty's Government to declare themselves "solidaires" with Russia on a question between Austria and Serbia, which in its present condition is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the Russian Government.

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of Serbia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance.

* See No. 47.

No. 60. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

Secretary of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported in my telegram of yesterday * to my French and Italian colleagues respecting your proposal. I discussed with my two colleagues this morning his reply, and we found, that while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.

* See No. 43.

No. 61. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike proceedings against Serbia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotiations on basis of Servian reply.

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict.

No. 62. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs today in the sense of your telegram of 27th July * to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but said that, as mentioned in your speech, † which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared today, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that

* See No. 46. † "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Cols. 931, 932, 933.

must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Serbia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Serbia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandizement and which could no longer be postponed.

No. 63. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 28, 1914.

Your telegram of 25th July to Paris.*

I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna.

* See No. 27.

No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 28, 1914.

At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following to you:

In a long conversation this morning Servian Chargé d'Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under Article V. and Article VI., Servia might still accept the whole Austrian note.

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Servia, they might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Servia to accept without conditions.

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inadequate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation—such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propaganda—quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian Chargé d'Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial

or administrative measures. Serbia was said to have wilfully misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that ground might be cleared here.

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian declaration.

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador.

No. 65. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 28, 1914.

I have urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation pending efforts being made toward a peaceful solution.

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged and two Servian merchant vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova.

No. 66. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 28, 1914.

Telegram received here that war declared by Austria.

No. 67. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

Explanation given in your telegram of the 27th July* of what was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies.

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all.

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, and if the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical.

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.†

* See No. 43. † See No. 46.

No. 68. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

German Government having accepted principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress.

No. 69. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

It is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your telegram of the 27th July.*

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co-operate in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape.

* See No. 55.

**No. 70. Telegrams Communicated by Count Benckendorff,
July 29, 1914**

- (1) Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914.

In consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia, the Imperial Government will announce tomorrow (29th) the mobilization in the military circumscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.

- (2) Telegram to Count Benckendorff.

The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Serbia is now most urgent.

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters to drag on and give Austria time to crush Serbia.

No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

At invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this evening. He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of

general peace, as they had done successfully in the last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a conference would, in his opinion, have had appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilizing, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers must be avoided," were his last words.

Austrian colleague said to me today that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here.

No. 72. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram * to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his Excellency. He took a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting news from Vienna as had reached his Majesty's Government. I said it was important that we should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurance which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of Servia's integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangements for averting a European war would be welcomed by his Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked, Russia would not be satisfied

* See No. 46.

with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and that order for mobilization against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier.

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining influence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Servia were attacked by Austria.

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions.

No. 73. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I have received note verbale from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23d July * in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Servia formal declaration, according to Article I of convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities, and considers herself from today in state of war with Servia. Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to stipulations of Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to declaration of London of 26th February, 1909.

* See No. 4.

No. 74. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's suggestion has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who should be authorized accordingly.

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned.

No. 75. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I was sent for again today by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to accupon your suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on receiving their reply, dispatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Serbia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Serbia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs.

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings.

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realize that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications.

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should know he was doing his best to support your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated.

No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I found Secretary of State very depressed today. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a fait accompli. This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Serbia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilization in Russia and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His Excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French

colleague said to Under Secretary of State in course of conversation that seemed to him that when Austria had entered Serbia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favorable for four disinterested powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. Under Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed by you.

Russian Ambassador returned today and has informed Imperial Government that Russia is mobilizing in four southern governments.

No. 77. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

I much appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram of today.* His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe.

* See No. 75.

No. 78. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

Partial mobilization was ordered today.

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant* to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilization which the German Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilization, he explained, would only be directed against Austria.

Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, to urge that a return should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost, and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with Ambassadors, either collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to accept.

* See No. 67.

Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realized by the British public that it was not fault of the Russian Government.

I asked him whether he would raise objections, if the suggestion made in Rome telegram of 27th July,[†] which I mentioned to him, were carried out. In reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four Powers, provided it was acceptable to Serbia; he could not, he said, be more Servian than Serbia. Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th instant[‡] was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the German Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as he did to me today. He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilization, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the fact that Austrian Consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colors, that Austria had already partially mobilized, and had now declared war on Serbia. From what had passed during the Balkan crises, she knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humiliation for Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilizing shown that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobilization was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation, it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.

[†] See No. 57. [‡] See No. 69.

No. 79. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

There is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with Serbia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to his people, which has been published this morning, and by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree with me in this view. If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Serbia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet. This, however, the Italian Ambassador is convinced the Austrian Government would refuse to do.

No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 29, 1914.

In your telegram of the 27th instant* to Berlin, German Ambassador was reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instant† from Berlin.

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 27th July,† but what creates difficulty is rather the "conference," so the Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin tonight, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German Secretary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the door open if the direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburg fails to have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views might be concomitant with such direct communication.

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Government must lend their co-operation in this.

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect.

Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue to exchange views.

* See No. 46. † See No. 43.

No. 81. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

With reference to your telegram of yesterday.*

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favorable reception is given to any suggestions he can make there.

* See No. 64.

No. 82. Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, July 29, 1914.

I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I gathered

this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the Austrian Army could count from Mussulman population discontented with Servian rule.

No. 83. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 29, 1914.

I have been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expression of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th instant in the House of Commons.

No. 84. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

The German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor to inform me that he is endeavoring to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and he hopes with good success. Austria and Russia seem to be in constant touch, and he is endeavoring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia. I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government had declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorized to discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict. The press correspondents at St. Petersburg had been told that Russian Government would mobilize. The German Government had said that they were favorable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation, or discussion, or even conversations à quatre in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace.

No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I was asked to call upon the Chancellor tonight. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give his Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realization of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's inquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of today* to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.

* See No. 77.

No. 86. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 29, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communication made today by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilization. The utmost he now hopes for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further demands on Servia.

No. 87. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—After telling M. Cambon today how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador today that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also that the public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Serbia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honor and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance, France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 88. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—I told the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her

mobilization. I also told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff, that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria. I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared today. Today the German Chancellor was working in the interest of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg. If he succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had suggested to the German Ambassador this morning, and propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Serbia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters and give Austria time to crush Serbia. It was of course too late for all military operations against Serbia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Serbia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed Berlin what I had said to him this morning,

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 89. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should under certain circumstances intervene.

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved prac-

tically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 90. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—In addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning, as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July* to your Excellency, I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd's telegram of the 28th July† and of my reply to it.‡ I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Servia would now satisfy Austria. But there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano had said, to be a method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity. I could, however, make no proposal, for the reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discussion with the Powers over her dispute with Servia. As to mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That would not be mediation, it would simply be putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia.

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Servian territory, as to which I observed that, by taking territory while leaving nominal Servian independence, Austria might turn Servia practically into a vassal State, and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans.

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands apparently were taking precautions.

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found for preserving the peace of Europe.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

* See No. 84. † See No. 64. ‡ See No. 81.

No. 91. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—The Austrian Ambassador told me today he had ready a long memorandum, which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an account of the conduct of Serbia toward Austria, and an explanation of how necessary the Austrian action was.

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and Serbia. The news today seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake.

Count Mensdorff said that the war with Serbia must proceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilizing again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandizement, and all she wished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded.

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the independence of Serbia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal State.

Count Mensdorff deprecated this.

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Serbia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 92. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—The Italian Ambassador made me today a communication from the Marquis di San Giuliano suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favored by Italy, might be removed by some change of the form of procedure.

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be applied.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

**No. 93. Telegrams Communicated by Count Benckendorff,
July 30, 1914**

(1.) Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonov

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.

I spoke to Count Berchtold today in the sense of your Excellency's instructions. I brought to his notice, in the most friendly manner, how

desirable it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Serbia.

I drew Count Berchtold's attention to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be involved by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

Count Berchtold replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the energetic measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of excitement, that the Government, even if they wished it, could no longer consent to such a course. This was all the more impossible, he said, inasmuch as the Serbian reply itself furnished proof of the insincerity of Serbia's promises for the future.

(2.) M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914.

The German Ambassador informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna and that she will continue to do so even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there has been no news that the Austrian army has crossed the Servian frontier. I have begged the Ambassador to express my thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly tenor of this communication. I have informed him of the military measures taken by Russia, none of which, I told him, were directed against Germany; I added that neither should they be taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their explanation being the mobilization of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.

The Ambassador said that he was in favor of direct explanations between the Austrian Government and ourselves, and I replied that I, too, was quite willing, provided that the advice of the German Government, to which he had referred, found an echo at Vienna.

I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy.

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turning to account the most suitable methods of finding a peaceful solution would be by arranging for parallel discussions to be carried on by a conference of the four powers—Germany, France, England, and Italy—and by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most critical moments of last year's crisis.

I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made by Serbia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed some good-will and that all the powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation.

(3.) M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914.

At the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, dealt with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schébeko's telegram of the 15th (28th) July.

The telegram reports the refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government.

From now on nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in the steps which they may consider advisable.

No. 94. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

I learn that the mobilization of Russian corps destined to carry out operations on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My informant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realized, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. I believe that the news of Russian mobilization will not be a surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening. Unless mediation which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro-Servian dispute be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns surprise that Servian affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian and French colleagues have spoken to him today. Russian Ambassador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demands in a favorable spirit; if approached in a proper manner he thought she would probably go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at having been completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which opened any prospect of possible acceptance by both sides he personally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three other Powers.

I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on Servia.

No. 95. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

Russian Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilization will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia must be con-

sulted regarding the fate of Serbia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Serbia will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Serbia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian territory.

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war.

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity.

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he indorses every line of it.

No. 96. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilized, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg continuing their conversation, although he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Servian reply.

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to make his preparations for his departure on the strength of a rumor that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilization. He now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria.

No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.

French Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so but nevertheless Serbia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian

vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia—more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 A. M., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of which following is translation:

"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations."

Preparations for general mobilization will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that if Austria refuses to make a concession Russia cannot hold back, and, now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilization.

No. 98. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from there. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilization against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilized against Servia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved.

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilization and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave—a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French Ambassador yesterday—Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilized they would have to mobilize on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.

His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly

with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in way he had done.

No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 30, 1914.

President of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have been informed by the German Government that unless Russia stopped her mobilization Germany would mobilize. But a further report, since received from St. Petersburg, states that the German communication had been modified, and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilization. The answer is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Serbia, and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Serbia has not accepted, to an international discussion.

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If his Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Serbia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for his Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilization so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep his Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war.

No. 100. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 30, 1914.

German Ambassador told me last night that he thought that Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Serbia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished.

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula

might be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an exchange of views.

I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion.

No. 101. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

Your telegram of 29th July.*

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligations or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for trying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that one way of maintaining good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso facto improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

* See No. 85.

No. 102. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

I have warned Prince Lichnowsky that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to German Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July.*

* See No. 98.

No. 103. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

German Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further while Powers endeavored to arrange that Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied would, of course, be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides.

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof, as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,* and fears it cannot be modified; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Serbia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence.

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same.

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

* See No. 97.

No. 104. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

You should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan of today,* and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburg.

* See No. 103.

No. 105. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

Sir:—M. Cambon reminded me today of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I inclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also inclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit.

I said that the Cabinet was to meet tomorrow morning, and I would see him again tomorrow afternoon.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 105

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon

London, Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1912.

My dear Ambassador:—From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,

E. GREY.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 105

M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey

(Translation.)

French Embassy, London, Nov. 23, 1912.

Dear Sir Edward:—You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22d November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorized to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an attack from a third power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common. If those measures involved action the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their General Staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, &c.,

PAUL CAMBON.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 105

French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon

(Translation.)

The German Army had its advance posts on our frontiers yesterday (Friday). German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory. Our advance posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilometers from the frontier. The local population is protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th corps from Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 15th army corps from Strassburg has closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by tens of thousands. This is the last stage before mobilization, whereas we have not called out a single reservist.

As you see, Germany has done it. I would add that all my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday, the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in.

These facts, added to those contained in my telegram of yesterday, will enable you to prove to the British Government the pacific intentions of the one party and the aggressive intentions of the other.

Paris, July 31 [sic.], 1914.

No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 30, 1914.

I learned from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that did not imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favor of continuing an exchange of views with his Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four Powers was impossible.

No. 107. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

I do not know whether you have received a reply from the German Government to the communication* which you made to them through the German Ambassador in London, asking whether they could suggest any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night that they had not had time to send an answer yet. Today, in reply to an inquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he felt that time would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned.

*See No. 84.

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise.

No. 108. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenseless while time was being utilized by other Powers; and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, today perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor.

His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request.

No. 109. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

I read to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of yesterday.* His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversation, and not as an official document.

His Excellency agreed.

*See No. 101.

No. 110. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I learn from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna

between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilizing eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Servians.

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show good will in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations.

It is with great satisfaction that I have learned that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them.

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia.

No. 111. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I hope that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations.

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal.

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it his Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above.

No. 112. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

According to information just received by German Government from their Ambassador at St. Petersburg, whole Russian Army and Fleet are being mobilized. Chancellor tells me that "Kriegsgefahr" will be proclaimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilization is directed. Mobilization would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that "Kriegsgefahr" signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country.

This news from St. Petersburg, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies.

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

No. 113. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilization.

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.

No. 114. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I still trust situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilization in Germany it becomes essential to his Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government is prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it.

A similar request is being addressed to German (French Government). It is important to have an early answer.

No. 115. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

In view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power.

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of her power her neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe.

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired.

No. 116. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I have received your telegram of yesterday's date.*

Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers.

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision.

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development.

*See No. 99.

No. 117. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

At 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency.

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilization of Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilized.

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilization of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and inquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England.

German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminate. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs tomorrow (Saturday) at 1 P. M. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances.

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any general mobilization of the Russian forces having taken place.

No. 118. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

I am informed by Count Forgach, Under Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilization, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilization was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would mobilize, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Serbia, Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recognize such a claim. I called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Serbia, and that a compromise between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. Although he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conversation.

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere unduly with Serbia; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia had counseled Serbia to yield to them as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace.

No. 119. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

Sir:—M. Cambon referred today to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would

intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France it would decide the German attitude in favor of peace. I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that if France and Germany became involved in war we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion in the Cabinet today that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 120. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram

of 30th July* with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.† . He trusted it would meet with your approval:

Translation.—“If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if recognizing that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude.”

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggressive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conversation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier; it was, however, of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilization which was already in progress.

M. Sazonof said that undoubtedly there would be better prospect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the atmosphere was far more favorable and he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this.

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain.

* See No. 103. † See No. 97.

No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Your telegram of 31st July.*

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war.

He expressed himself very sympathetically toward your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of today; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilization against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilize at once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize in south as well.

* See No. 111.

He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilization was only directed against Austria.

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favorable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand.

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continued discussions—and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilization had spoiled everything.

No. 122. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.*

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.

I hope to see his Excellency tomorrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.

In speaking to me today the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government.

* See No. 114.

No. 123. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

Sir:—I told the German Ambassador today that the reply* of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it,

* See No. 122.

it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 124. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

On the receipt at 8:30 tonight of your telegram of this afternoon,* I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received me at 10:30 tonight at the Elysée, where a Cabinet Council was being held. He took a note of the inquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make.

He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobilization of her army if Russia do not demobilize at once. He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made by his Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is packing up.

* See No. 114.

No. 125. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

My immediately preceding telegram.*

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to your inquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows:

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defense of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has

* See No. 124.

been given several times. *President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs today.

No. 126. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, Aug. 1, 1914.

I have had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning, that the French Government failed to comprehend the reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It was pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilization in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilization and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilize if all Powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburg requiring immediate demobilization by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was informed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding.

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated that he had packed up.

No. 127. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, Aug. 1, 1914.

General mobilization of army and fleet.

No. 128. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, Aug. 1, 1914.

Belgian neutrality.

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday* have been acted upon.

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of

* See No. 115.

the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbors were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.

No. 129. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 2.)

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

Luxemburg, Aug. 2, 1914.

The Luxemburg Minister of State has just received through the German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways, which are leased to the Empire.

No. 130. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

We are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant ships.

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered.

You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible.

No. 131. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any great power begins war.

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension.

His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters.

No. 132. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

Following telegram from M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff of the 31st July communicated to me today:

Translation.—“(Urgent.) Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: ‘If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.’”

(Above communicated to all the Powers.)

No. 133. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

M. De Etter came today to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, which are as follows:

“The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declares the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.

“M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory.”

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)

No. 134. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, Aug. 1, 1914.

President of the republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a decree of general mobilization had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilization; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilization, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilization will become necessary in self-defense, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the

French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilometers so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilizations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.

No. 135. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

Information reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that, though the situation has been changed by the mobilization of Russia, they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favorably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Serbia. The understanding of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Serbia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilization of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military countermeasures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilization.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government, also by Russian Government.

No. 136. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, Aug. 1, 1914.

Minister of War informed Military Attaché this afternoon that orders had been given at 3:40 for a general mobilization of the French Army. This became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of "Kriegszustand," the Germans have called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he said, being tantamount to mobilization, is mobilization under another name.

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of ten kilom. has been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilization is one for purely defensive purposes.

No. 137. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

I saw the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial aggrandizement. The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the Sanjak.

Count Mensdorff called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg by Count Berchtold, and gave me the substance.

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburg that the "door had been banged" by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburg, to the effect that neither an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary.

Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff to the fact that this telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburg had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary.

No. 138. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, Aug. 1, 1914.

Your telegram of today.*

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If, therefore, Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia, by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany.

* See No. 131.

She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had, therefore, ordered mobilization, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war.

No. 139. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, Aug. 1, 1914.

My telegram of 31st July.*

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No progress whatever was made.

In the evening M. Sazonof had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador, who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation toward a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Serbia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Serbia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Serbia a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment.

M. Sazonof informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Serbia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg; the former

*See No. 120.

was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonof was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavors he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilization, and the mobilization of Germany had created a desperate situation.

M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of 31st July,* had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first.

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilized on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis.

*See No. 120.

No. 140. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, Aug. 1, 1914.

The Minister of War again sent for the military attaché this evening, as he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom. which he had arranged between the French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French endeavors to commit no provocative act.

No. 141. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, Aug. 1, 1914.

I am to be received tomorrow by Minister of Foreign Affairs. This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that Russia should demobilize within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilize if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that mobilization is too expensive to be kept for long. Germany will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilization of Russia amounted to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. There seems to be even greater tension

between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again today to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias probably colored his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs today on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany.

No. 142. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 2.)

(Telegraphic)

Berlin, Aug. 1, 1914.

Orders have just been issued for the general mobilization of the navy and army, the first day of mobilization to be 2d August.

No. 143. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, Aug. 1, 1914.

Detention of British merchant ship at Hamburg.

Your telegram of 1st August* acted on.

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.

* See No. 130.

No. 144. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, Aug. 2, 1914.

Secretary of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war.

No. 145. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, Aug. 2, 1914.

My telegram of Aug. 1.*

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favor to his Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken.

* See No. 143.

No. 146. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, Aug. 2, 1914.

The news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government.

No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 2.)

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

Luxemburg, Aug. 2, 1914.

I have the honor to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts:

On Sunday, the 2d August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly toward the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armored trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of his Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

No. 148. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 2, 1914.

After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum:

"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations

against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of his Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding his Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany tomorrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Canibon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament tomorrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.

No. 149. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 2, 1914.

Your telegram of 1st August.*

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the British steamship *Sappho* at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar.

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram of 1st August, † I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships cover also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified.

* See No. 143. † See No. 130.

No. 150. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Telegraphic.)

(Received August 3.)

Berlin, Aug. 3, 1914.

Your telegram of 2d August.*

Detention of British ships at Hamburg.

No information available.

* See No. 149.

No. 151. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, Aug. 3, 1914.

French Government have offered through their Military Attaché the support of five French Army corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply has been received today:

"We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take."

No. 152. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 3, 1914.

Sir:—On the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communication:

"In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano replied:

"The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral."

In making this communication, M. Cambon was instructed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the *casus fœderis* under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 153. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914.

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

No. 154. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received Aug. 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.

German Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.

No. 155. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914.

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

No. 156. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914.

I continue to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international law and of the assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given.

No. 157. German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky

(Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 4, 1914.

Please dispell any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively

formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretense whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

No. 158. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.

Military Attaché has been informed at War Office that German troops have entered Belgian territory, and that Liège has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed.

No. 159. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914.

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning* be received here by 12 o'clock tonight. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that his Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

* See No. 153.

IV

GERMANY'S "WHITE BOOK"

Given out by the German Foreign Office on Monday, August 3

MEMORANDUM AND DOCUMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

Denkschrift und Aktenstücke zum Kriegeausbruch

On June 28 last the successor to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated by the revolver shots of a member of a Servian band of conspirators. An investigation of the crime by Austro-Hungarian officials has revealed that the plot to take the life of the Archduke was planned and promoted in Belgrade with the co-operation of official Servian individuals and was carried out with weapons from the Servian Government depot.

This crime was bound to open the eyes of the whole civilized world, not only with regard to the object of Servian politics as relating to the existence and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also with regard to the criminal means that the Pan-Servian propaganda did not hesitate to employ in order to attain these ends. The ultimate object of these policies was to revolutionize gradually and finally to bring about a separation of the southwestern region of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy from that empire and unite it with Servia.

The repeated and formal declarations of Servia to Austria-Hungary to bring about good neighborly relations did not change this trend of Servian politics in the least. For the third time in the course of the last six years Servia has brought Europe to the verge of a world war in this manner. She could only do this because she believed herself supported by Russia in her endeavors.

As a result of the developments of the year 1908 growing out of the Turkish revolution, Russian policies had begun to organize a league of the Balkan States directed against the existence of Turkey, under Russian patronage. This alliance of the Balkan States which was successful in crowding Turkey out of her European possessions in 1911, came to grief over the question of the disposition of the spoils. Russian policy was not, however, frightened by this failure. It was the idea of Russian statesmen that there should be formed a new Balkan League under Russian patronage, whose activities should be directed this time not against Turkey, which had been driven from the Balkans, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The idea was that Servia

should cede to Bulgaria the section of Macedonia that she had won in the last Balkan war and offset the loss by the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the expense of the Monarchy of the Danube. For this purpose Bulgaria, by her isolation, was to be made pliable, Rumania, as the result of a propaganda undertaken with the aid of France, was to be chained to Russia, and Servia was to be referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In view of these circumstances Austria had to admit that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the border without taking action. The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of this view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Servia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive our approval. We were fully aware in this connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Servia would bring Russia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with our duty as an ally. However, recognizing the vital interests of Austria-Hungary which were at stake, we could neither advise our ally to a compliance that would have been inconsistent with her dignity, nor could we deny her our support in this great hour of need. We were all the more unable to do this inasmuch as our interests also were seriously threatened as a result of the continuous Servian agitation. If Servia, with the help of Russia and France, had been allowed to imperil the existence of the neighboring monarchy any longer, this would lead to the gradual downfall of Austria and would result in submission to Slavic sway under the Russian sceptre, thus making the position of the Germanic race in Central Europe untenable. A morally weakened Austria breaking down as the result of the advance of Russian Pan-Slavism would no longer be an ally on whom we could count and upon whom we could rely, such as we need in view of the attitude of our eastern and western neighbors, which has constantly grown more threatening. We therefore gave Austria an entirely free hand in her action against Servia. We have taken no part in the preparations.

Austria chose the way, laying before the Servian Government in detail the immediate relation between the murder and the general Servian movement, not only tolerated by the Servian Government, but supported by it, which an investigation of the murder at Serajevo had established. At the same time Servia was asked by Austria to put an absolute end to these activities and to allow Austria to punish the guilty parties. Austria demanded as a guarantee for the carrying out of the proceedings participation in the investigation on Servian territory and the definite dissolution of the various Pan-Servian societies carrying on an agitation against Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government set a time limit of forty-eight hours for the unconditional acceptance of her terms. One day after the Austro-Hungarian note had been handed to it the Servian Government began mobilization. When, after the expiration of the time limit, the Servian Government made a reply which, while satisfying the demands of Austria-Hungary on certain points, made known emphatically with regard to the essential ones its intention to refuse the just demands of the monarchy by means of temporizing and the introduction of new

negotiations, Austria broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia without having recourse to further negotiations or allowing herself to be put off by Servian assurances, the value of which she knows well enough—to her sorrow.

From that moment Austria was actually in a state of war with Serbia, which was publicly proclaimed by means of the official declaration of war on the 28th of the month.

From the very beginning of the conflict we took the stand that this was an affair of Austria which she alone would have to bring to a decision with Serbia. We have therefore devoted our entire efforts to localizing the war and to convincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary was compelled to take justified defensive methods and appeal to arms. We took the stand emphatically that no civilized nation had the right in this struggle against lack of culture [Unkultur] and criminal political morality to prevent Austria from acting and to take away the just punishment from Serbia. We instructed our representatives abroad in that sense.

At the same time the Austro-Hungarian Government informed the Russian Government that her (Austria's) move against Serbia was entirely a defensive measure designed to put a stop to Servian agitation, but that Austria-Hungary was compelled by necessity to demand guarantees of a continued friendly attitude on the part of Serbia toward the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Austria-Hungary, the note to Russia stated, had no intention of bringing about a disturbance of the balance of power in the Balkans. Both the French and the English Governments, replying to our explanation that the German Government wished and was trying to localize the conflict, promised to work in the same interest. In the meantime these efforts did not succeed in preventing Russia's interference in the Austro-Servian disagreement.

The Russian Government issued an official communiqué on July 24, according to which it would be impossible for Russia to remain indifferent in the Servian-Austrian conflict. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sazonof, made this position known to the Imperial Ambassador, Count Pourtales. On the afternoon of July 26 the Austro-Hungarian Government again explained through its Ambassador in St. Petersburg that Austria-Hungary had no plans of conquest, but only wished to have peace at last on her frontiers. In the course of the same day the first reports of Russian mobilization reached Berlin. On the evening of the 26th the Imperial Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were directed to call the attention of the English, French, and Russian Governments energetically to the danger of this Russian mobilization. After Austria-Hungary had officially declared to Russia that she did not seek the acquisition of any territory in Serbia, the decision for world peace lay entirely in St. Petersburg. The same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was directed to make the following statement to the Russian Government:

The military preparatory measures of Russia will compel us to take counter-action which must consist in the mobilization of the army. Mobilization, however, indicates war. Inasmuch as we know France's obligations toward Russia, this mobilization would be directed simultaneously against Russia and France.

We cannot assume that Russia wishes to let loose such a European war. Inasmuch as Austria-Hungary will not impair the continuance of the Servian Kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can adopt a policy of waiting. We shall be all the more able to support Russia's wish not to allow the integrity of the Servian Kingdom to be called into question, since Austria does not call this integrity into question herself. It will be easy to find a basis of agreement in the further course of the affair.

On July 27 the Russian Minister for War, Suchomlinof, gave the German Military Attaché his word of honor that no mobilization order had as yet been issued. He said that for the present preparatory measures were being taken, no horses being levied and no reservists being called in. In case Austria-Hungary were to cross the Servian boundary, the military districts facing Austria, those of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, would be mobilized. Under no circumstances would there be a mobilization of the districts lying on the German front: St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. In answer to the Military Attaché's question as to what was the object of mobilization against Austria-Hungary, the Russian War Minister shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. Thereupon the Military Attaché indicated that measures to mobilize against Austria-Hungary were also decidedly threatening to Germany. In the following days reports concerning the Russian mobilization followed each other in quick succession. Among these were reports concerning preparations on the German border, such as the declaration of a state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison. On July 27 the first reports of preparatory measures by France arrived. The Fourteenth Corps discontinued its manœuvres and returned to garrison duty.

In the meantime we continued to exert our most energetic influence on the Cabinets to insure the localization of the conflict.

On the 26th Sir Edward Grey had suggested that the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia be laid before a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy, with himself presiding over the sessions. To this suggestion we replied that, while we approved his tender, we could not take part in such a conference because we could not call upon Austria to appear before a European court in her controversy with Servia.

France agreed to Sir Edward Grey's proposal, but it was finally brought to naught because Austria, as was to be expected, held herself aloof.

True to our conviction that an act of mediation could not take into consideration the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an Austro-Hungarian affair, but would have to take into consideration only the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our efforts to bring about an understanding between these two powers. We were also willing, after declining the conference idea, to transmit a further proposal by Sir Edward Grey to Vienna, in which he urged that Austria-Hungary either agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient or to look upon it as a basis for further conversations. The Austro-Hungarian Government, in full appreciation of our mediatory activity, replied to this proposal that, coming as it did after the opening of hostilities, it was too late.

In spite of this we continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy. Unluckily, all of these mediatory acts were soon overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France. On July 29 the Russian Government officially announced in Berlin that it had mobilized four army districts. At the same time additional reports reached us of rapidly progressing military preparations by France on land and sea. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg had a conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning which he reported as follows by telegraph:

The Minister tried to persuade me to agree in behalf of my Government to a conversation of four parties to devise means of moving Austria-Hungary to give up those demands touching on the sovereignty of Servia. While I agreed to a complete transmission of the conversation, I took the stand that, since Russia had decided on the ominous step of mobilization, it was difficult for me to exchange any opinions on this subject, and it almost seemed impossible to do so. I said that what Russia now demanded of us in respect to Austria-Hungary was the same thing of which Austria-Hungary was accused regarding Servia—a usurpation of the rights of sovereignty; that Austria-Hungary had promised to be considerate of Russian interests by declaring her territorial disinterestedness, a great concession on the part of a nation waging war. For this reason, I said, an opportunity should be given the Dual Monarchy to settle her dispute with Servia alone. There would be time enough to come back to the subject of safeguarding Servian sovereignty when peace terms were to be concluded.

I added very earnestly that at the present moment the Austro-Servian affair was secondary to the danger of a European conflagration, and I made every effort to show the Minister the greatness of this danger.

It was impossible to change Sazonof's mind on the point that Russia could not desert Servia now.

Similarly the Military Attaché at St. Petersburg reported by telegraph on the 29th as follows, regarding an interview with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army:

The Chief of the General Staff asked me to call and informed me that he had just come from His Majesty. He stated that he had been instructed by the Minister for War to assure me again that everything had remained the same as it had been explained to me by the Minister two days ago. He offered me a written confirmation and gave me his word of honor in the most formal manner that mobilization had begun nowhere, that is to say, not a single man or horse had been levied up to that hour, three o'clock in the afternoon. He stated that he could not answer for the future, but he could declare most emphatically that no mobilization was desired by His Majesty in the districts touching

on our boundary. However, many reports have reached here and also Warsaw and Vilna of the levying of reservists in various parts of the empire. I therefore told the General that I was confronted with a riddle as the result of his announcements to me. On his word as an officer he repeated, however, that such reports were untrue; that a false alarm may have been raised here and there.

In view of the positive, numerous reports before me of actual levying, I am compelled to consider the conversation as an attempt to mislead us with regard to the extent of the measures that have already been taken.

Inasmuch as the Russian Government, in reply to the several inquiries regarding the reasons for its threatening attitude, several times alluded to the circumstance that Austria-Hungary had not yet begun any conversations in St. Petersburg, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, at our request, was directed on July 29 to begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof. Count Szapary was authorized to make known to the Russian Minister the contents of the note to Servia which had been, as it were, overtaken by the declaration of war, and to receive any suggestions that might still come from the Russian side, as well as to discuss with Sazonof all questions touching directly on the Austro-Russian relations.

Shoulder to shoulder with England we continued to work without cessation for mediation, and supported every suggestion in Vienna which we believed showed hope of the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the conflict. As late as the 30th we transmitted an English proposal to Vienna which established this basis of negotiation, that Austria-Hungary, after succeeding in marching into Servia, should dictate her terms there. We had to assume that Russia would accept this basis.

While these efforts of ours for mediation, supported by English diplomacy, were being continued with increasing urgency in the time from July 29 to the 31st, there constantly came new and increasing reports concerning Russian mobilization measures. The assembling of troops on the East Prussian border and the declaration of a state of war in all important places on the Russian western boundary no longer left any doubt of the fact that Russian mobilization was actively going on against us, while at the same time all such measures were denied anew on word of honor to our representative at St. Petersburg. Even before the reply to the last English-German mediation proposal, the basis of which must have been known in St. Petersburg, could reach Berlin from Vienna, Russia ordered a general mobilization. On the same day an exchange of telegrams took place between his Majesty the Kaiser and King and Czar Nicholas in which his Majesty called the Czar's attention to the threatening character of the Russian mobilization and to the continuance of his own activity as mediator.

On July 31 the Czar directed the following telegram to his Majesty:

I thank you from my heart for your mediation, which permits a gleam of hope that everything can yet be settled peaceably. It is a technical impossibility for us to halt our military preparations which became necessary through Austria's mobilization. We are

far from desirous of war. So long as the negotiations continue with Austria concerning Serbia, my troops will not undertake any challenging action. I solemnly pledge you my word as to that. I am trusting in the grace of God with all my might and hope for the success of your mediation in Vienna, for the welfare of our countries and for the peace of Europe. Your sincerely devoted

NICHOLAS.

To this his Majesty the Kaiser replied:

Upon your appeal to my friendship and your plea for my help, I have undertaken a mediatory action between your Government and the Austro-Hungarian Government. While this negotiation was under way your troops were mobilized against Austria-Hungary, which is allied with me, as a consequence of which my mediation was almost made illusory, as I have already informed you. Notwithstanding this, I continued it. Now I am in receipt of reliable reports of serious preparations for war on my eastern boundary also. Responsibility for the safety of my empire compels me to take counter defensive measures. I have carried my efforts for the maintenance of world peace to the utmost limit. It is not I that bear the responsibility for the calamity that now threatens the entire civilized world. Yet at this moment it lies in your power to stave it off. No one threatens the honor and might of Russia, which might have awaited the result of my mediation. The friendship for you and your empire which was bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed has always been sacred to me, and I have been faithful to Russia when she was hard pressed, especially in her last war. It is still possible for you to maintain the peace of Europe if Russia will decide to put a stop to the military measures that threaten Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Even before this telegram reached its destination the mobilization of the entire Russian fighting force, which had been ordered in the forenoon of the same day, openly directed against us, was in full swing. The Czar's telegram, however, was sent at 2 o'clock in the afternoon.

After the mobilization became known in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was ordered on the afternoon of July 31 to advise the Russian Government that Germany had declared a state of war as a counter move to the mobilization of the Russian Army and Navy, which would have to be followed by mobilization unless Russia ceased her military preparations against Germany and Austria-Hungary within twelve hours, and so advise Germany.

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador at Paris was directed to request an explanation from the French Government within eighteen hours as to whether, in the case of a Russo-German war, France would remain neutral.

The Russian Government destroyed the painstaking mediatory work of the European State Chancelleries, shortly before its successful outcome, by her mobilization, which endangered the safety of the German Empire.

The mobilization measures, concerning the seriousness of which to the Russian Government no doubt was allowed to arise from the beginning, together with her continued denial, show clearly that Russia desired the war.

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered the message that had been given to him for Mr. Sazonof on July 31 at midnight.

After the expiration of the time limit set for Russia without the receipt of an answer to our inquiry, his Majesty the Emperor and King ordered the mobilization of the entire German Army and the Imperial Navy at 5 P. M. on Aug. 1. In the meantime the imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to hand a declaration of war to the Russian Government in case no favorable reply was issued before the expiration of the time limit. However, before a report regarding the execution of this order arrived, Russian troops crossed our border and advanced on German territory, namely, as early as the afternoon of Aug. 1.

By this move Russia began the war against us.

In the meantime the Imperial Ambassador at Paris put the question that he had been ordered to present before the French Cabinet at 7 P. M. on July 31.

To this the French Prime Minister made an ambiguous and unsatisfactory reply at 1 o'clock in the afternoon of Aug. 1. This does not give a clear picture of the French position, since it was limited to the statement that France would do what her interests seemed to warrant. A few hours later, at 5 in the afternoon, the complete mobilization of the entire French Army and Navy was ordered.

On the morning of the following day France opened hostilities.

Concluded on Aug. 2, noon.

The Austro-Hungarian Note to Servia

From the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, July 25, 1914.

Berlin, July 24.

The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade at 6 o'clock last night handed to the Servian Government a verbal note with the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government. In the note the answer is requested by 6 P. M., July 25. It reads as follows:

Already printed, see pages 5-7.

The Fremdenblatt writes, among other things, as follows: "The crime of Serajevo has revealed to the whole world the dangers that threaten us, and has directed our attention to the pressing need of insuring quiet and safety to ourselves at any cost. The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade today made known to the Servian Government the demands which we must make to it today. It is the result of long, careful consideration and does not go any further than absolutely necessary. We must insist on the demands as they stand; for this is a matter of underground passages extending from Servia directly to the heart of our South Slavic territories. Conditions that we cannot allow to continue have made themselves apparent on the threshold of our house as a result of the encroachment

of the Pan-Servian idea. Serbia has covered herself with a network of societies which, with the pretext of fostering culture, preach the doctrine of hatred of us throughout the country. Emissaries are sent out to Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Croatia to incite the populace to revolt and to picture to them an imminent union of those territories with the Servian Kingdom. The Servian Government, in spite of its emphatic declaration, has done nothing to stop this movement; its tolerance has had the effect of silent consent. Anything that has been done has been done only for appearances. There are many persons of high military rank, or professors or teachers in the service of the State, who are among the leaders of these societies. If one group hopes to attain its end by means of pacts and war, the others express their conviction that a terroristic and revolutionary stage must precede the diplomatic and military action. The event of Serajevo has demonstrated that this plan of campaign is being waged against us with terrible emphasis. It has been proved that the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife was carried out with the support of officials of the kingdom. We have to deal with an irreconcilable, bitterly hostile movement, which shows itself in most varied forms, but which, in its entirety, keeps our border populace in a state of excitement, shatters the confidence of the various races in our monarchy as to our ability to maintain peace with the outside world, and is the main point for the beginning of all efforts against us, and causes much precious blood to flow on our territories. The results of this agitation have frequently been felt in our economic life. Thousands of careers have been blasted as a result of the alarming crises following the constantly recurring Pan-Servian scare. Were we to endure all this without stepping in to take decided action against it, the same agitators who continually, for the sake of rhetorical effect, accuse us of the misuse of power, would call this a sign of weakness, lack of will, and fear. They would state that we do not dare to defend ourselves, and in that way they would find new supporters and would feel encouraged to a doubly strong attack. While we are making our will felt, we are bringing the Servian people themselves to a realization of their position. They will see that they have been deceived, that the movement for a greater Serbia will break against an iron wall, that the monarchy is determined to spurn them. The feeling that we have to deal with a condition that has become unbearable, that a stop must be put to it, is so strong among our people that complaints concerning the long delay in dealing with the situation are getting louder. This impatience and criticism can be understood. But the Austro-Hungarian Government did not wish to act in anger, not without the most careful testing of every circumstance, not without making absolutely certain what demands must be made. Serbia has been allowed a brief time in which to comply with our demands. We do not wish to lengthen the period of the crisis that weighs down our economic life and is making all Europe uneasy. We want to adjust an untenable relation as quickly as possible, convince public opinion in Serbia of our determination, and finally come to a settlement. We hope that Serbia will bow to the desires that we have expressed within the time set. There is no more reason to doubt our determined will to maintain our position under all circumstances than to doubt our sincere wish that better relations may be developed in the future between Serbia and Austria-Hungary."

VIENNA, July 24.—The newspapers declare that the note to Servia is the beginning of a defense and is not an attack, that it shows the strong will of the monarchy, but demands nothing from Servia except what should have been done long ago for the maintenance of its respect before Europe. The entire press expresses the hope that Servia, by prompt acceptance of Austria-Hungary's terms, will remove the suspicion of partnership with the murderers, and that she will be far-sighted enough to choose peace and not war.

Austria-Hungary and the Servian Note

From the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, July 29, 1914.

VIENNA, July 27.—The note of the Royal Servian Government of July 25, 1914, reads as follows:

The Royal Government has received the notification of the Austro-Hungarian Government of the 10th inst., and is convinced that its answer will remove every misunderstanding that threatens to disturb the pleasant neighborly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Servian Kingdom.

The Royal Government is certain that in dealing with the great neighboring monarchy those protests have under no pretext been renewed which formerly were made both in Skupshtina and in explanations and negotiations of responsible representatives of the State and which, through the declaration of the Servian Government of March 18, 1909, were settled; furthermore, that since that time none of the various successive Governments of the kingdom, nor any of its officers, has made an attempt to change the political and legal conditions set up in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Royal Government is certain that the Austro-Hungarian Government has made no representations of any kind along this line except in the case of a textbook concerning which the Austro-Hungarian Government received an entirely satisfactory reply. Servia, during the Balkan crisis, gave evidence in numerous cases of her pacific and temperate policies, and it will be thanks to Servia alone and the sacrifices that she alone made in the interest of European peace if that peace continue.

On this the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy comments:

The Royal Servian Government limits itself to the statement that since it made the declaration of March 18, 1909, no effort has been made by the Servian Government or its officers to alter the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Thereby it consciously and willfully evades the grounds on which we base our course, since we did not make the claim that it and its officials had undertaken anything of an official nature along this line.

Our grievance rather is this, that it failed to suppress movements directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy in spite of the pledges made in the note in question.

Its pledge consisted of this, that the entire trend of its policies was to be changed and pleasant, neighborly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy brought about; not merely to refrain from officially taking up the question of Bosnia's belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Servian note thereupon continues:

The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for utterances of a private character such as newspaper articles and the peaceful work of societies, utterances which are quite ordinary in almost all countries and which are not generally under State control, especially since the Royal Government, in the solution of a great number of questions that came up between Servia and Austria-Hungary, showed much consideration as a result of which most of these questions were settled in the best interests of the progress of the two neighboring countries.

Comment of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

The contention of the Royal Servian Government that utterances of the press and the activities of societies have a private character and are not under the control of the State is contrary to the practice of modern States, even under the freest interpretation of the rights of the press and societies, which are of public legal character and both subject to State supervision. Moreover, Servian practice is to exercise such control. The charge against the Servian Government is that it has entirely failed to inspect its press and societies whose acts hostile to Austria-Hungary were known to it.

The Servian note continues:

The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised to hear the contention that Servian subjects had taken part in the preparations for the murder committed in Serajevo. It had hoped to be invited to co-operate in the investigations following this crime and was prepared, in order to prove the entire correctness of its acts, to proceed against all persons concerning whom it had received information.

Comment of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

This contention is incorrect. The Servian Government had been carefully advised as to certain definite persons who were suspected, and it was not only in the position but bound by its internal laws to begin an action spontaneously. It did nothing at all along these lines.

Servia's note continues:

In conformity with the wish of the Austro-Hungarian Government, the Royal Government is prepared to turn over to the court, regardless of station or rank, any Servian subject concerning whose participation in the crime at Serajevo proofs may be given to it. The Government pledges itself especially to publish on the first page of the official organ of July 26 the following declaration: "The Royal Servian Government condemns every propaganda that may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all efforts designed ultimately to sever territory from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the sad consequences of these criminal machinations."

Comment of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

Our demand read as follows: "The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda that is directed against Austria-Hungary * * *." The change made by the Royal Servian Government in the declaration demanded by us infers that such a propaganda against Austria-Hungary does not exist or that it is unknown to the Royal Government. This formula is not sincere, and conceals something in order that the Servian Government later may reserve an avenue of escape, saying that in its declaration it did not disavow the existence of the present propaganda, and did not recognize it as inimical to the monarchy, whereupon it could mislead further to the contention that it would not be pledged to suppress a propaganda like the present one.

Servia's note continues:

The Royal Government regrets that, in accordance with advices from the Austro-Hungarian Government, certain Servian officers and functionaries are taking an active part in the present propaganda and that they have thereby jeopardized the pleasant neighborly relations to the maintenance of which the Royal Government was formally pledged by the declaration of March 31, 1909.

The Government (what follows here is similar to the text demanded).

Comment of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

The formal declaration demanded by us was as follows: "The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries * * * took part in * * *." Also in this choice of words and in the additional clause "in accordance with advices from the Austro-Hungarian Government," it is shown that the Servian Government is carrying out the object indicated above—to allow itself free rein in the future.

Servia's note continues:

The Royal Government further pledges itself:

1. To introduce a provision in the press law on the occasion of the next regular session of the Skupshtina, according to which instigations to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as well as any publication directed in general against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary, shall be punished severely.

The Government pledges itself, on the occasion of the coming revision of the Constitution, to add to Article XXII, a clause permitting the confiscation of publications, the confiscation of which, under the present Article XXII of the Constitution, would be impossible.

Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

We had demanded:

"1. The suppression of all publications that arouse people to hatred and contempt for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and whose tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy."

We thus wished to obligate Servia to take measures for having such attacks

in the press cease in future; we wished, therefore, to be sure that we had won certain success in this direction.

Instead, Serbia offers to make certain laws that may lead to the above result, to wit:

(a) A law by which the individuals may be punished for above-mentioned statements of the press hostile to the monarchy. This is nothing to us, especially, as it is well known that the punishment of individuals for press misdemeanors is possible only in very rare cases, and, under a correspondingly lax handling of such a law, even these few would not be punished. Thus this is a suggestion which in no wise answers our demand, and therefore does not offer us the slightest guarantee of the result desired by us.

(b) An addition to Article XXII of the Constitution to the effect that confiscation be allowed—a suggestion that likewise must fail to satisfy us, since the existence of such a law in Serbia is of no use to us. What would be of use would be the promise of the Government to enforce it, which promise is not made to us.

Therefore these suggestions are thoroughly unsatisfactory, all the more so as they are of an evasive nature, since we are not told within what space of time these laws will be enacted, and since if the enactment of the laws should be refused by the Skupshtina—to say nothing of the possible resignation of the Government—all would remain as it was.

Servia's note continues:

2. The Government possesses no proof—and the note of the Austro-Hungarian Government provides it with none—that the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and other similar associations have up to the present committed any criminal acts through any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Austro-Hungarian Government and dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society, as well as all societies that may work against Austria-Hungary.

Observation of the Imperial and Royal Government:

The anti-monarchical propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and the associations affiliated with it fills all public life in Serbia; it is therefore a quite unreliable statement on the part of the Servian Government to maintain that it knows nothing about this society.

To say nothing of the fact that the demand made by us is not entirely granted, since we furthermore demanded:

That the means of propaganda of these associations should be confiscated.

That the reorganization of the dissolved associations under other names and in other forms should be prevented.

Concerning these two points the Belgrade Government preserves complete silence, so that we have no assurance, in the partial agreement given us, that an end will be put to the anti-Austrian associations, especially of the "Narodna Odbrana," by their dissolution.

Servia's note continues:

3. The Royal Servian Government agrees to eliminate forthwith from public education in Serbia everything that might help the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, provided that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives it actual proof of this propaganda.

Observation of the Imperial and Royal Government:

Upon this point also the Servian Government demands proof that, in the public instruction courses of Serbia, there is an anti-Austrian propaganda.

although it must be aware that the books employed in the Servian schools contain such matter, and that a great part of the Servian teachers are in the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated associations.

Moreover, in this case also, the Servian Government has not met a part of our demands, since, in its text, it left out this addition desired by us, "as well as the body of teachers and the means of teaching are concerned"—an addition which clearly shows where the anti-Austrian propaganda in the Servian schools is to be sought.

Servia's note continues:

4. The Royal Government is also ready to discharge from military and civil service such officers—provided it is proved against them by legal investigation—who have implicated themselves in acts directed against the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; the Government expects that, for the purpose of instituting proceedings, the Austro-Hungarian Government will impart the names of these officers and employes and the acts of which they are accused.

Observation of the Imperial and Royal Government:

In view of the fact that the Royal Servian Government makes the discharge of the officers and employes in question from military and civil service dependent on whether they are found guilty after trial, its accession to our demand is limited to those cases where such persons have committed acts laying them open to legal penalties. Since, however, we demand the elimination of those officers and employes who are making an anti-Austrian propaganda, which in Servia is not usually punishable by law, it would seem that in this case also our demands have not been met.

Servia's note continues:

5. The Royal Servian Government must confess that it is not quite clear as to the sense and scope of the desire of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the effect that the royal Servian Government bind itself to allow the co-operation within its territory of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government, but it nevertheless declares itself willing to permit such co-operation as might be in conformity with international law and criminal procedure, as well as with friendly neighborly relations.

Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

International law has as little to do with this question as criminal procedure. The question is purely one of national policing, to be solved by special agreement. Servia's statement is, therefore, incomprehensible and, on account of its vague form, would give rise to insurmountable difficulties if an endeavor were made to arrange the agreement.

Servia's note continues:

6. The Royal Government naturally holds itself bound to institute an investigation against all such persons as were concerned in the plot of June 15-28, or are supposed to have been concerned in it, and are on Servian soil. As to the co-operation of special delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government in this investigation, the Servian Government cannot accept such

co-operation, since this would be a violation of the laws and criminal procedure. However, in individual cases, information as to the progress of the investigation might be given the Austro-Hungarian delegates.

Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

Our demand was perfectly clear and not to be misunderstood. We wished:

(1) The institution of a legal investigation against those implicated in the plot.

(2) That Austro-Hungarian representatives should take part in the investigation, ("recherche," in contradistinction to "enquête judiciaire.")

(3) We did not desire that Austro-Hungarian representatives take part in the Servian legal proceedings; all we wished them to do was to co-operate in the police preliminaries, and help get together and corroborate the evidence for the investigation. If the Servian Government misunderstands us it does so purposely, since the difference between "enquête judiciaire" and the simple "recherches" must certainly be plain to it. Since it wished to be free of all control in the proceedings to be instituted, which, if properly conducted, would have results highly undesirable for it, and as it has no loophole for plausibly declining our co-operation in the police proceedings (analogous cases for such police intervention exist in great number) it has taken a ground that gives to its refusal the appearance of right and to our demand the stamp of impossibility.

The Servian note continues:

7. On the very evening on which your note arrived the Royal Government caused the arrest of Major Voislav Tankosic. But, regarding Milan Ciganovic, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and who was employed until June 15 (as candidate) in the Department of Railroads, it has not been possible to arrest this man up to now, for which reason a warrant has been issued against him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government is requested, in order that the investigation may be made as soon as possible, to make known in the specified form what grounds of suspicion exist, and the proofs of guilt collected at the investigation in Serajevo.

Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

This answer is insincere. Ciganovic, according to our investigation, went on a furlough three days after the crime, when it became known that he was concerned in the plot, and repaired to Ribari in the service of the Prefect of Police of Belgrade. So that it is incorrect to say that, between June 15 and 28, Ciganovic was already out of the Servian service. To this must be added that the Prefect of Police of Belgrade, who himself had brought about the departure of Ciganovic, and who knew where the latter was, declared in an interview that there was no man of the name of Milan Ciganovic in Belgrade.

The Servian note continues:

8. The Servian Government will increase the severity and scope of its measures against the smuggling of arms and explosives.

It goes without saying that it will at once start an investigation and mete out severe punishment to the frontier officials of the Sabac-Loznica line who failed in their duty and allowed those responsible for the crime to cross the frontier.

9. The Royal Government is willing to give explanations of the statements made in interviews by its officials in Servia and foreign countries after the crime, and, which, according to the Austro-Hungarian Government, were anti-Austrian, as soon as the said Government indicates where these statements were made and provides proofs that such statements were actually made by the said officials. The Royal Government will itself take steps to collect the necessary proofs and means of transmission for this purpose.

Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

The Royal Servian Government must have perfectly good knowledge of these interviews. If it requires that the Austro-Hungarian Government provide all sorts of details about these interviews and demands a regular investigation, it shows that it has no desire really to accede to this demand.

The Servian note continues:

10. The Royal Government will, in so far as this has not already occurred in this note, inform the Austro-Hungarian Government of the taking of the measures concerning the foregoing matters, as soon as such measures have been ordered and carried out.

The Royal Servian Government is of the opinion that it is mutually advantageous not to hinder the settlement of this question, and therefore, in case the Austro-Hungarian Government should not consider itself satisfied with this answer, it is ready as always to accept a peaceful solution, either by referring the decision of this question to the international tribunal at The Hague or by leaving it to the great powers who co-operated in the preparation of the explanation given by the Servian Government on the 18th-31st March, 1909.

Annex 1 A. From the Austro-Hungarian Material

VIENNA, July 27.—The "dossier" mentioned in the Austro-Hungarian circular note to the foreign Embassies concerning the Servian dispute is made public today.

In this memorial, attention is called to the fact that the movement originating in Servia, which has as an object to tear away the southern portions of Austria-Hungary from the monarchy and unite them to Servia, strikes far back into the past. This propaganda, always the same in purpose, changing only in means and intensity, reached its climax at the time of the annexation crisis, and came out openly at that time with its aims. While, on the one side, the entire Servian press preached for war against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, associations were formed—to say nothing of other means of propaganda—which prepared such warfare, among which the Narodna Odbrana was the most important. Originating in a revolutionary committee, this association became entirely dependent on the Servian Foreign Office, under the direction of statesmen and officers, among them Gen. Jankovic and former Minister Ivanovic. Among the

founders are also Major Oja Tankovic and Milan Pribicevic. This association had as an object the formation and equipment of bodies of volunteers for the coming war against Austria-Hungary. In addition to the memorial, a quotation is given from the association's official organ, which bears the same name, Narodna Odbrana, and is issued at the association's headquarters, wherein, in several articles, the activities and aim of this society are set forth. Therein it is stated that part of the main task of the Narodna Odbrana is to effect union between its brothers far and near on the other side of the border, and with all the rest of our friends in the world.

Austria is mentioned as the first and greatest enemy. Just as the Narodna Odbrana preaches the necessity of war with Austria, it also preaches a holy truth about our national situation. The closing chapter contains an appeal to the Government and people of Serbia to prepare in every way for the struggle which the annexation foreshadowed.

The memorial tells of the Narodna Odbrana's activities at that time, as set forth in a statement of a komitadji raised by the association; it maintained a school under the direction of two of its principal members, of whom one was Tankovic, for the instruction of bands of men—schools which Gen. Jankovic and Capt. Milan Pribicevic inspected regularly. Furthermore, the komitadjis were instructed in shooting, bomb-throwing, laying of mines, blowing up of railway bridges, &c. After the solemn declaration of the Servian Government in 1909 it looked as if the end of this organization also had come. But expectations in this direction have not only not been fulfilled, but the propaganda was continued by the Servian press. The memorial adduces as an instance of this how the attack on the Bosnian local chief, Varesanin, was utilized in the public prints, which extolled the man responsible for it as a national hero and glorified his deed. These sheets were not only circulated in Serbia, but were smuggled into Austria-Hungary along well-organized secret channels.

Under the same leadership as when it was founded, the Narodna Odbrana recently became the centre of an agitation to which the Schütz-bund, including 762 associations, a Sokolbund, with 3,500 members, and various other societies belonged.

Appearing in the disguise of a culture association, concerned only with the intellectual and physical development of the population of Serbia as well as with its material strengthening, the Narodna Odbrana betrays its genuine reorganized programme in the above-mentioned quotations from its official organ, in which "the holy truth" is preached—that it is an inevitable necessity to carry on this fight of extermination against Austria, the first and greatest enemy, with rifle and cannon, and to prepare the people in every way for the struggle to liberate the oppressed territories where many millions of enslaved brothers are suffering. The appeals quoted in the memorial, and addresses of a like character, cast a light on the manifold foreign activities of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated societies, which consist of lecture tours and taking part in celebrations of Bosnian societies, at which members for the above-mentioned Servian union are openly recruited. At present an investigation is being made of the fact that the Sokol societies of Serbia intended to unite with similar societies in Austria-Hungary in a union kept secret up to now. Men of trust and missionaries stirred up adults and unthinking youths. Thus

Milan Pribicevic persuaded former Honved officers and a lieutenant of gendarmes to leave army service in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy under serious circumstances. In the schools where teachers are educated an agitation of wide scope was developed. The wished for fight against the Austro-Hungarian empire was also prepared militarily to the point that Servian emissaries were commissioned to destroy means of transportation, etc., and to kindle revolts and panics, in case of the outbreak of hostilities. All this is told in a special inclosure.

The memorial tells further of the connection between this activity of the Narodna Odrbrana and affiliated organizations with the attempts against Cuvaj, the Royal Commissioner at Agram, in July, 1912; with the attempt of Dojcic in Agram in 1913 against Skerlec, and the unsuccessful attempt of Schäfer on May 20 in the Agram Theatre. It then takes up the connection with the attack on the Crown Prince and his wife, and how even children in school are poisoned with thoughts of the Narodna Odrbrana, and how the conspirators, with the aid of Pribicevic and Dacic, secured the weapons for the attack. Here special stress is laid on the part played by Major Tankosic, who delivered the weapons for the murder, as also on that of a certain Ciganovic, a former comitadji, now employed on the Servian railways at Belgrade, who as early as 1909 figured as a graduate of the school for instructing bands of men maintained by the Narodna Odrbrana of that time. Furthermore, it is told how bombs and arms were secretly smuggled into Bosnia, which leaves no doubt that this is a well-prepared and often utilized road for the secret aims of the Narodna.

One inclosure contains a quotation from the minutes of the court-martial in Serajevo concerning the investigation of the attack on the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife. According to this, Princip, Cabrinovic, Grabez, Crupilovic, and Papovic appear as having confessed that they, in company with the fugitive Mehmedbasic, organized a plot for the murder of the Archduke and that they kept watch on him for this purpose. Cabrinovic is said to have confessed that he threw the bomb and that Gabrilo Princip carried out the attempt with the Browning pistol. Both men acknowledged that in doing the deed they premeditated murder. The other parts of the inclosure contain further statements of the guilty parties before the Judge conducting the investigation as to the origin of the plot and whence the bombs came. These were manufactured for military purposes and, judging from the way they were originally packed, came from the Servian arsenal at Kragujewac. Finally, the inclosure gives information as to the transportation of the three conspirators and their arms from Servia to Bosnia. From further testimony of witnesses it appears that a subject of Austria-Hungary wished to give information to the Austro-Hungarian Consulate at Belgrade that he suspected a plan existed for an attempt on the life of the Archduke during his stay in Bosnia. It is alleged that this man was prevented from lodging this information by Belgrade police officials, who arrested him on some empty pretext just as he was entering the Consulate. It is furthermore stated that the testimony of witnesses shows that the said police officials had knowledge of the attempt planned. Since these statements have not yet been investigated no opinion can be formed for the present as to their validity. In the inclosure with the memorial it is stated: Before the reception hall of the Servian Ministry of War there are four allegorical pictures of

which three are representations of Servian victories, while the fourth shows the realization of Servia's hostile dreams against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Over a landscape that is partly mountains (Bosnia), partly plains (Southern Hungary), the Zora, the morning light of Servian hopes, is dawning. In the foreground stands the armed figure of a woman, on whose shield are the names of the "provinces yet to be freed"—Bosnia, Herzegovina, Wojwodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, &c.

Annex 1 B. The Chancellor of the German Empire to the Imperial Ambassadors in Paris, London, St. Petersburg

Berlin, July 23, 1914.

The statements of the Austro-Hungarian Government as to the conditions under which the attempt on the life of the Austrian Crown Prince and his wife occurred make clear the aims of the Pan-Servian propaganda, and the means which it employs to accomplish its ends. Also, in view of the facts brought forward, there is no longer any doubt that Belgrade must be looked upon as the centre of action of the efforts to tear away the southern Slavic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and effect their union with the Servian Kingdom, and that these efforts develop there with the connivance, at least, of officials of the Government and army.

The Servian machinations go back many years. Servian Chauvinism showed itself in an especially marked form during the Bosnian crisis. That there was no conflict as a result of Servia's provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary at this time was due to the moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intervention of the great powers. The assurances of future good behavior which the Servian Government then gave have not been kept. Under the very eyes, or, at least, with the silent consent, of official Servia, the Pan-Servian propaganda has continually grown in scope and intensity; the latest crime, the threads which lead to Belgrade, must be placed to its account. It has become unmistakably apparent that it is incompatible both with the dignity and the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy that it should continue to look on inactively at the plotting across the border, which continually jeopardizes the integrity of its territory. Considering the conditions, the acts as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government cannot but be looked upon as justified. Nevertheless, the attitude adopted recently both by public opinion as well as by the Government in Servia does not preclude the apprehension that the Servian Government will refuse to comply with these demands, and that she is allowing herself to be led into an attitude of provocation toward Austria-Hungary. Unless the Austro-Hungarian Government wishes definitely to give up all claim to its position as a great power there is nothing for it to do but back up its demands on the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by recourse to military measures, in which case the choice of means must be left to it.

I ask your Excellency to express yourself in the above terms to the representative of (Mr. Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (Mr. Sazonof) and to

lay particular stress on the view that the above question is one, the settlement of which devolves solely upon Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and one which the powers should earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned. We strongly desire that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences impossible to measure.

I shall await with interest a telegraphic report from you as to the result of your interview.

Annex 2. The Imperial Chancellor to the Confederated Governments of Germany

July 23, 1914.

Confidential!

Kindly make the following announcement to the Government to which you are accredited:

In view of the facts which the Austro-Hungarian Government has made known in its note to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear that the plot to which the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince and his wife were victims was hatched in Servia, with the connivance, at least, of officials of the Servian Government. It is a product of the Pan-Servian efforts which, during a number of years, have become a source of lasting disquietude for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for all Europe.

Pan-Servian Chauvinism showed itself in an especially marked form during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-control and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intervention of the great powers was it due that the provocation which Austria-Hungary suffered at this time from Servia did not lead to war. The assurances of future good behavior which the Servian Government gave have not been kept by it. Under the very eyes, or at least with the silent consent, of official Servia, the Pan-Servian propaganda has continually grown in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with the dignity nor the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy if the latter continued to look inactively upon the plotting across the border, through which the safety and integrity of its territory is menaced. In view of the conditions, the acts as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government must be looked upon as justified.

The answer of the Servian Government to the demands which the Austro-Hungarian Government made on the 23d of the month through its representative in Belgrade makes clear that those at the head of Servian affairs are not inclined to give up the policy hitherto adopted by them, nor their activity as agitators. Therefore, the Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish to give up forever its position as a great power, has nothing left to it but to back up its demands with strong pressure, and, if necessary, by the adoption of military measures.

Certain elements in Russia consider it a natural right and the duty of Russia energetically to take the part of Servia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary. In fact, the Novoe Vremya considers itself justified in making Germany responsible for the European conflagration that might result from such a move by Russia, if it does not compel Austria-Hungary

to back down. Here the Russian press takes a wrong view. It was not Austria-Hungary that brought on the conflict with Serbia, but Serbia, which by unscrupulous favoring of Pan-Servian aspirations even in parts of Austria-Hungary's territory, has jeopardized the very existence of the latter, and created conditions which finally found expression in the dastardly crime of Serajevo. If Russia feels constrained to take sides with Serbia in this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it. But she must bear clearly in mind that in so doing she makes Serbia's aspirations to undermine the conditions necessary for the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, identical with her own, and that she alone must bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the Austro-Servian question, which all the rest of the great European powers wish to localize. This responsibility of Russia is perfectly apparent and is all the heavier since Count Berchtold has officially declared to Russia that there is no intention of acquiring Servian territory, nor of threatening the continued existence of the Servian Kingdom, but that all that is desired is to obtain permanent relief from Servian machinations that threaten Austria's existence.

The attitude of the Imperial German Government in this matter is clearly outlined. The agitation conducted by the Pan-Slavs against Austria-Hungary has, as its principal aim, the dissolution or weakening of the Triple Alliance by means of the destruction of the Danube Empire, and, as a result, the complete isolation of the German Empire. Our closest interests, therefore, summon us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty to save Europe if possible from a general war demands also that we support the efforts to localize the trouble in accordance with the policy which we have successfully followed for the last forty-four years in the interests of the preservation of the peace in Europe. But if, contrary to hope, the trouble should spread owing to the intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an ally, we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the entire might of the German Empire. We shall draw our sword only if obliged to do so, and we shall do it then in the firm conviction that we bear no responsibility for the calamity which a war must needs bring to the nations of Europe.

Annex 3. Telegram from the Imperial German Ambassador in Vienna to the Imperial German Chancellor

July 24, 1914.

Count Berchtold today summoned the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in order to explain to him in detail and in friendly terms the position of Austria regarding Serbia. After going over the historical developments of the last few years, he laid stress on the statement that the monarchy did not wish to appear against Serbia in the rôle of a conqueror. He said that Austria-Hungary would demand no territory, that the step was merely a definitive measure against Servian machinations, that Austria-Hungary felt herself obliged to exact guarantees for the future friendly behavior of Serbia toward the monarchy, that she had no intention of bringing about a shifting of the balance of power in the Balkans. The Chargé d'Affaires, who as yet had no instructions from St. Petersburg,

took the explanations of the Minister ad referendum adding that he would immediately transmit them to Sasanow.

Annex 4. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor

July 24, 1914.

I have just availed myself of the contents of Decree 592 in a long talk with Sasanow. The Minister made wild complaints against Austria-Hungary, and was much excited. What he said most definitely was this: that Russia could not possibly permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to be confined to the parties concerned.

Annex 5. The Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor—Telegram

July 26, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had a long interview today with Sasanow. Both, as they told me afterward, received a satisfying impression. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary was planning no conquests and simply wished to secure quiet at last on her boundaries visibly calmed the Minister.

Annex 6. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor

July 25, 1914.

Report for his Majesty from Gen. von Chelius. Today the drilling of the troops in the Krasnoe camp was suddenly interrupted and the regiments are to return at once to their garrison posts. The manœuvres have been given up. The military pupils were promoted to officers today instead of in the Autumn. Great excitement reigns in general headquarters as to Austria's proceedings. I have the idea that all preparations have been made for mobilization against Austria.

Annex 7. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor

July 26, 1914.

The Military Attaché requests the transmission of the following report to the General Staff:

I consider it certain that mobilization has been ordered for Kieff and Odessa. It is doubtful whether this is the case at Warsaw and Moscow, and elsewhere it has probably not been ordered.

**Annex 8. Telegram of the Head of the Imperial German Consulate
in Kovno to the Imperial German Chancellor**

July 27, 1914.

State of war declared in Kovno.

**Annex 9. Telegram of the Imperial German Envoy in Berne to the
Imperial German Chancellor**

July 27, 1914.

Have learned reliably that Fourteenth French Corps stopped manoeuvres.

**Annex 10. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the
Imperial German Ambassador in London**

Important!

July 26, 1914.

Austria-Hungary has declared officially and solemnly in St. Petersburg that she contemplates no acquisition of territory in Serbia, and that she will not endanger the continuance of the kingdom, but wishes only to secure quiet. According to reports reaching here, Russia is about to summon several bodies of reservists immediately, which would be equivalent to mobilization against us. If this news is corroborated, we shall be forced against our will to take measures to meet it. Today our efforts are still directed toward localizing the trouble and maintaining the peace in Europe. For this reason we ask that the strongest possible pressure be brought to bear in St. Petersburg for achieving this end.

**Annex 10 A. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the
Imperial German Ambassador in Paris**

July 26, 1914.

After Austria-Hungary officially declared to Russia that she contemplated no acquisition of territory and would not tamper with the continuance of the Servian kingdom, the decision of the question as to whether there is to be a European war lies with Russia alone, who has to bear the full responsibility. We trust that France, with whom we know we are agreed in the desire to maintain the peace in Europe, will use her influence in St. Petersburg in a quieting manner.

**Annex 10 B. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the
Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg**

July 26, 1914.

After Austria formally declared that she was not interested in acquiring territory, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the peace in Europe through Russian intervention lies with Russia alone. We still

trust that Russia will take no steps that may seriously endanger European peace.

Annex 11. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor

July 27, 1914.

Military Attaché reports concerning talk with Minister of War:

Said Sasanow had asked him to explain the situation to me. The Minister of War then gave me his word of honor that as yet no mobilization order had gone forth, that for the time being merely preparatory measures were being taken, but that not one reservist had been summoned nor a single horse requisitioned. He said that if Austria should cross the Servian frontier, the military districts in the direction of Austria—Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan—would be mobilized, that those on the German front—Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg—would not be under any circumstances. He said that peace with Germany was earnestly desired. To my inquiry as to the purpose of the mobilization against Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred me to diplomatic channels. I told the Minister that we appreciated the friendly attitude toward ourselves but would look upon the mobilization against Austria alone as very menacing.

Annex 12. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in London

July 27, 1914.

Nothing is known here as yet as to a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey to hold a four-sided conference in London. It is impossible for us to bring our ally before a European court in its difference with Servia. Our mediatory activity must confine itself to the danger of a Russian-Austrian conflict.

Annex 13. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in London

July 25, 1914.

The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between the Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian conflict is quite correct. We wish as little as England to mix in the first, and, first and last, we take the ground that this question must be localized by the abstention of all the Powers from intervention in it. It is therefore our earnest hope that Russia will refrain from any active intervention, conscious of her responsibility and of the

seriousness of the situation. If an Austro-Russian dispute should arise, we are ready, with the reservation of our known duties as allies, to co-operate with the other great Powers in mediation between Russia and Austria.

Annex 14. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg

July 28, 1914.

We are endeavoring continually to cause Vienna to make clear in St. Petersburg the purpose and scope of the Austrian action regarding Serbia in an indisputable and, it is to be hoped, satisfying manner to Russia. The declaration of war made in the meantime makes no difference in this connection.

Annex 15. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in London

July 27, 1914.

We have started the efforts toward mediation in Vienna immediately in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey. Moreover, we have communicated to Count Berchtold the wish of Mr. Sasanow for a direct talk with Vienna.

Annex 16. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in Vienna to the Imperial German Chancellor

July 28, 1914.

Count Berchtold requests me to express to your Excellency his deep gratitude for communicating to him the English mediation plan. He remarks, however, concerning it, that, after the opening of hostilities by Serbia and the declaration of war made in the meantime, he must look upon England's step as belated.

Annex 17. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in Paris

July 29, 1914.

Reports to us of French preparations for war increase from hour to hour. I request that you talk on this matter with the French Government and make it clear to them that such measures would lead to precautionary measures on our part. We should be obliged to proclaim the danger of war, and even if this should not mean calling in reserves and mobilization, it would, nevertheless, increase the tension. We still hoped uninterruptedly for the maintenance of peace.

Annex 18. Telegram of the German Military Envoy in St. Petersburg to His Majesty the Kaiser

July 30, 1914.

Yesterday Prince Troubetzki told me, after he had caused your Majesty's telegram to Emperor Nicholas to be delivered at once: "God be praised that a telegram from your Emperor has come." He told me a little while ago that the telegram had made a deep impression on the Emperor, but since mobilization against Austria had already been ordered, and Sasonow had doubtless convinced his Majesty that it was no longer possible to recede, his Majesty unfortunately could do nothing to alter matters. I then said to him that the responsibility for the unmeasurable consequences lay on the early mobilization against Austria-Hungary, who was involved after all in a purely local war with Serbia, that Germany's answer thereto was just and that the responsibility lay with Russia, as it had ignored Austria-Hungary's declaration that she contemplated no acquisition of territory from Serbia. I said that Austria-Hungary had mobilized against Serbia, not against Russia, and that there was no cause for Russia to plunge into the question. I added that in Germany we were unable after the frightful crime of Serajevo any longer to understand Russia's words to the effect that "we cannot leave our brothers in Serbia in the lurch." I told him in conclusion that he must not be surprised if Germany's forces were mobilized.

Annex 19. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in Rome

July 31, 1914.

We negotiated continually with a view to reconciliation between Russia and Austria-Hungary, both through direct exchange of telegrams from his Majesty the Kaiser to his Majesty the Czar, as well as in our relations with Sir Edward Grey. But all our efforts are made much more difficult, if not impossible of realization, by Russia's mobilization. In spite of calming assurances, Russia, according to all reports that reach us, is taking such far-reaching steps against us also that the situation becomes constantly more threatened.

Annex 20. I. His Majesty to the Czar

July 28, 10:45 P. M.

With the greatest disquietude I hear of the impression which Austria-Hungary's action against Serbia is making in your empire. The unscrupulous agitation which has gone on for years in Serbia has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Francis Ferdinand was the victim.

The spirit which allowed the Servians to murder their own King and his wife still rules in that land. Undoubtedly you will agree with me that we two, you and I as well as all sovereigns, have a common interest in insisting that all those morally responsible for this terrible murder shall suffer deserved punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook how difficult it is for you and your Government to resist the tide of popular opinion. Remembering the heartfelt friendship which has bound us closely for a long time, I am therefore exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria-Hungary come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia. I earnestly hope that you will help me in my efforts to set aside all obstacles that may yet arise.

Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin.

(Signed) WILHELM.

Annex 21. II. The Czar to His Majesty

Peterhof Palace, July 29, 1 P. M.

I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask you urgently to help me. A disgraceful war has been declared on a weak nation; the indignation at this, which I fully share, is immense in Russia. I foresee that soon I can no longer withstand the pressure that is being brought to bear upon me, and that I shall be forced to adopt measures which will lead to war. In order to prevent such a calamity as a European war I ask you, in the name of our old friendship, to do all that is possible to you to prevent your ally from going too far.

(Signed) NICHOLAS.

Annex 22. III. His Majesty to the Czar

I have received your telegram and share your wish for the maintenance of peace. Nevertheless—as I said to you in my first telegram—I cannot consider Austria-Hungary's action "disgraceful war." Austria-Hungary knows by experience that Servia's promises, when they are merely on paper, are quite unreliable. According to my opinion, Austria-Hungary's action is to be looked upon as an attempt to secure full guarantees that Servia's promises shall also be turned into deeds. I am confirmed in this view by the statement of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary contemplates no acquisition of territory at the expense of Servia. I think, therefore, that it is quite possible for Russia to remain in the rôle of a spectator toward the Austrian-Servian war, without dragging Europe into the most terrible war that it has ever seen. I think that a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna is possible and desirable, an understanding which—as I already telegraphed you—my Government is endeavoring to help with all its power. Naturally, military measures by Russia, which Austria-Hungary might take as

threatening, would hasten a calamity that we both wish to avoid, and would undermine my position as mediator, which I have willingly assumed after your appeal to my friendship and help.

(Signed) WILHELM.

Annex 23. IV. His Majesty to the Czar

July 30, 1 A. M.

My Ambassador has been instructed to call your Government's attention to the dangers and serious consequences of mobilization; I said the same thing to you in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary mobilized only against Serbia, and at that she mobilized only a part of her army. If Russia, as appears from what you and your Government say, is mobilizing against Austria-Hungary, the position of mediator, which you intrusted to me in a friendly manner and which I accepted at your urgent request, is jeopardized if not rendered untenable. The whole weight of the decision now rests on your shoulders; they must bear the responsibility for war or peace.

(Signed) WILHELM.

Annex 23 A. The Czar to His Majesty

Peterhof, July 30, 1914, 1:20 P. M.

I thank you from my heart for your prompt answer. I am sending Tatisheff this evening with instructions. The military measures now being taken were decided upon five days ago for defensive purposes against Austria's preparations. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any way your position as mediator, which I highly esteem. We need your strong pressure on Austria in order that an understanding may be brought about with us.

NICHOLAS.

Annex 24. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg

July 31, 1914.

In spite of still pending mediatory negotiations, and although we ourselves have up to the present moment taken no measures for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy; in other words, mobilized against us also. By these Russian measures we have been obliged, for the safeguarding of the empire, to announce that danger of war threatens us, which does not yet mean mobilization. Mobilization, however, must follow unless Russia ceases within twelve hours all warlike measures against us and Austria-Hungary and gives us definite assurance thereof. Kindly communicate this at once to Mr. Sazonof and wire hour of its communication to him.

Annex 25. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in Paris

Important!

July 31, 1914.

In spite of our still pending mediatory action, and although we ourselves have adopted no steps toward mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy, which means mobilization against us also. Thereupon we declared the existence of a threatening danger of war, which must be followed by mobilization, unless Russia within twelve hours ceases all warlike steps against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably means war. Kindly ask the French Government whether it will remain neutral in a Russian-German war. Answer must come within eighteen hours. Wire at once hour that inquiry is made. Act with the greatest possible dispatch.

Annex 26. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg

Important!

Aug. 1, 1914.

In case the Russian Government gives no satisfactory answer to our demand, will Your Excellency, at 5 o'clock this afternoon (Central European time), kindly hand to it the following declaration:

The Imperial Government has endeavored from the beginning of the crisis to bring it to a peaceful solution. In accordance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in co-operation with England, applied himself to the accomplishment of a mediating rôle toward the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, when Russia, without awaiting the outcome, proceeded to mobilize her entire land and naval forces.

Following this threatening measure, occasioned by no military preparation on the part of Germany, the German Empire found itself confronted by a serious and imminent peril. If the Imperial Government had failed to meet this peril, it would have jeopardized the safety and even the existence of Germany. Consequently, the German Government was obliged to address the Government of the Emperor of all the Russias and insist upon the cessation of all these military measures. Russia having refused to accede to this demand, and having manifested by this refusal that her acts were directed against Germany, I have the honor, by order of my Government, to make known to Your Excellency the following:

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the Empire, takes up the defiance, and considers himself in a state of war against Russia.

I urgently ask that you wire the hour of arrival of these instructions, and of their carrying out, according to Russian time.

Kindly ask for your passports and hand over protection and business to the American Embassy.

**Annex 27. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in Paris
to the Imperial German Chancellor**

Aug. 1, 1:05 P. M.

To my repeated inquiry as to whether France, in case of a German-Russian war, would remain neutral, the Premier declared that France would do that which might be required of her by her interests.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-66 (April, 1907, to May, 1913). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

67. Music as an International Language, by Daniel Gregory Mason, June, 1913.

68. American Love of Peace and European Skepticism, by Paul S. Reinsch, July, 1913.

69. The Relations of Brazil with the United States, by Manoel de Oliveira Lima, August, 1913.

70. Arbitration and International Politics, by Randolph S. Bourne, September, 1913.

71. Japanese Characteristics, by Charles William Eliot, October, 1913.

72. Higher Nationality; A Study in Law and Ethics, by Lord Haldane, November, 1913.

73. The Control of the Fighting Instinct, by George M. Stratton, December, 1913.

A New Year's Letter from Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, December, 1913.

The A B C of the Panama Canal Controversy. Reprinted from The Congressional Record, October 29, 1913. December, 1913.

74. A Few Lessons Taught by the Balkan War, by Alfred H. Fried, January, 1914.

Wanted—A Final Solution of the Japanese Problem, by Hamilton Holt, January, 1914.

The South American Point of View, by Charles Hitchcock Sherrill, January, 1914.

75. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, by Nicholas Murray Butler, February, 1914.

76. Our Relations with South America and How To Improve Them, by George H. Blakeslee, March, 1914.

77. Commerce and War, by Alvin Saunders Johnson, April, 1914.

A Panama Primer. Reprinted from *The Independent*, March 30, 1914. April, 1914.

78. A Defense of Cannibalism, by B. Beau. Translated from *La Revue* of February 15, 1909, by Preston William Slosson, May, 1914.

79. The Tradition of War, by Randolph S. Bourne, June, 1914.

The Causes Behind Mexico's Revolution, by Gilbert Reid. Reprint from the *New York Times*, April 27, 1914. June, 1914. The Japanese in California, June, 1914.

80. War and the Interests of Labor, by Alvin S. Johnson. Reprint from the *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1914. July, 1914.

81. Fiat Pax, by George Allan England, August, 1914.

82. Three Men Behind the Guns, by Charles E. Jefferson, D.D., September, 1914.

Special Bulletin. The Changing Attitude toward War as reflected in the American Press. September, 1914.

83. Official Documents Bearing upon the European War. Reprinted Through the Courtesy of the *New York Times*, October, 1914.

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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SPECIAL BULLETIN

THE GREAT WAR AND ITS LESSONS



By

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER

President, Columbia University

OCTOBER, 1914

American Association for International Conciliation

Sub-Station 84 (407 West 117th Street)

New York City



Pres. C. W. Eliot




ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT BUTLER

AT THE

OPENING EXERCISES OF THE ACADEMIC YEAR
OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

SEPTEMBER 23, 1914

 O each member of the University new or old, to the *Scholares docentes* and to the *Scholares discentes*, I give a hearty welcome on this opening day of the 161st year of Columbia's long and honorable life.

Our usual interests however great, our usual problems however pressing, all seem petty and insignificant in view of what has befallen the world while we were seeking rest and refreshment in the summer holiday. The murky clouds of cruel, relentless war, lit by the lightning flash of great guns and made more terrible by the thunderous booming of cannon, hang over the European countries that we know and love so well. The great scholars that we would have so gladly welcomed here, have not come to us. They are killing and being killed across the sea. Friends and colleagues whom we honor are filled with hate toward each other, and toward each other's countrymen. The words that oftenest come to our lips, the ideals that we cherish and pursue, the progress that we fancied we were making, seem not to exist. Mankind is back in the primeval forest, with the elemental brute passions finding a truly fiendish expression. The only apparent use of science is to enable men to kill other men more quickly and in greater numbers. The only apparent service of philosophy is to make the worse appear the better reason. The only apparent evidence of the existence of religion is the fact that divergent and impious appeals to a palpably pagan God, have led him, in perplexed distress, to turn over the affairs of Europe to an active and singularly accomplished devil.

What are we to think? Is science a sham? Is philosophy a pretence? Is religion a mere rumor? Is the great international structure of friendship, good-will and scholarly co-operation upon which this University and many of its mem-

bers have worked so long, so faithfully, and apparently with so much success, only an illusion? Are the long and devoted labors of scholars and of statesmen to enthrone Justice in the place of Brute Force in the world, all without effect? Are Lowell's lines true—

Right forever on the scaffold,
Wrong forever on the throne?

The answer is No; a thousand times, No!

Despite all appearances, even in this wicked and causeless war which is decimating the flower of European manhood; multiplying by the million the widows, the orphans, the suffering and distressed; wrecking the commercial and industrial progress of a century; impoverishing alike the belligerents and the neutrals; closing the exchanges from New York to Buenos Aires; ruining the cotton planter of the South as well as the copper miner of the far West; recruiting an army of unemployed that will far outnumber even the countless hosts of the fighting legions; loosing in the frenzied combatants the primitive instincts for savagery and lust—even here there is to be found something on which this University may continue to build the temple of wisdom, of justice and of true civilization to which its hand was laid when George II was king, when Louis XV still reigned in France, and when Frederick the Great was at the height of his fame in Prussia.

We are a neutral nation, and the President has rightly enjoined us all to observe neutrality in speech and in deed. But neutrality is not indifference: it is not the neutrality of the casual passer-by who views with amused carelessness a fight between two street rowdies; it is the neutrality of the just judge who aims, without passion and without prejudice, to render judgment on the proved facts. We cannot if we would refrain from passing judgment upon the conduct of men whether singly or in nations, and we should not attempt to do so.

In the first place, the moral judgment of the American people as to this war and as to the several steps in the declaration and conduct of it, is clear, calm, and practically unanimous. There is no beating of drums and blowing of bugles, but rather a sad pain and grief that our kin across the sea, owing whatever allegiance and speaking whatever tongue, are engaged in

public murder and destruction on the most stupendous scale recorded in history. This of itself proves that the education of public opinion has proceeded far, and, whatever the war-traders and militarists may say, that the heart of the American people is sound and its head well-informed. The attitude of the American press is worthy of the highest praise; in some notable instances the very high-water mark of dignity and of power has been reached. When the war-clouds have lifted, and all the facts are known everywhere, I believe that the moral judgment of the American people as to this war will prove to be that of the sober-minded and fair-minded men in every country of Europe.

Next, it must not be forgotten that this war was made by kings and by cabinets: it was not decreed by peoples. I can testify that the statement that kings and cabinets were forced into the war by public sentiment, is absolutely untrue, so far at least as several of the belligerent nations are concerned. Certainly in not more than two cases were the chosen representatives of the people consulted at all. A tiny minority in each of several countries may have desired war, but the militarist spirit was singularly lacking among the masses of the population. People generally have simply accepted with grim resignation and reluctant enthusiasm the conflict which in each case they are taught to believe has been forced on them by another's aggression.

The most significant statement that I heard in Europe was made to me on the third day of August last by a German railway servant, a grizzled veteran of the Franco-Prussian war. In reply to my question as to whether he would have to go to the front, the old man said: "No; I am too old. I am seventy-two. But my four boys went yesterday, God help them! and I hate to have them go." "For, Sir," he added in a lowered voice, "this is not a people's war; it is a kings' war, and when it is over there may not be so many kings."

Again, a final end has now been put to the contention, always stupid and often insincere, that huge armaments are an insurance against war and an aid in maintaining peace. This argument was invented by the war-traders who had munitions of war to sell, and was nothing more than an advertisement for their business. Sundry politicians, many newspapers, and not a few good people who are proud to have their thinking done for them, accepted this advertisement as a profound politi-

cal truth. Its falsity is now plain to every one. Guns and bullets and armor are not made to take the place of postage stamps and books and laboratories and other instruments of civilization and of peace; they are made to kill people. Since war is an affair of governments and of armies, one result of the present war should be to make the manufacture and sale of munitions of war, a government monopoly hereafter. This is a case where invasion of the field of liberty by government would do good, not harm. Then, too, the export of munitions of war from one country to another should be absolutely forbidden. When that happens, the taxpayer will be able to see just how his money is spent, and to check the expenditure, and the powerful war-trader with his lines of influence in every parliament house and in every chancellery will be eliminated.

It seems pretty clear that when the present huge supplies of guns and ammunition are used up in the contest now going on, no civilized people will ever again permit its government to enter into a competitive armament race. The time may not be so very far distant when to be the first moral power in the world will be a considerably greater distinction than to be the first military power or even the second naval power, which latter goal is so constantly and so subtly urged on the people of the United States. How any one, not fit subject for a mad-house, can find in the awful events now happening in Europe, a reason for increasing the military and naval establishments and expenditures of the United States, is to me wholly inconceivable.

Another great gain is to be found in the fact that no one is willing to be responsible for this war. Every combatant alleges that he is on the defensive, and summons his fellow countrymen who are scientists and philosophers to find some way to prove it. The old claim that war was a part of the moral order, a God-given instrument for the spreading of enlightenment, and the only real training-school for the manly virtues, is just now in a state of eclipse. Each one of the several belligerent nations insists that it—and its government—are devoted friends of peace, and that it is at war only because war was forced upon it by the acts of some one else. As to who that some one else is, it has not yet been possible to get a unanimous agreement. What we do know is that no one steps forward to claim credit for the war or to ask a vote

of thanks or a decoration for having forced it upon Europe and upon the world. Everybody concerned is ashamed of it and apologetic for it.

It may well be, moreover, that the desperately practical and direct education which this war is affording will hasten very much the coming of the day when the close economic and intellectual interdependence of the nations will assert itself more emphatically and more successfully against national chauvinism and the preposterous tyranny of the militarists. The armed peace which preceded this war, and led directly to it, was in some respects worse than war itself; for it had many of the evils of war without war's educational advantages. We are not likely to return again to that form of wickedness and folly, unless perchance the continent of Europe is able to produce another generation of public men as self-centered and of as narrow a vision as those who have generally been in control of public policy there for forty years past. The whole card-house of alliances and ententes, together with the balance of power theory, has come tumbling heavily to the ground. Something far different and much more rational will arise in its stead. In the Europe of tomorrow there will be no place for secret treaties and understandings, for huge systems of armed camps and limitless navies, for sleepless international enmity and treachery, for carefully stimulated race and religious hatred or for wars made on the sole responsibility of monarchs and of ministers. Moral, social and political progress will refuse longer to pay the crushing tolls which a conventional diplomacy and an unenlightened statesmanship have demanded of them. It is not the Slav or the Teuton, the Latin or the Briton, the Oriental or the American, who is the enemy of civilization and of culture. Militarism, there is the enemy!

The first notable victim of the Great War was the eloquent and accomplished French parliamentarian, M. Jaurès. He was murdered by a war-crazed fanatic. In the course of a long and intimate conversation with M. Jaurès shortly before his tragic death, he dwelt much on the part that America could play in binding the nations of Europe together. He spoke of the success of the policies that had been worked out here to make the United States and Germany and the United States and France better known to each other, and he thought that through the agency of the United States it might eventually be practicable to draw Germany and France together in real

trust and friendship. As we parted his last words to me were: "Do not leave off trying. No matter what the difficulties are, do not leave off trying." To-day the words of this great socialist leader of men, seem like a voice from beyond the grave. They are true. We must not leave off trying. When exhaustion, physical and economic, brings this war to an end, as I believe it will at no distant day, the task of America and Americans will be heavy and responsible. It will be for us to bind up the war's wounds, to soften the war's animosities, and to lead the way in the colossal work of reconstruction that must follow. Then if our heads are clear, our hearts strong, and our aims unselfish—and if our nation continues to show that it means always to keep its own plighted word—we may gain new honor and imperishable fame for our country. We may yet live to see our great policies of peace, of freedom from entangling alliances, of a world concert instead of a continental balance of power, of an international judiciary and an international police, of international co-operation instead of international suspicion, generally assented to, and, as a result, the world's resources set free to improve the lot of peoples, to advance science and scholarship, and to raise humanity to a level yet unheard of. Here lies the path of national glory for us, and here is the call to action in the near future.

It is often darkest just before the dawn, and the hope of mankind may lie in a direction other than that Europe toward which we are now looking so anxiously. Arthur Hugh Clough's noble verses are an inspiration to us at this hour:

Say not the struggle nought availeth,
The labor and the wounds are vain,
The enemy faints not, nor faileth,
And as things have been, they remain.

* * * * *

For while the tired waves, vainly breaking,
Seem here no painful inch to gain,
Far back, through creeks and inlets making,
Comes silent, flooding in, the main.

And not by eastern windows only,
When daylight comes, comes in the light,
In front the sun climbs slow, how slowly,
But westward, look, the land is bright.

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
ADDITIONAL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS BEARING UPON THE EUROPEAN WAR

- I SPEECH OF THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO REICHSTAG,
AUGUST 4, 1914
- II SPEECH OF THE PRIME MINISTER TO HOUSE OF COMMONS
AUGUST 6, 1914
- III THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK
- IV THE ORIGINAL TEXTS OF THE AUSTRIAN NOTE OF JULY
23, 1914, AND THE SERVIAN REPLY OF JULY 25, 1914,
WITH ANNOTATIONS



NOVEMBER, 1914, No. 84

American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City



The Association

The Executive Committee of the Association for International Conciliation wish to arouse the interest of the American people in the progress of the movement for promoting international peace and relations of comity and good fellowship between nations. To this end they print and circulate documents giving information as to the progress or interruption of these movements, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have readily available accurate information on these subjects. A list of publications will be found on pages 58 and 59.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S APPEAL FOR IMPARTIALITY AND RESTRAINT IN DIS- CUSSING THE WAR

MY FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN: I suppose that every thoughtful man in America has asked himself during the last troubled weeks what influence the European war may exert upon the United States, and I take the liberty of addressing a few words to you in order to point out that it is entirely within our own choice what its effects upon us will be and to urge very earnestly upon you the sort of speech and conduct which will best safeguard the nation against distress and disaster.

The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say or do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The spirit of the nation in this critical matter will be determined largely by what individuals and society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and magazines contain, upon what our ministers utter in their pulpits and men proclaim as their opinions on the streets.

The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility; responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its Government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinions, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion, if not in action. Such diversions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend.

I venture, therefore, my fellow-countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.

My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action, a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world.

Shall we not resolve to put upon ourselves the restraint which will bring to our people the happiness and the great and lasting influence for peace we covet for them?

WOODROW WILSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 18, 1914.

THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG

INTRODUCTION

The neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg has been guaranteed at different times by the larger European powers now unfortunately at war, and the duties of belligerents, including that of the inviolability of neutral territory, have been formally recognized by the powers represented at the Second Hague Peace Conference.

First as to the specific treaties of European powers. On November 15, 1831, a treaty was signed between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and Belgium, relative to the separation of Belgium from Holland. Article VII thereof decrees the neutrality of Belgium, and by Article XXV thereof the five powers "guarantee to His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the execution of all the preceding Articles." Article VII, which appears without change in the succeeding treaties, is as follows:

Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV, shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other States.

It will be noted that Holland was not a party to this treaty, as its king was at that time unwilling to acknowledge the independence of Belgium.

On April 19, 1839, a treaty was concluded between the Netherlands and Belgium, by which the former country recognized the independence of the latter, thus dissolving the union between Holland and Belgium created by the Treaty of Vienna of May 30, 1815. The seventh article of this treaty is the same as the corresponding article of the treaty of 1831 and of the subsequent treaties.

On the same date (April 19, 1839) a treaty was concluded between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia, on the one hand, and the Netherlands, on the other, recognizing the independence and neutrality of Belgium; and an identical treaty was concluded between the five powers, on the one hand, and Belgium, on the other, to which was annexed the treaty of even date between the five powers and Holland, Article VII of which neutralizes Belgium. The first article of this treaty declares that "they (the articles of the treaty between the Netherlands and Belgium) are thus placed under the guarantee of their said Majesties." The essential difference between the treaty of November 15, 1831, and the series of treaties between the five powers, on the one hand, and the Netherlands and Belgium, on the other, is that, whereas in the first treaty an express guarantee was made to Belgium of its neutrality, in the latter treaties the guarantee is general.

It will be noted that the Germanic Confederation on April 19, 1839, acceded to Articles I to VII, inclusive, of the Treaties of April 19, 1839, and that this accession was accepted by the parties to such treaties. The

importance of this fact is that not merely Prussia and Austria guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, but that all of the German States, including Prussia and Austria, did so.

In 1870 Great Britain feared that France or Germany might violate the neutrality of Belgium, and for this reason Great Britain concluded a treaty with Prussia, on August 9, 1870, and a treaty with France, on August 11, 1870, by the terms of which Prussia and France agreed to observe the neutrality of Belgium, and Great Britain pledged itself in case of a violation of neutrality by either of these countries to use force against the Power so violating the neutrality.

It will be observed that these treaties confirm the quintuple treaty of 1839 and that "without impairing or invalidating the conditions of the said quintuple treaty," they "shall be subsidiary and accessory to it."

Passing now to Luxemburg, it appears that Napoleon III, Emperor of France, expected the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, of which the King of the Netherlands was at that time Grand Duke, as the price of his neutrality in the war of 1866 between Prussia and Austria. To this Austria objected, and proposed that the Grand Duchy should be neutralized as Belgium had been, and that its fortifications be destroyed. This proposal was agreed to, and a treaty was signed at London, on May 11, 1867, between Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Prussia and Russia, recognizing the neutrality of Luxemburg, and placing it under their collective guaranty. Belgium as a neutral state was not a guarantor of this treaty.

In addition to the above treaties, neutralizing Belgium and Luxemburg, there is a Convention of the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, which deals with the subject in general. It is entitled the Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land. The following are the material articles:

The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. (Article I.)

Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral power. (Article II.)

A neutral power must not allow any of the acts referred to in Article 2 to 4 to occur on its territory. (Article V.)

The fact of a neutral power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality can not be regarded as a hostile act. (Article X.)

These articles were unanimously adopted by the Conference and were signed and ratified by Germany, the United States, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France and other countries. Great Britain signed, but has not ratified the convention, as it objected to Articles XVI, XVII and XVIII thereof, which do not concern the present question. Likewise Servia and Montenegro have signed, but have not ratified the convention. Article XX states that "the provisions of the present convention do not apply except between contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the convention." This provision, however, does not justify the violation of Belgian territory by Germany on the morning of August 4, because at that time the powers with which Germany was at war had ratified the convention. Germany was not then at war with Great Britain, a non-contracting power, and it declared war two days later (August 6) against Servia.

**TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA, FRANCE,
PRUSSIA, AND AUSTRIA, ON THE ONE PART AND
BELGIUM ON THE OTHER.—SIGNED AT LONDON,
APRIL 19, 1839.***

In the Name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity.

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the King of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, taking into consideration, as well as His Majesty the King of the Belgians, their Treaty concluded at London on the 15th of November, 1831, as well as the Treaties signed this day, between their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of the French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, on the other part, and between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His said Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, their said Majesties have named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: * * *

Who, after having communicated to each other their Full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

**Articles annexed to have same Force as the Treaty. Guarantee of the
Five Powers**

ART. I. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the King of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, declare, that the Article hereunto annexed, and forming the tenor of the Treaty concluded this day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg,† are considered as having the same force and validity as if they were textually inserted in the present Act, and that they are thus placed under the Guarantee of their said Majesties..

(1) Article VII. Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV, shall form an independent and perpetually Neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such Neutrality towards all other States. [Treaty of April 19, 1839].

**Treaty of 15th November, 1831, not obligatory upon High Contracting
Parties**

ART. II. The Treaty of the 15th of November, 1831, between their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,

* See also Treaties of 5th November, 1842; 8th August, 1843; 11th May, 1867; and 9th and 11th August, 1871.

† See page 994.

the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of the French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, and His Majesty the King of the Belgians, is declared not to be obligatory upon the High Contracting Parties.

Ratifications

ART. III. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the Ratifications shall be exchanged at London at the expiration of 6 weeks, or sooner if possible. This exchange shall take place the same time as that of the Ratifications of the Treaty between Belgium and Holland.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty, and have affixed thereto the Seal of their Arms.

Done at London, the 19th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, 1839.
(L. S.) SYLVAIN VAN DE WEYER.

(L. S.) PALMERSTON
(L. S.) SENPFT
(L. S.) H. SEBASTIANI
(L. S.) BULOW
(L. S.) POZZO DI BORGO.

Map of Europe by Treaty
Hertslet, Vol II, pp. 996-998

**ACT OF ACCESSION ON THE PART OF THE GERMANIC
CONFEDERATION TO THE TERRITORIAL AR-
RANGEMENTS CONCERNING THE GRAND DUCHY
OF LUXEMBURG, LAID DOWN IN THE TREATY
OF APRIL 19, 1839.—LONDON, APRIL 19, 1839.***

The Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia, having this day signed the Treaties concluded between the five Courts and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, between their Majesties the King of the Belgians and the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, and between the five Courts and His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the Plenipotentiaries have deemed it expedient that the Plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia, invested with Full Powers from the Diet of the Germanic Confederation, should be invited to accede in the name of the said Confederation, to the arrangements concerning the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, which are contained in the Treaties above mentioned.

In consequence, the Plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia, representing the Diet in virtue of the said Full Powers, declare that the Germanic Confederation formally accedes to the territorial arrangements concerning the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, which are contained in Article I, II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII, of the Annex to the Treaties this day concluded between the five Courts and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, and between the 5 Courts and His Majesty the King of the Belgians, as well as in the corresponding Articles of the Treaty signed at the same time between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg. And they take towards the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Prussia and Russia, in the name of the Germanic Confederation, the engagement that the Confederation will entirely conform to the stipulations contained in the said Articles, which are hereinafter inserted word for word, so far as they concern the Germanic Confederation.

[Here follow the first 7 Articles of the Annex to the two preceding Treaties.]†

The Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia, in virtue of their Full Powers, formally accept, in the name of their respective Courts, the said Accession on the part of the Germanic Confederation.

The present Act of Accession shall be ratified by the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Prussia and Russia, and also by the Germanic Confederation, by means of a Decree of the Diet,

* See also Treaty of 11th May, 1867.

† Article VII. Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV, shall form an independent and perpetually Neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such Neutrality toward all other States.

of which the requisite number of copies shall be prepared. And the respective Acts of Ratification shall be exchanged at London at the expiration of 6 weeks from this date, or sooner if possible, and at the same time as the exchange of the Ratifications of the 3 Treaties above mentioned.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Act of Accession, and have affixed thereto the Seal of their Arms.

Done at London, the 19th day of April, in the year of our Lord, 1839.

(L. S.) PALMERSTON.

(L. S.) SENFFT.

(L. S.) SENFFT.

(L. S.) BULOW.

(L. S.) SYLVAIN VAN DE WEYER.

(L. S.) H. SEBASTIANI.

(L. S.) DEDEL.

(L. S.) BULOW.

(L. S.) POZZO DI BORGO.

**TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND PRUSSIA,
RELATIVE TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND NEU-
TRALITY OF BELGIUM.—SIGNED AT LONDON,
AUGUST, 9, 1870.***

[Ratifications exchanged at London, August 26, 1870.]

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, being desirous at the present time of recording in a solemn Act their fixed determination to maintain the independence and neutrality of Belgium, as provided in Article VII of the Treaty signed at London on the 19th of April, 1839, between Belgium and the Netherlands, which Article was declared by the Quintuple Treaty of 1839 to be considered as having the same force and value as if textually inserted in the said Quintuple Treaty, their said Majesties have determined to conclude between themselves a separate Treaty, which, without impairing or invalidating the conditions of the said Quintuple Treaty, shall be subsidiary and accessory to it; and they have accordingly named as their Plenipotentiaries for that purpose, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honourable Granville George Earl Granville, Lord Leveson, a Peer of the United Kingdom, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, a Member of Her Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports and Constable of Dover Castle, Chancellor of the University of London, Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:

And His Majesty the King of Prussia, his Excellency the Minister of State, Albert Count of Bernstorff-Stintenburg, Grand Cross of the Order of the Red Eagle with Oak Leaves, and Grand Commander of the Royal Order of the House of Hohenzollern in Diamonds, &c., Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty from his said Majesty for the North German Confederation:

Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

ART. I. His Majesty the King of Prussia having declared that, notwithstanding the hostilities in which the North German Confederation is engaged with France, it is his fixed determination to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as the same shall be respected by France, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on her part declares that, if during the said hostilities the armies of France should violate that neutrality, she will be prepared to co-operate with His Prussian Majesty for the defence of the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her naval and military forces to

* British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 60, pp. 13-17.

insure its observance, and to maintain, in conjunction with His Prussian Majesty, then and thereafter, the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this Treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the war now carried on between the North German Confederation and France, beyond the limits of Belgium, as defined in the Treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands of April 19, 1839.

II. His Majesty the King of Prussia agrees on his part, in the event provided for in the foregoing Article, to co-operate with Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing his naval and military forces for the purpose aforesaid; and, the case arising, to concert with Her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, separately or in common, to secure the neutrality and independence of Belgium.

III. This Treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting Parties during the continuance of the present war between the North German Confederation and France, and for 12 months after the ratification of any Treaty of Peace concluded between those Parties; and on the expiration of that time the independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on Article I of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839.

IV. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the 9th day of August, in the year of our Lord 1870.

(L. S.) GRANVILLE.
(L. S.) BERNSTORFF.

**TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE,
RELATIVE TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND NEU-
TRALITY OF BELGIUM.—SIGNED AT LONDON,
AUGUST 11, 1870.***

[Ratifications exchanged at London, August 26, 1870.]

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, being desirous at the present time of recording in a solemn Act their fixed determination to maintain the independence and neutrality of Belgium, as provided by Article VII of the Treaty signed at London on the 19th of April, 1839, between Belgium and the Netherlands, which Article was declared by the Quintuple Treaty of 1839 to be considered as having the same force and value as if textually in the said Quintuple Treaty, their said Majesties have determined to conclude between themselves a separate Treaty, which, without impairing or invalidating the conditions of the said Quintuple Treaty, shall be subsidiary and accessory to it; and they have accordingly named as their Plenipotentiaries for the purpose, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honourable Granville George Earl Granville, Lord Leveson, a Peer of the United Kingdom, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, a Member of Her Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports and Constable of Dover Castle, Chancellor of the University of London, Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

And His Majesty the Emperor of the French, His Excellency the Marquis de la Valette, a Member of His Privy Council, a Senator, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honour, His Ambassador to Her Britannic Majesty;

Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

ART. I. His Majesty the Emperor of the French having declared that, notwithstanding the hostilities in which France is now engaged with the North German Confederation and its Allies, it is his fixed determination to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as the same shall be respected by the North German Confederation and its Allies, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on her part declares that, if during the said hostilities the armies of the North German Confederation and its Allies should violate that neutrality, she will be prepared to co-operate with His Imperial Majesty for the defence of the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her naval and military forces to insure its observance, and to maintain, in con-

* British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 60, pp. 10-13.

junction with His Imperial Majesty, then and thereafter, the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this Treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the war now carried on between France and the North German Confederation and its Allies, beyond the limits of Belgium, as defined in the Treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands of April 19, 1839.

II. His Majesty the Emperor of the French agrees on his part, in the event provided for in the foregoing Article, to co-operate with Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing his naval and military forces for the purpose aforesaid; and, the case arising, to concert with Her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, separately or in common, to secure the neutrality and independence of Belgium.

III. This Treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting Parties during the continuance of the present war between France and the North German Confederation and its Allies, and for 12 months after the ratification of any Treaty of Peace concluded between those Parties; and on the expiration of that time the independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest, as heretofore, on Article I of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839.

IV. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respect[ive] Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the 11th day of August, in the year of our Lord 1870.

(L. S.) GRANVILLE.

(L. S.) LA VALETTE.

TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, FRANCE, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS, PRUSSIA AND RUSSIA, RELATIVE TO THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBURG AND THE DUCHY OF LIMBURG.—SIGNED AT LONDON, MAY 11, 1867.*

In the Name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity.

His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, taking into consideration the change produced in the situation of the Grand Duchy in consequence of the dissolution of the ties by which it was attached to the late Germanic Confederation, has invited Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, the King of the Belgians, the Emperor of the French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, to assemble their Representatives in Conference at London, in order to come to an understanding, with the Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the King, Grand Duke, as to the new arrangements to be made in the general interest of Peace.

And Their said Majesties, after having accepted that invitation, have resolved, by common consent, to respond to the desire manifested by His Majesty the King of Italy to take part in a deliberation destined to offer a new pledge of security for the maintenance of the general tranquillity.

In consequence, Their Majesties, in concert with His Majesty the King of Italy, wishing to conclude a Treaty with a view to that object, have named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:—

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honourable Edward Stanley, commonly called Lord Stanley, a Member of Her Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, a Member of Parliament, her Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the Sieur Rudolph Count Apponyi, Chamberlain and Privy Councillor of His Imperial Royal and Apostolic Majesty, his Ambassador Extraordinary to Her Britannic Majesty, &c.;

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the Sieur Sylvain Van de Weyer, Minister of State, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, &c.;

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, the Sieur Godfrey Bernard Henry Alphonse, Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne Lauraguais, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, &c.;

His Majesty the King of Italy, the Sieur Emmanuel Taparelli de Lagnasco, Marquis d'Azeglio, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, &c.;

* See Declarations of France and Prussia of 17th July, 1870.

His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, the Sieur Adolphus Baron Bentinck, his Chamberlain and Minister of State, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, &c.; the Baron Victor de Tornaco, Minister of State, President of the Government of the Grand Duchy, his Honorary Chamberlain, &c.; and the Sieur Emanuel Servais, Vice-President of the Council of State and of the Superior Court of Justice, formerly Member of the Government, &c.;

His Majesty the King of Prussia, the Sieur Albert Count de Bernstorff-Stintenburg, his Minister of State and Chamberlain, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, &c.;

And His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Sieur Philip Baron de Brunnow, his Actual Privy Councillor, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, &c.;

Who, after having exchanged their Full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Maintenance of Rights of the House of Orange-Nassau

ART. I. His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, maintains the ties which attach the said Grand Duchy to the House of Orange-Nassau, in virtue of the Treaties which placed that State under the Sovereignty of the King Grand Duke, his descendants and successors.

The Rights which the Agnates of the House of Nassau possess with regard to the Succession of the Grand Duchy, in virtue of the same Treaties, are maintained.

The High Contracting Parties accept the present Declaration, and place it upon record.

Grand Duchy to form a Perpetual Neutral State under Guarantee of Contracting Parties

ART. II. The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the Limits determined by the Act annexed to the Treaties of the 19th April, 1839, under the Guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, shall henceforth form a perpetually Neutral State.

It shall be bound to observe the same Neutrality towards all other States.

The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the principle of Neutrality stipulated by the present Article.

That principle is and remains placed under the sanction of the collective Guarantee of the Powers signing Parties to the present Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a Neutral State.

Luxemburg to cease to be a Fortified City. Troops to be maintained by the King Grand Duke.

ART. III. The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg being Neutralised, according to the terms of the preceding Article, the maintenance, or establishment

of Fortresses upon its Territory becomes without necessity as well as without object.

In consequence, it is agreed by common consent that the City of Luxemburg, considered in time past, in a military point of view, as a Federal Fortress, shall cease to be a fortified city.

His Majesty the King Grand Duke reserves to himself to maintain in that city the number of troops necessary to provide in it for the maintenance of good order.

Evacuation of Fortress of Luxemburg by Prussian Troops

ART. IV. In conformity with the stipulations contained in Articles II and III, His Majesty the King of Prussia declares that his troops actually in garrison in the Fortress of Luxemburg shall receive orders to proceed to the Evacuation of that place immediately after the exchange of the Ratifications of the present Treaty. The withdrawal of the artillery, munitions, and every object which forms part of the equipment of the said Fortress shall commence simultaneously. During that operation there shall remain in it no more than the number of troops necessary to provide for the safety of the material of war, and to effect the dispatch thereof, which shall be completed within the shortest time possible.

Demolition of Fortress of Luxemburg by the Netherlands

ART. V. His Majesty the King Grand Duke, in virtue of the rights of Sovereignty which he exercises over the City and Fortress of Luxemburg, engages, on his part, to take the necessary measures for converting the said Fortress into an open city by means of a demolition which His Majesty shall deem sufficient to fulfill the intentions of the High Contracting Parties expressed in Article III of the present Treaty. The works requisite for that purpose shall be commenced immediately after the withdrawal of the garrison. They shall be carried out with all the attention required for the interests of the inhabitants of the city.

Fortifications not to be Restored

His Majesty the King Grand Duke promises, moreover, that the Fortifications of the city of Luxemburg shall not be restored in future, and that no Military Establishment shall be there maintained or created.

Duchy of Limburg to form an integral part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

ART. VI. The Powers signing Parties to the present Treaty recognise that the Dissolution of the Germanic Confederation having equally produced the Dissolution of the ties which united the Duchy of Limburg, collectively with the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, to the said Confederation, it results therefrom that the relations, of which mention is made in Articles III, IV, and V of the Treaty of the 19th April, 1839, between the Grand Duchy and certain Territories belonging to the Duchy of Limburg, have ceased to exist, the said Territories continuing to form an integral part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Ratifications*

ART. VII. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the Ratifications shall be exchanged at London within the space of 4 weeks, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the Seals of their Arms.

Done at London, the 11th day of May, in the year of Our Lord, 1867.

(L. S.) STANLEY.
(L. S.) APPONYI.
(L. S.) VAN DE WEYER.
(L. S.) LA TOUR D'AUVERGNE.
(L. S.) D'AZEGLIO.
(L. S.) BENTINCK.
(L. S.) TORNACO.
(L. S.) E. SERVAIS.
(L. S.) BERNSTORFF.
(L. S.) BRUNNOW.

(During the War between France and Prussia in 1870, 1871, those Powers mutually engaged to respect the Neutrality of Luxemburg.)

* Ratifications exchanged at London, 31st May, 1867.
The Map of Europe by Treaty.
Hertalet, Vol. III, pp. 1801-1805.

CONVENTION RESPECTING THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRAL POWERS AND PERSONS IN CASE OF WAR ON LAND.

CHAPTER I.—THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRAL POWERS

ARTICLE I

The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.

ARTICLE II

Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power.

ARTICLE III

Belligerents are likewise forbidden to:

(a) Erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless telegraphy station or other apparatus for the purpose of communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea;

(b) Use any installation of this kind established by them before the war on the territory of a neutral Power for purely military purposes, and which has not been opened for the service of public messages.

ARTICLE IV

Corps of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents.

ARTICLE V

A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts referred to in Articles II to IV to occur on its territory.

It is not called upon to punish acts in violation of its neutrality unless the said acts have been committed on its own territory.

* * * * *

ARTICLE X

The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act.

* * * * *

CHAPTER V.—FINAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE XX

The provisions of the present Convention do not apply except between Contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.

II

ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE FRENCH SENATE AUGUST 4, 1914.

Translated by Theodore Henckels

Gentlemen, after having notified us of the existence of a state of war, the German Ambassador left Paris yesterday.

It is incumbent upon the government to lay before Parliament the true account of the events which in less than ten days have led to the European war and compelled peaceful and sturdy France to defend her frontier against an aggression whose premeditated suddenness emphasizes the odious injustice of it.

This aggression that nothing can excuse and that had already been started before any declaration of war had reached us, is the final act in a plan, the origin and purpose of which I mean to lay before our democracy and the public opinion of the civilized world.

In the train of the abominable crime which brought about the death of the Arch-Duke and heir of Austria-Hungary and of the Duchess of Hohenberg, certain difficulties arose between the cabinets of Vienna and Belgrade.

A majority of the powers were only semi-officially informed of this fact on Friday, July 24, when the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors forwarded to them a circular which has been reprinted in the public press.

It was the object of this circular to explain and justify an ultimatum which the envoy of Austria-Hungary, accredited to Belgrade, had on the previous day addressed to Servia.

Affirming the complicity of numerous Servian citizens and associations in the crime of Serajevo, this ultimatum insinuated that the official Servian authorities themselves had had a hand in the act. It demanded an answer from Servia by six o'clock P. M., Saturday, July 25.

The satisfactions exacted, or some of them at least, incontestably assailed the rights of a sovereign state; despite their excessive nature, Servia on July 25 declared almost unreservedly her readiness to comply with them.

The counsels of France, of Russia, and of Great Britain offered to Belgrade from the beginning had had a part in this compliance, which meant a diplomatic success for Austria-Hungary and a guarantee for European peace.

These counsels were all the more important because the Austro-Hungarian demands had been concealed from the chancellories of the Triple Entente, to which, within the previous three weeks, the Austro-Hungarian government had repeatedly given assurances that these demands would be extremely moderate.

The cabinets of Paris, of St. Petersburg and of London were therefore justly astounded when on July 26 they learned that the Austrian Minister

at Belgrade had, after an examination of a few minutes, declared the Servian answer unacceptable, and broken off diplomatic relations.

This unexpected action was aggravated by the fact that as early as Friday, July 24, the German Ambassador had come to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, to whom he read a verbal note stating that the Austro-Servian conflict must be localized without the intervention of the great powers, or otherwise there would be cause to fear "incalculable consequences." Similar steps were taken on Saturday, the 25th, at London and at St. Petersburg.

Gentlemen: is it necessary to point out to you in what measure the threatening words used by the German Empire at Paris were in contrast with the conciliating sentiments of which the powers of the Triple Entente had just given proof by advising Servia to comply with the demands presented? Without further discussing the abnormal nature of the step taken by Germany, we did, nevertheless, in agreement with our allies and our friends immediately engage in conciliatory negotiations by inviting Germany to take part therein.

From the beginning we regretfully realized that our dispositions and our efforts were not reciprocated at Berlin.

Not only did Germany in no way appear disposed to give to Austria-Hungary such friendly advice as her position entitled her to, but from that very moment and even more so in the days following, she seemed to interpose herself between Vienna and the propositions for negotiations made on the part of the other powers.

On Tuesday, July 28, Austria-Hungary declared war against Servia. This declaration, which aggravated the state of affairs created by the rupture of diplomatic relations forty-eight hours previously, gave reason to believe that war had been premeditated and a systematic program had been evolved with a view to subjugating Servia.

Not only the independence of a sturdy people, but the balance of power in the Balkans, inscribed in the treaty of Bucharest of 1913 and approved by the moral adhesion of all the great powers, were thus put in jeopardy.

At the suggestion of the British government, ever conscientiously endeavoring to maintain European peace, the negotiations were nevertheless carried forward, or to be more exact, the powers of the Triple Entente endeavored to carry them forward. From this common desire issued the proposition of a four-fold action by England, France, Germany, and Italy for the purpose of reaching an equitable settlement of the conflict, and of assuring to Austria compliance with every legitimate demand she had made. When on Wednesday, July 29, the Russian government realized the persistent check to these endeavors, and in view of the Austrian mobilization and declaration of war feared that Servia would be crushed by the Austrian army, that government decided by way of precaution to mobilize her troops in four military districts, that is to say, to form a military cordon along the Austro-Hungarian frontier exclusively.

In doing this Russia took care, however, to inform the German government that this limited measure of no offensive character with regard to Austria was also in no way directed against Germany.

In the conversation which he had with the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, the German Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged this fact forthwith.

On the other hand, everything Great Britain attempted to do with the adhesion of Russia and the support of France, to bring Austria and Servia together under the moral patronage of Europe met at Berlin with the opposition of an irreconcilable attitude, of which the absolute proof is disclosed in the diplomatic correspondence.

This was a disquieting state of affairs, indicating that very probably Berlin was making certain mental reservations. A few hours later these suppositions and fears were to be transformed into certainties.

Indeed, within thirty-six hours the negative attitude of Germany was replaced by justly alarming measures. In declaring the state of war on July 31, Germany cut off communication between herself and the rest of Europe, and under the veil of absolute secrecy undertook military operations against France which, as appears from what I have stated, nothing could justify.

For several days, and in a situation which it is difficult to explain, Germany had already been preparing to transform her army from the peace to the war footing.

As early as the morning of July 25, that is to say, even before the expiration of the time limit granted to Servia by Austria, Germany had issued instructions to the garrisons in Alsace-Lorraine. On the same day she had provided ammunition for the fortified positions near the frontier. On the 26th she had issued to the railroads preparatory instructions with a view to the concentration of their rolling stock. On the 27th she had effected all requisitions and placed her covering troops. On the 28th individual appeals to reservists had been sent out and those far removed from the frontier had been brought nearer.

Could all these measures, prosecuted with an unrelenting thoroughness, leave any doubts regarding the intentions of Germany?

This was the state of affairs when, on the evening of July 31, the German government, which since the 24th had by no positive act participated in the conciliatory endeavors of the Triple Entente, addressed an ultimatum to the Russian government on the pretext that Russia had ordered a general mobilization of her armies, and it demanded that within the space of twelve hours an end should be brought to this mobilization.

This demand, all the more insulting in its form because only a few hours before Emperor Nicholas II had requested the mediation of the German Emperor, an act of spontaneous trustfulness, was made at the very moment when, upon the request of England and with the knowledge of Germany, the Russian government had accepted a proposition which was intended to prepare for a friendly adjustment of the Austro-Servian conflict and the Austro-Russian difficulties through the simultaneous stopping of all military operations and preparations.

This unfriendly measure toward Russia was on the same day followed by acts plainly hostile toward France, stoppage of all railway, telegraph and telephone communication, seizure of French railway engines upon their arrival at the frontier, placing of mitrailleuses in the middle of the railway track, which had been torn up, and concentration of troops on the frontier.

From this moment we could no longer believe in the sincerity of the pacific assurances which the representative of Germany persisted in giving us.

We knew that under the mask of the state of war which she had declared, Germany was mobilizing her army.

We learned that six classes of the reserves had been called to the colors and that the transportation stock to facilitate the concentration of these forces was ordered made ready for army corps stationed at a great distance from the frontier.

As these events proceeded, our government, alert and vigilant, took from day to day and from hour to hour those safeguarding measures made necessary by the situation; the general mobilization of our land and sea forces was ordered.

That same evening at 7:30 o'clock, and regardless of the acceptance by the St. Petersburg cabinet of the English proposition to which I have already referred, Germany declared war against Russia.

The following morning, Sunday, August 2, regardless of the extreme moderation of France, contrary to the pacific declarations of the German Ambassador at Paris, and in utter contempt of the rules of international law, German troops crossed our frontier at three different points.

At the same time, and in violation of the treaty of 1867, which with the signature of Prussia guaranteed the neutrality of Luxemburg, German troops invaded the territory of the Grand Duchy, thereby justifying the protest made by the Luxemburg government.

And finally the neutrality of Belgium was threatened: the German envoy on the evening of August 2 presented to the Belgian government an ultimatum, requesting it to facilitate in Belgium the military operations of Germany against France, on the false pretext that we were threatening Belgian neutrality. The Belgian government refused to comply, declaring that it was resolved to defend, with energy, a neutrality which was respected by France and guaranteed by a treaty, among the signatories to which was the King of Prussia.

Gentlemen: aggressive acts have ever since been continued, increased and accentuated; at more than fifteen different points our frontier has been violated. Our soldiers and customs officers were fired at, resulting in killed and wounded. Only yesterday a German military aviator dropped three bombs upon Lunéville.

We have communicated these facts to all the great powers, as well as to the German Ambassador, who has neither denied them nor expressed any regret. On the contrary, he came to me last evening to ask for his passports and to notify us of the state of war by declaring, contrary to all truth, that French aviators had committed hostile acts within German territory in the region of the Eiffel and even on the railway from Carlsruhe to Nuremberg. I have his letter with me and I am going to read it to you:

Mr. President:

The German military and administrative authorities have observed a certain number of marked acts of hostility committed by the French military aviators on German territory. Several of these aviators have plainly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country. One of them attempted to destroy certain constructions near Wesel, others have been seen over the region of the Eiffel, while still another has dropped bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.

I have been directed, and I have the honor to make known to your Excellency, that in the presence of these aggressions the German Empire considers itself at war with France, through acts of the latter power.

At the same time I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the German authorities will hold French merchant vessels in the German ports, but will release them if, within forty-eight hours, complete reciprocity has been assured.

My diplomatic mission having thus been brought to an end, there remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to provide me with my passport and to order such measures taken as your Excellency may deem necessary to insure my return to Germany, together with the personnel of the Embassy, the personnel of the Bavarian Legation, and of the Consulate-General of Germany at Paris.

Be kind enough, Mr. President, to accept assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) SCHOEN.

Gentlemen: why is there need of my insisting upon the absurdity of these pretexts, which they would present to us in the guise of grievances? At no time did a French aviator penetrate into Belgium; neither in Bavaria or in any other part of Germany did any French aviator commit any act of hostility. Public opinion in Europe has already done justice to these miserable mendacities.

Against this attack, which violates all the laws of equity and all the rules of public law, we have already taken the necessary measures, which will be most emphatically and calmly carried out.

The mobilization of the Russian army is being likewise prosecuted with remarkable energy and unbounded enthusiasm. The Belgian army, mobilized to the number of 250,000 men, is making ready to defend the neutrality and independence of its country with magnificent ardor.

The English fleet is entirely mobilized and orders have been issued to mobilize the English land forces.

Since the year 1912, communications have been carried on between the English and French general staffs. They had led to an exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Paul Cambon. The Secretary of State yesterday acquainted the House of Commons with the contents of this correspondence, and with the concurrence of the British government I have the honor to read these two documents to Parliament:

SIR EDWARD GREY TO M. CAMBON

London, Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1912.

My dear Ambassador:—From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and

ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reasons to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,

E. GREY.

M. CAMBON TO SIR EDWARD GREY

(Translation)

French Embassy, London, Nov. 23, 1912.

Dear Sir Edward:—You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, November 22d, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorized to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an attack from a third power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common. If those measures involved action the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their General Staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, &c., PAUL CAMBON.

In the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs referred to France amid the applause of the members in the highest and warmest terms, and his language has deeply impressed all French hearts.

From this tribune I wish, in the name of the government of the Republic, to thank the English government for the cordiality of its words, and I know the French Parliament is one with me in the expression of this sentiment.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has in particular made the following declaration:

In case the German fleet should cross the channel or move up into the North Sea or pass around the British Isles, for the purpose of attacking the French coasts or the French war fleet and to harass the French merchant marine, the English fleet will intervene and give her entire protection to the French marine, so that from that moment England and Germany would be at war.

Hence the English fleet covers our northern and western coasts against German aggression.

Gentlemen: those are the facts; I believe that in their rigorous succession they are sufficient to justify the acts of the government of the Republic.

From this recital I wish, however, to draw a conclusion and give the real meaning of the unheard-of aggression to which France has fallen victim.

Do you know that at various times the victors of 1870 have desired to follow up the blows they dealt us at that time? The war intended to overwhelm defeated France was in 1875 prevented only by the intervention of the two powers to which we were later to be bound by ties of alliance and friendship, by the intervention of Russia and by that of Great Britain.

Ever since, by the restoration of the national vigor and the consummation of diplomatic agreements invariably lived up to, the French Republic has succeeded in liberating itself from the yoke which even in time of peace Bismarck had placed upon Europe.

It has reestablished the European balance, the guarantee of the liberty and dignity of each nation.

Gentlemen: I do not know whether I am mistaken in my estimate of the situation, but it seems to me that this work of pacific rehabilitation, of liberation, and of dignity, definitely sealed in 1904 and 1907 with the genial help of King Edward VII, of England, and of the government of the Crown, it seems to me it is that which the German Empire now seeks to destroy by one audacious blow.

There is nothing in this situation for which Germany can blame us.

For the sake of peace we have made an unprecedented sacrifice by bearing in silence for half a century the open wound made by her in our side.

We have made still other sacrifices in all the discussions which since

1904 the Imperial diplomacy has systematically provoked, either in Morocco or elsewhere, in 1905 as well as in 1906, in 1908 and in 1911.

At the time of the events of 1908, as well as in the present crisis, Russia also has given proof of great moderation. She, together with the Triple, Entente, has shown great moderation when, in the Eastern crisis of 1912, Austria and Germany made unwarranted demands upon Serbia and upon Greece, as has been proven by the events themselves.

But the sacrifices have proved useless, the compromises, futile; the efforts, idle; since now, while engaged in acts of conciliation, we and our allies are unexpectedly attacked.

No one can in good faith say that we were the aggressors; it is an effort spent in vain to try to obscure the sacred principles of right and of liberty that govern both nations and individuals: with the clear perception of the Latin genius, Italy has informed us that she means to remain neutral.

Throughout France this decision is met with an expression of sincerest joy. I have constituted myself the spokesman to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, by telling him how much I rejoiced because the two sister nations of the same origin and the same ideals, with a common glorious past, were not to be opposed to one another. Gentlemen, I wish to affirm most plainly that what Germany attacks is that independence, that dignity, that security which the Triple Entente has again found in that balance of power which it placed at the service of peace.

What Germany attacks is those liberties of Europe, of which France, her allies, and her friends are proud to be the defenders.

We are going to defend these liberties; for it is they that are at stake and all the rest has been but a pretext.

France unjustly challenged, has not sought this war. She has done all in her power to prevent it. But, being forced upon her, France will defend herself against Germany and against any other power which, not yet having made known its position in this crisis, should decide to take its place with the latter in the conflict between the two. A people free and strong, upholding century-old ideals and marshalling its forces to safeguard its existence; a democracy that has been able to develop its military strength, and that only this past year did not shrink from shouldering the additional burdens forced on us to meet the armaments of our neighbor; a nation in arms, fighting for its very life, for the independence of Europe, those are some of the elements of the spectacle that we feel honored to lay before the witnesses of this formidable struggle, for which preparations are under way and the result of which we face with absolute equanimity.

We are blameless. We are without fear.

Under less favorable conditions, France has repeatedly proven that she is a most redoubtable adversary when she prepares, as she is now doing, to fight in behalf of liberty and of right.

In laying our acts before you, you gentlemen who are our judges, we have on our side, that which will help us to bear the burden of our great responsibility, the consolation of a clear conscience and the feeling of certitude that we have well performed our duty.

III

OFFICIAL JAPANESE DOCUMENTS

I

THE IMPERIAL RESCRIPT ISSUED AT TOKIO, AUGUST 23, 1914, 6 P.M.

We, by the grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne occupied by the same Dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make the following Proclamation to all Our loyal and brave subjects:

We hereby declare war against Germany and We command Our Army and Navy to carry on hostilities against that Empire with all their strength, and We also command all Our competent authorities to make every effort, in pursuance of their respective duties to attain the national aim by all means within the limits of the law of nations.

Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, calamitous effect of which We view with grave concern, We on our part have entertained hopes of preserving peace of the Far East by the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, Our Ally, to open hostilities against that country, and Germany is at Kiaochow, its leased territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while its armed vessels cruising seas of Eastern Asia are threatening Our commerce and that of Our Ally. Peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy.

Accordingly, Our Government and that of His Britannic Majesty, after full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general interests, contemplated in the Agreement of Alliance and We on Our part being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means commended Our Government to offer with sincerity an advice to the Imperial German Government. By the last day appointed for the purpose, however, Our Government failed to receive an answer accepting their advice. It is with profound regret that We, in spite of Our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war, especially at this early period of Our reign and while we are still in mourning for Our lamented Mother.

It is Our earnest wish that by the loyalty and valor of Our faithful subjects, peace may soon be restored and the glory of the Empire be enhanced.

II

AGREEMENT OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND JAPAN, SIGNED AT LONDON, JULY 13, 1911.

PREAMBLE

The Government of Great Britain and the Government of Japan, having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese agreement of the 12th August, 1905, and believing that a revision of that agreement responding to such changes would contribute to general stability and repose, have agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the said agreement, namely:

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the high contracting parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defense of their special interests in the said regions:—

ARTICLE I

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this agreement are in jeopardy, the two governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

ARTICLE II

If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers, either high contracting party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this agreement, the other high contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE III

The high contracting parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this agreement.

ARTICLE IV

Should either high contracting party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.

ARTICLE V

The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the naval and military authorities of the high contracting parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

ARTICLE VI

The present agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force ten years from that date.

In case neither of the high contracting parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the high contracting parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this agreement, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 13th day of July, 1911.

E. GREY,

His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.

TAKAAKI KATO,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the
Court of St. James.

III

TELEGRAM DESPATCHED BY THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AD INTERIM AT BERLIN ON AUGUST 15, 1914.

"You are hereby instructed to address to Herr von Jagow immediately on receipt of this telegram a signed note to the following effect:

The undersigned Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan has the honor in pursuance of instructions from his Government to communicate to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the German Emperor to the following effect:—

Considering it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia which is the aim of the said agreement the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

First—To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn;

Second—To deliver on a date not later than September 15, 1914 to the Imperial Japanese authorities without condition or compensation the entire leased territory of Kiaochow with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.

The Imperial Japanese Government announce at the same time that in the event of their not receiving by noon August 23rd, 1914, the answer of the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government they will be compelled to take such action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation.

The undersigned, etc."

IV

ADDRESS OF THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE IMPERIAL DIET, SEPTEMBER, 5 1914.

Following is the text of Baron Kato's speech on foreign affairs to the Imperial Diet yesterday:—

Gentlemen, I esteem it an honor to be allowed to give you here in this House a brief review of the progress of events which led to war between Japan and Germany, with consequent termination of diplomatic relations between Japan and Austria-Hungary.

As you are well aware the present war in Europe originated in the Servo-Austro-Hungarian affair. On July 28th last Austria-Hungary declared war against Servia and the same day the Austro-Hungarian Government, in a note verbale, communicated that fact to the Japanese Ambassador at Vienna.

Previous to this event Russia ordered a partial mobilization of her army for the purpose of restraining the action of Austria-Hungary, to which the latter responded with counter mobilization on her part. A critical situation was thus brought forth upon the relations of several Powers. Hereupon Great Britain proposed a conference of four Powers, namely, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, with a view to pacific settlement of the situation. But the British efforts were not successful. In the meantime Austria-Hungary ordered the mobilization of her entire military forces, thus compelling Russia to make more extended preparations. On July 31st the German Government communicated to the Russian Government that unless Russia would stop her military activities by noon August 1st Germany would order a general mobilization and on the following day the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, in the name of his Government, advised the Russian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs that war was declared, whereupon Russia on her part declared war on Germany the following day.

On the other hand Germany which since July 31st had been showing military activities also on the Franco-German frontier, recalled her Ambassador in France. This compelled France to order mobilization and recall her Ambassador in Germany. The two States thus entered upon a state of war.

Furthermore Germany not only violated the neutrality of Luxemburg, but sent an ultimatum to Belgium demanding in disregard of her neutrality to facilitate German military operations. Great Britain, which has a very strong interest in Belgian neutrality, asked both the French and the German Governments whether they would respect the neutrality of that Kingdom. France replied that she was prepared to do so unless another Power violated that neutrality. But Germany refused to give that guarantee. It was under none of these circumstances that Great Britain decided at length to take part in the European war on the side of France and Russia.

The above is a résumé of the situation arising first from the Servo-Austro-Hungarian dispute and eventuating in the present war with Germany and Austria-Hungary on one side and Russia, France and Great Britain on the other.

Realizing from the outset the gravity of the European situation thus created the Imperial Government felt it necessary to make known the attitude of Japan in regard to this situation, and as early as August 4th the Foreign Office issued the following statement:—

"The Imperial Government cannot but view with grave concern from both political and economical standpoints the latest aspect of the political situation in Europe. It need hardly be said that the Imperial Government earnestly hope for a speedy termination of strife and early restoration of peace. But unfortunately if the present war must continue, the Imperial Government hope that the sphere of the contest will not extend beyond the regions which are actually involved in the war, and so far the Imperial Government believe that they will be able to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality. It is necessary, however, that further development of the situation should be most closely watched. In the event of Great Britain becoming involved in the conflict and the object of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance be at stake, Japan may take such measures as are necessary to fulfil her obligations under that Agreement. It cannot be predicted at present whether a time for such action may come or not. The Imperial Government, while earnestly hoping that no such occasion will arise, are nevertheless paying most careful attention to various aspects of the situation."

It is plain from the foregoing statement that the Imperial Government from the outset earnestly hoped that the effect of the European war would not extend over to the Far East. As was related above, however, Great Britain was at last compelled to take part in the contest, and early in August the British Government asked the Imperial Government for assistance under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance. German men-of-war and armed vessels were then prowling the seas of Eastern Asia to the serious menace of our commerce and that of our Ally, while in Kiaochow, her leased territory in China, Germany was busy with warlike preparations, apparently with the purpose of making it the base of her warlike operations in Eastern Asia. Grave anxiety was thus felt as to the maintenance of the peace of the Far East.

As you all are aware the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain has for its object, the consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in Eastern Asia, insuring the independence and integrity of China as well as the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in that country, and the maintenance and defence respectively of the territorial rights and of the special interests of the contracting parties in Eastern Asia. Therefore inasmuch as she is asked by her Ally for assistance at the time when the commerce in Eastern Asia, which Japan and Great Britain regard alike as one of their special interests, is subjected to constant menace, Japan, which regards that alliance as the guiding principle of her foreign policy, cannot but comply with such request and do her part. Besides in the opinion of the Government the possession by Germany, whose interests are opposed to those of the Anglo-Japanese

Alliance, of a base of her powerful activities in one corner of the Far East is not only a serious obstacle to the maintenance of permanent peace of Eastern Asia, but is also in conflict with the more immediate interests of our own Empire. The Government, therefore, resolved to comply with the British request and if necessary in doing so to open hostilities against Germany and after the Imperial sanction was obtained, they communicated this resolution to the British Government. Full and frank exchange of views between the two Governments followed and it was finally agreed between them to take such measures as may be necessary to protect the general interest contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance.

Japan had no desire or inclination to get herself involved in the present conflict. She only believed that she owed it to herself to be faithful to the Alliance and strengthen its foundation by ensuring the permanent peace of the East and by protecting the special interests of our two allied Powers. Desiring, however, to solve the situation by pacific means, the Imperial Government gave on August 15th the following advice to the German Government:

"Considering it highly important and necessary, in the present situation, to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain, in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, establishment of which is the aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:—

"1st. To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn.

"2nd. To deliver on a date not later than September 15, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese Authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-chow with a view to eventual restoration of same to China.

"The Imperial Japanese Government announce, at the same time, that, in the event of their not receiving by noon August 23, 1914 the answer of the Imperial German Government signifying an unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, they will be compelled to take such action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation."

But until the last moment of the time allowed for the purpose, namely, noon August 23rd, the Imperial Government received no answer from the German Government. Thus the two countries having unfortunately entered upon a state of war, the Imperial Rescript declaring war on Germany was issued the same day.

As for Austria-Hungary, which has only very limited interests in the Far East, Japan desired to maintain peaceful relations with it as long as possible for in spite of the fact that the present trouble originated in the affair between that country and Serbia, Japan's position in relation thereto, was markedly different from that of other Powers of Europe. At the same

time it appeared as if Austria-Hungary had also desired to avoid complications with Japan. In fact, as soon as Japan and Germany entered upon a state of war, the Austro-Hungarian Government asked for the consents and good offices of the Imperial Government for permitting the Kaiserin Elizabeth, their only man-of-war in the Far East likely to force a state of war upon Japan and Austria-Hungary, to go to Shanghai to be disarmed there. But Great Britain being already at war with Austria-Hungary, the Imperial Government had to consult with the British Government before coming to any decision on this matter. The Imperial Government, therefore, consulted with the British Government and having ascertained that the latter entertained no particular objection to Japan's acceding to the Austro-Hungarian request, I was about to communicate that fact to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, when all of a sudden on August 27 the said Ambassador informed me that in consideration of Japan's action against Germany, his Government instructed him to leave his post. Hereupon the Imperial Government immediately handed passports to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador and at the same time instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna to withdraw from his post. Diplomatic relations between Japan and Austria-Hungary were thus broken off.

The above is the résumé of the situation which led to war between Japan and Germany and to consequent rupture of diplomatic relations of Japan with Austria-Hungary.

I cannot close my speech without a word on the courtesy which the American Government were good enough to extend to the Imperial Government in connection with the present trouble.

When the relations between Japan and Germany reached a point of rupture, the Imperial Government asked the American Government if in case of need they would be good enough to undertake the protection of Japanese subjects and interests in Germany. This request the American Government promptly complied with. Subsequently upon the rupture of diplomatic relations between Japan and Austria-Hungary, the Imperial Government again appealed to the American Government for the protection of Japanese subjects and interests in Austria-Hungary and were given the same willing consent as before. I desire to avail myself of this opportunity to give an expression to the sincere appreciation on the part of the Imperial Government of the courtesy so kindly extended by the American Government.

While regretting that Japan was compelled to take up arms against Germany, I am happy to believe that the army and navy of our illustrious Sovereign will not fail to show the same loyalty and valor with which they distinguished themselves in the past, so that we all may be blessed with an early restoration of peace.

IV

ADDRESSES TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE

Out of the depths of my heart I thank you for this expression of your love and your fidelity. During the conflict we are about to enter upon, I shall no longer distinguish political parties among my people. We are one and all Germans. And whatsoever parties have, in the heat of debate, turned upon me, I forgive. It is a question now solely of standing together like brothers, then God will help the German sword to victory.—KAISER WILHELM on August 1, 1914, from the balcony of the Berlin Palace.

To the German People!

Since the founding of the Empire, during a period of 43 years, it has been my zealous endeavor and the endeavor of my ancestors to preserve peace to the world and in peace to promote our vigorous development. But our enemies envy us the success of our toil. All professed and secret hostility from East and West and from beyond the sea, we have till now borne in the consciousness of our responsibility and power. Now, however, our opponents desire to humble us. They demand that we look on with folded arms while our enemies girt themselves for treacherous attack. They will not tolerate that we support our ally with unshaken loyalty, who fights for its prestige as a great power, and with whose abasement our power and honor are likewise lost. Therefore the sword must decide. In the midst of peace the world attacks us. Therefore up! To arms! All hesitation, all delay were treachery to the Fatherland. It is a question of the existence or non-existence of the Empire which our fathers founded anew. It is the question of the existence or the non-existence of German might and German culture. We shall defend ourselves to the last breath of man and beast. And we shall survive this fight, even though it were against a world of enemies. Never yet was Germany conquered when she was united. Then forward march with God! He will be with us as He was with our fathers.

WILHELM,
I. R.

BERLIN, August 6, 1914.

ERRATUM

In Document No. 83, page 113, Annex II, the Confidential Communication of the Imperial Chancellor to the Confederate Governments of Germany was dated July 23. It has been pointed out that the original *Vorläufige Denkschrift und Aktenstücke zum Kriegeausbruch*, which had not been received when the material was set up, is dated July 28. To avoid possible misapprehension and consequent injustice the error is herewith brought to the attention of the readers of INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nov. 1-66 (April, 1907, to May, 1913) Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

67. Music as an International Language, by Daniel Gregory Mason, June, 1913.
68. American Love of Peace and European Skepticism, by Paul S. Reinsch, July, 1913.
69. The Relations of Brazil with the United States, by Manoel de Oliveira Lima, August, 1913.
70. Arbitration and International Politics, by Randolph S. Bourne, September, 1913.
71. Japanese Characteristics, by Charles William Eliot, October, 1913.
72. Higher Nationality: A Study in Law and Ethics, by Lord Haldane, November, 1913.
73. The Control of the Fighting Instinct, by George M. Stratton, December, 1913.
- A New Year's Letter from Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, December, 1913.
- The A B C of the Panama Canal Controversy. Reprinted from *The Congressional Record*, October 30, 1913. December, 1913.
74. A Few Lessons Taught by the Balkan War, by Alfred H. Fried, January, 1914.
- Wanted—A Final Solution of the Japanese Problem, by Hamilton Holt, January, 1914.
- The South American Point of View, by Charles Hitchcock Sherrill, January, 1914.
75. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, by Nicholas Murray Butler, February, 1914.
76. Our Relations with South America and How To Improve Them, by George H. Blakelee, March, 1914.
77. Commerce and War, by Alvin Sanders Johnson, April, 1914.
- A Panama Primer. Reprinted from *The Independent*, March 30, 1914. April, 1914.
78. A Defense of Capitalism, by B. Bean. Translated from *La Rasse* of February 15, 1900, by Preston William Sisson, May, 1914.
79. The Tradition of War, by Randolph S. Bourne, June, 1914.
- The Causes Behind Mexico's Revolution, by G. Hart Reid. Reprint from the *New York Times*, April 27, 1914. June, 1914. The Japanese in California, June, 1914.
80. War and the Interest of Labor, by Alvin S. Johnson. Reprint from the *American Monthly*, March, 1914. July, 1914.
81. Pax Pax, by George Allan England, August, 1914.
82. Three Men Behind the Guns, by Charles E. Jefferson, D.D., September, 1914.
- Special Bulletin. The Changing Attitude toward War as reflected in the American Press. September, 1914.
83. Official Documents Bearing upon the European War. Reprinted Through the Courtesy of the New York Times, October, 1914.
- Special Bulletin. The Great War and its Lessons, by Nicholas Murray Butler.
84. Additional Official Documents bearing upon the European War. November, 1914.
85. Documents Regarding the European War. Series III. December, 1914.

Up to the limit of the editions printed, any one of the above will be sent postpaid upon receipt of a request addressed to the Secretary of the American Association for International Conciliation, Postoffice Sub-station 34, New York, N. Y.

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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SPECIAL BULLETIN

CONTEMPORARY WAR POEMS



WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

JOHN ERSKINE

DECEMBER, 1914

American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-Station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City



The Association

THE poems of this collection have been chosen to illustrate the emotional attitudes of the United States toward the war, as those attitudes find expression in newspaper and magazine verse. At another time the literary merits of these pieces would invite judgment or comment; now, however, the suitability of war poems for the purpose of an anthology is a very minor question, and it is therefore not as a literary museum that these verses are offered, but as social documents, as evidence of the state of our civilization at this moment. Of course the emotional attitudes of a nation may unfortunately change from day to day, and it is quite possible that before these selections are in print they may have ceased to represent the national feeling, but at this moment at least we may read in them certain well-defined and common attitudes which are all the more significant since the individual poems were written in various circumstances, and come together here almost by accident.

The first observation the reader will make is that the glamor of war has not touched these poems; here are no stirring battle songs and no heroic ballads. Perhaps the newspaper correspondent and the newspaper photograph have made war too frightfully real for any but a horrified treatment; perhaps warfare has ceased for the moment at least to be an idea of any sort, alluring or otherwise, and has become, or has tended to become, for the public consciousness simply an ugly and stupefying fact. But however we explain it, the absence of glamor from these verses on the war is a new and interesting phenomenon. Even when war has been condemned in itself, poets have usually recognized the moral value of certain of its by-products, or have justified the battles fought in a good cause. Chivalry gave the modern gentleman the example and the name for his ideal behavior, as the Roman arms gave St. Paul an illustration of the Christian life; Wordsworth could portray the duties of conscientious bloodshed in his "Happy Warrior" without disturbing his own or his readers' equanimity; Tennyson could sing of that peculiarly militaristic obedience that does not discriminate between a useful and unequivocal command and a fatal and obvious error—he could even satisfy us that those

men are "noble" who discard reason and execute what they know is a blunder; and even yesterday, as it seems, William Vaughan Moody could imply in his beautiful and otherwise enlightened "Ode in Time of Hesitation" that a war is just, even morally alluring, if it rises from generous impulses and is made to serve some high end. Doubtless there are many to agree with the great poets in all these instances, but clearly the verse-writers who have been expressing the emotional judgments of the United States in the last few weeks do not agree with them. The battle passages in Wordsworth's poem, Tennyson's fine song, and Moody's eloquent peroration have suddenly become antiquated, and Christianity is invoked, not in the images of discipline and strategy, but in the figure of the widowed and the orphaned and the slain. There can be little question that if the United States were actually in the conflict this humane attitude would largely disappear, and the glamor of war would return upon much of our verse; yet never before has so general a condemnation of war been voiced even by a nation at peace.

Since this frame of mind prevails in these poems, it is not surprising that the "literary" manner is absent from them. Whatever else they are, these pieces are spontaneous and sincere; they impress the reader as vehicles of an urgent protest rather than as elaborations of a theme. No one would charge the writers with having used the war for "copy." Such abstinence may not be self-denial—it may not be a virtue at all; it is, however, unusual. War in the past has not only fitted out ethics and religion with a language of spiritual control and conflict, but it has also furnished the ballad-maker with incident. This war from the beginning has been rich in incident, and it broke out at a moment when narrative verse, after a long interval, was returning to popular favor. We might have expected, therefore, that such a collection as this would contain accounts of air- and sea-fights, of forced marches and exciting encounters, but the papers have been singularly barren of such material. One journal complained editorially that its office was deluged with verse on the war in general, but no poems were coming in which dealt with single events or aspects, and the editor pointed out that successful war-poems in the past have confined themselves to the stirring details of the conflict, instead of projecting a broad mental attitude. His testimony is significant. When we have become hardened to this war or have got further away from its horrors, we may begin to make literary use

of them, but at present, it seems, the poets and their readers think it a kind of sacrilege to convert any of this stupendous misery to the purposes of art.

It might have been expected also that feeling so anti-military would have directed itself against one or another of the warring governments, as against the supposed nurse and citadel of militarism. Yet the poems in our newspapers have in this respect shown remarkable poise; much more in fact than the editorials. To be sure, a few foreign-born Americans whose spirit at such a moment as this naturally resides in their fatherland, wherever their physical presence may be, have expressed a violent partisanship. To make this collection representative, examples of this kind of prejudice have been included. For the most part, however, it has been militarism rather than any one country or government that has roused the indignation expressed in these poems.

Is it fanciful to read in them a new emphasis on democracy? There have always been protests in American literature against the aristocratic conception of war, against the willingness to devote the common man to the salvation or the profit of a few, but the protests here gathered seem to contain surprise as well as indignation. Why surprise? We cannot suppose these writers are ignorant of the venerable antiquity of this selfishness, or of its prevalence in all aristocratic countries to-day. Carlyle summed the matter for us in a famous passage in "Sartor Resartus." Evidently the American poet to-day supposed that the old giant of feudalism had been withered up by modern humaneness, and his surprise comes from discovering his mistake. In his own intellectual background liberal ideas of the best sort have, it seems, been making during recent decades faster progress than he realized; the manner of his protest implies that the right of all men to live and enjoy life is everywhere beyond dispute, and that all life, whether in peasant or noble, is equally sacred. This implication, if we do not deceive ourselves in reading it throughout these poems, is probably their most American contribution and their chief significance. It is what makes them seem remarkably cosmopolitan. The bitterness against war here expressed is very remote from the interest an outsider would manifest; the makers of these verses write not as spectators of the disaster but as sharers in it. Sympathy so broad has been the mark of rare natures, but here it seems to be a public attitude.

Is it fanciful to discover also in certain of these poems an in-

dication of the new position that woman holds in society? War has always fallen heavily on the children and the mothers, and such poems as Ella Wheeler Wilcox's "The Messenger" have always been part of man's comment on the tragedy of battle. But in some of these poems the injustice that war does to womanhood is defined in a new way, with the implication that the tragedy might be avoided, and that women will no longer accept it as inevitable. So at least one may read the verses by Edith M. Thomas and those by Edna Valentine Trapwell. As in the rest of this collection the emphasis is upon the right of the common man to enjoy life, peace and safety, so in these fine poems the emphasis is upon woman's right to decide whether she will pay the penalty that war always exacts of her.

These are the attitudes that are most clearly discovered in these verses. As a whole the collection represents, so to speak, the nation's first impression of the war. It should have value as evidence of our instinctive reaction at a moment so searching.

JOHN ERSKINE.)

Columbia University.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN WALKS AT MIDNIGHT

By VACHEL LINDSAY

It is portentous, and a thing of state
That here at midnight, in our little town
A mourning figure walks, and will not rest
Near the old court-house pacing up and down.

Or by his homestead, or the shadowed yards
He lingers where his children used to play,
Or thru the market, on the well-worn stones
He stalks until the dawn-stars burn away.

A bronzed, lank man! His suit of ancient black,
A famous high top-hat and plain worn shawl
Make him the quaint great figure that men love,
The prairie-lawyer, master of us all.

He cannot sleep upon his hillside now.
He is among us, as in times before!
And we who toss and lie awake for long
Breathe deep, and start, to see him pass the door.

His head is bowed. He thinks on men and kings.
Yea, when the sick world cries, how can he sleep?
Too many peasants fight, they know not why,
Too many homesteads in black terror weep.

The sins of all the war-lords burn his heart.
He sees the dreadnaughts scouring every main.
He carries on his shawl-wrapt shoulders now
The bitterness, the folly and the pain.

He cannot rest until a spirit-dawn
Shall come;—the shining hope of Europe free;
The league of sober folk, the Workers' Earth
Bringing long peace to Cornland, Alp and Sea.

It breaks his heart that kings must murder still,
That all his hours of travail here for men
Seem yet in vain. And who will bring white peace
That he may sleep upon his hill again?

Springfield, Illinois.

—The Independent.

THE NEW BEATITUDE

BY RICHARD BUTLER GLAENZER

In gay Brabant I have danced till the night turned rose,
All the health and the wealth of a Rubens before my eye.

In meadows which only the tramper of byways knows,
I have tasted the peace of earth neath a kind calm sky,
Glad of the Angelus, gladdened by love-looks shy
And the laughter of children and songs of men who mow.
All that I hear to-day is the harsh dull cry:

Blessed are they which died a year ago!

In Picardy plain through which all joyance flows
Like the tranquil Somme; and churches beautify
Every hamlet with noble shrines that spell repose;
And the simple peasant has never a thought to deny
A bed or a snack to the stranger wandering by,—
In gentle, smiling Picardy, all aglow

With poppies amid ripe wheat, I hear the sigh:

Blessed are they which died a year ago!

In Prussia the proud, whose boundaries enclose
Full many a fireside happy once to vie

In soft content with any home that owes
Its worth to toil and thrift, now gone awry;

Yea, in proud Prussia, not only those that fly
The Cossack, but women secure from death or blow,—
Do not their hearts confess (though lips may lie):

Blessed are they which died a year ago!

ENVOY

Lord Prince of Peace, who for men's sins didst die,
Let them not reap the whirlwind that they sow!

Twice-crucified, do not Thou too reply:

Blessed are they which died a year ago!

—*The Bookman.*

THE MAD WAR

BY RICHARD BUTLER GLAENZER

Because one man, one man, was slain—
No more a man than you or I—
Must nations suffer murder's stain,
Millions be made to die?

They have no cruel wrong to right,
No wrong to rouse a righteous ire;
No noble cause for which to fight
With heart and soul on fire.

Austria's heir was killed by plan!
Ah, so is someone's hope each day:
Can vengeance give back life to man,
Though royal be his clay?

A ruler's death to punish? Then,
Punish the cowards and their tool;
But not a million guiltless men
With hungry homes to rule!

Attila and his wolfish Huns,—
We read of them as horror past:
That "Scourge of God" before our guns
Were less than trumpet-blast.

Ponder how Death now bares his teeth,
Waiting the certain holocaust;
The vanquished torn and crushed beneath
A conqueror half lost.

War . . . this red madness of an hour
Whelped from base fear by baser pride
Unbalanced by its lust for power?
The mailed fist defied!

One group of three who fraternise
To-day, though once close locked in hate,
To thwart another three must rise,
All blaming all on Fate.

Christians, they prate of "Triplices"
As if of pledges made to God.
What is the Trinity to these
Who trample life roughshod?

The civilised! The civilised!—
Smug irony of modern cant!
Culture so blind, self-idolised,
The East may well supplant.

And well may smile the pagan Mars
And grin the bloody Juggernaut:
Christendom rends its Saviour's scars
With weapons Judas-bought.

Harken, vain Europe— Nay, your ears
Can only hear your shout "To arms!"
Deaf to your women's pleading tears,
Your children's dazed alarms.

Yet could you hear, and heed the roar
Of sullen Asia, you would cease
Ruin's mad march, though cold before
Your flaunted Prince of Peace.

—*The Bookman.*

WAR

BY WITTER BYNNER

Fools, fools, fools,
Your blood is hot to-day.
It cools
When you are clay.
It joins the very clod
Wherein your foe shall be,—
Wherein you look at God,
Wherein at last you see
The living God,
The loving God,
Which was your enemy.

—*The Nation.*

A PRAYER

BY EDWARD S. VAN ZILE

God of my Fathers, grant me aid
That I may rout my countless foes!
By Thee were guns and cannons made,
From Thee the joy of battle flows.

O God, who gave me might and power,
Thou knowest that my heart is pure.
Be with me in this awful hour,
That I and mine may still endure.

Thou art the God who loveth war,
And famine, rapine, blood and death;
I pray Thee stand beside me, for
Thou knowest what my spirit saith.

The soul of me is linked with Thine
To bid the blood of heroes flow,
The death we grant them is divine,
And in Thy name I bid them go.

God of my Fathers, still be kind
To them who raise Thy banner high,
While Thou and I together find
The surest way for them to die.

They do my bidding. God, look down
And bless the sword that I have drawn.
My blight shall fall on field and town,
And thousands shall not see the dawn.

To Thee, O God, I give all praise
That Thou hast made my hand so strong;
That now, as in my father's days,
The King and Thee can do no wrong.

—*The New York Sun.*

IF!

BY BARTHOLOMEW F. GRIFFEN

Suppose 'twere done!
The lanyard pulled on every shotted gun;
Into the wheeling death-clutch sent
Each millioned armament,
To grapple there
On land, on sea and under, and in air!
Suppose at last 'twere come—
Now, while each bourse and shop and mill is dumb,
And arsenals and dockyards hum—
Now all complete, supreme,
That vast, Satanic dream!

Each field were trampled, soaked,
Each stream dyed, choked,
Each leaguered city and blockaded port
Made famine's sport;
The empty wave
Made reeling dreadnought's grave;
Cathedral, castle, gallery, smoking fell
'Neath bomb and shell;
In deathlike trance
Lay industry, finance;
Two thousand years'
Bequest, achievement, saving, disappears
In blood and tears,
In widowed woe
That slum and palace equal know,
In civilization's suicide—
What served thereby, what satisfied?
For justice, freedom, right, what wrought?
Naught!

Save, after the great cataclysm, perchap
On the world's shaken map
New lines, more near or far,
Binding to king or czar;
In festering hate
Some newly vassalled state;
And passion, lust and pride, made satiate;
And just a trace
Of lingering smile on Satan's face!

—*The Boston Globe.*

THE VICTORY

BY JAMES J. MONTAGUE

No martial music goes before,
No stirring bugles play,
As in the smoking wake of war
I take my somber way.
But where pale women wait and weep,
Where old men cringe in dread,
And little trusting children sleep,
I take my toll of dead.

Afar from fame's highways I seek,
Through farm and little town,
The frail, the innocent, the meek,
And swiftly strike them down.
They never know the battle's thrill
Nor watch the flag that waves
Its inspiration, ere they fill
Their unremembered graves.

They shall not wake a nation's pride
In years that are to be;
For war and fame march side by side,
But hunger walks with me.
I fill no glowing history's page
With thrilling hero lore;
Yet I have been, through every age,
The blackest curse of war.

—*Hearst's Magazine.*

THE MESSENGER

BY ELLA WHEELER WILCOX

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She rose up in the early dawn,
And white and silently she moved
About the house. Four men had gone
To battle for the land they loved,
And she, the mother and the wife,
Waited for tidings from the strife.
How still the house seemed! and her tread
Was like the footsteps of the dead.

The long day passed; the dark night came,
She had not seen a human face,
Some voice spoke suddenly her name.
How loud it echoed in that place,
Where, day on day, no sound was heard
But her own footsteps. "Bring you word,"
She cried to whom she could not see,
"Word from the battle-plain to me?"

A soldier entered at the door,
And stood within the dim firelight:
"I bring you tidings of the four,"
He said, "who left you for the fight."
"God bless you, friend," she cried, "speak on!
For I can bear it. One is gone?"
"Ay, one is gone," he said. "Which one?"
"Dear lady, he, your eldest son."

A deathly pallor shot across
Her withered face; she did not weep.
She said: "It is a grievous loss,
But God gives His beloved sleep.
What of the living—of the three?
And when can they come back to me?"
The soldier turned away his head:
"Lady, your husband, too, is dead."

She put her hand upon her brow;
A wild, sharp pain was in her eyes.
"My husband! Oh, God help me now!"
The soldier heard her shuddering sighs.

The task was harder than he thought.
"Your youngest son, dear madam, fought
Close at his father's side; both fell
Dead, by the bursting of a shell."

She moved her lips and seemed to moan.

Her face had paled to ashen gray:

"Then one is left me—one alone,"

She said, "of four who marched away.

Oh, overruling, All-wise God,

How can I pass beneath Thy rod!"

The soldier walked across the floor,

Paused at the window, at the door,

Wiped the cold dew-drops from his cheek

And sought the mourner's side again.

"Once more, dear lady, I must speak:

Your last remaining son was slain

Just at the closing of the fight.

'Twas he who sent me here to-night."

"God knows," the man said afterward,

"The fight itself was not so hard."

—*The New York Evening Journal.*

THE SURVIVOR

BY DANA BURNET

Have ye heard the thunder down the wind?

Have ye seen the smoke against the sky?

Nay, for my love goes from my arms

To march and die!

Have ye seen the scarlet battle flags,

The distant lightnings of the sword?

Nay, for my house hath lost its king,

My heart its lord!

Have ye heard the splendid lifting song

The wind-blown psalm of the strife?

Nay, for they sing of Death—and I

Am chained to life!

—*The New York Evening Sun.*

WOMAN AND WAR

"SHOT. TELL HIS MOTHER"

BY W. E. P. FRENCH, Captain, U. S. Army

What have I done to you, Brothers,—War-Lord and Land-Lord and Priest,—

That my son should rot on the blood-smeared earth where the raven and buzzard feast?

He was my baby, my man-child, that soldier with shell-torn breast,
Who was slain for your power and profit—aye, murdered at your behest,
I bore him, my boy and my manling, while the long months ebbed away:
He was part of me, part of my body, which nourished him day by day.

He was mine when the birth-pang tore me, mine when he lay on my heart,

When the sweet mouth mumbled my bosom and the milk-teeth made it smart,

Babyhood, boyhood, and manhood, and a glad mother proud of her son—

See the carrion birds, too gorged to fly! Ah! Brothers, what have you done?

You prate of duty and honor, of a patriot's glorious death,
Of love of country, heroic deeds—nay, for shame's sake, spare your breath!

Pray, what have you done for your country? Whose was the blood that was shed

In the hellish warfare that served your ends? My boy was shot in your stead.

And for what were our children butchered, men makers of cruel law?

By the Christ, I am glad no woman made the Christless code of war!

Shirks and schemers, why don't you answer? Is the foul truth hard to tell?

Then a mother will tell it for you, of a deed that shames fiends in hell:—

Our boys were killed that some faction or scoundrel might win mad race

For goals of stained gold, shamed honors, and the sly self-seeker's place;
That money's hold on our country might be tightened and made more sure;

That the rich could inherit earth's fullness and their loot be quite secure;

That the world-mart be wider opened to the product mulct from toil;
That the labor and land of our neighbors should become your war-won
 spoil;

That the eyes of an outraged people might be turned from your graft
 and greed

In the misruled, plundered home-land by lure of war's ghastly deed;
And that priests of the warring nations could pray to the selfsame God
For His blessing on battle and murder and corpse-strewn, blood-soaked
 sod.

Oh, fools! if God were a woman, think you She would let kin slay
For gold-lust and craft of gamesters, or cripple that trade might pay?

This quarrel was not the fighters':—the cheated, red pawns in your
 game:—

You stay-at-homes garnered the plunder, but the pawns,—wounds,
 death, and "Fame"!

You paid them a beggarly pittance, your substitute prey-of-the-sword,
But, ye canny beasts of prey, they paid, in life and limb, for your hoard.
And, behold! you have other victims: a widow sobs by my side,
Who clasps to her breast a girl-child. Men, she was my slain son's
 bride!

I can smell the stench of the shambles, where the mangled bodies lie;
I can hear the moans of the wounded; I can see the brave lads die;
And across the heaped, red trenches and the tortured, bleeding rows
I cry out a mother's pity to all mothers of dear, dead "foes."
In love and a common sorrow, I weep with them o'er our dead,
And invoke my sister woman for a curse on each scheming head.

Nay, why should we mothers curse you? Lo! flesh of our flesh are ye;
But, by soul of Mary who bore the Christ man-murdered at Calvary,
Into our own shall the mothers come, and the glad day speed apace
When the law of peace shall be the law of the women that bear the race;
When a man shall stand by his mother, for the world-wide common
 good,
And not bring her tears and heart-break nor make mock of her mother-
 hood.

—*New York Times.*

A PRAYER OF THE PEOPLES

(On the Day of the President's Call to Prayer)

BY PERCY MACKAYE

God of us, who kill our kind!
Master of this blood-tracked Mind
Which from wolf and Caliban
Staggers toward the star of Man—
Now, on Thy cathedral stair,
God, we cry to Thee in prayer!

Where our stifled anguish bleeds
Strangling through Thine organ reeds,
Where our voiceless songs suspire
From the corpses in Thy choir—
Through Thy charred and shattered nave,
God, we cry on Thee to save!

Save us from our tribal gods!
From the racial powers, whose rods—
Wreathed with stinging serpents—stir
Odin and old Jupiter
From their ancient hells of hate
To invade Thy dawning state.

Save us from their curse of kings!
Free our souls' imaginings
From the feudal dreams of war;
Yea, God, let us nevermore
Make, with slaves' idolatry,
Kaiser, czar, or king of *Thee!*

We who, craven in our prayer,
Would lay off on Thee our care—
Lay instead on *us* Thy load;
On our minds Thy spirit's goad,
On our laggard wills Thy whips
And Thy passion on our lips!

Fill us with the reasoned faith
That the prophet lies who saith
All this web of destiny,
Torn and tangled, cannot be
Newly wove and redesigned
By the Godward human mind.

Teach us, so, no more to call
Guidance supernatural
To our help, but—heart and will—
Know ourselves responsible
For our world of wasted good
And our blinded brotherhood.

Lord, our God! to whom, from clay,
Blood and mire, Thy peoples pray—
Not from Thy cathedral's stair
Thou hearest:—Thou criest *through* our prayer;
For our prayer is but the gate:
We, who pray, ourselves are fate.

—*The New York Times.*

MEMORY AWAKES

BY ETHEL H. WOLFF

What care I for war, or who may lose!
Thank God that I am old, and these dim eyes
Long since wept dry. Fear, in her hideous guise,
No more can haunt my pillow till the long night flies,
Whispering her dreadful tale.

What is't to me that others' sons must go?
My share is paid in three mounds, side by side;
And I live on, who gladly would have died,
With naught to lose, whate'er may now betide—
Whether 'tis win or fail.

Women may lie with open eyes till the faint dawn
Thinking of lips that babble feebly to a darkening sky—
Gray hands that clutch a water flask long since run dry—
Of husband, lovers, sons—but not so I—
On dreamless seas I sail.

Prate not to me of war! I've had my fill
Of death and sacrifice and bitter tears;
Yon marching feet, and blaring music in my ears
But rend apart my graves, now green these many years—
Make Time Past drop its veil.

—*The New York Times.*

WE MOURN FOR PEACE

[For the Peace Parade, August 29]

BY EDITH M. THOMAS

"Who is this pacing sisterhood,
Moving in silent, broken mood,
Clad all in mourning weeds?
Are ye the celebrants of martial deeds—
The work of dauntless spirits lifted high
From many a red field where the brave for country die?"

No! We are not the celebrants of warlike deeds—
We mourn for World-Peace slain,
Hid in our hearts until she rise again!
We hate your fields of death,
Your brasen Mars that leads
Where men are reaped as grain!
Your "Glory" is to us but venomous breath!
A-near our hearts your "causes" do not lie—
Nor one, nor other, O ye warring States!

But we are they who hate your mutual hates;
And we are they whom ye shall ask in vain,
In home's dear covert to remain—
Praying at home—yet serving still your needs,
Yielding to you our sons, our brothers and our mates—
We mourn for World-Peace slain—
We mourn—but oh, not that alone!
A heresy through all our ranks is blown:
The order old is changing—shall not come again;
No more shall tender cowardice restrain,
The "Call of Country" shall betray no more,
To trick our tears in bravery of a smile,
Gazing upon the glittering file
(Of those that march away to war (so fair?)—
Of whom what remnant shall their fate restore?

We celebrants of martial deeds?
Trading in previous lives more dear than are our own?
At last, O warring States, the soul-of-woman know—
We will not give our men, to serve your schemes,
Your warring plans, and your Imperial dreams!

And if ye seize them, we to slaughter too will go,
And in the breach ourselves will throw;
Upon us, too, the quiver of your hatreds rain!
We mourn the World-Peace slain!

—*The Evening Post.*

WHO PAYS?

BY EDNA VALENTINE TRAPNELL

Drum and trumpet and banner, banner and trumpet and drum!
Tramp, tramp, through the city streets the new-listed armies come.
Song and laugh on the transports steaming under the stars,
Wet eyes star-blind of those behind who pay for the nations' wars—
(The women who pay and have paid, dear Lord, for immemorial wars.)

Cheers and shouts greet the headlines that tell of the battles won.
Who remembers the death-wrecked bodies motionless under the sun?
"Victory stood to our banners, only a handful lost—"
Only! We bore those bodies, and we know what bodies cost!
(Mothers and wives of the soldiers dead—who better can gauge the cost?)

Man is blinded by passion, by glory or gold or power.
Shall we not see more clearly when it comes to the woman's hour?
Before we loose hell's lightning that shall prove a cause through strife,
Shall we not weigh the price we pay when the payment's in human life?
(Dear Lord, we know by each birth-throe the value of human life.)

Counselors, kings, and rulers, ye take what ye cannot give.
Can ye say to the things in the trenches, "Be whole, rise up and live"?
Do ye know—who have killed your thousands by a word from a death-
tipped pen—
One little pang of the cost to those who breed you your fighting men?
(Who pays, dear Lord, for their bodies and souls but the mothers and
wives of men?)

—*The Outlook.*

DOUBT

BY PERCY MACKAYE

So thin, so frail the opalescent ice
Where yesterday, in lordly pageant, rose
The monumental nations—the repose
Of continents at peace! Realities
Solid as earth they seemed; yet in a trice
Their bastions crumbled in the surging floes
Of unconceivable, inhuman woes,
Gulfed in a mad, unmeaning sacrifice.

We, who survive that world-quake, quail and start,
Searching our hidden souls with dark surmise:
So thin, so frail—is reason? Patient art—
Is it all a mockery, and love all lies?
Who sees the lurking Hun in childhood's eyes?
Is hell so near to every human heart?

—*Boston Evening Transcript.*

DESTINY

BY PERCY MACKAYE

We are what we imagine, and our deeds
Are born of dreaming. Europe acts to-day
Epics that little children in their play
Conjured, and statesmen murmured in their creeds;
In barrack, court and school were sown those seeds,
Like Dragon's teeth, which ripen to affray
Their sowers. Dreams of slaughter rise to slay,
And fate itself is stuff that fancy breeds.

Mock, then, no more at dreaming, lest our own
Create for us a like reality!
Let not imagination's soil be sown
With armed men but justice, so that we
May for a world of tyranny atone
And dream from that despair—democracy.

—*Boston Evening Transcript.*

RHEIMS

BY PERCY MACKAYE

Apollo mourns another Parthenon
In ruins!—Is the God of Love awake?
And we—must we behold the world's heart break
For peace and beauty ravished, and look on
Dispassionate?—Rheims' gloried fane is gone:
Not by a planet's rupture, nor the quake
Of subterranean titans, but to slake
The vengeance of a Goth Napoleon.

O Time, let not the anguish numb or pall
Of that remembrance! Let no callous heal
Our world-wound, till our kindled pities call
The parliament of nations, and repeal
The vows of war. Till then, pain keep us thrall!
More bitter than to battle—is to feel.

—*Boston Evening Transcript.*

IN MEMORIAM

NOTRE DAME DE RHEIMS, SEPTEMBER, 1914

BY LEE WILSON DODD

Men raised thee with loving hands;
Thy stones, more precious than gems,
They wrought for a Light to the Lands;
Now the Light of all Lands condemns
Hun and Vandal and Goth
Who serve the Lords of the Night,
Who have turned the coat of their troth
And darkened Our Lady of Light.

Men made thee beautiful, yea
Their hearts flowed out as they wrought;
Thou wast builded not for a day,
For an age thou wast builded not:
And they carved thy portals and towers
For peer and burgher and clown,
That the Book of Our Lady's Hours
Might endure tho' the sun burned down.

By the grace of thy ruined Rose,
By the sullied strength of thy Towers,
Thou shalt triumph, Lady! Thy foes
Shall cower as the hunted cowers.
Thou hast not fallen in vain—
Fallen? Thou canst not fall:
They shall crave thy pity in pain,
Who flung thee hate for a pall.

—*The New York Tribune.*

PEASANT AND KING

(What the peasants of Europe are thinking)

BY CHRISTOPHER MORLEY

You who put faith in your banks and brigades,
Drank and ate largely, slept easy at night,
Hoarded your lyddite and polished the blades,
Let down upon us this blistering blight—
You who played grandly the easiest game,
Now can you shoulder the weight of the same?
Say, can *you* fight?

Here is the tragedy: losing or winning
Who profits a copper? Who garners the fruit?
From the bloodiest ending to futile beginning
Ours is the blood, and the sorrow to boot.
Muster your music, flutter your flags,
Ours are the hunger, the wounds, and the rags.
Say, can *you* shoot?

Down in the muck and despair of the trenches
Comes not the moment of bitterest need;
Over the sweat and the groans and the stench
There is a joy in the valorous deed—
But, lying wounded, what one forgets
You and your ribbons and d——d epaulettes—
Say, do *you* bleed?

This is *your* game: it was none of our choosing—
We are the pawns with whom you have played.
Yours is the winning and ours is the losing,
But, when the penalties have to be paid,
We who are left, and our womenfolk, too,
Rulers of Europe, will settle with you—
Are you afraid?

—*The Evening Post.*

WHO DIES IF ENGLAND LIVE?

BY MORRIS RYSKIND

LONDON, Sept. 3.—England, ready for a staggering blow on publication of the government casualty list, heaved a sigh of relief when it was found that so few of the noble families had been affected.—*The Mail*, Sept. 3.

Ten thousand Tommy Atkinses went forth into the fray;
Ten thousand stalwart Tommies who gave Death their lives for pay.
But still we sing, "God Save the King," and thank the Fates of War:
For Viscount What-the-Who's-This hasn't even got a scar.

Ten thousand Tommy Atkinses, courageous, clear-eyed, brave,
Went boldly into battle—and the battlefield's their grave.
Their souls God rest!—He knows what's best: Good news, bad news
shall match:
The Duke of What-You-Call-It hasn't even got a scratch.

Ten thousand Tommy Atkinses that faced the German hordes;
Ten thousand Tommy Atkinses cut down by guns and swords.
In peace they sleep.—Why do ye weep, ye girls they left behind?
Lord So-and-So is safe and sound.—The others,—never mind!
—*The Columbia Jester.*

THE PRICE

BY J. H. H.

A costly thing is a War Lord's word
When he bids his subjects draw the sword.

Here's part of the cost the Germans pay
For their Kaiser's plunge into bloody strife:
For a metal check they trade away
A vigorous German soldier's life.
Thousands and thousands of little tags
Have been garnered by British and French, they say,
To send to Berlin in gunny bags.
Dear God! what an awful price to pay;
And scarcely a month has flown away.

But this is only the partial cost,
Because in the tumult of the fray
Thousands and thousands of checks are lost,
And the lives they tally are thrown away;
For they fail to get even metal disks,
For those who bleeding and anguished stray,
For the souls they count in missing lists.
Great God! what an awful price to pay;
And scarcely a month has flown away.

Can the Kaiser bring them back again?
Can the War Lord still the tortured wail
Of wives and children for murdered men?
Oh! the shocked world shudders at the tale.
If 'twere only loss of yellow gold,
Or only lack of barter and sale,
Why, hearts might grieve, but they'd not grow cold.
Dear God! what an awful price to pay
Ere scarcely a month has flown away.

When the Kaiser bids them fight, they must;
They cannot, they dare not disobey.
But there'll be reckoning, since God is just,
For blood and iron have had their day;
And out of the wreck of war for greed
The German nation will be freed
From the heavy hand of the War Lord's breed.
But God! what an awful price to pay;
And scarcely a month has flown away.

A costly thing is a War Lord's word
When he bids his subjects draw the sword.

NOTE.—Each German soldier wears an identification check. The newspapers of September 7 reported that 62,000 of these checks had been gathered by the Allies to be sent to Berlin.

—*The New York Times.*

FOR ALL WE HAVE AND ARE

(*An Answer*)

BY HENRY B. SALISBURY

"For all we have and are,"
"For all our children's fate,"
Stand and denounce the war
Of horrid, hellish hate.
Let empires pass away
And kingdoms be o'erthrown.
For deeds ye've done to-day
Shall thrones and crowns atone?

"Though all we know depart,"
"The old commandments stand."
"Thou shalt not kill." Ye start?
"Thou shalt not steal" the land.

Though emperors give the word
To drench with blood the world,
There's a law above the sword
By mightier power unfurled.
"Love thou thy neighbor as thyself."
Heard ye that King's command?
Go! Royal lords of pelf,
Go! Hide your bloody hand.

Though kingly robes ye wear
(Your brother's keeper still.)
The mark of Cain ye bear;
Hark ye: "Thou shalt not kill."
The hand upon the wall
Has written out your fate.
"Begone." Ye rulers all,
Feel ye the millstone's weight.

The people to their own
Shall come when ye are gone.
Your exit shall atone.
(Ye were better never born.)
The brotherhood of man
From war's ruin shall rise,
War shall all nations ban
As your regal power dies.

"Though all we know depart,"

"The old commandments stand."

"Thou shalt not kill." Ye start?

"Thou shalt not steal" the land.

—*The New York Globe.*

TO EUROPE

BY GEORGE STERLING

I

Beat back thy forfeit plowshares into swords.

It is not yet the far, seraphic Dream

Of peace made beautiful and love supreme.

For now the strong, unwearable chords

Of battle shake to thunder, and the hordes

Advance, where now the circling vultures scream.

The standards gather and the trumpets gleam;

Down the long hillside stare the mounted lords.

Now far beyond the tumult and the hate

The white-clad nurses and the surgeons wait

The backward currents of tormented life,

When on the waiting silences shall come

The screams of men, and, ere those lips are dumb,

The searching probe, the ligature and knife.

II

Was it for such, the brutality and the pain,

Civilization gave her holy fire

Unto thy guardianship, and the snowy spire

Of her august and most exalted fane?

Are these the harvests of her ancient rain

Men glean at evening in the scarlet mire,

Or where the mountain smokes, a dreadful pyre,

Or where the war-ship drags a bloody stain?

Are these thy votive lilies and their dew,

That now the outraged stars look down to see?

Behold them, where the cold prophetic damps

Congel on youthful brows so soon to lose

Their dream of sacrifice to thee—to thee,

Harlot to Murder in a thousand camps!

III

Was it for this that loving men and true
Have labored in the darkness and the light
To rear the solemn temple of the Right
On Reason's deep foundations, bared anew
Long after the Cæsarian eagles flew
And Rome's last thunder died upon the Night?
Cuirassed, the cannon menace from the height;
Armored, the new-born eagles take the blue.

Wait not thy lords the avenging certain knell—
One with the captains and abhorrent fames
The echoes of whose conquests died in Hell?—
They that have loosened the ensanguined flood
And whose malign and execrable names
The Angel of the Record writes in blood.
—*The New York World.*

THE VULTURE

BY GEORGE S. HELLMAN

I

With bleeding wings and shame-enveiled eyes.
How like a stricken eagle flies
The soul of mankind now!
War, the great vulture, hunts her from the skies;
His raucous voice mocks at her high desire;
His grim, embattled wings forbid her goal.
O thou world-soul,
How long shall thy dark foe besmirch thee with his mire?

II

Blame not too far the Hohenzollern pride;
Trace not the curse alone to Emperor or Czar;
Yield sorrowful applause
To Belgic valor, Gaul's defensive cause,
Or England's loyalty to treaties and to laws;
Yet shall no man escape the essential shame,
Nor any of earth's nations, whatsoe'er its name,
To what avail, paternity denied,
Since misbegotten War
Is the foul offspring of a sire world-wide?

III

Oh, grim account soon to be rendered—
Illimitable columns of lost life—
When vulture War, whom mankind hath engendered,
With sated gorge flies from the fields of strife!
Then
Shall we, with searching vision of brave men,
To its far roots far-reaching evil trace,
And bear our share in a whole world's disgrace;
Or, quibbling like mean merchants, face the score,
Crying, "The crafty Slav hath caused this war!"
Or "Sordid Anglo-Saxon!" or "Nay,
The too-ambitious Teuton—let *him* pay!"

IV

Immediate causes are for shallow minds:
He hath small sight who uses but his eyes.
If the world-soul sails forth on high emprise,
Her care is not alone the contravening winds
Of autocratic wills,
Or venomous shafts of ancient racial passions.
These shall be transient ills—
The forms ridiculous of barbaric fashions—
When once the universal voice of man
Proclaims in tones that God shall hear afar:
"In the great future's perfect plan
There is no place for war!"

V

Let tiger 'gainst fierce tiger fight in lust,
While the dark jungle trembles with the fray;
Deep crimsoning with blood the gray Saharan dust,
Let lions dispute their prey.
How long, O Soul of Man, shall men be such as they?
How long, how long,
Redress of evil seek through means of greatest wrong?
How long shall Christian nations hurl in air
The final blasphemy of the battle-prayer?
Oh, when shall cease
This gibe, this cruel gibe, against their Prince of Peace?

VI

Backward move all marching feet,
And downward strikes each mailed hand.
The cry to arms confesses man's defeat
In whatsoever land.

Poor little human minds
That seek in armaments their strength or their disguise;
The trumpet blares how we are weakly wise,
The bugle blows our justice to the winds.

VII

Today
In black humiliation stand we all,
Seeing, how like a house of cards,
Similitudes, with no essential stay,
Shards, useless shards,
Civilization's boasted structures fall.
Not force, but wisdom, be our shield.
And our sword justice, man's divinest power!
For when these twain, that make us more than beast,
Sway all the earth, war shall have ceased.
And it may be that this disgraceful hour
Will from its shadows still the sunlight yield—
The sunlight of high peace, which man's rebirth shall see.
His soul from the great vulture, War, set free, O God, set free!
—*The New York Times.*

THE VINTAGE

BY CLINTON SCOLLARD

Rumors of ravaging war perturb the mind,
Ruffling the channels of our wonted ease;
Within the sky we read red auguries,
And hear grim portents shivering down the wind.
Not as aforetime do we fondly find
Orchestral notes or lulling harmonies
In the long plunge and murmur of the seas,
But discords horrent unto all mankind!

The fields of France are bright with poppy flowers;
Along the terraced vineyards by the Rhine
The ripening grapes are crimsoning for the wine;
Beneath the sun what fairer sight to see!
But ere the march of many hastening hours,
What will the bloom, what will the vintage be?

—*The Sun.*

THE RECKONING

BY CLINTON SCOLLARD

What do they reck who sit aloof on thrones,
Or in the chambered chancelleries apart,
Playing the game of state with subtle art,
If so be they may win, what wretched groans
Rise from red fields, what unrecorded bones
Bleach within shallow graves, what bitter smart
Pierces the widowed or the orphaned heart—
The unhooded horror for which naught atones!

A word, a pen stroke, and this might not be!
But vengeance, power lust, festering jealousy,
Triumph, and grim carnage stalks abroad.
Hark! Hear that ominous bugle on the wind!
And they who might have stayed it, shall they find
No reckoning within the courts of God?

—*The Sun.*

THE WAR OF KINGS

BY CLINTON SCOLLARD

From dawn to dusk reign horror and affright,
And the sad night no healing respite brings;
In all its hideous panoply of might,
This is the war of kings!

The people are but pawns upon the board;
What of their wants, their woes, their sufferings?
Speak, Death, dark watcher both by field and ford,
In this grim war of kings!

Will history still repeat the sanguine past,
With all its trail of ruthless anguishings?
Oh, may this slaughter-carnival be the last—
The last dread war of kings!

—*The Outlook.*

AMERICA

BY CONRAD AIKEN

We lay and smiled, to see our sky
So blue, so luminous with sun;
Lo, far off, wailed an ominous cry;
We heard a thunder of footsteps run

Under a darkness settling there,
Some huge and sinister wing's eclipse;
Smoke fouled the east; a baleful glare
Lightened beneath; and maddened lips

Took up that cry, while darkness stirred
And heaved, and like a wounded thing
Bled, by the utterance of one word
Which bade a myriad war-swords sing.

What murderous shadow troubled so
Our summer dream? . . . The sunlight ceased.
A sick and fetid wind came slow
From the stale tenements of the east.

Brother to slay his brother rose,
The shambles fell, and from that gloom
Came the hoarse herded cry of those
Who blindly massed to fight for room.

Room! Give us air! A breathing space!
The sunlight and the land for all!
Each lifted up a stifled face,
And battered door, and beat at wall,

And surged against resurgent horde
For space to sow his little seed.
Lo, they would plow the earth with sword,
Strew dead on earth that earth might feed.

And we—where now our summer bliss?
From the stale tenements of the east
Stole fear lest we should come to this,
And prove us brother to the beast.

—*The Outlook.*

WAR AND DEATH

BY HELEN COALE GREW

Two figures out of the gloom of despair on man's vision broke;
And one, colossal, brute-visaged, vengeful, and pitiless, spoke—

"I am War! And behold in the courts of the gods none is greater than I!
Earth quivers and reels at my gauntlet's touch, and the dome of the sky
Is shattered and torn by my trumpet's blare and the flash of my sword;
And man at my coming is fearful and fain of the help of the Lord.
Yea, black is the doom that I spread on the world, and the ruin is wide.
Man may pray himself dumb! Can he slay me in fear who begot me in
pride?"

But he, the other, benignant, pitying, quiet of breath,
Smiled, "You shall know me and fear me not. I am but Death!"
—*The Outlook.*

PEACE

BY EDWIN MARKHAM

Who are the ghosts in flight
Where siege guns spat their rage upon the night?
What shapes are those that shiver in the moon
About the towers and banners of Verdun?
And what those cries at night on hill and tarn
Down the long ruined Valley of the Marne?
They are the ghosts that cannot rest, that cry
Because there was no need to die.

And look, on the north still runs a line of fire
Where armies struggle in the battle-mire!
And yonder, see the crimson battle-rain
Upon the height of Aisne!
And farther still upon the cliffs of Oise
That streaming banners and the loud huzzahs,
And far upon the east the marching masses
Are pouring thru the wild Carpathian passes;
And the bright quiet flood
Of Vistula is red with brother's blood.

Peace, peace, O men, for ye are brothers all—
Ye in the trench and on the shattered wall.
Do ye not know ye came
Out of one Love and wear one sacred name?

Let there be no more battles; earth is old
With sorrows; let the weary banners fold.
And the grim cannons spewing death on men,
They, too, are weary and would sleep again.
And they have drunk enough, the battle blades—
Enough, God knows, are laid asleep with spades.
Yes, there are ghosts enough hurled on ahead,
Choking the shadowy passes of the dead.

Peace, brothers; let the music of the loom
Help us a little to forget the doom.
Yes, let the busy whisper of the wheel
And the bright furrow of the happy keel,
Help to forget the rage of sword and flame,
And wrongs that are too terrible for name.
And let the grasses hurry to the graves
To cover them with ripple of green waves;
And where the fields ran reddest in wild hours,
Let Mercy hide them with a foam of flowers.

O brothers, lift a cry, a long world-cry
Sounding from sky to sky—
The cry of one great word,
Peace, peace, the world-will clamoring to be heard—
A cry to break the ancient battle-ban,
To end it in the sacred name of Man!

—*The New York American.*

STAIN NOT THE SKY

BY HENRY VAN DYKE

Ye gods of battle, lords of fear,
Who work your iron will as well
As once ye did with sword and spear,
With rifled gun and rending shell,—
Masters of sea and land, forbear
The fierce invasion of the inviolate air!

With patient daring man hath wrought
A hundred years for power to fly,
And shall we make his winged thought
A hovering horror in the sky,
Where flocks of human eagles sail,
Dropping their bolts of death on hill and dale?

Ah no, the sunset is too pure,
The dawn too fair, the noon too bright,
For wings of terror to obscure
Their beauty, and betray the night
That keeps for man, above his wars,
The tranquil vision of untroubled stars.

Pass on, pass on, ye lords of fear!
Your footsteps in the sea are red,
And black on earth your paths appear
With ruined homes and heaps of dead.
Pass on, and end your transient reign,
And leave the blue of heaven without a stain.

The wrong ye wrought will fall to dus .
The right ye shielded will abide;
The world at last will learn to trust
In law to guard, and love to guide;
The Peace of God that answers prayer
Will fall like dew from the inviolate air.

The Hague, Netherlands.

—The Independent.

TO THE PEACE PALACE AT THE HAGUE

BY ROBERT UNDERWOOD JOHNSON

Builted of Love and Joy and Faith and Hope,
Thou standest firm beyond the tides of war
That dash in gloom and fear and tempest-roar,
Beacon of Europe!—tho wise pilots grope
Where trusted lights are lost; tho the dread scope
Of storm is wider, deadlier than before;
Ay, tho the very floods that strew the shore
Seem to obey some power turned misanthrope.

For thou art witness to a world's desire,
And when—oh, happiest of days!—shall cease
The throes by which our Age doth bring to birth
The fairest of her daughters, heavenly Peace,
When Man's red folly has been purged in fire,
Thou shalt be Capitol of all the Earth.

—*The Independent.*

A VOICE FROM THE BATTLEFIELD

BY HERBERT BASHFORD

To look upon the fool that once was I—
That gory thing with face half red, half white,
I can but smile; it seems so droll—the sight
Of those glazed eyes—one staring at the sky!
And now that all is clear I wonder why
I could not see until that last mad fight—
When I awoke in His eternal light—
How blind is he who marches forth to die

For some vain monarch seated on a throne!
If those brave soldiers there could only see
As I see now who draw no mortal breath,
No more the lifted sword, the crash and groan,
The thunder of the red artillery—
That awful, flaming orchestra of Death!

—*The San Francisco Bulletin.*

A CHANT OF HATE AGAINST ENGLAND

BY ERNST LISSAUER, in Jugend

Rendered into English verse by Barbara Henderson

French and Russian, they matter not,
A blow for a blow and a shot for a shot;
We love them not, we hate them not,
We hold the Weichsel and Vosges-gate,
We have but one and only hate,
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe and one alone.

He is known to you all, he is known to you all,
He crouches behind the dark gray flood,
Full of envy, of rage, of craft, of gall,
Cut off by waves that are thicker than blood.
Come let us stand at the Judgment place,
An oath to swear to, face to face,
An oath of bronze no wind can shake,
An oath for our sons and their sons to take.
Come, hear the word, repeat the word,
Throughout the Fatherland make it heard.
We will never forego our hate,
We have all but a single hate,
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe and one alone—
ENGLAND!

In the Captain's Mess, in the banquet-hall,
Sat feasting the officers, one and all,
Like a sabre-blow, like the swing of a sail,
One seized his glass held high to hail;
Sharp-snapped like the stroke of a rudder's play,
Spoke three words only: "To the Day!"

Whose glass this fate?
They had all but a single hate.
Who was thus known?
They had one foe and one alone—
ENGLAND!

Take you the folk of the Earth in pay,
With bars of gold your ramparts lay,
Bedeck the ocean with bow on bow,
Ye reckon well, but not well enough now.
French and Russian they matter not,
A blow for a blow, a shot for a shot,
We fight the battle with bronze and steel,
And the time that is coming Peace will seal.
You will we hate with a lasting hate,
We will never forego our hate,
Hate by water and hate by land,
Hate of the head and hate of the hand,
Hate of the hammer and hate of the crown,
Hate of seventy millions, choking down.
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe and one alone—
ENGLAND!

—*The New York Times.*

ANSWERING THE "HASSGESANG"

BY BEATRICE M. BARRY

French and Russian, they matter not,
For England only your wrath is hot;
But little Belgium is so small
You never mentioned her at all—
Or did her graveyards, yawning deep,
Whisper that silence was discreet?

For Belgium is waste! Ay, Belgium is waste!
She welters in the blood of her sons,
And the ruins that fill the little place
Speak of the vengeance of the Huns.
"Come, let us stand at the Judgment place,"
German and Belgian, face to face.
What can you say? What can you do?
What will history say of you?
For even the Hun can only say
That little Belgium lay in his way.

Is there no reckoning you must pay?
What of the Justice of that "Day"?
Belgium one voice—Belgium one cry
Shrieking her wrongs, inflicted by
GERMANY!

In her ruined homesteads, her trampled fields.
You have taken your toll, you have set your seal;
Her women are homeless, her men are dead,
Her children pitifully cry for bread;
Perchance they will drink with you—"To the Day!"
Let each man construe it as he may.
What shall it be?
They, too, have but one enemy;
Whose work is this?
Belgium has but one word to hiss—
GERMANY!

Take you the pick of your fighting men
Trained in all warlike arts, and then
Make of them all a human wedge
To break and shatter your sacred pledge;
You may fling your treaty lightly by,
But that "scrap of paper" will never die!
It will go down to posterity,
It will survive in eternity.
Truly you hate with a lasting hate;
Think you you will escape that hate?
"Hate by water and hate by land;
Hate of the head and hate of the hand."
Black and bitter and bad as sin,
Take you care lest it hem you in,
Lest the hate you boast of be yours alone,
And curses, like chickens, find roost at home
IN GERMANY!

—*The New York Times.*

ANOTHER CHANT OF HATE

BY ROSALIE M. MOYNAHAN

French and Russian, they matter not,
Some wrong remembered, some good forgot;

England stands at the Bar alone,
Nemesis rises to claim her own.
Ireland or Belgium—dare you say
Whose wrongs cry loudest this Judgment Day,
ENGLAND?

For not in a sudden, swift campaign,
The World as Mourner, was Ireland slain;
No soldier's steel plunged straight to her heart—
The sword *you* wield has a finer art.
Deep in the darkness of your hold
You forged it with hate, you weighed it with gold;
You drew it with lust,
You swung it with sin,
Sure and stealthy you thrust it in,
And never have plucked it out again,
ENGLAND! —

You cry aloud through the printed page
"For Liberty, Honor, the fight I wage!"
Australia, Canada, governed well?
Aye! *They* are distant, might rebel.
Ireland, helpless under your heel,
Proof of the value those words conceal!
You have wrenched their Celtic tongue away,
But their hate cries out in *your* tongue today,
And casts your treacherous past in the way,
ENGLAND!

Yet why the past do we judge you by?
Stricken Belgium must deny,
But we aloud to the world can cry:
"You pledged your Power to be her shield,
You pledged her the millions your conquests yield;
What help can now the wrong atone?
You pledged your honor—*She* fought alone,
ENGLAND!"

They have stood at the Judgment-Place,
The Saints, the Heroes of our race.
Through the long Night of the Tyrant's sin
Ireland has trusted her Cause to Him.
"Vengeance is Mine, I will repay,"
And God fulfills His Word today
Through *GERMANY!*

MOTHERHOOD'S CHANT

BY McLANDBURGH WILSON

French or Russian, they matter not,
German or English, as one begot.
We bore them all and we bore them well,
We went for them to the gates of hell,
We are the makers of flesh and bone,
We have one foe, one hate alone—
WAR!

He is known to you all, he has called to you all,
He crouches behind each boundary wall,
He rides on the waves of a crimson flood,
He rides on the tides of our children's blood,
He lies of glory and sacrifice,
Of honor and fame and pomp he lies—
WAR!

Come, let us stand in the Judgment Place
And take an oath for the human race,
An oath our daughters, and theirs, shall take,
An oath no trumpet or drum can shake.
We hate no sinner, we hate the sin,
Not those who lose, not those who win.
We, the makers of flesh and bone,
We have one foe, one hate alone—
WAR!

You take the folk of our pain to slay,
That gold nor steel can ever repay.
You shall we hate with a lasting hate.
We will never forego our hate—
Hate of the heart and hate of the womb,
Hate of the cradle and hate of the tomb.
And you shall answer and make reply,
For we are partners of God on high.
What will you say before that Throne
To Us, the makers of flesh and bone,
WAR?

—*The New York Times.*

MARS, COMEDIAN

War, an international dementia alleged to insure the survival of the fittest, should be assiduously encouraged by all unfit members of society. The man with narrow chest and withered hand struggles under a decided handicap in the piping times of peace. He commonly sees the rich, witty and pulchritudinous female of the species carried off into "happiness ever after" by strapping fellows against whom he has no chance whatever in the sex arena. All this is changed, however, with the declaration of war, and the arrival of the recruiting officer. Apollo Belvedere is the favorite fodder of the machine gun. Shrapnel screams with joy as it increases an athlete's chest expansion from seven inches to thirty feet. What matters it if ten thousand mothers weep and wail and gnash their teeth over the details of victory. Who taught their handsome sons to love war? These are but the tears of shameless recantation. Let them turn for comfort to little Oscar whose dry cough kept him out of the army; to Minnie and Hal at the State Home for the Feeble-Minded. Let the unfit dead bury themselves. These that survive are the fittest.—*Life*.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

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DOCUMENTS REGARDING THE EUROPEAN WAR SERIES No. IV

- I. TURKISH OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, NOVEMBER, 1914.
- II. SPEECH OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR TO
THE REICHSTAG, DECEMBER 2, 1914.
- III. THE BELGIAN GRAY BOOK (JULY 24-AUGUST 29, 1914).



JANUARY, 1915, No. 86

American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City



The Executive Committee of the Association for International Conciliation wish to arouse the interest of the American people in the progress of the movement for promoting international peace and relations of comity and good fellowship between nations. To this end they print and circulate documents giving information as to the progress or interruption of these movements, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have readily available accurate information on these subjects. A list of publications will be found on page 54.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S APPEAL FOR IMPARTIALITY AND RESTRAINT IN DIS- CUSSING THE WAR

MY FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN: I suppose that every thoughtful man in America has asked himself during the last troubled weeks what influence the European war may exert upon the United States, and I take the liberty of addressing a few words to you in order to point out that it is entirely within our own choice what its effects upon us will be and to urge very earnestly upon you the sort of speech and conduct which will best safeguard the nation against distress and disaster.

The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say or do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The spirit of the nation in this critical matter will be determined largely by what individuals and society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and magazines contain, upon what our ministers utter in their pulpits and men proclaim as their opinions on the streets.

The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility; responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its Government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinions, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion, if not in action. Such diversions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend.

I venture, therefore, my fellow-countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.

My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action, a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world.

Shall we not resolve to put upon ourselves the restraint which will bring to our people the happiness and the great and lasting influence for peace we covet for them?

WOODROW WILSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 18, 1914.

I

THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG

INTRODUCTION

The neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg has been guaranteed at different times by the larger European powers now unfortunately at war, and the duties of belligerents, including that of the inviolability of neutral territory, have been formally recognized by the powers represented at the Second Hague Peace Conference.

First as to the specific treaties of European powers. On November 15, 1831, a treaty was signed between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and Belgium, relative to the separation of Belgium from Holland. Article VII thereof decrees the neutrality of Belgium, and by Article XXV thereof the five powers "guarantee to His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the execution of all the preceding Articles." Article VII, which appears without change in the succeeding treaties, is as follows:

Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV, shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other States.

It will be noted that Holland was not a party to this treaty, as its king was at that time unwilling to acknowledge the independence of Belgium.

On April 19, 1839, a treaty was concluded between the Netherlands and Belgium, by which the former country recognized the independence of the latter, thus dissolving the union between Holland and Belgium created by the Treaty of Vienna of May 30, 1815. The seventh article of this treaty is the same as the corresponding article of the treaty of 1831 and of the subsequent treaties.

On the same date (April 19, 1839) a treaty was concluded between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia, on the one hand, and the Netherlands, on the other, recognizing the independence and neutrality of Belgium; and an identical treaty was concluded between the five powers, on the one hand, and Belgium, on the other, to which was annexed the treaty of even date between the five powers and Holland, Article VII of which neutralizes Belgium. The first article of this treaty declares that "they (the articles of the treaty between the Netherlands and Belgium) are thus placed under the guarantee of their said Majesties." The essential difference between the treaty of November 15, 1831, and the series of treaties between the five powers, on the one hand, and the Netherlands and Belgium, on the other, is that, whereas in the first treaty an express guarantee was made to Belgium of its neutrality, in the latter treaties the guarantee is general.

It will be noted that the Germanic Confederation on April 19, 1839, acceded to Articles I to VII, inclusive, of the Treaties of April 19, 1839, and that this accession was accepted by the parties to such treaties. The

they extend to the Gulf of Persia. England has carried out its plan of impairing the sovereign rights of Turkey and of opening up a way of access into Arabia, for a long time coveted by the English.

"Faithful to its policy of hostility, England has ever opposed the attempts at reforms in Turkey. It exerted all its influence to prevent the Powers from furnishing expert technical help to the Turkish Government. The Kaiser alone, disregarding the intrigues of Great Britain, authorized S. E. Liman von Sanders, Pasha, to re-organize the Turkish Army; that army which is to-day challenging the British forces."

After having recalled the Franco-British convention of 1904 which "passed a sentence of death on Morocco and on Egypt," and the agreement with Russia in reference to Persia, the note concludes:

"England for more than a century has been striving to destroy the freedom of the Moslem so as to open up their countries to the greedy exploitation of the British merchants. The English Government, pursuing its program of hatred against the Moslem states, has succeeded in giving to its policy a religious color which ensures to it the support and the adhesion of the English people, puritanic and fanatical.

"Let us be grateful to God who has given us the opportunity of victoriously defending the welfare of Islam against its three ruthless enemies, England, Russia, and France."

THE TEXT OF THE "FETVA"

Translated from the *Corriere della Sera*, November 16, 1914.

Constantinople, November 15th, 1914.

Sixty thousand persons or thereabouts participated to-day in a mass meeting organized by several patriotic associations. The different corporations that took part in the event marched to Fatickh Square, in the old Stamboul, where an immense crowd had assembled. In the mosque of Fatickh the "Fetva" proclaiming the Holy War was read by a special delegation of the Sheik ul Islam. The text of the "Fetva" drawn in the form of answers and questions as required by the rules of Islam is as follows:

"If several enemies unite against Islam, if the countries of Islam are sacked, if the Moslem populations are massacred or made captive; and if in this case the Padishah in conformity with the sacred words of the Koran proclaims the Holy War, is participation in this war a duty for all Moslems, old and young, cavalry and infantry? Must the Moham-medans of all countries of Islam hasten with their bodies and possessions to the *Djal?*" (Jihad) (Holy War)

Answer: "Yes."

"The Moslem subjects of Russia, of France, of England and of all the countries that side with them in their land and sea attacks dealt against the Caliphate for the purpose of annihilating Islam, must these subjects, too, take part in the Holy War against the respective governments from which they depend?"

Answer: "Yes."

"Those who at a time when all Moslems are summoned to fight, avoid the struggle and refuse to join in the Holy War, are they exposed to the wrath of God, to great misfortunes, and to the deserved punishment?"

Answer: "Yes."

"If the Moslem subjects of the said countries should take up arms against the government of Islam, would they commit an unpardonable sin, even if they had been driven to the war by threats of extermination uttered against themselves and their families?"

Answer: "Yes."

"The Moslems who in the present war are under England, France, Russia, Servia, Montenegro and those who give aid to these countries by waging war against Germany and Austria, allies of Turkey, do they deserve to be punished by the wrath of God as being the cause of harm and damage to the Caliphate and to Islam?"

Answer: "Yes."

II

SPEECH OF THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO THE REICHSTAG, DECEMBER 2, 1914.

Gentlemen: His Majesty, the Emperor, who is with the army, has directed me at my departure to convey his best wishes and most cordial greetings to the German National Assembly with whom he feels united unto death, in storm and stress, and in the common care for the welfare of the Fatherland. His Majesty also wishes me, from this place, to thank the whole nation in his name for their unexampled devotion and sacrifices, for the powerful work which all classes of the population, without difference of rank and station, have done and will do both at the front and at home. Our first thought in return goes out to the Kaiser, to the army and navy, to our soldiers who fight in the field and on the open sea for the honor and greatness of the Empire. With a justified pride and unshakable trust we look up to them. Let us also think of our brothers-in-arms from Austria and Hungary, who are faithfully united with us and fight the great fight with a valor that has stood the test most brilliantly. In this war, which has been forced upon us, a new ally, the Ottoman Empire, has only recently joined us, an ally who knows well that if the German Empire were crushed today the Turkish State, too, would lose its autonomy. Even though our adversaries have raised a powerful coalition against us, we trust they will soon find out that the arm of our brave allies, too, will reach the weak spots of their world-position.

On August 4th the Diet declared the inflexible will of the entire nation to take up the war which had been forced on us, and to defend our independence to the utmost. Since then great things have happened. It is impossible to enumerate the heroic deeds of single armies, regiments and squadrons in a war whose various fronts are scattered all over the globe. History will record these deeds. The incomparable valor of our arms has carried the war into the land of the enemy. There we stand firm and strong and can look to the future with every confidence. But the enemy's power of resistance is not broken, we are not at the end of our sacrifices. The nation will continue to bear all sacrifices with the same heroism as they have done before. For we must and will wage this war of defence, in which we are assaulted from all sides, to a successful end for the sake of right and liberty. When that time has come we shall also remember the injustice and ill-treatment dealt out to our defenceless citizens in hostile countries,—wrongs which in many cases were an outrage against all the principles of civilization. The world must come to learn that nobody can hurt a hair on a German's head with impunity.

Gentlemen ! A few moments after the Session of the 4th of August was finished, the British Ambassador came and handed us England's

ultimatum and, this being at once refused, a declaration of war. As I had no opportunity then to speak about the attitude the British Government had finally taken, I shall now offer some remarks on that point. Where the responsibility in this greatest of all wars lies is quite evident to us. Outwardly responsible are the men in Russia who planned and carried into effect the general mobilization of the Russian army. But in reality and truth the British Government is responsible. The London Cabinet could have made war impossible if they had unequivocally told Petersburg that England was not willing to let a continental war of the Great Powers result from the Austro-Hungarian conflict with Serbia. Such words would have compelled France to use all her energy to keep Russia away from every warlike measure. Then our good offices and mediation between Vienna and Petersburg would have been successful, and there would have been no war! But England has chosen to act otherwise. She knew that the clique of powerful and partly irresponsible men, surrounding the Czar, were spoiling for war and intriguing to bring it about. England saw that the wheel was set a-rolling, but she did not think of stopping it. While openly professing sentiments of peace, London secretly gave St. Petersburg to understand that England stood by France and therefore by Russia too. This has been clearly and irrefutably shown by the official publications which in the meantime have come out, more particularly by the Blue Book edited by the British Government. Then St. Petersburg could no longer be restrained. In proof of this we possess the testimony of the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg, a witness who is surely beyond every suspicion. He reported (you know his words, but I will repeat them now), he reported to his Government on July 30th that "England commenced by making it understood that she would not let herself be drawn into a conflict. Sir George Buchanan said this openly. Today, however, everybody in St. Petersburg is quite convinced,—one has actually received the assurance—that England will stand by France. This support is of enormous weight and has contributed largely toward giving the war-party the upper hand." Up to this summer English statesmen have assured their Parliament that no treaty or agreement existed influencing England's independence of action, should a war break out, England was free to decide whether she would participate in a European war or not. Hence, there was no treaty obligation, no compulsion, no menace of the homeland which induced the English statesmen to originate the war and then at once to take part in it. The only conclusion left is that the London Cabinet allowed this European war, this monstrous world war, because they thought it was an opportune moment with the aid of England's political confederates, to destroy the vital nerve of her greatest European competitors in the markets of the world. Therefore, England, together with Russia (I have spoken about Russia on the 4th of August),* is answerable before God and man for this catastrophe which has come over Europe and over mankind.

The Belgian neutrality which England pretended she was bound to shield, is but a mask. On the 2d of August, 7 P.M., we informed Brussels

* See Document No. 84, pp. 5-6.

that France's plan of campaign was known to us and that it compelled us, for reasons of self-preservation, to march through Belgium, but as early as the afternoon of the same day, August 21, that is to say, before anything was known and could be known of this step, the British Government promised unconditional aid to France in case the German navy attacked the French coastline. Not a word was said of Belgian neutrality. This fact is established by the declaration made by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons on the 31 of August. The declaration was communicated to me on August 4th, but not in full, because of the difficulties experienced at that time in the transmission of telegrams. Besides the very Blue Book issued by the British Government confirms that fact. How then can England allege that she drew the sword because we violated Belgian neutrality? How could British statesmen, who accurately knew the past, talk at all of Belgian neutrality? When on the 4th of August I referred to the wrong which we were doing in marching through Belgium, it was not yet known for certain whether the Brussels Government in the hour of need would not decide after all to spare the country and to retire to Antwerp under protest. You remember that, after the occupation of Liege, at the request of our army leaders, I repeated the offer to the Belgian Government. For military reasons it was absolutely imperative that at the time, about the 4th of August, the possibility for such a development was being kept open. Even then the guilt of the Belgian Government was apparent from many a sign, although I had not yet any positive documentary proofs at my disposal. But the English statesmen were perfectly familiar with these proofs. The documents which in the meantime have been found in Brussels, and which have been given publicity by me, prove and establish in what way and to what degree Belgium has surrendered her neutrality to England. The whole world is now acquainted with two outstanding facts: (1) In the night from the 31 to the 4th of August, when our troops entered Belgian territory, they were not on neutral soil, but on the soil of a state that had long abandoned its neutrality. (2) England has declared war on us, not for the sake of Belgian neutrality, which she herself had helped to undermine, but because she believed that she could overcome and master us with the help of two great military powers on the Continent. Ever since the 2d of August when England promised to back up the French in this war, she was no longer neutral, but actually in a state of war with us. On the 4th of August she declared war, the alleged reason being our violation of Belgian neutrality. But that was only a sham motive and a spectacular scene intended to conceal the true war motive and thus to mislead both the English people and foreign neutral countries.

The military plans which England and Belgium had worked out to the minutest details now being unveiled, the policy of English statesmen is branded for all times of history to come. But English diplomacy still added to this: At its call, Japan snatched from us Kiangtchau, so bravely defended, and thus violated Chinese neutrality. Has England interfered with that breach of neutrality? Has she shown in this instance her scrupulous anxiety about the neutral states?

Gentlemen! Five years ago when I was called to this place, the

Triple Alliance had to reckon with a solid counter-combination of Powers. England had created the Triple Entente and knitted it firmly for the purpose of maintaining the "balance of power." For centuries it had been a fundamental tenet of British policy to turn against that Continental Power which was strongest, and this principle was to find its most efficient instrument in the Triple Entente. Thus, whilst the Triple Alliance was of a strictly defensive character, the nature of the Triple Entente was offensive from the beginning. In this lay all the elements of a terrific explosion. A nation as great and efficient as the Germans are does not allow its free and pacific development to be thwarted. In the face of this aggressive combination the course of German policy was clear. We had to try to come to a separate understanding with each member of the Triple Entente in order to dispel the clouds of war, and at the same time we had to increase our armaments so as to be ready if war actually broke out. Gentlemen, you know that we have done both. In France we encountered, again and again, sentiments of revenge. These sentiments being fed and fostered by ambitious politicians proved stronger than the wish, undoubtedly cherished by a part of the French people, to live with us, as neighbors should, on friendly terms. We made, indeed, some specific agreements with Russia, but her close alliance with France, her opposition to our Austro-Hungarian ally and an anti-German feeling, born and bred of the panslavistic craving for power, made agreements impossible which would have averted all dangers of war in the case of a political crisis. Freer than France and Russia was England. I have already reminded you how British statesmen in parliament, again and again, proudly affirmed Great Britain's absolutely unrestricted right to steer her own course. The attempt to come to an understanding, which would have safeguarded the peace of the world, was easiest to make with England.

On these lines I had to act and I did act. I well knew that it was a narrow road, not easy to tread. In the course of centuries, the English insular way of thinking had evolved the political maxim that England had a right to an "*arbitrium mundi*," which she could only uphold by an unrivalled supremacy on sea and by the maintenance of the balance of power on the Continent. I never had any hopes that my persuasion could break that old English maxim. What I did hope and thought possible was that the growth of German power and the increase of the risks of a war might open England's eyes to the fact that her old-fashioned maxim had become untenable and impracticable, and that an amicable settlement with Germany was preferable. But that old doctrine of hers more than once stood in the way of a peaceful understanding. The crisis of 1911 gave a new impetus to the negotiations. The English people suddenly realized that they had stood at the brink of a European war. Popular sentiment forced the British Government to a rapprochement with Germany. After long and arduous negotiations we finally arrived at an understanding on various disputed questions of an economic character, regarding Africa and Asia Minor. This understanding was to lessen every possible political friction. The world is wide. There is room enough for both nations to measure their strength in peaceful rivalry as long as our national strength is al-

lowed free scope for development. German policy always stood up for that principle. But during the negotiations England was indefatigable in her endeavors to enter into ever closer relations with France and Russia. The decisive point was that beyond the political sphere of action one military agreement after the other was made in view of a possible continental war. England kept these negotiations as secret as possible. When something about them would percolate, it was declared, both in the press and in Parliament, to be perfectly harmless. But things could not be concealed, as you know from the official papers that were published by me. The general situation was this: England was indeed ready to come to an understanding on single items, but the first and foremost principle of her policy was the "balance of power" as a means of checking German strength in its free development.

This forms the borderline of England's amicable relations with Germany; and the purpose was the utmost strengthening of the Triple Entente. When the Allies demanded military assurances in return, England was at once ready to give them. The circle was closed. The English were sure of the following of France and hence of Russia. But they, too, had to abandon their free-will. As the jingoes of France and Russia found their strongest support in the military accommodation promised by her, England, as soon as either of the two Allies began the war, was morally bound to support them. And all this was done to what purpose? Because Germany was to be kept down. We have not been remiss in warning the British Government. As late as the beginning of last July I gave them to understand that their secret negotiations with Russia about a naval agreement were well known to me. I called their attention to the grave danger which such policy implied for the peace of the world. As soon as a fortnight afterward my predictions came true.

We have taken the consequences of the general situation. In quick succession I have laid before you the hugest war bill which history ever recorded, and you, gentlemen, fully recognizing the country's danger, have gladly made the sacrifice and have granted what was necessary for our national self-defence. And when war broke out, England dropped the mask of hypocrisy. Loudly and openly she declares her determination to fight until Germany is laid prostrate both in an economic and military sense. Anti-German Pan Slavism joins its jubilant notes, France with the full strength of an old warlike nation hopes to redeem the humiliation inflicted on her in 1870. Our only answer to our enemies is: Germany does not allow herself to be crushed!

The financial strength of Germany has, as well as the military, brilliantly passed the test when the demand was made of it to place itself unreservedly at the service of the Fatherland. Economic life is being maintained. The number of the unemployed is relatively small. The German power of organization, strong and skilled as it is, finds numberless outlets to prevent and repair any economic damage. No man or woman shrinks from voluntary cooperation. No recruiting is necessary. And all this is done for the one great purpose of sacrificing everything, blood and earthly possessions, for the land of our fathers, for the hope of our children and grandchildren. If this spirit, this moral greatness of our

people, unknown in history; if the valor of our nation, proven and tested a million times against a world of foes; if all this is denounced by our enemies as militarism; if we are denounced as Huns and barbarians; if a deluge of lies about us is poured out all over the world—I believe we ought to be too proud to grieve about that.

The wonderful fervor glowing in the hearts of the German people, the unprecedented unity and unconditional self-surrender of one to another, they must be and will be victorious. And when a glorious and happy peace is ours, we shall hold this national spirit sacred and regard it as the holiest bequest of this terribly grave and great age. As by magic the walls have fallen which separated for a time, a dull and barren time, the various classes of our people, the walls which we had raised against one another in misunderstanding, envy and mistrust. It is a liberation and a blessing that the rubbish heap of social prejudice has been swept away; that man alone has value now; that all count alike and that each holds out his hand to his fellow-man for a common and holy end. So once more I repeat the Kaiser's words uttered at the outbreak of the war: "I know no more parties, I only know Germans." After the war, parties will revive; even the freest and most united nation cannot fully live out its political life without parties and political strife. But let us strive—I for my part promise you to do so—that also in this strife there shall be nothing but Germans.

Gentlemen! My speech is finished. This is no time for words. I cannot speak on all questions which affect the nation, including myself, most deeply, but I will say one more word: With deep love and gratitude we remember Germany's sons who have given up their lives on the battlefields in the East and West, on the open sea, on the shores of the Pacific and in our Colonies for the honor of the Fatherland. Before their heroism—now, alas, silent,—we bow, vowing to persevere to our last breath so that our children and grandchildren, free and safe against foreign menace and violence, may help to develop the greatness of our Empire. And this vow shall go out to our sons and brothers who are fighting the foe, to the heart's blood of Germany, blood shed by heroes numberless and often unknown; it shall go out to our countrymen abroad, to those who care for us in foreign lands—who are cut off from home and are in peril, who are unjustly imprisoned and ill-treated.

We shall hold out until we are sure that none will dare disturb our peace, in which we mean to unfold and develop German character and German strength as a free people.

III

BELGIAN DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE

JULY 24—AUGUST 29, 1914

**No. 1. Count Errembault de Dudzele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to
Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs**

(Translation.)

Vienna, July 24, 1914

Sir:—I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia.

(Signed) COUNT ERREMBAUT DE DUDZEELE.

Enclosure in No. 1

(Text of Austro-Hungarian note, already printed in this series, October, 1914, No. 83, pp. 5-6.)

**No. 2. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the
Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg**

(Translation.)

Brussels, July 24, 1914.

Sir:—The Belgian Government have had under their consideration whether, in present circumstances, it would not be advisable to address to the Powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neutrality a communication assuring them of Belgium's determination to fulfill the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war breaking out on her frontiers.

The Government have come to the conclusion that such a communication would be premature at present, but that events might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable instructions at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives abroad.

In these circumstances I have proposed to the King and to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you now exact instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the prospect of a Franco-German war became more threatening.

I enclose herewith a note, signed but not dated, which you should read

to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you should give him a copy, if circumstances render such a communication necessary.

I will inform you by telegram when you are to act on these instructions.

This telegram will be despatched when the order is given for the mobilisation of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our information leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

Enclosure in No. 2 .

(Translation.)

Sir:—The international situation is serious, and the possibility of a war between several Powers naturally preoccupies the Belgian Government.

Belgium has most scrupulously observed the duties of a neutral State imposed upon her by the treaties of April 19, 1839; and those duties she will strive unflinchingly to fulfil, whatever the circumstances may be.

The friendly feelings of the Powers towards her have been so often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her territory will remain free from any attack, should hostilities break out upon her frontiers.

All necessary steps to ensure respect to Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has been mobilised and is taking up such strategic positions as have been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put in a state of defence.

It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature of these measures. They are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfil her international obligations; and it is obvious that they neither have been nor can have been undertaken with any intention of taking part in an armed struggle between the Powers or from any feeling of distrust of any of those Powers.

In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to communicate to your Excellency a copy of the declaration by the Belgian Government, and to request that you will be good enough to take note of it.

A similar communication has been made to the other Powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality.

No. 3. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg

(Translation.)

Brussels, July 25, 1914.

Sir:—I have addressed an undated circular note, a copy of which is enclosed, to the Belgian representatives accredited to the Powers guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

Should the danger of a war between France and Germany become imminent, this circular note will be communicated to the Governments of the guaranteeing Powers, in order to inform them of our fixed determination to fulfil those international obligations that are imposed upon us by the treaties of 1839.

The communications in question would only be made upon telegraphic instructions from me.

If circumstances lead me to issue such instructions, I shall request you also, by telegram, to notify the Government to which you are accredited of the step we have taken, and to communicate to them a copy of the enclosed circular note for their information, and without any request that they should take note thereof.

My telegram will inform you of the date to be given to the circular note, which you should be careful to fill in on the copy which you hand to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It is unnecessary to point out that this despatch and its enclosure should be treated as strictly confidential until the receipt of fresh instructions from me.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

Enclosure in No. 3

(See Enclosure in No. 2.)

No. 4. Monsieur Michotte de Welle, Belgian Minister at Belgrade, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the reply returned by the Servian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note of the 10 (23) July.

(Signed) MICHOTTE DE WELLE.

Enclosure in No. 4

(Text of the Servian reply, already printed in this series, October, 1914, No. 83, pp. 8–11.)

No. 5. Communication made on July 26, 1914, by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Brussels to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

Monsieur Pashitch gave the reply of the Servian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note before 6 o'clock yesterday. This reply not having been considered satisfactory, diplomatic relations have been broken off and the Minister and staff of the Austrian Legation have left Belgrade. Servian mobilisation had already been ordered before 3 o'clock.

No. 6. Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

According to a telegram from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, the Servian Government have given way on all the points of the Austrian

note. They even allow the intervention of Austrian officials if such a proceeding is in conformity with the usages of international law. The British Chargé d'Affaires considers that this reply should satisfy Austria if she is not desirous of war. Nevertheless, a more hopeful atmosphere prevails here to-day, more particularly because hostilities against Serbia have not begun. The British Government suggest mediation by Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy at St. Petersburg and Vienna in order to find some basis for compromise. Germany alone has not yet replied. The decision rests with the Emperor.

No. 7. Count Errembault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has notified me of the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia.

No. 8. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg

(Translation.)

Brussels, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—The Belgian Government have decided to place the army upon a strengthened peace footing.

This step should in no way be confused with mobilisation.

Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium consists, in some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on the ordinary peace footing consists of only one class of armed militia; on the strengthened peace footing, owing to the recall of three classes, her army divisions and her cavalry division comprise effective units of the same strength as those of the corps permanently maintained in the frontier zones of the neighbouring Powers.

This information will enable you to reply to any questions which may be addressed to you.

(Signed) DAVIGNON

No. 9. M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London

(Translation.)

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

Sir:—The French Minister came to show me a telegram from the Agence Havas reporting a state of war in Germany, and said:—

"I seize this opportunity to declare that no incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to incur the responsi-

bility, so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile act. Instructions in this sense will be given to the French authorities."

I thanked Monsieur Klobukowski for his communication, and I felt bound to observe that we had always had the greatest confidence in the loyal observance by both our neighbouring States of their engagements towards us. We have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the German Government will be the same as that of the Government of the French Republic.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 10. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Heads of Belgian Missions abroad

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

The Minister of War informs me that mobilisation has been ordered, and that Saturday, the 1st August, will be the first day.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 11. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London and Paris

(Translation.)

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

Sir:—The British Minister asked to see me on urgent business, and made the following communication, which he had hoped for some days to be able to present to me: Owing to the possibility of a European war, Sir Edward Grey has asked the French and German Governments separately if they were each of them ready to respect Belgian neutrality provided that no other Power violated it:—

"In view of existing treaties, I am instructed to inform the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and that she desires and expects that the other Powers will respect and maintain it."

I hastened to thank Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, which the Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added that Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our independence could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other Powers, in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence which had always existed between us, would respect and maintain that neutrality.

I did not fail to state that our military forces, which had been considerably developed in consequence of our recent re-organization, were sufficient to enable us to defend ourselves energetically in the event of the violation of our territory.

In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis seemed to me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided to mobilise

our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands had come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that, moreover, the recent date of our new military system, and the temporary nature of the measures upon which we then had to decide, made it necessary for us to take immediate and thorough precautions. Our neighbours and guarantors should see in this decision our strong desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves.

Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated that his Government were awaiting this reply before continuing negotiations with France and Germany, the result of which would be communicated to me.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 12. M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris

(Translation.)

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

Sir:—In the course of the conversation which the Secretary-General of my Department had with Herr von Below this morning, he explained to the German Minister the scope of the military measures which we had taken, and said to him that they were a consequence of our desire to fulfil our international obligations, and that they in no wise implied an attitude of distrust towards our neighbours.

The Secretary-General then asked the German Minister if he knew of the conversation which he had had with his predecessor, Herr von Flotow, and of the reply which the Imperial Chancellor had instructed the latter to give.

In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a consequence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of Flushing, certain newspapers had maintained that in the case of a Franco-German war Belgian neutrality would be violated by Germany.

The Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a declaration in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign affairs would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the mistrust which was so regrettable from the point of view of the relations between the two countries.

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he had fully appreciated the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but he considered that in making a public declaration Germany would weaken her military position in regard to France, who, secured on the northern side, would concentrate all her energies on the east.

Baron van der Elst, continuing, said that he perfectly understood the objections raised by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to the proposed public declaration, and he recalled the fact that since then, in 1913, Herr von Jagow had made reassuring declarations to the Budget Commission of the Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian neutrality.

Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments expressed at that time had not changed.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

Enclosure in No. 12

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

Berlin, May 2, 1913.

Sir:—I have the honour to bring to your notice the declarations respecting Belgian neutrality, as published in the semi-official "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," made by the Secretary of State and the Minister of War, at the meeting of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag on April 29th:—

"A member of the Social Democrat Party said: 'The approach of a war between Germany and France is viewed with apprehension in Belgium, for it is feared that Germany will not respect the neutrality of Belgium.'

"Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State, replied: 'Belgian neutrality is provided for by International Conventions and Germany is determined to respect those Conventions.'

"This declaration did not satisfy another member of the Social Democrat Party. Herr von Jagow said that he had nothing to add to the clear statement he had made respecting the relations between Germany and Belgium.

"In answer to fresh enquiries by a member of the Social Democrat Party, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War, replied: 'Belgium plays no part in the causes which justify the proposed reorganisation of the German military system. That proposal is based on the situation in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international treaty.'

"A member of the Progressive Party having once again spoken of Belgium, Herr von Jagow repeated that this declaration in regard to Belgium was sufficiently clear."

(Signed) **BARON BEYENS.**

No. 13. Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

London, August 1, 1914.

Great Britain has asked France and Germany separately if they intend to respect Belgian territory in the event of its not being violated by their adversary. Germany's reply is awaited. France has replied in the affirmative.

No. 14. Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Monsieur Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

The British Ambassador has been instructed to inquire of the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of war, Germany would respect Belgian neutrality, and I understand that the Minister replied that he was unable to answer the question.

No. 15. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 1, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honour to inform you that the French Minister has made the following verbal communication to me:—

"I am authorised to declare that, in the event of an international war, the French Government, in accordance with the declarations they have always made, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, the French Government, to secure their own defence, might find it necessary to modify their attitude."

I thanked his Excellency and added that we on our side had taken without delay all the measures necessary to ensure that our independence and our frontiers should be respected.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 16. Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 1, 1914.

Carry out instructions contained in my despatch of the 24th July.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

(See No. 2.)

No. 17. Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, Luxemburg

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 1, 1914.

Carry out instructions contained in my despatch of the 25th July.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

(See No. 3.)

No. 18. Monsieur Eyschen, President of the Luxemburg Government to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.

I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency with the following facts: According to information which has just reached the Grand Ducal Government, early on the morning of Sunday, August 2, German troops entered Luxemburg territory by the Wasserbillig and Remich bridges, proceeding more particularly towards the south and towards the town of Luxemburg, capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have passed along the railway from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where they are expected at any moment. These incidents

constitute acts plainly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to protest vigorously to the German Representative at Luxemburg against this act of aggression. An identical protest will be telegraphed to the German Secretary of State at Berlin.

(Signed) EYSCHEN.

No. 19. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 2, 1914.

Sir:—I was careful to warn the German Minister through Monsieur de Bassompierre that an announcement in the Brussels press by Monsieur Klobukowski, French Minister, would make public the formal declaration which the latter had made to me on the 1st August. When I next met Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention, and added that up to the present he had not been instructed to make us an official communication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security, which we had the right to entertain towards our eastern neighbours. I at once replied that all that we knew of their intentions, as indicated in numerous previous conversations, did not allow us to doubt their perfect correctness towards Belgium. I added, however, that we should attach the greatest importance to the possession of a formal declaration, which the Belgian nation would hear of with joy and gratitude.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 20. Note presented by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

Imperial German Legation in Belgium.— Brussels, August 2, 1914.

(Very Confidential.)

Reliable information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany.

The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defence of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory.

In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the German Government make the following declaration:—

1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full.

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in co-operation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessities for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two States must be left to the decision of arms.

The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighbouring States will grow stronger and more enduring.

No. 21. Memorandum of an interview asked for at 1:30 A.M., on August 3, by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, with Baron van der Elst, Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

At 1:30 A.M. the German Minister asked to see Baron van der Elst. He told him that he had been instructed by his Government to inform the Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in violation of international law, seeing that war had not been declared.

The Secretary-General asked Herr von Below where these incidents had happened, and was told that it was in Germany. Baron van der Elst then observed that in that case he could not understand the object of this communication. Herr von Below stated that these acts, which were contrary to international law, were calculated to lead to the supposition that other acts, contrary to international law, would be committed by France.

No. 22. Note communicated by Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 3, 1914 (7 A.M.).

The German Government stated in their note of the 2nd August, 1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended to march on

the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an advance of French troops.

The German Government, therefore, considered themselves compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the decision of arms.

This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government.

The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name of the French Government.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality.

The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threaten her, constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe.

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilisation of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope is disappointed, the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights.

No. 23. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at St. Petersburg, Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, The Hague

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

At 7 P.M. last night Germany presented a note proposing friendly neutrality. This entailed free passage through Belgian territory, while guaranteeing the maintenance of the independence of Belgium and of her

possessions on the conclusion of peace, and threatened, in the event of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours was allowed within which to reply.

Our answer has been that this infringement of our neutrality would be a flagrant violation of international law. To accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the honour of the nation. Conscious of her duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel any attack by all the means in her power.
(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 24. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 3, 1914 (12 noon).

Sir:—As you are aware, Germany has delivered to Belgium an ultimatum which expires this morning, 3rd August, at 7 A.M. As no act of war has occurred up to the present, the Cabinet has decided that there is, for the moment, no need to appeal to the guaranteeing Powers.

The French Minister has made the following statement to me upon the subject:—

"Although I have received no instructions to make a declaration from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French Government as one of the Powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to Belgium's appeal; if such an appeal were not made, it is probable that—unless of course exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence—the French Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance."

I thanked Monsieur Klobukowski for the support which the French Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to be done.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 25. His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty King George

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

Mindful of the numerous marks of friendship of your Majesty and of your Majesty's predecessors, as well as the friendly attitude of Great Britain in 1870 and of the proofs of sympathy which she has once again shown us, I make the supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the neutrality of Belgium.

(Signed) ALBERT.

No. 26. Belgian Minister at London to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

London, August 3, 1914.

I showed your telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has laid it before the Cabinet. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me that if our neutrality is violated it means war with Germany.

(Signed) COUNT DE LALAING.

(See No. 23.)

No. 27. Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(The original is in French.)

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914 (6 A.M.).

Sir:—In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian Government to entertain the well-intentioned proposals made to them by the German Government, the latter, to their deep regret, find themselves compelled to take—if necessary by force of arms—those measures of defence already foreshadowed as indispensable, in view of the menace of France.

(Signed) VON BELOW.

No. 28. Note communicated by Sir Francis H. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that if Germany brings pressure to bear upon Belgium with the object of forcing her to abandon her attitude of neutrality, His Britannic Majesty's Government expect Belgium to resist with all the means at her disposal.

In that event, His Britannic Majesty's Government are prepared to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire, in tendering at once joint assistance to the Belgian Government with a view to resisting any forcible measures adopted by Germany against Belgium, and also offering a guarantee for the maintenance of the future independence and integrity of Belgium.

No. 29. Belgian Minister at The Hague to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

The Hague, August 4, 1914.

Sir:—The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday evening that the Netherlands Government would perhaps be obliged, owing to the gravity of the present situation, to institute war buoying on the Scheldt.

M. Loudon read me the draft of the note which would announce this decision to me.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the note in question which was communicated to me yesterday evening.

As you will observe, the Scheldt will only be closed at night. By day navigation will be possible, but only with Dutch pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instructions. In this way both Dutch interests in the defence of their territory and Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp will be safeguarded.

You will note that the Netherlands Government further ask that in the event of the war buoying being carried out, we should cause the lightships "Wielingen" and "Wandelaar" to be withdrawn in order to facilitate the maintenance of the neutrality of Dutch territory.

I would point out that the phrase used in this note, "sailing up the Scheldt," is not sufficiently explicit; sailing down would be permitted under the same conditions. The Minister has, however, given me this assurance.

As soon as the Netherlands Government have decided upon this exceptional measure I shall be informed of it.

About six hours are necessary to carry out war buoying.

I will at once telegraph to you.

(Signed) BARON FALLON.

Note enclosed in No. 29

The Netherlands Government may be compelled, in order to maintain the neutrality of Dutch territory, to institute war buoying upon the Scheldt, that is to say, to move or modify a portion of the actual arrangement of buoys and lights.

At the same time, this special arrangement of buoys has been so drawn up that when it is brought into force it will still be possible to sail up the Scheldt as far as Antwerp by day, but only with Dutch pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instructions. In thus acting the Netherlands Government are convinced that they will be able to serve equally both the Dutch interests in the defence of Netherlands territory and Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp.

After the establishment of war buoying on the Scheldt, there would be no further reason to enter the tidal water of Flushing at night, and as the presence of the lightships "Wielingen" and "Wandelaar" is not indispensable to navigation by day, the Netherlands Government would be much obliged if the Belgian Government would be good enough, in the event of the establishment of war buoying, to withdraw these boats in order to facilitate the maintenance of the neutrality of Dutch territory.

No. 30. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at London and Paris

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

The General Staff announces that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

**No. 31. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister**

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honour to inform your Excellency that from to-day the Belgian Government are unable to recognise your diplomatic status and cease to have official relations with you. Your Excellency will find enclosed the passports necessary for your departure with the staff of the legation.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 32. Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 4th August, and to inform you that I have entrusted the custody of the German Legation of Brussels to the care of my United States colleague.

(Signed) DE BELOW.

**No. 33. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid**

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

Please ask the Spanish Government if they will be good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany, and whether in that event they will issue the necessary instructions to their Ambassador at Berlin.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

**No. 34. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin**

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

The German Minister is leaving to-night; you should ask for your passports. We are requesting the Spanish Government to authorise the Spanish Ambassador to be good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

**No. 35. Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs**

(Translation.)

Berlin, August 4, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of part of the speech made to-day in the Reichstag by the Imperial Chancellor on the subject of the infamous violation of Belgian neutrality:—

"We are in a state of legitimate defence and necessity knows no law.

"Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already entered Belgium. This is contrary to the dictates of international law. France has, it is true, declared at Brussels that she was prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was respected by her adversary. But we knew that France was ready to invade Belgium. France could wait; we could not. A French attack upon our flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over the legitimate protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. For the wrong which we are thus doing, we will make reparation as soon as our military object is attained.

"Anyone in such grave danger as ourselves, and who is struggling for his supreme welfare, can only be concerned with the means of extricating himself; we stand side by side with Austria."

It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg recognises, without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating international law by her invasion of Belgian territory and that she is committing a wrong against us.
(Signed) BARON BEYENS.

No. 36. Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

London, August 4, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honour to inform you that in the House of Commons this afternoon the Prime Minister made a fresh statement with regard to the European crisis.

After recalling the principal points set forth yesterday by Sir E. Grey, the Prime Minister read:—

1. A telegram received from Sir F. Villiers this morning which gave the substance of the second ultimatum presented to the Belgian Government by the German Government, which had been sent to you this morning (see No. 27).

2. Your telegram informing me of the violation of the frontier at Gemmenich, a copy of which I have given to Sir A. Nicolson.

3. A telegram which the German Government addressed to its Ambassador in London this morning with the evident intention of misleading popular opinion as to its attitude. Here is the translation as published in one of this evening's newspapers:—

"Please dispel any mistrust which may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively the formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will under no pretence whatever annex Belgian territory.

"Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality.

"It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the time territorial acquisitions at the expense of Holland.

"Please impress upon Sir E. Grey the German army could not be ex-

posed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned, according to absolutely unimpeachable information.

"Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance."

Mr. Asquith then informed the House that in answer to this note of the German Government the British Government had repeated their proposal of last week, namely, that the German Government should give the same assurances as to Belgian neutrality as France had given last week both to England and to Belgium. The British Cabinet allowed the Berlin Cabinet till midnight to reply.

(Signed) COUNT DE LALAING.

No. 37. Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

London, August 4, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the British Ministers in Norway, Holland, and Belgium that Great Britain expects that these three kingdoms will resist German pressure and observe neutrality. Should they resist they will have the support of Great Britain, who is ready in that event, should the three above-mentioned Governments desire it, to join France and Russia in offering an alliance to the said Governments for the purpose of resisting the use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain the future independence and integrity of the three kingdoms. I observed to him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity. The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered: This is in case her neutrality is violated.

(Signed) COUNT DE LALAING.

No. 38. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honour to inform you of the course of recent events as regards the relations of Belgium with certain of the Powers which guarantee her neutrality and independence.

On the 31st July the British Minister made me a verbal communication according to which Sir E. Grey, in anticipation of a European war, had asked the German and French Governments separately if each of them were resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium should that neutrality not be violated by any other Power.

In view of existing treaties, Sir F. Villiers was instructed to bring this step to the knowledge of the Belgian Government, adding that Sir E. Grey presumed that Belgium was resolved to maintain her neutrality, and that she expected other Powers to respect it.

I told the British Minister that we highly appreciated this communica-

tion, which was in accordance with our expectation, and I added that Great Britain, as well as the other Powers who had guaranteed our independence, might rest fully assured of our firm determination to maintain our neutrality; nor did it seem possible that our neutrality could be threatened by any of those States, with whom we enjoyed the most cordial and frank relations. The Belgian Government, I added, had given proof of this resolution by taking from now on all such military measures as seemed to them to be necessitated by the situation.

In his turn the French Minister made a verbal communication on August 1st to the effect that he was authorised to inform the Belgian Government that in case of an international war the French Government, in conformity with their repeated declarations, would respect Belgian territory, and that they would not be induced to modify their attitude except in the event of the violation of Belgian neutrality by another Power.

I thanked his Excellency, and added that we had already taken all the necessary precautions to ensure respect of our independence and our frontiers.

On the morning of August 2nd I had a fresh conversation with Sir F. Villiers, in the course of which he told me that he had lost no time in telegraphing our conversation of July 31st to his Government, and that he had been careful to quote accurately the solemn declaration which he had received of Belgium's intention to defend her frontiers from whichever side they might be invaded. He added: "We know that France has given you formal assurances, but Great Britain has received no reply from Berlin on this subject."

The latter fact did not particularly affect me, since a declaration from the German Government might appear superfluous in view of existing treaties. Moreover, the Secretary of State had reaffirmed, at the meeting of the committee of the Reichstag of April 29th, 1913, "that the neutrality of Belgium is established by treaty which Germany intends to respect."

The same day Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister, called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 7 o'clock, and handed to me the enclosed note (see No. 20). The German Government gave the Belgian Government a time limit of twelve hours within which to communicate their decision.

No hesitation was possible as to the reply called for by the amazing proposal of the German Government. You will find a copy enclosed. (See No. 22.)

The ultimatum expired at 7 A.M. on August 3rd. As at 10 o'clock no act of war had been committed, the Belgian Cabinet decided that there was no reason for the moment to appeal to the guaranteeing Powers.

Towards mid-day the French Minister questioned me upon this point, and said:—

"Although in view of the rapid march of events I have as yet received no instructions to make a declaration from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French Government as one of the Powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to Belgium's appeal; if such an appeal were not made it is probable that—

unless, of course, exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence—the French Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance."

I thanked Monsieur Klobukowski for the support which the French Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to be done.

Finally, at 6 A.M. on August 4th, the German Minister made the following communication to me. (See No. 27.)

The Cabinet is at the present moment deliberating on the question of an appeal to the Powers guaranteeing our neutrality.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 39. Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

London, August 4, 1914.

Great Britain this morning called upon Germany to respect Belgian neutrality. The ultimatum says that whereas the note addressed by Germany to Belgium threatens the latter with an appeal to the force of arms if she opposes the passage of German troops; and whereas Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich; and whereas Germany has refused to give Great Britain a similar assurance to that given last week by France; therefore Great Britain must once again demand a satisfactory reply on the subject of the respect of Belgian neutrality and of the treaty to which Germany, no less than Great Britain, is a signatory. The ultimatum expires at midnight.

In consequence of the British ultimatum to Germany, the British proposal which I telegraphed to you is cancelled for the time being.

(Signed) COUNT DE LALAING.

(See No. 37.)

No. 40. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British, French, and Russian Ministers at Brussels

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

Sirs—The Belgian Government regret to have to announce to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany entered Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist by all the means in their power.

Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory.

There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose the forcible measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same time, to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium.

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defence of her fortified places.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 41. Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

London, August 5, 1914.

Germany, having rejected the British proposals, Great Britain has informed her that a state of war existed between the two countries as from 11 o'clock.

(Signed) COUNT DE LALAING.

No. 42. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

After the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmenich, Belgium appealed to Great Britain, France, and Russia through their representatives at Brussels, to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory.

Belgium undertakes the defence of her fortified places.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 43. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

Sir:—In my despatch of August 4 (see No. 38) I had the honour to inform you of the sequence of events which had attended the international relations of Belgium from July 31st to August 4th. I added that the Cabinet was considering the question whether Belgium, whose territory had been invaded since the morning, should appeal to the guarantee of the Powers.

The Cabinet had decided in the affirmative when the British Minister informed me that the proposal which he had communicated to me, and according to which the British Government were disposed to respond favourably to our appeal to her as guaranteeing Power, was cancelled for the time being. (See No. 37.)

A telegram from London made it clear that this change of attitude was caused by an ultimatum from Great Britain giving Germany a time limit of ten hours within which to evacuate Belgian territory and to respect Belgian neutrality. (See No. 39.) During the evening, the Belgian Government addressed to France, Great Britain, and Russia, through their respective representatives at Brussels, a note, of which a copy is enclosed herewith. (See No. 40.)

As you will observe, Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory and in the maintenance for the future of the independence and integrity of her territory. She will herself undertake the defence of her fortified places.

As yet we are not aware how our appeal has been received.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 44. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Heads of Missions in all Countries having Diplomatic Relations with Belgium

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

Sir:—By the treaty of April 18th, 1839, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty concluded on the same day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty runs: "Belgium shall form a State independent and perpetually neutral." Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations, she has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that neutrality to be respected.

In these circumstances the Belgian Government have learnt with deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a Power guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian territory in violation of the obligations undertaken by treaty.

It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage against international law provoked by no act of ours.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel by all the means in their power the attack thus made upon their neutrality, and they recall the fact that, in virtue of article 10 of The Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral Power repels, even by force, attacks on her neutrality, such action cannot be considered as a hostile act.

I have to request that you will ask at once for an audience with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this despatch to his Excellency, handing him a copy. If the interview cannot be granted at once you should make the communication in question in writing.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 45. Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Berlin, August 5, 1914.

I have received my passports and shall leave Berlin to-morrow morning for Holland with the staff of the legation.

(Signed) BARON BEYENS.

N^o. 46. Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

St. Sebastian, August 5, 1914.

The Spanish Government undertake the custody of Belgian interest in Germany, and are to-day sending telegraphic instructions to their Ambassador at Berlin.

(Signed) BARON GRENIER.

(See No. 33.)

No. 47. Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

Paris, August 5, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the notification of a state of war between France and Germany, which has been communicated to me to-day.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

Enclosure in No. 47

Whereas the Imperial German Government have allowed their armed forces to cross the frontier and to indulge in divers acts of murder and violence on French territory; and whereas they have violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, in contravention of the provisions of the Convention of London of May 11th, 1867, and of the Convention of The Hague of October 18th, 1907, respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in the case of war on land (articles I-III), to which conventions the German Government were signatories; and whereas they have addressed an ultimatum to the Belgian Government in order to secure the passage of the German forces through Belgian territory, thereby violating the treaties of April 19th, 1839, also signed by them, and of the above-mentioned Hague Convention;

They have declared war against France on August 3rd, 1914, at 6:45 P.M.:

Therefore the French Government are themselves obliged in these circumstances to resort to arms.

The French Government therefore have the honour hereby to inform the Belgian Government that a state of war exists between France and Germany as from August 3rd, at 6:45 P.M.

The French Government protest to all civilised nations, and more particularly to the signatory Governments of the conventions and treaties alluded to above, against Germany's violation of her international undertakings; the French Government reserve to themselves any action respecting reprisals which they may feel impelled to take against an enemy who pays so little regard to his plighted word.

The French Government, desirous of observing the principles of international law, will, on condition of reciprocity, act, during hostilities, in conformity with the provisions of the international conventions signed by France on the subject of the rights of war on land and on sea.

This notification, which is made in accordance with article 2 of the said Second Hague Convention of October 18th, 1907, respecting the opening of hostilities, is communicated to the Belgian Minister at Paris on August 5th, 1914, at 2 P.M.

No. 48. Communication of August 5, from Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that His Britannic Majesty's Government consider joint action with a view to resisting Germany to be in force and to be justified by the Treaty of 1839.

No. 49. Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

London, August 5, 1914.

Great Britain agrees to take joint action in her capacity of guaranteeing Power for the defence of Belgian territory. The British fleet will ensure the free passage of the Scheldt for the provisioning of Antwerp.

(Signed) COUNT DE LALAING.

No. 50. Belgian Minister at The Hague to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

The Hague, August 5, 1914.

The war buoying is about to be established.

(Signed) BARON FALLON.

(See No. 29.)

No. 51. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

Please express to the Spanish Government the sincere thanks of the Belgian Government.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

(See No. 46.)

No. 52. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honour to inform you that the French and Russian Ministers made a communication to me this morning informing me of the willingness of their Governments to respond to our appeal, and to co-operate with Great Britain in the defence of Belgian territory.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 53. Jonkheer de Weede, Netherlands Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 6, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of the special edition of the "Staats-courant," containing the declaration of the neutrality of the Netherlands in the war between Belgium and Germany, and between Great Britain and Germany.

(Signed) JONKHEER DE WEEDE.

**Enclosure to No. 53
Laws, Decrees, Nominations, &c.**

(Translation.)

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies authorised to that effect by Her Majesty the Queen, make known to all whom it may concern that the Netherlands Government will observe strict neutrality in the war which has broken out between Great Britain and Germany, and Belgium and Germany, Powers friendly to the Netherlands, and that, with a view of the observance of this neutrality, the following dispositions have been taken:—

ARTICLE I

Within the limits of the territory of the State, including the territory of the Kingdom in Europe and the colonies and possessions in other parts of the world, no hostilities of any kind are permitted, neither may this territory serve as a base for hostile operations.

ARTICLE 2

Neither the occupation of any part of the territory of the State by a belligerent nor the passage across this territory by land is permitted to the troops or convoys of munitions belonging to the belligerents, nor is the passage across the territory situated within the territorial waters of the Netherlands by the warships or ships assimilated thereto of the belligerents permitted.

ARTICLE 3

Troops or soldiers belonging to the belligerents or destined for them arriving in the territory of the State by land will be immediately disarmed and interned until the termination of the war.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, who contravenes the provisions of articles 2, 4, or 7 will not be permitted to leave the said territory until the end of the war.

ARTICLE 4

No warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to any of the belligerents shall have access to the said territory.

ARTICLE 5

The provisions of article 4 do not apply to:—

1. Warships or ships assimilated thereto which are forced to enter the ports or roadstead of the State on account of damages or the state of the sea. Such ships may leave the said ports or roadsteads as soon as the circumstances which have driven them to take shelter there shall have ceased to exist.

2. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent which anchor in a port or roadstead in the colonies or oversea possessions exclusively with the object of completing their provision of foodstuffs or fuel. These ships must leave as soon as the circumstances which have forced them to anchor shall have ceased to exist, subject to the condition that their stay in the roadstead or port shall not exceed twenty-four hours.

3. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent employed exclusively on a religious, scientific, or humanitarian mission.

ARTICLE 6

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent may only execute such repairs in the ports and roadsteads of the State as are indispensable to their seaworthiness, and they may in no way increase their fighting capacities.

ARTICLE 7

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent who may at the commencement of war be within the territory of the State must leave within twenty-four hours from the moment of the publication of this declaration.

ARTICLE 8

If warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to different belligerents find themselves at the same time, in the conditions set forth in article 5, in the same part of the world and within the territory of the State, a delay of at least twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure of

each respective belligerent ship. Except in special circumstances, the order of departure shall be determined by the order of arrival. A warship or ship assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent may only leave the territory of the State twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant ship which flies the flag of another belligerent.

ARTICLE 9

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent to which articles 5 and 7 are applicable may only be provisioned with foodstuffs in the ports and roadsteads of the country to the extent necessary to bring their provisions up to the normal limit in time of peace.

Similarly they can only be supplied with fuel to the extent necessary to enable them, with the stock they already have on board, to reach the nearest port of their own country.

The same vessel cannot again be provided with fuel until a period of at least three months shall have elapsed since it was last provisioned in the territory of the State.

ARTICLE 10

A prize may only be brought into Dutch territory if such prize is un-navigable, or unseaworthy, or short of fuel or foodstuffs.

Such prize must leave as soon as the reasons which caused her to enter Dutch territory cease to exist.

Should such prize fail to do so, immediate orders shall be given her to leave. In the event of a refusal, all possible means shall be employed to liberate the prize, with her officers and crew, and to intern the crew placed on board by the belligerent who has taken it as prize.

ARTICLE 11

It is forbidden, in State territory, to form a corps of combatants or to open recruiting offices on behalf of the belligerents.

ARTICLE 12

It is forbidden, in State territory, to take service on board warships or ships assimilated thereto.

ARTICLE 13

It is forbidden, in State territory, to equip, arm, or man vessels intended for military purposes on behalf of a belligerent, or to furnish or deliver such vessels to a belligerent.

ARTICLE 14

It is forbidden in State territory to supply arms or ammunition to warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or to come to their assistance in any manner whatsoever with a view to augment their crew or their equipment.

ARTICLE 15

It is forbidden in State territory failing previous authorisation by the competent local authorities, to repair warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or to supply them with victuals or fuel.

ARTICLE 16

It is forbidden in State territory to take part in the dismantling or repairing of prizes, except in so far as is necessary to make them seaworthy; also to purchase prizes or confiscated goods, and to receive them in exchange, in gift, or on deposit.

ARTICLE 17

The State territory comprises the coastal waters to a distance of 3 nautical miles, reckoning 60 to the degree of latitude, from low-water mark.

As regards inlets, this distance of 3 nautical miles is measured from a straight line drawn across the inlet at the point nearest the entrance where the mouth of the inlet is not wider than 10 nautical miles, reckoning 60 to the degree of latitude.

ARTICLE 18

Further, attention is called to Articles 100, Section 1, and 205 of the Penal Code; "Indisch Staatsblad," 1905, No. 62; Article 7, Section 4, of the Law respecting the status of Netherlands nationality, and respecting domicile ("Nederlandsch Staatsblad," 1892, No. 268; 1910, No. 216); Article 2, No. 3, of the Law respecting the status of Netherlands nationality ("Nederlandsch Staatsblad," 1910, No. 55; "Indisch Staatsblad," 1910, No. 296; Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal Code of Surinam; Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal Code of Curaçoa).

Similarly, the attention of commanding officers, owners, and charterers of ships is called to the dangers and inconveniences to which they would expose themselves by disregarding the effective blockade of belligerents, by carrying contraband of war, or military despatches for belligerents (except in the course of the regular postal service), or by rendering them other transport services.

Any person guilty of the acts aforesaid would expose himself to all the consequences of those acts, and would not be able, as regards them, to obtain any protection or intervention on the part of the Netherlands Government.

No. 54. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 6, 1914.

Please communicate the following note to the Netherlands Government:—

The Belgian Government have taken note of the establishment of war

buoying on the Scheldt and of the fact that the Netherlands Government will ensure the maintenance of navigation.

It would be convenient that navigation should be possible from 30 minutes before sunrise to 30 minutes after sunset, and that the exchange of pilots should take place at Bath.

With every desire to fall in with the requests of the Netherlands Government, the Belgian Government think that it is desirable in the interests of the littoral ports to retain the lightships of Wielingen and of Wandelaar, and also the buoys of the Wielingen Channel.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

(See No. 50.)

No. 55. Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 6, 1914.

Navigation on the Scheldt is allowed from daybreak and so long as it is light. The Wielingen buoys will be replaced. The exchange of pilots at Hansweert is easier and better organised. Are you particularly anxious to have Bath?

(Signed) BARON FALLON.

No. 56. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague

(Translation.)

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 7, 1914.

Please express to the Netherlands Government the sincere thanks of the Belgian Government for the measures taken to secure navigation on the Scheldt. The Belgian Government are in agreement with the Netherlands Government on the subject of the extent of navigation. They had proposed Bath, but accept Hansweert, since this port has better facilities for the exchange of pilots.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 57. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris and London

(Translation.)

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 7, 1914.

Belgium trusts that the war will not be extended to Central Africa. The Governor of the Belgian Congo has received instructions to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. Please ask the French Government [British Government] whether they intend to proclaim the neutrality of the French Congo [British colonies in the conventional basin of the Congo], in accordance with article 11 of the General Act of Berlin. A telegram from Boma

reports that hostilities are probable between the French and Germans in the Ubangi.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 58. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris and London

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 7, 1914.

Sir:—With reference to my telegram of this morning, I have the honour to request you to bring to the notice of the French [British] Government the following information:—

While instructions have been sent to the Governor-General of the Congo to take defensive measures on the common frontiers of the Belgian colony and of the German colonies of East Africa and the Cameroons, the Belgian Government have suggested to that officer that he should abstain from all offensive action against those colonies.

In view of the civilizing mission common to colonizing nations, the Belgian Government desire, in effect, for humanitarian reasons, not to extend the field of hostilities to Central Africa. They will, therefore, not take the initiative of putting such a strain on civilization in that region, and the military forces which they possess there will only go into action in the event of their having to repel a direct attack on their African possessions.

I should be glad to learn whether the French [British] Government share this view and in that case whether it is their intention, during the present conflict, to avail themselves of article 11 of the General Act of Berlin to neutralise such of their colonies as are contained in the conventional basin of the Congo.

I am addressing an identical communication to your colleague at London [Paris].

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 59. Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

Paris, August 8, 1914.

Sir:—I have had the honour of speaking to the President of the Republic with respect to your telegram of yesterday. I had received it during the evening and had immediately communicated it to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They asked for time to consider it before answering.

Monsieur Poincaré has promised me to speak on this subject to-day to the Minister of the Colonies. At first sight he could see little difficulty in proclaiming the neutrality of the French Congo, but he nevertheless reserves his reply. He believes that acts of war have already taken place in the Ubangi. He has taken the opportunity to remind me that the protection accorded us by France extends also to our colonies and that we have nothing to fear.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

No. 60. Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

The Hague, August 9, 1914.

The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has begged me to convey to you the following information, the United States Minister at Brussels having declined to do so:—

The fortress of Liège has been taken by assault after a brave defence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody encounters should have resulted from the attitude of the Belgian Government towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy into Belgium, it is only through the force of circumstances that she has had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liège as a base for her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld the honour of its arms by its heroic resistance to a very superior force, the German Government beg the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium the further horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any compact with Belgium which can be reconciled with their arrangements with France. (See No. 70.) Germany once more gives her solemn assurance that it is not her intention to appropriate Belgian territory to herself and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so.

The United States Ambassador had asked his colleague to undertake this attempt at mediation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has accepted this mission without enthusiasm. I have undertaken it to oblige him.

(Signed) BARON FALLON.

No. 61. Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Paris, August 9, 1914.

The French Government are strongly inclined to proclaim the neutrality of the possessions in the conventional basin of the Congo and are begging Spain to make the suggestion at Berlin.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

(See No. 59.)

No. 62. Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

The Hague, August 10, 1914.

Sir:—In response to a call on the telephone, yesterday evening at 9 o'clock, I went to the Department for Foreign Affairs.

Jonkheer Loudon told me that my German colleague had just left his room, and had handed him a document which the United States representative at Brussels had declined to forward to you.

The United States official in charge of the German Legation at Brussels stated that he had received no special instructions from Washington to intervene officially with the Belgian Government in the interest of Germany.

The United States Minister consequently telegraphed to his colleague at The Hague, who informed the German representative of Mr. Whitlock's refusal.

The German Government, therefore, took the initial step by approaching the United States Ambassador at Berlin.

In these circumstances, and in view of the urgency of these matters, Herr von Müller begged Jonkheer Loudon to act as the intermediary of the German Government in this negotiation with you.

His Excellency read me the German text of the document. I did not hide my astonishment at this attempt at mediation, and its poor chance of success in this form; but, solely in order to oblige the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs I promised to telegraph to you immediately; and this I did yesterday.

You will find the German document enclosed in original and translation.

(Signed) BARON FALLON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 62

Enclosure 2 in No. 62

(Translation.)

The fortress of Liège has been taken by assault after a brave defence. The German Government most deeply regrets that bloody encounters should have resulted from the Belgian Government's attitude towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy into Belgium. It is only through the force of circumstances that she has had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liège as a base of her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld the honour of its arms in the most brilliant manner by its heroic resistance to a very superior force, the German Government beg the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium the horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any compact with Belgium which can in any way be reconciled with their arrangements with France. Germany gives once more her solemn assurance that she has not been animated by the intention of appropriating Belgian territory for herself, and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so.

The United States Ambassador here concurs in this attempt at mediation by his colleague in Brussels.

**No. 63. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague**

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 10, 1914.

The Belgian Government have received the proposals made to them by the German Government through the intermediary of the Netherlands Government. They will forward a reply shortly.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

(See No. 62 and Enclosures.)

**No. 64. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague**

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 10, 1914.

Doubt exists as to the meaning of the word "Auseinandersetzung," which you translate by "arrangement." Please ascertain whether the German Government have in mind any arrangements which we may have come to with France, or a settlement of the dispute between France and Germany.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

**No. 65. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the
British, Russian, and French Ministers at Brussels**

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 10, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Belgian Minister at The Hague, at the request of the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, has forwarded to us the following proposal from the German Government. (See No. 62, enclosure 2.)

The Belgian Government propose to return the following reply to this communication:—

"The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats the proposal formulated in their ultimatum of August 2. Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3 her neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on her territory, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded loyally and without delay to her appeal."

The Belgian Government consider that the Powers guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium should have cognizance of these documents.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

**No. 66. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the
Belgian Ministers at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg**

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 10, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honour to inform you of the circumstances which led to the departure of the Belgian representative from Luxemburg.

The General Officer commanding the German troops in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg informed the German Minister in that town, on August 8, of the desire of the military authorities for the departure of the Belgian representative at the Grand Ducal Court.

Herr von Buch addressed to Monsieur Eyschen, President of the Government, a note, of which the following is a translation:—

"Luxemburg, August 8, 1914.

"Your Excellency:—In consequence of the completely hostile attitude adopted by Belgium towards Germany, the military authorities find themselves obliged to insist upon the departure of the Belgian Minister from Luxemburg.

"His Excellency the General Officer commanding begs Count van den Steen de Jehay to arrange his journey home in such a way that he may be able, within twenty-four hours, to see General von Ploetz at Coblenz, with a view to settling the details of the further stages of his journey. It is impossible for him to travel except via Trèves-Coblenz.

(Signed) "VON BUCH."

Monsieur Eyschen forwarded this note the same day to Count van den Steen de Jehay, accompanied by a letter in the following terms:—

"Luxemburg, August 8, 1914.

"Sir:—I greatly regret to have to communicate to you the enclosed copy of a note from the German Minister, informing me that the German military authorities demand your departure.

"You will find in it the conditions which they attach thereto.

"Herr von Buch told me that the military authorities advise you to travel by railway, as an attempt to carry out your journey by motor would expose you to being too frequently stopped for reasons connected with the control of the roads. But the choice is left to you.

"The German Minister will come to me for your answer.

"I cannot tell you how painful it is to me to fulfil my present task. I shall never forget the pleasant relations which have existed between us, and I hope that your journey may be carried out under the best possible conditions.

(Signed) "EYSCHEN."

The Belgian Government, considering that the Grand Ducal Government had no choice in their attitude, and that the course they had been obliged to adopt in no way implied any discourteous intention towards the King of the Belgians or towards Belgium, decided that there was no reason, in these circumstances, for requesting the Luxemburg Chargé d'Affaires to leave Belgium.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 67. Mr. Whitlock, United States Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 11, 1914.

Sir:—The United States Legation received a telegram to-day from Washington, conveying the information that the United States Govern-

ment had, at the request of the German Government, consented, as a matter of international courtesy, to undertake the protection of German subjects in Belgium.

In accordance with the instructions contained in this telegram, we will, therefore, if you see no objection, undertake to use our good and friendly offices with the Belgian Government for the protection of German subjects. The pleasant relations which we have had with you in this matter up to the present convince me that we may continue them with the same object on the same pleasant footing.

(Signed) BRAND WHITLOCK.

o. 63. Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 11, 1914.

Sir:—I have telegraphed to Sir E. Grey the German communication and the proposed reply.

I have received instructions to express to your Excellency the entire concurrence of His Britannic Majesty's Government. The latter can only declare their approval of the terms of the reply which the Belgian Government propose to give to this attempt to sow discord between the Powers at present united for the defence of the treaties violated by Germany.

(Signed) F. H. VILLIERS.

(See No. 65.)

No. 69. Monsieur Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 11, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the French Government give their entire concurrence to the reply which the Belgian Government propose to return to the new German ultimatum.

That reply is one which was to be expected from a Government and a people who have so heroically resisted the hateful violation of their territory.

France will continue to fulfil her duties as a guaranteeing Power of Belgian neutrality and as a faithful friend of Belgium.

(Signed) KLOBUKOWSKI.

(See No. 65.)

No. 70. Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

The Hague, August 12, 1914.

The German text contained a mistake: instead of "seine Auseinandersetzung," it should read "ihre," and thus be translated "their conflict with France."

(Signed) BARON FALLON.

(See No. 64.)

No. 71. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 12, 1914.

Please communicate the following telegram to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

"The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum of August 2nd. Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3rd her neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on her territory, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded loyally and without delay to her appeal."

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 72. Monsieur Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, August 13, 1914.

Please thank the Belgian Government for their communication, and express to them the pleasure which the Russian Government feel at the firm and dignified attitude, upon which they are heartily to be congratulated.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

(See No. 65.)

No. 73. Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

The Hague, August 13, 1914.

Sir:—I had the honour to receive your telegram of yesterday, and I at once communicated to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Belgian reply to the second German proposal.

His Excellency undertook to forward the Belgian communication to the German Minister forthwith.

(Signed) BARON FALLON.

(See No. 71.)

No. 74. Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

Paris, August 16, 1914.

Sir:—In the course of a conversation which I had this morning with Monsieur de Margerie, I turned the conversation to colonial affairs and to the action which you had instructed me to take in your telegram and your despatch of the 7th instant.

Monsieur de Margerie reminded me that the French Government had approached Spain, but the latter had not answered before knowing the views of Great Britain. It seems that the latter has still given no answer.

Monsieur de Margerie considered that in view of the present situation Germany should be attacked wherever possible; he believes that such is also the opinion of Great Britain, who certainly has claims to satisfy; France wishes to get back that part of the Congo which she had been compelled to give up in consequence of the Agadir incident.

Monsieur de Margerie added that a success would not be difficult to obtain.

(Signed) **BARON GUILLAUME.**

(See Nos. 57 and 58.)

No. 75. Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

London, August 17, 1914.

Sir:—In reply to your despatch of August 7th, I have the honour to inform you that the British Government cannot agree to the Belgian proposal to respect the neutrality of the belligerent powers in the conventional basin of the Congo.

German troops from German East Africa have already taken the offensive against the British Central African Protectorate. Furthermore, British troops have already attacked the German port of Dar-es-Salaam, where they have destroyed the wireless telegraphy station.

In these circumstances, the British Government, even if they were convinced from the political and strategical point of view of the utility of the Belgian proposal, would be unable to adopt it.

The British Government believe that the forces they are sending to Africa will be sufficient to overcome all opposition. They will take every step in their power to prevent any risings of the native population.

France is of the same opinion as Great Britain on account of German activity which has been noticed near Bonar and Ekododo.

(Signed) **COUNT DE LALAING.**

(See Nos. 57 and 58.)

No. 76. Monsieur Tombeur, Belgian Vice-Governor of the Katanga, to Monsieur Renkin, Belgian Minister for the Colonies

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Elizabethville, August 26, 1914.

The Germans are continuing their skirmishes on Tanganyika and attacked the port of Lukuga, on August 22nd. Two of their natives were killed and two wounded. Fresh attacks are expected.

(Signed) **TOMBEUR.**

No. 77. Count Clary and Aldringen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Forwarded through the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.)

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

The Hague, August 28, 1914.

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform your Excellency as follows:—

"Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals made to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording her military assistance to France and Great Britain, both of which Powers have declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and whereas, as has just been proved, Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to submit, under the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity and inadmissible even towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations and considers herself from this moment in a state of war with Belgium. I am leaving the country with the staff of the legation and I am entrusting the protection of Austrian interests to the United States Minister in Belgium. The Austro-Hungarian Government are forwarding his passports to Count Errembault de Dudzele."

(Signed) CLARY.

No. 79. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

Antwerp, August 29, 1914.

Please inform the Austrian Legation through the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I have received Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Belgium, and add the following:—

"Belgium has always entertained friendly relations with all her neighbours without distinction. She had scrupulously fulfilled the duties imposed upon her by her neutrality. If she has not been able to accept Germany's proposals, it is because those proposals contemplated the violation of her engagements toward Europe, engagements which form the conditions of the creation of the Belgian Kingdom. She has been unable to admit that a people, however weak they may be, can fail in their duty and sacrifice their honour by yielding to force. The Government have waited, not only until the ultimatum had expired, but also until Belgian territory had been violated by German troops, before appealing to France and Great Britain, guarantors of her neutrality, under the same terms as are Germany and Austria-Hungary, to co-operate in the name and in virtue of the treaties in defence of Belgian territory. By repelling the invaders by force of arms, she has not even committed an hostile act as laid down by the provisions of article 10 of The Hague Convention respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers.

"Germany herself has recognised that her attack constitutes a violation

of international law, and, being unable to justify it, she has pleaded her strategic interests.

"Belgium formally denies the allegation that Austrian and Hungarian nationals have suffered treatment in Belgium contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity.

"The Belgian Government, from the very commencement of hostilities, have issued the strictest orders for the protection of Austro-Hungarian persons and property."

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 79. Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers abroad

(Translation.)

Antwerp, August 29, 1914.

Sir:—Under date of the 17th August, I addressed a despatch to the Belgian Minister at London, in which I felt bound to call attention to certain allegations made by the German Government which are mentioned in the Blue Book recently published by the British Government.

I have the honour to enclose for your information a copy of the despatch in question and of its enclosures.

I request that you will bring its contents to the notice of the Government to which you are accredited.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 79

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 17, 1914.

Sir:—The Blue Book recently published by the British Government contains (see No. 122, p. 65) the text of a telegram despatched from Berlin on the 31st July by Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, in which the following passage occurs:—

"It appears from what he [his Excellency the Secretary of State] said, that the German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already."

The incident to which the German Secretary of State alluded in his conversation with Sir E. Goschen, and which he considered as an hostile act on the part of Belgium, doubtless refers to the application of the Royal decree of the 30th July, which provisionally prohibited the export from Belgium of certain products. As you will see from the explanation in the following paragraph, the incident with which we are reproached has in no wise the character which Germany has wished to attribute to it.

The Royal decrees dated the 30th July and published in the "Moniteur belge" the following day forbade, provisionally, the export, both by land and by sea, of a series of products, more especially of cereals. On the 31st

July the German Minister at Brussels called my attention to the fact that the Antwerp customs were detaining cargoes of grain addressed to Germany, which, as they were merely transshipped in our port, were in reality only in *transit*. Herr von Below Saleske requested that the vessels carrying these cargoes should be allowed to depart freely. The very day on which the German Minister's request was received, the Foreign Office brought the matter to the notice of the Ministry of Finance, and the following day, the 2nd August, that Department informed us that instructions had been forwarded to the Belgian Customs giving full and entire satisfaction to Germany.

I cannot do better than enclose, for your information, copies of the correspondence exchanged on this subject with Herr von Below Saleske. You will observe that nothing in our attitude can be taken as showing any hostile dispositions towards Germany; the steps taken by the Belgian Government at that time were nothing more than those simple precautions which it is the right and duty of every State to adopt in such exceptional circumstances.

It would be as well that you should address a communication to the British Government in order to explain the real facts of the case.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 79

Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation.)

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

Sir:—I am informed from Antwerp that the Customs have forbidden the despatch of vessels containing cargoes of grain for Germany.

In view of the fact that it is not in this case a question of the *export* of grain, but of grain in *transit*, the goods in question having been merely transshipped at Antwerp, I have the honour to ask your good offices in order that the vessels in question may be allowed to leave for Germany.

At the same time I beg your Excellency to inform me if the port of Antwerp is closed for the transit of those goods specified in the "Moniteur" of to-day.

Awaiting your Excellency's reply at your earliest possible convenience, I have, &c.

(Signed) DE BELOW SALESKE.

Enclosure 3 in No. 79

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 1, 1914.

Sir:—In reply to your Excellency's note of the 31st July, I have the honour to inform you that the Belgian decree of the 30th July concerns only the export and not the transit of the products mentioned.

I at once communicated your note to the Minister of Finance and begged him to issue precise instructions to the Customs officials in order that any error in the application of the above-mentioned decree might be avoided.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

Enclosure 4 in No. 79

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

Sir:—With reference to the note which your Excellency was good enough to address to me on the 31st July, I have the honour to inform you that the Minister of Finance has instructed the Customs that the prohibitions established by the Royal decrees of the 30th July last, only apply to actual exports, and do not, therefore, extend to goods regularly declared in transit at the time of import. Moreover, when duty-free goods are declared to be for actual consumption, although they are really intended for export, they are commonly the object of special declarations of free entry, which are considered as transit documents. In short, if it should happen that such goods had been declared as for consumption without restriction, as though they were to remain in the country, the Customs would still allow them to leave the country as soon as it had been duly established by despatch receipts, bills of lading, &c., that they were to be exported forthwith in transit.

I would add that the export of grain with which your note deals was authorised on the 1st August.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-66 (April, 1907, to May, 1913). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

67. Music as an International Language, by Daniel Gregory Mason, June, 1913.
68. American Love of Peace and European Skepticism, by Paul S. Reinach, July, 1913.
69. The Relations of Brazil with the United States, by Manoel de Oliveira Lima, August, 1913.
70. Arbitration and International Politics, by Randolph S. Bourne, September, 1913.
71. Japanese Characteristics, by Charles William Eliot, October, 1913.
72. Higher Nationality; A Study in Law and Ethics, by Lord Haldane, November, 1913.
73. The Control of the Fighting Instinct, by George M. Stratton, December, 1913.
- A New Year's Letter from Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, December, 1913.
- The A B C of the Panama Canal Controversy. Reprinted from *The Congressional Record*, October 29, 1913. December, 1913.
74. A Few Lessons Taught by the Balkan War, by Alfred H. Fried, January, 1914.
- Wanted—A Final Solution of the Japanese Problem, by Hamilton Holt, January, 1914.
- The South American Point of View, by Charles Hitchcock Sherrill, January, 1914.
75. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, by Nicholas Murray Butler, February, 1914.
76. Our Relations with South America and How To Improve Them, by George H. Blakeslee, March, 1914.
77. Commerce and War, by Alvin Saunders Johnson, April, 1914.
- A Panama Primer. Reprinted from *The Independent*, March 30, 1914. April, 1914.
78. A Defense of Cannibalism, by B. Beau. Translated from *Le Reven* of February 15, 1909, by Preston William Slosson, May, 1914.
79. The Tradition of War, by Randolph S. Bourne, June, 1914.
- The Causes Behind Mexico's Revolution, by Gilbert Reid. Reprint from the *New York Times*, April 27, 1914. June, 1914. The Japanese in California, June, 1914.
80. War and the Interest of Labor, by Alvin S. Johnson. Reprint from the *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1914. July, 1914.
81. Fiat Pax, by George Allan England, August, 1914.
82. Three Men Behind the Guns, by Charles E. Jefferson, D.D., September, 1914.
- Special Bulletin. The Changing Attitude toward War as reflected in the American Press. September, 1914.
83. Official Documents Bearing upon the European War. Reprinted Through the Courtesy of the *New York Times*, October, 1914.
- Special Bulletin. The Great War and its Lessons, by Nicholas Murray Butler.
84. Additional Official Documents bearing upon the European War. November, 1914.
85. Documents Regarding the European War. Series III. December, 1914.

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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SPECIAL BULLETIN

CONTEMPORARY WAR POEMS



WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

JOHN ERSKINE

DECEMBER, 1914

American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-Station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City



The Association

THE poems of this collection have been chosen to illustrate the emotional attitudes of the United States toward the war, as those attitudes find expression in newspaper and magazine verse. At another time the literary merits of these pieces would invite judgment or comment; now, however, the suitability of war poems for the purpose of an anthology is a very minor question, and it is therefore not as a literary museum that these verses are offered, but as social documents, as evidence of the state of our civilization at this moment. Of course the emotional attitudes of a nation may unfortunately change from day to day, and it is quite possible that before these selections are in print they may have ceased to represent the national feeling, but at this moment at least we may read in them certain well-defined and common attitudes which are all the more significant since the individual poems were written in various circumstances, and come together here almost by accident.

The first observation the reader will make is that the glamor of war has not touched these poems; here are no stirring battle songs and no heroic ballads. Perhaps the newspaper correspondent and the newspaper photograph have made war too frightfully real for any but a horrified treatment; perhaps warfare has ceased for the moment at least to be an idea of any sort, alluring or otherwise, and has become, or has tended to become, for the public consciousness simply an ugly and stupefying fact. But however we explain it, the absence of glamor from these verses on the war is a new and interesting phenomenon. Even when war has been condemned in itself, poets have usually recognized the moral value of certain of its by-products, or have justified the battles fought in a good cause. Chivalry gave the modern gentleman the example and the name for his ideal behavior, as the Roman arms gave St. Paul an illustration of the Christian life; Wordsworth could portray the duties of conscientious bloodshed in his "Happy Warrior" without disturbing his own or his readers' equanimity; Tennyson could sing of that peculiarly militaristic obedience that does not discriminate between a useful and unequivocal command and a fatal and obvious error—he could even satisfy us that those

men are "noble" who discard reason and execute what they know is a blunder; and even yesterday, as it seems, William Vaughan Moody could imply in his beautiful and otherwise enlightened "Ode in Time of Hesitation" that a war is just, even morally alluring, if it rises from generous impulses and is made to serve some high end. Doubtless there are many to agree with the great poets in all these instances, but clearly the verse-writers who have been expressing the emotional judgments of the United States in the last few weeks do not agree with them. The battle passages in Wordsworth's poem, Tennyson's fine song, and Moody's eloquent peroration have suddenly become antiquated, and Christianity is invoked, not in the images of discipline and strategy, but in the figure of the widowed and the orphaned and the slain. There can be little question that if the United States were actually in the conflict this humane attitude would largely disappear, and the glamor of war would return upon much of our verse; yet never before has so general a condemnation of war been voiced even by a nation at peace.

Since this frame of mind prevails in these poems, it is not surprising that the "literary" manner is absent from them. Whatever else they are, these pieces are spontaneous and sincere; they impress the reader as vehicles of an urgent protest rather than as elaborations of a theme. No one would charge the writers with having used the war for "copy." Such abstinence may not be self-denial—it may not be a virtue at all; it is, however, unusual. War in the past has not only fitted out ethics and religion with a language of spiritual control and conflict, but it has also furnished the ballad-maker with incident. This war from the beginning has been rich in incident, and it broke out at a moment when narrative verse, after a long interval, was returning to popular favor. We might have expected, therefore, that such a collection as this would contain accounts of air- and sea-fights, of forced marches and exciting encounters, but the papers have been singularly barren of such material. One journal complained editorially that its office was deluged with verse on the war in general, but no poems were coming in which dealt with single events or aspects, and the editor pointed out that successful war-poems in the past have confined themselves to the stirring details of the conflict, instead of projecting a broad mental attitude. His testimony is significant. When we have become hardened to this war or have got further away from its horrors, we may begin to make literary use

of them, but at present, it seems, the poets and their readers think it a kind of sacrilege to convert any of this stupendous misery to the purposes of art.

It might have been expected also that feeling so anti-military would have directed itself against one or another of the warring governments, as against the supposed nurse and citadel of militarism. Yet the poems in our newspapers have in this respect shown remarkable poise; much more in fact than the editorials. To be sure, a few foreign-born Americans whose spirit at such a moment as this naturally resides in their fatherland, wherever their physical presence may be, have expressed a violent partisanship. To make this collection representative, examples of this kind of prejudice have been included. For the most part, however, it has been militarism rather than any one country or government that has roused the indignation expressed in these poems.

Is it fanciful to read in them a new emphasis on democracy? There have always been protests in American literature against the aristocratic conception of war, against the willingness to devote the common man to the salvation or the profit of a few, but the protests here gathered seem to contain surprise as well as indignation. Why surprise? We cannot suppose these writers are ignorant of the venerable antiquity of this selfishness, or of its prevalence in all aristocratic countries to-day. Carlyle summed the matter for us in a famous passage in "Sartor Resartus." Evidently the American poet to-day supposed that the old giant of feudalism had been withered up by modern humaneness, and his surprise comes from discovering his mistake. In his own intellectual background liberal ideas of the best sort have, it seems, been making during recent decades faster progress than he realized; the manner of his protest implies that the right of all men to live and enjoy life is everywhere beyond dispute, and that all life, whether in peasant or noble, is equally sacred. This implication, if we do not deceive ourselves in reading it throughout these poems, is probably their most American contribution and their chief significance. It is what makes them seem remarkably cosmopolitan. The bitterness against war here expressed is very remote from the interest an outsider would manifest; the makers of these verses write not as spectators of the disaster but as sharers in it. Sympathy so broad has been the mark of rare natures, but here it seems to be a public attitude.

Is it fanciful to discover also in certain of these poems an in-

dication of the new position that woman holds in society? War has always fallen heavily on the children and the mothers, and such poems as Ella Wheeler Wilcox's "The Messenger" have always been part of man's comment on the tragedy of battle. But in some of these poems the injustice that war does to womanhood is defined in a new way, with the implication that the tragedy might be avoided, and that women will no longer accept it as inevitable. So at least one may read the verses by Edith M. Thomas and those by Edna Valentine Trapwell. As in the rest of this collection the emphasis is upon the right of the common man to enjoy life, peace and safety, so in these fine poems the emphasis is upon woman's right to decide whether she will pay the penalty that war always exacts of her.

These are the attitudes that are most clearly discovered in these verses. As a whole the collection represents, so to speak, the nation's first impression of the war. It should have value as evidence of our instinctive reaction at a moment so searching.

JOHN ERSKINE.)

Columbia University.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN WALKS AT MIDNIGHT

BY VACHEL LINDSAY

It is portentous, and a thing of state
That here at midnight, in our little town
A mourning figure walks, and will not rest
Near the old court-house pacing up and down.

Or by his homestead, or the shadowed yards
He lingers where his children used to play,
Or thru the market, on the well-worn stones
He stalks until the dawn-stars burn away.

A bronzed, lank man! His suit of ancient black,
A famous high top-hat and plain worn shawl
Make him the quaint great figure that men love,
The prairie-lawyer, master of us all.

He cannot sleep upon his hillside now.
He is among us, as in times before!
And we who toss and lie awake for long
Breathe deep, and start, to see him pass the door.

His head is bowed. He thinks on men and kings.
Yea, when the sick world cries, how can he sleep?
Too many peasants fight, they know not why,
Too many homesteads in black terror weep.

The sins of all the war-lords burn his heart.
He sees the dreadnaughts scouring every main.
He carries on his shawl-wrapt shoulders now
The bitterness, the folly and the pain.

He cannot rest until a spirit-dawn
Shall come;—the shining hope of Europe free;
The league of sober folk, the Workers' Earth
Bringing long peace to Cornland, Alp and Sea.

It breaks his heart that kings must murder still,
That all his hours of travail here for men
Seem yet in vain. And who will bring white peace
That he may sleep upon his hill again?

Springfield, Illinois.

—The Independent.

THE NEW BEATITUDE

BY RICHARD BUTLER GLAENZER

In gay Brabant I have danced till the night turned rose,
All the health and the wealth of a Rubens before my eye.

In meadows which only the tramper of byways knows,
I have tasted the peace of earth neath a kind calm sky,
Glad of the Angelus, gladdened by love-looks shy
And the laughter of children and songs of men who mow.
All that I hear to-day is the harsh dull cry:

Blessed are they which died a year ago!

In Picardy plain through which all joyance flows
Like the tranquil Somme; and churches beautify

Every hamlet with noble shrines that spell repose;
And the simple peasant has never a thought to deny

A bed or a snack to the stranger wandering by,—
In gentle, smiling Picardy, all aglow

With poppies amid ripe wheat, I hear the sigh:

Blessed are they which died a year ago!

In Prussia the proud, whose boundaries enclose
Full many a fireside happy once to vie

In soft content with any home that owes
Its worth to toil and thrift, now gone awry;

Yea, in proud Prussia, not only those that fly
The Cossack, but women secure from death or blow,—

Do not their hearts confess (though lips may lie):

Blessed are they which died a year ago!

ENVOY

Lord Prince of Peace, who for men's sins didst die,
Let them not reap the whirlwind that they sow!

Twice-crucified, do not Thou too reply:

Blessed are they which died a year ago!

—*The Bookman.*

THE MAD WAR

BY RICHARD BUTLER GLAENZER

Because one man, one man, was slain—
No more a man than you or I—
Must nations suffer murder's stain,
Millions be made to die?

They have no cruel wrong to right,
No wrong to rouse a righteous ire;
No noble cause for which to fight
With heart and soul on fire.

Austria's heir was killed by plan!
Ah, so is someone's hope each day:
Can vengeance give back life to man,
Though royal be his clay?

A ruler's death to punish? Then,
Punish the cowards and their tool;
But not a million guiltless men
With hungry homes to rule!

Attila and his wolfish Huns,—
We read of them as horror past:
That "Scourge of God" before our guns
Were less than trumpet-blast.

Ponder how Death now bares his teeth,
Waiting the certain holocaust;
The vanquished torn and crushed beneath
A conqueror half lost.

War . . . this red madness of an hour
Whelped from base fear by baser pride
Unbalanced by its lust for power?
The mailed fist defied!

One group of three who fraternise
To-day, though once close locked in hate,
To thwart another three must rise,
All blaming all on Fate.

Christians, they prate of "Triplices"
As if of pledges made to God.
What is the Trinity to these
Who trample life roughshod?

The civilised! The civilised!—
Smug irony of modern cant!
Culture so blind, self-idolised,
The East may well supplant.

And well may smile the pagan Mars
And grin the bloody Juggernaut:
Christendom rends its Saviour's scars
With weapons Judas-bought.

Harken, vain Europe— Nay, your ears
Can only hear your shout "To arms!"
Deaf to your women's pleading tears,
Your children's dazed alarms.

Yet could you hear, and heed the roar
Of sullen Asia, you would cease
Ruin's mad march, though cold before
Your flaunted Prince of Peace.

—*The Bookman.*

WAR

BY WITTER BYNNER

Fools, fools, fools,
Your blood is hot to-day.
It cools
When you are clay.
It joins the very clod
Wherein your foe shall be,—
Wherein you look at God,
Wherein at last you see
The living God,
The loving God,
Which was your enemy.

—*The Nation.*

A PRAYER

BY EDWARD S. VAN ZILE

God of my Fathers, grant me aid
That I may rout my countless foes!
By Thee were guns and cannons made,
From Thee the joy of battle flows.

O God, who gave me might and power,
Thou knowest that my heart is pure.
Be with me in this awful hour,
That I and mine may still endure.

Thou art the God who loveth war,
And famine, rapine, blood and death;
I pray Thee stand beside me, for
Thou knowest what my spirit saith.

The soul of me is linked with Thine
To bid the blood of heroes flow,
The death we grant them is divine,
And in Thy name I bid them go.

God of my Fathers, still be kind
To them who raise Thy banner high,
While Thou and I together find
The surest way for them to die.

They do my bidding. God, look down
And bless the sword that I have drawn.
My blight shall fall on field and town,
And thousands shall not see the dawn.

To Thee, O God, I give all praise
That Thou hast made my hand so strong;
That now, as in my father's days,
The King and Thee can do no wrong.

—*The New York Sun.*

IF!

BY BARTHOLOMEW F. GRIFFEN

Suppose 'twere done!
The lanyard pulled on every shotted gun;
Into the wheeling death-clutch sent
Each millioned armament,
To grapple there
On land, on sea and under, and in air!
Suppose at last 'twere come—
Now, while each bourse and shop and mill is dumb,
And arsenals and dockyards hum—
Now all complete, supreme,
That vast, Satanic dream!

Each field were trampled, soaked,
Each stream dyed, choked,
Each leaguered city and blockaded port
Made famine's sport;
The empty wave
Made reeling dreadnought's grave;
Cathedral, castle, gallery, smoking fell
'Neath bomb and shell;
In deathlike trance
Lay industry, finance;
Two thousand years'
Bequest, achievement, saving, disappears
In blood and tears,
In widowed woe
That slum and palace equal know,
In civilization's suicide—
What served thereby, what satisfied?
For justice, freedom, right, what wrought?
Naught!

Save, after the great cataclysm, perhaps
On the world's shaken map
New lines, more near or far,
Binding to king or czar;
In festering hate
Some newly vassalled state;
And passion, lust and pride, made satiate;
And just a trace
Of lingering smile on Satan's face!

—*The Boston Globe.*

THE VICTORY

BY JAMES J. MONTAGUE

No martial music goes before,
No stirring bugles play,
As in the smoking wake of war
I take my somber way.
But where pale women wait and weep,
Where old men cringe in dread,
And little trusting children sleep,
I take my toll of dead.

Afar from fame's highways I seek,
Through farm and little town,
The frail, the innocent, the meek,
And swiftly strike them down.
They never know the battle's thrill
Nor watch the flag that waves
Its inspiration, ere they fill
Their unremembered graves.

They shall not wake a nation's pride
In years that are to be;
For war and fame march side by side,
But hunger walks with me.
I fill no glowing history's page
With thrilling hero lore;
Yet I have been, through every age,
The blackest curse of war.

—*Hearst's Magazine.*

THE MESSENGER

BY ELLA WHEELER WILCOX

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She rose up in the early dawn,
And white and silently she moved
About the house. Four men had gone
To battle for the land they loved,
And she, the mother and the wife,
Waited for tidings from the strife.
How still the house seemed! and her tread
Was like the footsteps of the dead.

The long day passed; the dark night came,
She had not seen a human face,
Some voice spoke suddenly her name.
How loud it echoed in that place,
Where, day on day, no sound was heard
But her own footsteps. "Bring you word,"
She cried to whom she could not see,
"Word from the battle-plain to me?"

A soldier entered at the door,
And stood within the dim firelight:
"I bring you tidings of the four,"
He said, "who left you for the fight."
"God bless you, friend," she cried, "speak on!
For I can bear it. One is gone?"
"Ay, one is gone," he said. "Which one?"
"Dear lady, he, your eldest son."

A deathly pallor shot across
Her withered face; she did not weep.
She said: "It is a grievous loss,
But God gives His beloved sleep.
What of the living—of the three?
And when can they come back to me?"
The soldier turned away his head:
"Lady, your husband, too, is dead."

She put her hand upon her brow;
A wild, sharp pain was in her eyes.
"My husband! Oh, God help me now!"
The soldier heard her shuddering sighs.

The task was harder than he thought.
"Your youngest son, dear madam, fought
Close at his father's side; both fell
Dead, by the bursting of a shell."

She moved her lips and seemed to moan.

Her face had paled to ashen gray:
"Then one is left me—one alone,"

She said, "of four who marched away.
Oh, overruling, All-wise God,
How can I pass beneath Thy rod!"
The soldier walked across the floor,
Paused at the window, at the door,

Wiped the cold dew-drops from his cheek
And sought the mourner's side again.

"Once more, dear lady, I must speak:

Your last remaining son was slain
Just at the closing of the fight.

'Twas he who sent me here to-night."

"God knows," the man said afterward,

"The fight itself was not so hard."

—*The New York Evening Journal.*

THE SURVIVOR

BY DANA BURNET

Have ye heard the thunder down the wind?

Have ye seen the smoke against the sky?

Nay, for my love goes from my arms

To march and die!

Have ye seen the scarlet battle flags,

The distant lightnings of the sword?

Nay, for my house hath lost its king,

My heart its lord!

Have ye heard the splendid lifting song

The wind-blown psalm of the strife?

Nay, for they sing of Death—and I

Am chained to life!

—*The New York Evening Sun.*

WOMAN AND WAR

"SHOT. TELL HIS MOTHER"

BY W. E. P. FRENCH, Captain, U. S. Army

What have I done to you, Brothers,—War-Lord and Land-Lord and Priest,—

That my son should rot on the blood-smeared earth where the raven and buzzard feast?

He was my baby, my man-child, that soldier with shell-torn breast,
Who was slain for your power and profit—aye, murdered at your behest,
I bore him, my boy and my manling, while the long months ebbed away:
He was part of me, part of my body, which nourished him day by day.

He was mine when the birth-pang tore me, mine when he lay on my heart,

When the sweet mouth mumbled my bosom and the milk-teeth made it smart,

Babyhood, boyhood, and manhood, and a glad mother proud of her son—

See the carrion birds, too gorged to fly! Ah! Brothers, what have you done?

You prate of duty and honor, of a patriot's glorious death,
Of love of country, heroic deeds—nay, for shame's sake, spare your breath!

Pray, what have you done for your country? Whose was the blood that was shed

In the hellish warfare that served your ends? My boy was shot in your stead.

And for what were our children butchered, men makers of cruel law?

By the Christ, I am glad no woman made the Christless code of war!

Shirks and schemers, why don't you answer? Is the foul truth hard to tell?

Then a mother will tell it for you, of a deed that shames fiends in hell:—

Our boys were killed that some faction or scoundrel might win mad race

For goals of stained gold, shamed honors, and the sly self-seeker's place;
That money's hold on our country might be tightened and made more sure;

That the rich could inherit earth's fullness and their loot be quite secure;

That the world-mart be wider opened to the product mulct from toil;
That the labor and land of our neighbors should become your war-won
 spoil;

That the eyes of an outraged people might be turned from your graft
 and greed

In the misruled, plundered home-land by lure of war's ghastly deed;
And that priests of the warring nations could pray to the selfsame God
For His blessing on battle and murder and corpse-strewn, blood-soaked
 sod.

Oh, fools! if God were a woman, think you She would let kin slay
For gold-lust and craft of gamesters, or cripple that trade might pay?

This quarrel was not the fighters':—the cheated, red pawns in your
 game:—

You stay-at-homes garnered the plunder, but the pawns,—wounds,
 death, and "Fame"!

You paid them a beggarly pittance, your substitute prey-of-the-sword,
But, ye canny beasts of prey, they paid, in life and limb, for your hoard.
And, behold! you have other victims: a widow sobs by my side,
Who clasps to her breast a girl-child. Men, she was my slain son's
 bride!

I can smell the stench of the shambles, where the mangled bodies lie;
I can hear the moans of the wounded; I can see the brave lads die;
And across the heaped, red trenches and the tortured, bleeding rows
I cry out a mother's pity to all mothers of dear, dead "foes."
In love and a common sorrow, I weep with them o'er our dead,
And invoke my sister woman for a curse on each scheming head.

Nay, why should we mothers curse you? Lo! flesh of our flesh are ye;
But, by soul of Mary who bore the Christ man-murdered at Calvary,
Into our own shall the mothers come, and the glad day speed apace
When the law of peace shall be the law of the women that bear the race;
When a man shall stand by his mother, for the world-wide common
 good,
And not bring her tears and heart-break nor make mock of her mother-
 hood.

—*New York Times.*

A PRAYER OF THE PEOPLES

(On the Day of the President's Call to Prayer)

BY PERCY MACKAYE

God of us, who kill our kind!
Master of this blood-tracked Mind
Which from wolf and Caliban
Staggers toward the star of Man—
Now, on Thy cathedral stair,
God, we cry to Thee in prayer!

Where our stifled anguish bleeds
Strangling through Thine organ reeds,
Where our voiceless songs suspire
From the corpses in Thy choir—
Through Thy charred and shattered nave,
God, we cry on Thee to save!

Save us from our tribal gods!
From the racial powers, whose rods—
Wreathed with stinging serpents—stir
Odin and old Jupiter
From their ancient hells of hate
To invade Thy dawning state.

Save us from their curse of kings!
Free our souls' imaginings
From the feudal dreams of war;
Yea, God, let us nevermore
Make, with slaves' idolatry,
Kaiser, czar, or king of *Thee!*

We who, craven in our prayer,
Would lay off on Thee our care—
Lay instead on *us* Thy load;
On our minds Thy spirit's goad,
On our laggard wills Thy whips
And Thy passion on our lips!

Fill us with the reasoned faith
That the prophet lies who saith
All this web of destiny,
Torn and tangled, cannot be
Newly wove and redesigned
By the Godward human mind.

Teach us, so, no more to call
Guidance supernatural
To our help, but—heart and will—
Know ourselves responsible
For our world of wasted good
And our blinded brotherhood.

Lord, our God! to whom, from clay,
Blood and mire, Thy peoples pray—
Not from Thy cathedral's stair
Thou hearest:—Thou criest *through* our prayer;
For our prayer is but the gate:
We, who pray, ourselves are fate.

—*The New York Times.*

MEMORY AWAKES

BY ETHEL H. WOLFF

What care I for war, or who may lose!
Thank God that I am old, and these dim eyes
Long since wept dry. Fear, in her hideous guise,
No more can haunt my pillow till the long night flies,
Whispering her dreadful tale.

What is't to me that others' sons must go?
My share is paid in three mounds, side by side;
And I live on, who gladly would have died,
With naught to lose, whate'er may now betide—
Whether 'tis win or fail.

Women may lie with open eyes till the faint dawn
Thinking of lips that babble feebly to a darkening sky—
Gray hands that clutch a water flask long since run dry—
Of husband, lovers, sons—but not so I—
On dreamless seas I sail.

Prate not to me of war! I've had my fill
Of death and sacrifice and bitter tears;
Yon marching feet, and blaring music in my ears
But rend apart my graves, now green these many years—
Make Time Past drop its veil.

—*The New York Times.*

WE MOURN FOR PEACE

[For the Peace Parade, August 29]

BY EDITH M. THOMAS

"Who is this pacing sisterhood,
Moving in silent, broken mood,
Clad all in mourning weeds?
Are ye the celebrants of martial deeds—
The work of dauntless spirits lifted high
From many a red field where the brave for country die?"

No! We are not the celebrants of warlike deeds—
We mourn for World-Peace slain,
Hid in our hearts until she rise again!
We hate your fields of death,
Your brazen Mars that leads
Where men are reaped as grain!
Your "Glory" is to us but venomous breath!
A-near our hearts your "causes" do not lie—
Nor one, nor other, O ye warring States!

But we are they who hate your mutual hates;
And we are they whom ye shall ask in vain,
In home's dear covert to remain—
Praying at home—yet serving still your needs,
Yielding to you our sons, our brothers and our mates—
We mourn for World-Peace slain—
We mourn—but oh, not that alone!
A heresy through all our ranks is blown:
The order old is changing—shall not come again;
No more shall tender cowardice restrain,
The "Call of Country" shall betray no more,
To trick our tears in bravery of a smile,
Gazing upon the glittering file
Of those that march away to war (so fain!)—
Of whom what remnant shall their fate restore?

We—celebrants of martial deeds?
Trading in precious lives more dear than are our own?
At last, O warring States, the soul-of-woman know—
We will not give our men, to serve your schemes,
Your cozzening plans, and your Imperial dreams!

And if ye seize them, we to slaughter too will go,
And in the breach ourselves will throw;
Upon us, too, the quiver of your hatreds rain!
We mourn the World-Peace slain!

—*The Evening Post.*

WHO PAYS?

BY EDNA VALENTINE TRAPNELL

Drum and trumpet and banner, banner and trumpet and drum!
Tramp, tramp, through the city streets the new-listed armies come.
Song and laugh on the transports steaming under the stars,
Wet eyes star-blind of those behind who pay for the nations' wars—
(The women who pay and have paid, dear Lord, for immemorial wars.)

Cheers and shouts greet the headlines that tell of the battles won.
Who remembers the death-wrecked bodies motionless under the sun?
"Victory stood to our banners, only a handful lost—"
Only! We bore those bodies, and we know what bodies cost!
(Mothers and wives of the soldiers dead—who better can gauge the cost?)

Man is blinded by passion, by glory or gold or power.
Shall we not see more clearly when it comes to the woman's hour?
Before we loose hell's lightning that shall prove a cause through strife,
Shall we not weigh the price we pay when the payment's in human life?
(Dear Lord, we know by each birth-throe the value of human life.)

Counselors, kings, and rulers, ye take what ye cannot give.
Can ye say to the things in the trenches, "Be whole, rise up and live"?
Do ye know—who have killed your thousands by a word from a death-
tipped pen—
One little pang of the cost to those who breed you your fighting men?
(Who pays, dear Lord, for their bodies and souls but the mothers and
wives of men?)

—*The Outlook.*

DOUBT

BY PERCY MACKAYE

So thin, so frail the opalescent ice
Where yesterday, in lordly pageant, rose
The monumental nations—the repose
Of continents at peace! Realities
Solid as earth they seemed; yet in a trice
Their bastions crumbled in the surging flocs
Of unconceivable, inhuman woes,
Gulfed in a mad, unmeaning sacrifice.

We, who survive that world-quake, quail and start,
Searching our hidden souls with dark surmise:
So thin, so frail—is reason? Patient art—
Is it all a mockery, and love all lies?
Who sees the lurking Hun in childhood's eyes?
Is hell so near to every human heart?

—*Boston Evening Transcript.*

DESTINY

BY PERCY MACKAYE

We are what we imagine, and our deeds
Are born of dreaming. Europe acts to-day
Epics that little children in their play
Conjured, and statesmen murmured in their creeds;
In barrack, court and school were sown those seeds,
Like Dragon's teeth, which ripen to affray
Their sowers. Dreams of slaughter rise to slay,
And fate itself is stuff that fancy breeds.

Mock, then, no more at dreaming, lest our own
Create for us a like reality!
Let not imagination's soil be sown
With armed men but justice, so that we
May for a world of tyranny atone
And dream from that despair—democracy.

—*Boston Evening Transcript.*

RHEIMS

BY PERCY MACKAYE

Apollo mourns another Parthenon
In ruins!—Is the God of Love awake?
And we—must we behold the world's heart break
For peace and beauty ravished, and look on
Dispassionate?—Rheims' gloried fane is gone:
Not by a planet's rupture, nor the quake
Of subterranean titans, but to slake
The vengeance of a Goth Napoleon.

O Time, let not the anguish numb or pall
Of that remembrance! Let no callous heal
Our world-wound, till our kindled pities call
The parliament of nations, and repeal
The vows of war. Till then, pain keep us thrall!
More bitter than to battle—is to feel.

—*Boston Evening Transcript.*

IN MEMORIAM

NOTRE DAME DE RHEIMS, SEPTEMBER, 1914

BY LEE WILSON DODD

Men raised thee with loving hands;
Thy stones, more precious than gems,
They wrought for a Light to the Lands;
Now the Light of all Lands condemns
Hun and Vandal and Goth
Who serve the Lords of the Night,
Who have turned the coat of their troth
And darkened Our Lady of Light.

Men made thee beautiful, yea
Their hearts flowed out as they wrought;
Thou wast builded not for a day,
For an age thou wast builded not:
And they carved thy portals and towers
For peer and burgher and clown,
That the Book of Our Lady's Hours
Might endure tho' the sun burned down.

By the grace of thy ruined Rose,
By the sullied strength of thy Towers,
Thou shalt triumph, Lady! Thy foes
Shall cower as the hunted cowers.
Thou hast not fallen in vain—
Fallen? Thou canst not fall:
They shall crave thy pity in pain,
Who flung thee hate for a pall.

—*The New York Tribune.*

PEASANT AND KING

(What the peasants of Europe are thinking)

BY CHRISTOPHER MORLEY

You who put faith in your banks and brigades,
Drank and ate largely, slept easy at night,
Hoarded your lyddite and polished the blades,
Let down upon us this blistering blight—
You who played grandly the easiest game,
Now can you shoulder the weight of the same?
Say, can *you* fight?

Here is the tragedy: losing or winning
Who profits a copper? Who garners the fruit?
From the bloodiest ending to futile beginning
Ours is the blood, and the sorrow to boot.
Muster your music, flutter your flags,
Ours are the hunger, the wounds, and the rags.
Say, can *you* shoot?

Down in the muck and despair of the trenches
Comes not the moment of bitterest need;
Over the sweat and the groans and the stench
There is a joy in the valorous deed—
But, lying wounded, what one forgets
You and your ribbons and d——d epaulettes—
Say, do *you* bleed?

This is *your* game: it was none of our choosing—
We are the pawns with whom you have played.
Yours is the winning and ours is the losing,
But, when the penalties have to be paid,
We who are left, and our womenfolk, too,
Rulers of Europe, will settle with you—
Are you afraid?

—*The Evening Post.*

WHO DIES IF ENGLAND LIVE?

BY MORRIS RYSKIND

LONDON, Sept. 3.—England, ready for a staggering blow on publication of the government casualty list, heaved a sigh of relief when it was found that so few of the noble families had been affected.—*The Mail*, Sept. 3.

Ten thousand Tommy Atkinses went forth into the fray;
Ten thousand stalwart Tommies who gave Death their lives for pay.
But still we sing, "God Save the King," and thank the Fates of War:
For Viscount What-the-Who's-This hasn't even got a scar.

Ten thousand Tommy Atkinses, courageous, clear-eyed, brave,
Went boldly into battle—and the battlefield's their grave.
Their souls God rest!—He knows what's best: Good news, bad news
shall match:
The Duke of What-You-Call-It hasn't even got a scratch.

Ten thousand Tommy Atkinses that faced the German hordes;
Ten thousand Tommy Atkinses cut down by guns and swords.
In peace they sleep.—Why do ye weep, ye girls they left behind?
Lord So-and-So is safe and sound.—The others,—never mind!
—*The Columbia Jester.*

THE PRICE

BY J. H. H.

A costly thing is a War Lord's word
When he bids his subjects draw the sword.

Here's part of the cost the Germans pay
For their Kaiser's plunge into bloody strife:
For a metal check they trade away
A vigorous German soldier's life.
Thousands and thousands of little tags
Have been garnered by British and French, they say,
To send to Berlin in gunny bags.
Dear God! what an awful price to pay;
And scarcely a month has flown away.

But this is only the partial cost,
Because in the tumult of the fray
Thousands and thousands of checks are lost,
And the lives they tally are thrown away;
For they fail to get even metal disks,
For those who bleeding and anguished stray,
For the souls they count in missing lists.
Great God! what an awful price to pay;
And scarcely a month has flown away.

Can the Kaiser bring them back again?
Can the War Lord still the tortured wail
Of wives and children for murdered men?
Oh! the shocked world shudders at the tale.
If 'twere only loss of yellow gold,
Or only lack of barter and sale,
Why, hearts might grieve, but they'd not grow cold.
Dear God! what an awful price to pay
Ere scarcely a month has flown away.

When the Kaiser bids them fight, they must;
They cannot, they dare not disobey.
But there'll be reckoning, since God is just,
For blood and iron have had their day;
And out of the wreck of war for greed
The German nation will be freed
From the heavy hand of the War Lord's breed.
But God! what an awful price to pay;
And scarcely a month has flown away.

A costly thing is a War Lord's word
When he bids his subjects draw the sword.

NOTE.—Each German soldier wears an identification check. The newspapers of September 7 reported that 62,000 of these checks had been gathered by the Allies to be sent to Berlin.

—*The New York Times.*

FOR ALL WE HAVE AND ARE

(*An Answer*)

BY HENRY B. SALISBURY

"For all we have and are,"
"For all our children's fate,"
Stand and denounce the war
Of horrid, hellish hate.
Let empires pass away
And kingdoms be o'erthrown.
For deeds ye've done to-day
Shall thrones and crowns atone?

"Though all we know depart,"
"The old commandments stand."
"Thou shalt not kill." Ye start?
"Thou shalt not steal" the land.

Though emperors give the word
To drench with blood the world,
There's a law above the sword
By mightier power unfurled.
"Love thou thy neighbor as thyself."
Heard ye that King's command?
Go! Royal lords of pelf,
Go! Hide your bloody hand.

Though kingly robes ye wear
(Your brother's keeper still.)
The mark of Cain ye bear;
Hark ye: "Thou shalt not kill."
The hand upon the wall
Has written out your fate.
"Begone." Ye rulers all,
Feel ye the millstone's weight.

The people to their own
Shall come when ye are gone.
Your exit shall atone.
(Ye were better never born.)
The brotherhood of man
From war's ruin shall rise,
War shall all nations ban
As your regal power dies.

"Though all we know depart,"

"The old commandments stand."

"Thou shalt not kill." Ye start?

"Thou shalt not steal" the land.

—*The New York Globe.*

TO EUROPE

BY GEORGE STERLING

I

Beat back thy forfeit plowshares into swords.

It is not yet the far, seraphic Dream

Of peace made beautiful and love supreme.

For now the strong, unweariable chords

Of battle shake to thunder, and the hordes

Advance, where now the circling vultures scream.

The standards gather and the trumpets gleam;

Down the long hillside stare the mounted lords.

Now far beyond the tumult and the hate

The white-clad nurses and the surgeons wait

The backward currents of tormented life,

When on the waiting silences shall come

The screams of men, and, ere those lips are dumb,

The searching probe, the ligature and knife.

II

Was it for such, the brutehood and the pain,

Civilization gave her holy fire

Unto thy guardianship, and the snowy spire

Of her august and most exalted fane?

Are these the harvests of her ancient rain

Men glean at evening in the scarlet mire,

Or where the mountain smokes, a dreadful pyre,

Or where the war-ship drags a bloody stain?

Are these thy votive lilies and their dews,

That now the outraged stars look down to see?

Behold them, where the cold prophetic damps

Congel on youthful brows so soon to lose

Their dream of sacrifice to thee—to thee,

Harlot to Murder in a thousand camps!

III

Was it for this that loving men and true
Have labored in the darkness and the light
To rear the solemn temple of the Right
On Reason's deep foundations, bared anew
Long after the Cæsarian eagles flew
And Rome's last thunder died upon the Night?
Cuirassed, the cannon menace from the height;
Armored, the new-born eagles take the blue.

Wait not thy lords the avenging certain knell—
One with the captains and abhorrent fames
The echoes of whose conquests died in Hell?—
They that have loosened the ensanguined flood
And whose malign and execrable names
The Angel of the Record writes in blood.
—*The New York World.*

THE VULTURE

BY GEORGE S. HELLMAN

I

With bleeding wings and shame-enveiled eyes.
How like a stricken eagle flies
The soul of mankind now!
War, the great vulture, hunts her from the skies;
His raucous voice mocks at her high desire;
His grim, embattled wings forbid her goal.
O thou world-soul,
How long shall thy dark foe besmirch thee with his mire?

II

Blame not too far the Hohenzollern pride;
Trace not the curse alone to Emperor or Czar;
Yield sorrowful applause
To Belgic valor, Gaul's defensive cause,
Or England's loyalty to treaties and to laws;
Yet shall no man escape the essential shame,
Nor any of earth's nations, whatsoe'er its name,
To what avail, paternity denied,
Since misbegotten War
Is the foul offspring of a sire world-wide?

III

Oh, grim account soon to be rendered—
Illimitable columns of lost life—
When vulture War, whom mankind hath engendered,
With sated gorge flies from the fields of strife!
Then
Shall we, with searching vision of brave men,
To its far roots far-reaching evil trace,
And bear our share in a whole world's disgrace;
Or, quibbling like mean merchants, face the score,
Crying, "The crafty Slav hath caused this war!"
Or "Sordid Anglo-Saxon!" or "Nay,
The too-ambitious Teuton—let *him* pay!"

IV

Immediate causes are for shallow minds:
He hath small sight who uses but his eyes.
If the world-soul sails forth on high emprise,
Her care is not alone the contravening winds
Of autocratic wills,
Or venomous shafts of ancient racial passions.
These shall be transient ills—
The forms ridiculous of barbaric fashions—
When once the universal voice of man
Proclaims in tones that God shall hear afar:
"In the great future's perfect plan
There is no place for war!"

V

Let tiger 'gainst fierce tiger fight in lust,
While the dark jungle trembles with the fray;
Deep crimsoning with blood the gray Saharan dust,
Let lions dispute their prey.
How long, O Soul of Man, shall men be such as they?
How long, how long,
Redress of evil seek through means of greatest wrong?
How long shall Christian nations hurl in air
The final blasphemy of the battle-prayer?
Oh, when shall cease
This gibe, this cruel gibe, against their Prince of Peace?

VI

Backward move all marching feet,
And downward strikes each mailed hand.
The cry to arms confesses man's defeat
In whatsoever land.

Poor little human minds
That seek in armaments their strength or their disguise;
The trumpet blares how we are weakly wise,
The bugle blows our justice to the winds.

VII

Today
In black humiliation stand we all,
Seeing, how like a house of cards,
Similitudes, with no essential stay,
Shards, useless shards,
Civilization's boasted structures fall.
Not force, but wisdom, be our shield,
And our sword justice, man's divinest power!
For when these twain, that make us more than beast,
Sway all the earth, war shall have ceased.
And it may be that this disgraceful hour
Will from its shadows still the sunlight yield—
The sunlight of high peace, which man's rebirth shall see.
His soul from the great vulture, War, set free, O God, set free!
—*The New York Times.*

THE VINTAGE

BY CLINTON SCOLLARD

Rumors of ravaging war perturb the mind,
Ruffling the channels of our wonted ease;
Within the sky we read red auguries,
And hear grim portents shivering down the wind.
Not as aforetime do we fondly find
Orchestral notes or lulling harmonies
In the long plunge and murmur of the seas,
But discords horrent unto all mankind!

The fields of France are bright with poppy flowers;
Along the terraced vineyards by the Rhine
The ripening grapes are crimsoning for the wine;
Beneath the sun what fairer sight to see!
But ere the march of many hastening hours,
What will the bloom, what will the vintage be?

—*The Sun.*

THE RECKONING

BY CLINTON SCOLLARD

What do they reck who sit aloof on thrones,
Or in the chambered chancelleries apart,
Playing the game of state with subtle art,
If so be they may win, what wretched groans
Rise from red fields, what unrecorded bones
Bleach within shallow graves, what bitter smart
Pierces the widowed or the orphaned heart—
The unhooded horror for which naught atones!

A word, a pen stroke, and this might not be!
But vengeance, power lust, festering jealousy,
Triumph, and grim carnage stalks abroad.
Hark! Hear that ominous bugle on the wind!
And they who might have stayed it, shall they find
No reckoning within the courts of God?

—*The Sun.*

THE WAR OF KINGS

BY CLINTON SCOLLARD

From dawn to dusk reign horror and affright,
And the sad night no healing respite brings;
In all its hideous panoply of might,
This is the war of kings!

The people are but pawns upon the board;
What of their wants, their woes, their sufferings?
Speak, Death, dark watcher both by field and ford,
In this grim war of kings!

Will history still repeat the sanguine past,
With all its trail of ruthless anguishings?
Oh, may this slaughter-carnival be the last—
The last dread war of kings!

—*The Outlook.*

AMERICA

BY CONRAD AIKEN

We lay and smiled, to see our sky
So blue, so luminous with sun;
Lo, far off, wailed an ominous cry;
We heard a thunder of footsteps run

Under a darkness settling there,
Some huge and sinister wing's eclipse;
Smoke fouled the east; a baleful glare
Lightened beneath; and maddened lips

Took up that cry, while darkness stirred
And heaved, and like a wounded thing
Bled, by the utterance of one word
Which bade a myriad war-swords sing.

What murderous shadow troubled so
Our summer dream? . . . The sunlight ceased.
A sick and fetid wind came slow
From the stale tenements of the east.

Brother to slay his brother rose,
The shambles fell, and from that gloom
Came the hoarse herded cry of those
Who blindly massed to fight for room.

Room! Give us air! A breathing space!
The sunlight and the land for all!
Each lifted up a stifled face,
And battered door, and beat at wall,

And surged against resurgent horde
For space to sow his little seed.
Lo, they would plow the earth with sword,
Strew dead on earth that earth might feed.

And we—where now our summer bliss?
From the stale tenements of the east
Stole fear lest we should come to this,
And prove us brother to the beast.

—*The Outlook.*

WAR AND DEATH

BY HELEN COALE GREW

Two figures out of the gloom of despair on man's vision broke;
And one, colossal, brute-visaged, vengeful, and pitiless, spoke—

"I am War! And behold in the courts of the gods none is greater than I!
Earth quivers and reels at my gauntlet's touch, and the dome of the sky
Is shattered and torn by my trumpet's blare and the flash of my sword;
And man at my coming is fearful and fain of the help of the Lord.
Yea, black is the doom that I spread on the world, and the ruin is wide.
Man may pray himself dumb! Can he slay me in fear who begot me in
pride?"

But he, the other, benignant, pitying, quiet of breath,
Smiled, "You shall know me and fear me not. I am but Death!"
—*The Outlook.*

PEACE

BY EDWIN MARKHAM

Who are the ghosts in flight
Where siege guns spat their rage upon the night?
What shapes are those that shiver in the moon
About the towers and banners of Verdun?
And what those cries at night on hill and tarn
Down the long ruined Valley of the Marne?
They are the ghosts that cannot rest, that cry
Because there was no need to die.

And look, on the north still runs a line of fire
Where armies struggle in the battle-mire!
And yonder, see the crimson battle-rain
Upon the height of Aisne!
And farther still upon the cliffs of Oise
That streaming banners and the loud huzzahs,
And far upon the east the marching masses
Are pouring thru the wild Carpathian passes;
And the bright quiet flood
Of Vistula is red with brother's blood.

Peace, peace, O men, for ye are brothers all—
Ye in the trench and on the shattered wall.
Do ye not know ye came
Out of one Love and wear one sacred name?

Let there be no more battles; earth is old
With sorrows; let the weary banners fold.
And the grim cannons spewing death on men,
They, too, are weary and would sleep again.
And they have drunk enough, the battle blades—
Enough, God knows, are laid asleep with spades.
Yes, there are ghosts enough hurled on ahead,
Choking the shadowy passes of the dead.

Peace, brothers; let the music of the loom
Help us a little to forget the doom.
Yes, let the busy whisper of the wheel
And the bright furrow of the happy keel,
Help to forget the rage of sword and flame,
And wrongs that are too terrible for name.
And let the grasses hurry to the graves
To cover them with ripple of green waves;
And where the fields ran reddest in wild hours,
Let Mercy hide them with a foam of flowers.

O brothers, lift a cry, a long world-cry
Sounding from sky to sky—
The cry of one great word,
Peace, peace, the world-will clamoring to be heard—
A cry to break the ancient battle-ban,
To end it in the sacred name of Man!

—*The New York American.*

STAIN NOT THE SKY

BY HENRY VAN DYKE

Ye gods of battle, lords of fear,
Who work your iron will as well
As once ye did with sword and spear,
With rifled gun and rending shell,—
Masters of sea and land, forbear
The fierce invasion of the inviolate air!

With patient daring man hath wrought
A hundred years for power to fly,
And shall we make his winged thought
A hovering horror in the sky,
Where flocks of human eagles sail,
Dropping their bolts of death on hill and dale?

Ah no, the sunset is too pure,
The dawn too fair, the noon too bright,
For wings of terror to obscure
Their beauty, and betray the night
That keeps for man, above his wars,
The tranquil vision of untroubled stars.

Pass on, pass on, ye lords of fear!
Your footsteps in the sea are red,
And black on earth your paths appear
With ruined homes and heaps of dead.
Pass on, and end your transient reign,
And leave the blue of heaven without a stain.

The wrong ye wrought will fall to dust;
The right ye shielded will abide;
The world at last will learn to trust
In law to guard, and love to guide;
The Peace of God that answers prayer
Will fall like dew from the inviolate air.

The Hague, Netherlands.

—The Independent.

TO THE PEACE PALACE AT THE HAGUE

BY ROBERT UNDERWOOD JOHNSON

Builted of Love and Joy and Faith and Hope,
Thou standest firm beyond the tides of war
That dash in gloom and fear and tempest-roar,
Beacon of Europe!—tho wise pilots grope
Where trusted lights are lost; tho the dread scope
Of storm is wider, deadlier than before;
Ay, tho the very floods that strew the shore
Seem to obey some power turned misanthrope.

For thou art witness to a world's desire,
And when—oh, happiest of days!—shall cease
The throes by which our Age doth bring to birth
The fairest of her daughters, heavenly Peace,
When Man's red folly has been purged in fire,
Thou shalt be Capitol of all the Earth.

—*The Independent.*

A VOICE FROM THE BATTLEFIELD

BY HERBERT BASHFORD

To look upon the fool that once was I—
That gory thing with face half red, half white,
I can but smile; it seems so droll—the sight
Of those glazed eyes—one staring at the sky!
And now that all is clear I wonder why
I could not see until that last mad fight—
When I awoke in His eternal light—
How blind is he who marches forth to die

For some vain monarch seated on a throne!
If those brave soldiers there could only see
As I see now who draw no mortal breath,
No more the lifted sword, the crash and groan,
The thunder of the red artillery—
That awful, flaming orchestra of Death!

—*The San Francisco Bulletin.*

A CHANT OF HATE AGAINST ENGLAND

BY ERNST LISSAUER, in Jugend

Rendered into English verse by Barbara Henderson

French and Russian, they matter not,
A blow for a blow and a shot for a shot;
We love them not, we hate them not,
We hold the Weichsel and Vosges-gate,
We have but one and only hate,
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe and one alone.

He is known to you all, he is known to you all,
He crouches behind the dark gray flood,
Full of envy, of rage, of craft, of gall,
Cut off by waves that are thicker than blood.
Come let us stand at the Judgment place,
An oath to swear to, face to face,
An oath of bronze no wind can shake,
An oath for our sons and their sons to take.
Come, hear the word, repeat the word,
Throughout the Fatherland make it heard.
We will never forego our hate,
We have all but a single hate,
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe and one alone—
ENGLAND!

In the Captain's Mess, in the banquet-hall,
Sat feasting the officers, one and all,
Like a sabre-blow, like the swing of a sail,
One seized his glass held high to hail;
Sharp-snapped like the stroke of a rudder's play,
Spoke three words only: "To the Day!"

Whose glass this fate?
They had all but a single hate.
Who was thus known?
They had one foe and one alone—
ENGLAND!

Take you the folk of the Earth in pay,
With bars of gold your ramparts lay,
Bedeck the ocean with bow on bow,
Ye reckon well, but not well enough now.
French and Russian they matter not,
A blow for a blow, a shot for a shot,
We fight the battle with bronze and steel,
And the time that is coming Peace will seal.
You will we hate with a lasting hate,
We will never forego our hate,
Hate by water and hate by land,
Hate of the head and hate of the hand,
Hate of the hammer and hate of the crown,
Hate of seventy millions, choking down.
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe and one alone—
ENGLAND!

—*The New York Times.*

ANSWERING THE "HASSGESANG"

BY BEATRICE M. BARRY

French and Russian, they matter not,
For England only your wrath is hot;
But little Belgium is so small
You never mentioned her at all—
Or did her graveyards, yawning deep,
Whisper that silence was discreet?

For Belgium is waste! Ay, Belgium is waste!
She welters in the blood of her sons,
And the ruins that fill the little place
Speak of the vengeance of the Huns.
"Come, let us stand at the Judgment place,"
German and Belgian, face to face.
What can you say? What can you do?
What will history say of you?
For even the Hun can only say
That little Belgium lay in his way.

Is there no reckoning you must pay?
What of the Justice of that "Day"?
Belgium one voice—Belgium one cry
Shrieking her wrongs, inflicted by
GERMANY!

In her ruined homesteads, her trampled fields,
You have taken your toll, you have set your seal;
Her women are homeless, her men are dead,
Her children pitifully cry for bread;
Perchance they will drink with you—"To the Day!"
Let each man construe it as he may.
What shall it be?
They, too, have but one enemy;
Whose work is this?
Belgium has but one word to hiss—
GERMANY!

Take you the pick of your fighting men
Trained in all warlike arts, and then
Make of them all a human wedge
To break and shatter your sacred pledge;
You may fling your treaty lightly by,
But that "scrap of paper" will never die!
It will go down to posterity,
It will survive in eternity.
Truly you hate with a lasting hate;
Think you you will escape that hate?
"Hate by water and hate by land;
Hate of the head and hate of the hand."
Black and bitter and bad as sin,
Take you care lest it hem you in,
Lest the hate you boast of be yours alone,
And curses, like chickens, find roost at home
IN GERMANY!

—*The New York Times.*

ANÓTHER CHANT OF HATE

BY ROSALIE M. MOYNAHAN

French and Russian, they matter not,
Some wrong remembered, some good forgot;

England stands at the Bar alone,
Nemesis rises to claim her own.
Ireland or Belgium—dare you say
Whose wrongs cry loudest this Judgment Day,
ENGLAND?

For not in a sudden, swift campaign,
The World as Mourner, was Ireland slain;
No soldier's steel plunged straight to her heart—
The sword *you* wield has a finer art.
Deep in the darkness of your hold
You forged it with hate, you weighed it with gold;
You drew it with lust,
You swung it with sin,
Sure and stealthy you thrust it in,
And never have plucked it out again,
ENGLAND! —

You cry aloud through the printed page
"For Liberty, Honor, the fight I wage!"
Australia, Canada, governed well?
Aye! *They* are distant, might rebel.
Ireland, helpless under your heel,
Proof of the value those words conceal!
You have wrenched their Celtic tongue away,
But their hate cries out in *your* tongue today,
And casts your treacherous past in the way,
ENGLAND!

Yet why the past do we judge you by?
Stricken Belgium must deny,
But we aloud to the world can cry:
"You pledged your Power to be her shield,
You pledged her the millions your conquests yield;
What help can now the wrong atone?
You pledged your honor—*She* fought alone,
ENGLAND!"

They have stood at the Judgment-Place,
The Saints, the Heroes of our race.
Through the long Night of the Tyrant's sin
Ireland has trusted her Cause to Him.
"Vengeance is Mine, I will repay,"
And God fulfills His Word today
Through *GERMANY!*

MOTHERHOOD'S CHANT

BY McLANDBURGH WILSON

French or Russian, they matter not,
German or English, as one begot.
We bore them all and we bore them well,
We went for them to the gates of hell,
We are the makers of flesh and bone,
We have one foe, one hate alone—
WAR!

He is known to you all, he has called to you all,
He crouches behind each boundary wall,
He rides on the waves of a crimson flood,
He rides on the tides of our children's blood,
He lies of glory and sacrifice,
Of honor and fame and pomp he lies—
WAR!

Come, let us stand in the Judgment Place
And take an oath for the human race,
An oath our daughters, and theirs, shall take,
An oath no trumpet or drum can shake.
We hate no sinner, we hate the sin,
Not those who lose, not those who win.
We, the makers of flesh and bone,
We have one foe, one hate alone—
WAR!

You take the folk of our pain to slay,
That gold nor steel can ever repay.
You shall we hate with a lasting hate.
We will never forego our hate—
Hate of the heart and hate of the womb,
Hate of the cradle and hate of the tomb.
And you shall answer and make reply,
For we are partners of God on high.
What will you say before that Throne
To Us, the makers of flesh and bone,
WAR?

—*The New York Times.*

MARS, COMEDIAN

War, an international dementia alleged to insure the survival of the fittest, should be assiduously encouraged by all unfit members of society. The man with narrow chest and withered hand struggles under a decided handicap in the piping times of peace. He commonly sees the rich, witty and pulchritudinous female of the species carried off into "happiness ever after" by strapping fellows against whom he has no chance whatever in the sex arena. All this is changed, however, with the declaration of war, and the arrival of the recruiting officer. Apollo Belvedere is the favorite fodder of the machine gun. Shrapnel screams with joy as it increases an athlete's chest expansion from seven inches to thirty feet. What matters it if ten thousand mothers weep and wail and gnash their teeth over the details of victory. Who taught their handsome sons to love war? These are but the tears of shameless recantation. Let them turn for comfort to little Oscar whose dry cough kept him out of the army; to Minnie and Hal at the State Home for the Feeble-Minded. Let the unfit dead bury themselves. These that survive are the fittest.—*Life*.



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DOCUMENTS REGARDING THE EUROPEAN WAR SERIES No. IV

- I. TURKISH OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, NOVEMBER, 1914.
- II. SPEECH OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR TO
THE REICHSTAG, DECEMBER 2, 1914.
- III. THE BELGIAN GRAY BOOK (JULY 24-AUGUST 29, 1914).



JANUARY, 1915, No. 86

American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City



The Executive Committee of the Association for International Conciliation wish to arouse the interest of the American people in the progress of the movement for promoting international peace and relations of comity and good fellowship between nations. To this end they print and circulate documents giving information as to the progress or interruption of these movements, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have readily available accurate information on these subjects. A list of publications will be found on page 54.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S APPEAL FOR IMPARTIALITY AND RESTRAINT IN DIS- CUSSING THE WAR

MY FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN: I suppose that every thoughtful man in America has asked himself during the last troubled weeks what influence the European war may exert upon the United States, and I take the liberty of addressing a few words to you in order to point out that it is entirely within our own choice what its effects upon us will be and to urge very earnestly upon you the sort of speech and conduct which will best safeguard the nation against distress and disaster.

The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say or do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The spirit of the nation in this critical matter will be determined largely by what individuals and society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and magazines contain, upon what our ministers utter in their pulpits and men proclaim as their opinions on the streets.

The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility; responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its Government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinions, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion, if not in action. Such diversions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend.

I venture, therefore, my fellow-countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.

My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action, a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world.

Shall we not resolve to put upon ourselves the restraint which will bring to our people the happiness and the great and lasting influence for peace we covet for them?

WOODROW WILSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 18, 1914.

CHAPTER I

WARNINGS (1913)

No. 1. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin, to
M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, March 17, 1913.

Our naval and military attachés are sending to their respective Ministers reports on the new German military law. I take this opportunity of drawing the attention of your Excellency to these important documents.

The consideration of the financial expedients by which Germany intends to provide for these military measures is the sole cause of the delay in the publication of the definite proposals of the Government. In spite of the patriotism with which the rich classes affect to accept the sacrifices asked of them, they are none the less, particularly the business circles, dissatisfied with the financial measures which have been announced, and they feel that a compulsory levy imposed in times of peace creates a formidable precedent for the future. On the other hand, the Federal Governments have strongly opposed an innovation which grants to the Empire resources derived from direct taxation. Hitherto, taxation of this kind has been reserved to the Federal States, and the latter see in the surrender of this principle a new declaration of the corporate unity (*personnalité*) of the Empire, constituting a distinct diminution of their own sovereign power.

However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German army the Empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event of a possible crisis.

The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the Republic to re-establish the three years' service, and the manly determination with which this proposal has been welcomed in France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals has been utilised by the Imperial Government for the purpose of insisting on the absolute necessity of an increase of German military strength; the German proposals are represented as a reply to our own. The reverse is the case, since the immense military effort which France is undertaking is but the consequence of German initiative.

The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic sentiment. Every day the Emperor delights to revive memories of 1813. Yesterday evening a military tattoo went through the streets of Berlin, and speeches were delivered in which the present situation was compared to that of a hundred years ago. The trend of public opinion will find an echo in the speeches which will be delivered next month in the Reichstag, and I have reason to fear that the Chancellor himself will be forced to allude in his statements to the relations of France and Germany. It was of course to be expected that national patriotism would be worked up just when fresh sacrifices are being required, but to compare the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical analogy. If, to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement which a hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a counterpart would have to be sought, since the French nation seeks to protect itself against the domination of force.

Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in both countries makes the situation grave.

JULES CAMBON.

Enclosure I. Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Military Attaché to the Embassy of the French Republic at Berlin, to M. Etienne, Minister of War.

Berlin, March 15, 1913.

The patriotic movement which has manifested itself in France has caused real anger in certain circles.

I do not, indeed, mean to say that the virulent article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* is the expression of prevalent opinion. It is rather the angry outburst of an impulsive journalist, which has been immediately disavowed by the Government.

However, in spite of its want of good manners, the article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* cannot be disregarded; several important newspapers have approved of its substance, if not of its form, and it appears to express a real feeling, a latent anger.

It is interesting to note this fact, because it throws very vivid light on the meaning of the present armaments.

For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet people who declare that the military plans of France are extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the Reichstag who is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years' service in France, went so far as to say, "It is a provocation; we will not allow it." More moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that France with her forty million inhabitants has no right to compete in this way with Germany.

To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry at realising that in spite of the enormous effort made last year, continued and even increased this year, it will probably not be possible this time to outrun France completely.

To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with her, is Germany's real aim. I cannot insist too much on the fact that the impending legislation, which French public opinion is too apt to consider as a spontaneous outburst, is but the inevitable and expected consequence of the law of June, 1912.

This law, while creating two new army corps, had deliberately, according to German fashion, left regiments and other large units incomplete. It was evident that there would be no long delay in filling in the gaps.*

The Balkan crisis, coming just at the right moment, furnished a wonderful opportunity for exploiting the centenary of the War of Liberation, and obtaining with greater ease sacrifices through the memory of those made in days gone by, and that too at a time when Germany was opposed to France.

* The problem which is set us to-day would, therefore, only be set again a few years later, and in a much more acute fashion, since the decrease of our contingents is continually lowering the number of our effectives on a peace footing.

In order to show clearly the genesis of this military programme, I beg to recall what was written by my predecessor Colonel Pellé a year ago, when the law of 1912 was published:

"We are discovering every day how deep and lasting are the feelings of injured pride and revenge provoked against us by the events of last year.

The Treaty of the 4th November 1911 has proved a complete disillusion.

The feeling is the same in all parties. All Germans, even the Socialists, bear us a grudge for having taken away their share in Morocco.

It seemed, a year or so ago, as if the Germans had set out to conquer the world. They considered themselves so strong that no one would dare to oppose them. Limitless possibilities were opening out for German manufactures, German trade, German expansion.

Needless to say, these ideas and ambitions have not disappeared to-day. Germany always requires outlets for commercial and colonial expansion. They consider that they are entitled to them, because their population is increasing every day, because the future belongs to them. They consider us, with our forty million inhabitants, as a second rate power.

In the crisis of 1911, however, this second rate power successfully withstood them, and the Emperor and the Government gave way. Public opinion has forgiven neither them nor us. *People are determined that such a thing shall never happen again."*

And at the moment when the second and formidable part of the programme is about to be realised, when German military strength is on the point of acquiring that final superiority which, should the occasion arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction, France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said, "her eternal power of renaissance and resurrection." The disgust of Germany can well be understood.

Of course the Government points to the general situation in Europe and speaks of the "Slav Peril." As far as I can see, however, public opinion really seems indifferent to this "Peril," and yet it has accepted with a good grace, if not with welcome, the enormous burdens of these two successive laws.

On the 10th March last, being the centenary of the *levée en masse* of Germany against France, in spite of a downpour of rain, a huge crowd surged to the military parade in front of the Schloss, in the middle of the Tiergarten, in front of the statues of Queen Louise and Frederick William III., which were surrounded by heaps of flowers.

These anniversaries, recalling as they do the fight with France, will be repeated the whole year through. In 1914 there will be a centenary of the first campaign in France, the first entry of the Prussians into Paris.

To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France, as does the *Kölnische Zeitung*, we are in fact, and shall long remain, the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our forty millions of inhabitants our place in the sun is really too large.

Germans wish for peace—so they keep on proclaiming, and the Emperor more than anyone—but they do not understand peace as involving

either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments. They want to be feared and they are at present engaged in making the necessary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national vanity is wounded, the confidence which the country will feel in the enormous superiority of its army will be favourable to an explosion of national anger, in the face of which the moderation of the Imperial Government will perhaps be powerless.

It must be emphasized again that the Government is doing everything to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with éclat all the various anniversaries of 1813.

The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first decisive blows being struck at France.

Enclosure II. M. de Faramond, Naval Attaché to the French Embassy at Berlin, to M. Baudin, Minister of Marine.

Berlin, March 15, 1913.

In reporting on the examination of the Naval budget by the Financial Committee of the Reichstag, I said that no Naval law would be introduced this year having as its object an increase of the fleet, and that the whole of the military effort would be directed against us.

Although the new Bill, having for its object the increase of the German effectives, has not yet been presented to the Reichstag, we know that it deals with "an increase of military strength of immense scope" to use the expression of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.

The official newspapers have also referred to the military proposal in terms which enable us to consider the communiqué of the *Lokal Anzeiger* as accurate.

The German effectives reach at the present moment 720,000 men. We are, therefore, entitled to conclude that on the 1st October 1914, the Imperial army will be raised to a figure not far removed from 860,000.

The importance of this figure would not be so great if the provisions of the proposed legislation (as far as one can gather from the official newspapers) did not tend, as, in fact, those of the law of 1912 tend, to place the army corps nearest to our frontier in a state which most nearly approaches a war footing, in order to be able on the very day of the outbreak of hostilities, to attack us suddenly with forces very much stronger than our own. It is absolutely imperative for the Imperial Government to obtain success at the very outset of the operations.

The conditions under which the German Emperor would nowadays commence a campaign against France are not those of forty years ago. At the commencement of the war of 1870 the Prussian General Staff had considered the possibility of a victorious French offensive, and Moltke, seeing that we might conceivably get as far as Mayence, remarked to his sovereign, "There they will come to a stop." William II. cannot allow a retreat to enter into his calculations, although the German soldier is no longer to-day what he was forty years ago, a plain religious man, ready to die at the order of his king. When it is remembered that at the last elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by the Socialists and that the franchise is only obtained in Germany at the age of 25, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of young men from 20 to 25, must contain in its ranks a considerable proportion of Socialists.

It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists will throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany come to blows; but it will be very important that the Imperial Government should persuade them that on the one hand we are the aggressors, and on the other that they can have entire confidence in the direction of the campaign and its final result.

On the last occasion when the recruits for the Guard took the oath at Potsdam I was struck to hear the Emperor take as a theme for his address to the young soldiers "the duty of being braver and more disciplined in adversity than in success."

And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such an incalculable effect on the Empire, that we find in all the plans worked out by the General Staff proposals for a crushing offensive movement against France.

In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of France that the danger seems to them greatest. The *Kölnische Zeitung* has said as much in an article both spiteful and violent, the form rather than the substance of which has been disavowed by the Wilhelmstrasse.

But we must be willing to realise that the opinion expressed by the *Kölnische Zeitung* is at the present moment that of the immense majority of the German people.

In this connection I think it is interesting to quote a conversation which a member of our Embassy had the other evening with the old Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, as it may serve to reflect the opinions which dominate Court circles.

Referring to the new German military proposals Prince Donnersmarck spoke as follows:—

"French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbour evil designs and want war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 popular opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on us before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion, which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the Government to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish to protect ourselves."

And the Prince added:

"I have even been considered in France as one of those responsible for the war of 1870. That is quite false. Even if I took part in the war after it had begun, I did my utmost to prevent its outbreak. A short time before the war, happening to be at a dinner where there were some of the most important personages of the Imperial Government, I expressed my regret at the hostile sentiments which were already becoming manifest between France and Prussia. The answer was that, if I spoke like that, it was because I was afraid of a struggle in which the issue would certainly be unfavourable to Prussia. I replied, 'No, it is not because I am afraid, that I repudiate the idea of war between France and Prussia, but rather because I think that it is in the interest of both countries to avoid war. And since you have referred to the possible result of such a struggle I will give you my opinion. I am convinced that you will be beaten and for this reason. In spite

of the brilliant qualities which I recognise are possessed by the French and which I admire, you are not sufficiently accurate; by accuracy I do not mean arriving in time at a meeting, but I mean punctuality in the whole sense of the word. Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not as punctual as Germans in the fulfilment of their duty. In the coming war that nation will be victorious whose servants from the top of the ladder to the bottom will do their duty with absolute exactitude, however important or small it may be."

And Prince Donnersmarck added:

"An exactitude which played so great a rôle forty years ago in moving an army of 500,000 men will have a far greater importance in the next war, when it will be a question of moving masses far more numerous."

In this way the old Prince gave expression to the confidence shared by all Germans in the superiority of their military organisation.

When I spoke above of the new German proposal I only alluded to increased effectives. But the proposal will include also an increase of material and of defence works, the details of which are not known, but some idea of which may be gained by the figure estimated to be necessary to meet the expenses, viz., 1,250,000,000 francs.

The carrying into effect of the law of the quinquennium of 1911 did not necessitate any special financial measures.

The military and naval law of 1912 had been provisionally covered by the Budget surplus of the years 1910 and 1911, by the reform of the law with regard to alcohol and by delaying the reduction of the tax on sugar. (These last two resources only represent together the sum of 60,000,000 francs.)

It must also be remembered that large loans have recently been raised by the Empire and Prussia: 500,000,000 marks on the 29th January 1912, and 350,000,000 marks on the 7th March 1913. Quite an important part of these loans must have been applied to military expenses.

The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional financial measures.

According to the indications given by the semi-official press, the "non-recurring" expenditure will amount to a milliard marks, while the "permanent" annual expenditure resulting from the increase of effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks.

It seems certain that the "non-recurring" expenditure will be covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small fortunes would be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax would not be objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in accordance with their usual tactics, to reject the principle of the military law and at the same time to pass the votes which assure its being carried into effect.

The Government are afraid that among the rich and bourgeois classes this extraordinary tax of a milliard levied exclusively on acquired capital will cause permanent discontent. Accordingly they are doing everything in their power to persuade those on whom so heavy an exaction is to be levied that the security of the Empire is threatened, establishing for the

purpose an analogy between the warlike times of 1813 and the present day.

By noisy celebrations of the centenary of the War of Independence it is desired to convince people of the necessity of sacrifice, and to remind them that France is to-day, as 100 years ago, their hereditary enemy.

If it is established that the German Government are doing their utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be made in full, and not by way of instalment, and if, as some of the newspapers say, the whole payment is to be complete before 1st July 1914, these facts have a formidable significance for us, for nothing can explain such haste on the part of the military authorities to obtain war treasure in cash to the amount of a milliard.

With regard to the manner in which the permanent expenditure resulting from the application of the laws of 1912 to 1913 is to be met, nothing has yet been said. Further legislation will certainly be necessary in order that the required annual amounts may be forthcoming.

To sum up: In Germany the execution of military reforms always follows very closely the decision to carry them out. All the provisions made by the law of the quinquennium of 1911 and by the law of 1912 have already been put into operation. It is quite possible that part of the material, the purchase of which will be authorised by the new law, is already in course of manufacture. Military secrets are so well kept here that it is extremely difficult to follow the changes in *personnel* and *matériel*.

With 700,000 men under arms (without counting the very large number of reservists who are at the present time in training), a perfect military organisation and a public opinion which can be swayed by the warlike appeals of the Military and Naval Leagues, the German people is at the present moment a very dangerous neighbour.

If the three years' service is adopted and immediately applied in France, the conditions will be less unequal next year. The German effectives will still be considerably more numerous than ours, but the call to the Colours of all available contingents will no longer allow any selection, and will bring into the ranks of the German army elements of inferior quality and even some undesirable individuals. The morale of the active army will deteriorate.

Germany has wished to upset the equilibrium of the two camps which divide Europe by a supreme effort beyond which they can do little more.

They did not think that France was capable of a great sacrifice. Our adoption of the three years' service will upset their calculations.

FARAMOND.

No. 2. M. Etienne, Minister of War, to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, April 2, 1913.

I have just received from a reliable source an official secret report concerning the strengthening of the German army. The report is divided into two parts; the first consisting of general statements, the second dealing with technicalities and describing in the greatest detail, for each branch of the service, the measures to be adopted. Especially striking are the instructions with regard to the employment of motor traction and the utilisation of aircraft.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the first part of this document, which seems to merit your attention.

ÉTIENNE.

Enclosure. Memorandum on the strengthening of the German Army.

Berlin, March 19, 1913.

I. GENERAL MEMORANDUM ON THE NEW MILITARY LAWS.

The increase has taken place in three stages:—

(1) The Conference of Algeciras has removed the last doubt with regard to the existence of an *Entente* between France, England, and Russia. Moreover we have seen that Austria-Hungary was obliged to keep some of her forces mobilised against Servia and Italy; finally our fleet was not at that time sufficiently strong. At the end of the dispute the first matter taken in hand was the strengthening of our coast defences and the increase of our naval forces. To meet the English plan of sending an Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men to the Continent, it would be necessary to make a better formation of reserves to be used according to circumstances in the protection of the Coast, in fortresses and in siege operations. It was already clear at that time that it would be absolutely necessary to make a great effort.

(2) The French having violated the Morocco Conventions brought on the incident of Agadir. At that time the progress made by the French army, the moral recovery of the nation, the technical advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns rendered an attack on France less easy than in the previous period. Further, an attack by the English fleet had to be considered. This difficult situation opened our eyes to the necessity for an increase in the army. This increase was from this moment considered as a minimum.

(3) The war in the Balkans might have involved us in a war in support of our ally. The new situation in the south of Austria-Hungary lessened the value of the help which this ally could give us. On the other hand, France was strengthened by a new *loi des cadres*; it was accordingly necessary to anticipate the date of execution contemplated by the new military law.

Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the active army, which would ensure Germany an honourable peace and the possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs of the world. The new army law and the supplementary law which should follow will enable her almost completely to attain this end.

Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending *Deutschtum* (German influence) all the world over.

The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one day increase their population. The employment of an army of negroes in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long time a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty.

II. AIM AND OBLIGATIONS OF OUR NATIONAL POLICY, OF OUR ARMY, AND OF THE SPECIAL ORGANISATIONS FOR ARMY PURPOSES.

Our new army law is only an extension of the military education of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been put into our hands and to hold it ready for defence as well as for offence. *We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French.* We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. We must act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak (*Losschlagen*) should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed.

We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen organisations, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course in case of war we should openly recognise these secret allies; and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of realisation. The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.

Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication; they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose; more and more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the Mohammedan World.

However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their strong positions can be rapidly conquered or neutralised; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, especially as in any event we shall provide for the concentration of a strong northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most unfavourable case, Denmark might be

forced by England to abandon her neutrality; but by this time the decision would already have been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defence to any offensive measures from this quarter.

In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank.

As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states on our north-western frontier cannot be viewed in quite the same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. For this purpose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states to follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states to organise their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganisation, particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the contrary, their defensive organisation was established against us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the west, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our interests.

The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law.

Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hundred years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question of restoring to Germany her former possessions.

No. 3. M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, May 6, 1913.

I was talking this evening to the Secretary of State about the conference of Ambassadors and the results obtained at the meeting in London yesterday. The crisis with which Europe was threatened is in his opinion over, but only temporarily. "It seems to me," said Herr von Jagow, "that we are travelling in a mountainous district. We have just reached a difficult pass and we see other heights rising in front of us." "The height which we have just surmounted," I replied, "was, perhaps, the most difficult to cross."

The crisis which we have just gone through has been very serious. Here the danger of war has been considered imminent. I have proof of the anxiety of the German Government by a number of facts which it is important that your Excellency should know.

I received yesterday a visit from one of my colleagues with whom I maintain special and cordial relations. On the occasion of the visit he paid to Herr von Jagow, the latter asked my colleague confidentially what was exactly the situation of Russia in the Far East, and whether this Power had at the present time any cause for fear which might necessitate the retention of its troops in that quarter. The Ambassador answered him that he knew of nothing, absolutely nothing, which could be a cause of pre-occupation for the Russian Government, and that the latter have their hands free in Europe.

I said above that the danger of war had been regarded here as extremely near. The Government have not been satisfied with investigating the position in the Far East; preparations have even been made here.

The mobilisation of the German army is not restricted to the recall of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a preliminary measure which we have not got, and which consists in warning officers and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready for the call, in order that they may make the necessary arrangements. It is a general call to "attention," and it requires an incredible spirit of submission, discipline, and secrecy such as exists in this country, to make a step of this kind possible. If such a warning were given in France, a thrill would run through the whole country, and it would be in the papers the next day.

This warning was given in 1911 during the negotiations which I was carrying on with regard to Morocco.

Now it has been given again about ten days ago—that is to say, at the moment of the Austro-Albanian tension. I know that this is so, and I have it from several different sources, notably from officers of the reserve who have told it to their friends in the strictest confidence. These gentlemen have taken the necessary measures to put aside in a safe the means of existence for their families for a year. It has even been said that it was for this reason that the Crown Prince, who was to make the trial trip on the "Imperator," did not embark.

The decision which occasioned this preliminary mobilisation order is quite in keeping with the ideas of the General Staff. On this point I have been informed of some remarks made in a German *milieu* by General von Moltke, who is considered here as the most distinguished officer of the German army.

The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. "We must put on one side," said General von Moltke, "all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one's own favour. Success alone justifies war. Germany cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilise, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France. Accordingly," added the General, "we must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance."

This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it corre-

sponds to that of political circles; the latter, however, do not consider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary enemy.

This is what was being thought and said privately a fortnight ago.

From these events the following conclusions may be drawn which comprise the facts stated above; these people are not afraid of war, they fully accept its possibility and they have consequently taken the necessary steps. *They wish to be always ready.*

As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of persistence; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may form a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the Republic ask Parliament for the means of strengthening the defences of the country.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 4. M. Allizé, Minister of the Republic in Bavaria, to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Munich, July 10, 1913.

From a political point of view people are asking what is the object of the new armaments. Recognising that no one threatens Germany, they consider that German diplomacy had already at its disposal forces sufficiently large and alliances sufficiently powerful to protect German interests with success. As I pointed out the day after the Morocco agreement of 1911, it is thought that the Imperial Chancery will be as incapable in the future as in the past, of adopting an active foreign policy and of achieving, at least in this sphere, successes which would justify the burdens which the nation has assumed.

This frame of mind is all the more a cause of anxiety as the Imperial Government would find themselves supported by public opinion in any enterprise on which they might energetically embark, even at the risk of a conflict. The state of war to which all the events in the East have accustomed people's minds for the last two years appears no longer like some distant catastrophe, but as a solution of the political and economic difficulties which will continue to increase.

May the example of Bulgaria exercise a salutary influence on Germany. As the Prince Regent recently said to me, "The fortune of war is always uncertain; every war is an adventure, and the man is a fool who risks it believing himself sure of victory."

ALLIZÉ.

No. 5. Report to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs (on Public Opinion in Germany According to the Reports of the Diplomatic and Consular Agents).

Paris, July 30, 1913.

From observations which our agents in Germany have been able to collect from persons having access to the most diverse circles, it is possible to draw the conclusion that two feelings sway and irritate men's minds:—

(1) The Treaty of the 4th November, 1912, is considered a disappointment for Germany.

(2) France—a new France—undreamed of prior to the summer of 1911 is considered to be a warlike country, and to want war.

Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the Conservatives to the Socialists, representing the most different districts of Germany, university people from Berlin, Halle, Jena, and Marburg, students, elementary school teachers, commercial clerks, bank clerks, bankers, artisans, merchants, manufacturers, doctors, lawyers, editors of Democratic and Socialistic newspapers, Jewish publicists, members of trade unions, clergymen and shopkeepers from the Mark of Brandenburg, country squires from Pomerania and shoemakers from Stettin celebrating the 505th anniversary of their association, country gentlemen, officials, priests, and large farmers from Westphalia, are unanimous on these two points, with very slight differences corresponding to their position in society or their political party. Here is a synthesis of all these opinions:

The Treaty of the 4th November is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma.

In July 1911, the "Coup of Agadir" made the Morocco question for the first time a national question affecting the life and expansion of the Empire. The revelations and the press campaign which followed, have sufficiently proved how the campaign has been organised, what Pan-German greed it had awakened, and what hatred it had left behind. If the Emperor was discussed, the Chancellor unpopular, Herr von Kiderlen was the best-hated man in Germany last winter. However, he begins to be merely thought little of, for he allows it to be known that he will have his revenge.

Thus, during the summer of 1911, German public opinion became restive when confronted with French opinion with regard to Morocco. And the attitude of France, her calmness, her re-born spiritual unity, her resolution to make good her rights right up to the end, the fact that she has the audacity not to be afraid of war, these things are the most persistent and the gravest cause of anxiety and bad temper on the part of German public opinion.

Why then did not Germany go to war during the summer of 1911, since public opinion although not so unanimous and determined as French public opinion, was certainly favourable? Apart from the pacific disposition of the Emperor and the Chancellor, military and financial reasons made themselves felt.

But these events of 1911 have caused a profound disillusionment in Germany. A new France united, determined, resolved not to be intimidated any longer, has emerged from the shroud in which she had been seen burying herself for the last ten years. Public opinion in Germany, from December to May, from the columns of the press of all parties, which reproached the Imperial Government for their incapacity and cowardice has discovered with surprise mingled with irritation that the country conquered in 1870 had never ceased since then to carry on war, to float her flag and maintain the prestige of her arms in Asia and Africa, and to conquer vast territories; that Germany on the other hand had lived on her reputation, that Turkey is the only country in which during the reign of William II. she had made moral conquests, and these were now compro-

misled by the disgrace of the Morocco solution. Each time that France made a colonial conquest this consolation was offered:—"Yes, but that does not prevent the decadence, anarchy, and dismemberment of France at home."

The public were mistaken and public opinion was misled.

Given this German public opinion that considers France as longing for war, what can be augured for the future as regards the possibility and proximity of war?

German public opinion is divided into two currents on the question of the possibility and proximity of war.

There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganised and have no popular leaders. They consider that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armour plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit England.

The forces consist of the following elements:—

The bulk of the workmen, artisans and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct.

Those members of the nobility detached from military interests and engaged in business, such as the *grands seigneurs* of Silesia and a few other personages very influential at Court, who are sufficiently enlightened to realise the disastrous political and social consequences of war, even if successful.

Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean bankruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are chiefly supported by foreign capital.

Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and Schleswig-Holstein—conquered, but not assimilated and sullenly hostile to Prussian policy. There are about 7,000,000 of these annexed Germans.

Finally, the Governments and the governing classes in the large southern states—Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and the Grand Duchy of Baden—are divided by these two opinions:—an unsuccessful war would compromise the Federation from which they have derived great economic advantages; a successful war would only profit Prussia and Prussianisation, against which they have difficulty in defending their political independence and administrative autonomy.

These classes of people either consciously or instinctively prefer peace to war; but they are only a sort of makeweight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive and defenceless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling.

An example will make this idea clear:—The 110 Socialist members of the Reichstag are in favour of peace. They would be unable to prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the Reichstag, and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater part of their number would join the rest of the country in a chorus of angry excitement and enthusiasm.

Finally, it must be observed that these supporters of peace believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for the present situation. In certain contracts, especially in publishers' contracts, a clause has been introduced cancelling the contract in the case of war. They hope, however, that the will of the Emperor on the one side, France's difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be for some time a guarantee of peace. Be that as it may, their pessimism gives free play to those who favour war.

People sometimes speak of a military party in Germany. The expression is inaccurate, even if it is intended to convey the idea that Germany is the country where military power is supreme, as it is said of France that it is the country where the civil power is supreme. There exists a state of mind which is more worthy of attention than this historical fact, because it constitutes a danger more evident and more recent. There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a press either convinced or subsidised for the purpose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed.

Those in favour of war are divided into several categories; each of these derives from its social caste, its class, its intellectual and moral education, its interests, its hates, special arguments which create a general attitude of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of the stream of warlike desire.

Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it is *inevitable*. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner the better.

Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on over-population, over-production, the need for markets and outlets; or for social reasons, *i.e.*, to provide the outside interests that alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of the democratic and socialist masses.

Others, uneasy for the safety of the Empire, and believing that time is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to an immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the course of conversation or in the pages of patriotic pamphlets, the vague but deeply rooted conviction that a free Germany and a regenerated France are two historical facts mutually incompatible.

Others are bellicose from "Bismarckism" as it may be termed. They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force. From their still recent past they derive a sense of pride ever fed by personal memories of former exploits, by oral traditions, and by books, and irritated by the events of recent years. Angry disappointment is the unifying force of the *Wehrvereine*, and other associations of Young Germany.

Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary France; others finally from a feeling of rancour. These last are the people who heap up pretexts for war.

Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as follows:—The country squires represented in the Reichstag by the Conservative party want at all costs to escape the death duties, which are bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting of the session which has just closed, the Reichstag agreed to these duties in principle. It is a serious attack on the interests and privileges of the landed gentry. On the other hand this aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest. During the discussions on the Army Bill, a Conservative speaker put forward the need for promotion among officers as an argument in its favour. Finally, this social class which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realises with dread the democratisation of Germany and the increasing

power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection threaten its material interests, but in addition, the number of its political representatives decreases with each legislative period. In the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162 belonged to the aristocracy; in 1898, 83; in 1912, 57. Out of this number 27 alone belong to the Right, 14 to the Centre, 7 to the Left, and one sits among the Socialists.

The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal Party, the party of the contented spirits, have not the same reasons as the squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions, however, they are bellicose. They have their reasons, social in character.

The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy at the democratisation of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members in the Reichstag; in 1874, 155; in 1887, 99; in 1912, 45. They do not forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the leading rôle in parliament, helping Bismarck in his schemes against the country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between Conservative instincts and Liberal ideas, they look to war to settle problems which their parliamentary representatives are painfully incapable of solving. In addition, doctrinaire manufacturers declare that the difficulties between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom—without France industrial unrest would be unknown.

Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armour plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity—all these regard war as good business.

Amongst the "Bismarckians" must be reckoned officials of all kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free Conservatives or Imperial Party. This is the party of the "pensioned," whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the *Post*. They find disciples and political sympathisers in the various groups of young men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public schools and universities.

The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so they say, is a crushing burden on the nations, it checks improvement in the lot of the masses, and assists the growth of socialism. France, by clinging obstinately to her desire for revenge opposes disarmament. Once for all she must be reduced, for a century, to a state of impotence; that is the best and speediest way of solving the social problem.

Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other apologists of German *Kultur* wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which, according to the clearest thinkers, is still her possession. From this source is derived the phraseology of the Pan-Germans and the ideas and adherents of the *Kriegsvereine*, *Wehrvereine*, and other similar associations too well known to need particular description. It is enough to note that the dissatisfaction caused by the treaty of November 4th has considerably swelled the membership of colonial societies.

We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancour and resentment. These are the most dangerous. They are re-

cruited chiefly among diplomatists. German diplomatists are now in very bad odour in public opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war press. It seems as if they were looking for grievances chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is always possible in any part of the globe where France and Germany are in contact.

They must have their revenge, for they complain that they have been duped. During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these warlike diplomatists exclaimed, "Germany will not be able to have any serious conversation with France until she has every sound man under arms."

In what terms will this conversation be couched? The opinion is fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the tendencies of the Emperor. But when the moment comes, she will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. Offence will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition.

Must war then be considered as inevitable?

It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France can make it clear to the world that the *Entente Cordiale* and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The English fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be obtained.

As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in political and military circles than was the case three or four years ago, it is not believed that her co-operation will be sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective.

People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as a duel between France and Germany.

**No. 6. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at Berlin,
to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.**

Berlin, November 22, 1913.

I have received from an absolutely reliable source an account of a conversation which took place a fortnight ago between the Emperor and the King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff—General von Moltke. This conversation, it appears, has made a profound impression on King Albert. I am in no way surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with what I have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increasing, and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace.

The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as did all the world, that William II., whose personal influence had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany. William II. has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it must come sooner or later. Naturally he believes in the crushing superiority of the German army and in its certain success.

General von Moltke spoke exactly in the same strain as his sovereign. He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more assured of success "for," he said, to the King, "this time the matter must be settled, and your Majesty can have no conception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes."

The King of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that sense; and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators.

The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff nevertheless persisted in their point of view.

During the course of this conversation the Emperor moreover seemed overstrained and irritable. As William II. advances in years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and who does not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to the last increase of the German army, the object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is realised that Germany cannot go much further.

One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may have wished to impress the King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us. Perhaps Germany would be glad to see Belgium less hostile to certain aspirations lately manifested here with regard to the Belgian Congo, but this last hypothesis does not seem to me to fit in with the interposition of General von Moltke.

For the rest, the Emperor William is less master of his impatience than is usually supposed. I have known him more than once to allow his real thoughts escape him. Whatever may have been the object of the conversation related to me, the revelation is none the less of extreme gravity. It tallies with the precariousness of the general situation and with the state of a certain shade of public opinion in France and Germany.

If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion, I would submit that it would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he likes to use, "we must keep our powder dry."

JULES CAMBON.

CHAPTER II.

PRELIMINARIES.

From the death of the Hereditary Archduke (June 28, 1914) to the Presentation of the Austrian Note to Serbia (July 23, 1914).

No. 7. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, June 28, 1914.

News has just arrived at Vienna that the Hereditary Archduke of Austria and his wife have been to-day assassinated at Serajevo by a student belonging to Grahovo. Some moments before the attack to which they fell a victim, they had escaped the explosion of a bomb which wounded several officers of their suite.

The Emperor, who is now at Ischl, was immediately informed by telegraph.

DUMAINE.

No. 8. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 2, 1914.

The crime of Serajevo arouses the most acute resentment in Austrian military circles, and among all those who are not content to allow Serbia to maintain in the Balkans the position which she has acquired.

The investigation into the origin of the crime which it is desired to exact from the Government at Belgrade under conditions intolerable to their dignity would, in case of a refusal, furnish grounds of complaint which would admit of resort to military measures.

DUMAINE.

No. 9. M. de Manneville, French Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 4, 1914.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday, and has to-day repeated to the Russian Ambassador, that he hoped Serbia would satisfy the demands which Austria might have to make to her with regard to the investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices in the crime of Serajevo. He added that he was confident that this would be the case because Serbia, if she acted in any other way, would have the opinion of the whole civilised world against her.

The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety which is shown by a part of the German press as to possible tension in the relations between the Governments of Vienna and Belgrade, or at least they do not wish to seem to do so.

DE MANNEVILLE.

**No. 10. M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to
M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister
for Foreign Affairs.**

St. Petersburg, July 6, 1914.

In the course of an interview which he had asked for with the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Sazonof pointed out in a friendly way the disquieting irritation which the attacks of the Austrian press against Serbia are in danger of producing in his country.

Count Czernin having given him to understand that the Austro-Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled to search for the instigators of the crime of Serajevo on Servian territory, M. Sazonof interrupted him: "No country," he said, "has had to suffer more than Russia from crimes prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in any country whatsoever the procedure with which your papers threaten Serbia? Do not embark on such a course."

May this warning not be in vain.

PALÉOLOGUE.

**No. 11. M. d'Apchier le Maugin, French Consul-General at Budapest,
to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister
for Foreign Affairs.**

Budapest, July 11, 1914.

Questioned in the Chamber on the state of the Austro-Servian question M. Tisza explained that before everything else it was necessary to wait for the result of the judicial inquiry, as to which he refused at the moment to make any disclosure whatsoever. And the Chamber has given its full approval to this. He also showed himself equally discreet as to the decisions taken at the meeting of Ministers at Vienna, and did not give any indication whether the project of a *démarche* at Belgrade, with which all the papers of both hemispheres are full, would be followed up. The Chamber assented without hesitation.

With regard to this *démarche* it seems that the word has been given to minimise its significance; the anger of the Hungarians has, as it were, evaporated through the virulent articles of the press, which is now unanimous in advising against this step, which might be dangerous. The semi-official press especially would desire that for the word "*démarche*," with its appearance of a threat, there should be substituted the expression "*pourparlers*," which appears to them more friendly and more courteous. Thus, officially, for the moment all is for peace.

All is for peace, in the press. But the general public here believes in war and fears it. Moreover, persons in whom I have every reason to have confidence have assured me that they knew that every day cannon and ammunition were being sent in large quantities towards the frontier. Whether true or not this rumour has been brought to me from various quarters with details which agree with one another; at least it indicates what are the thoughts with which people are generally occupied. The Government, whether it is sincerely desirous of peace, or whether it is *preparing a coup*, is now doing all that it can to allay these anxieties. This is why the tone of the Government newspapers has been lowered, first by one note, then by two, so that it is at the present moment almost optimistic. But they had themselves spread the alarm as it suited them

(à plaisir). Their optimism to order is in fact without an echo; the nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer which cannot be neglected, is a sure proof of this; without exception stocks have fallen to an unaccountably low level; the Hungarian 4 per cents. were quoted yesterday at 79.95, a rate which has never been quoted since they were first issued.

D'APCHIER LE MAUGIN.

No. 12. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 15, 1914.

Certain organs of the Vienna press, discussing the military organisation of France and of Russia, represent these two countries as incapable of holding their own in European affairs; this would ensure to the Dual Monarchy, supported by Germany, appreciable facilities for subjecting Servia to any treatment which it might be pleased to impose. The *Militärische Rundschau* frankly admits it. "The moment is still favourable to us. If we do not decide for war, that war in which we shall have to engage at the latest in two or three years will be begun in far less propitious circumstances. At this moment the initiative rests with us: Russia is not ready, moral factors and right are on our side, as well as might. Since we shall have to accept the contest some day, let us provoke it at once. Our prestige, our position as a Great Power, our honour, are in question; and yet more, for it would seem that our very existence is concerned—to be or not to be—which is in truth the great matter to-day."

Surpassing itself, the *Neue Freie Presse* of to-day reproaches Count Tisza for the moderation of his second speech, in which he said, "Our relations with Servia require, however, to be made clear." These words rouse its indignation. For it, tranquility and security can result only from a *war to the knife* against Pan-Servism, and it is in the name of humanity that it demands the extermination of the cursed Servian race.

DUMAINE.

No. 13. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 19, 1914.

The Chancellor of the Consulate, who has sent me his half-yearly report, in which he sums up the various economic facts which have been the subject of his study since the beginning of the year, has added a section containing political information emanating from a trustworthy source.

I asked him briefly to sum up the information which he has obtained regarding the impending presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, which the papers have for some days been persistently announcing.

You will find the text of this memorandum interesting on account of the accurate information which it contains.

DUMAINE.

No. 14. Memorandum. (Extract from a Consular Report on the Economic and Political Situation in Austria.)

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

From information furnished by a person specially well informed as to official news, it appears that the French Government would be wrong to have confidence in disseminators of optimism; much will be demanded of Serbia; she will be required to dissolve several propagandist societies, she will be summoned to repress nationalism, to guard the frontier in co-operation with Austrian officials, to keep strict control over anti-Austrian tendencies in the schools; and it is a very difficult matter for a Government to consent to become in this way a policeman for a foreign Government. They foresee the subterfuges by which Serbia will doubtless wish to avoid giving a clear and direct reply; that is why a short interval will perhaps be fixed for her to declare whether she accepts or not. The tenour of the note and its imperious tone almost certainly ensure that Belgrade will refuse. Then military operations will begin.

There is here, and equally at Berlin, a party which accepts the idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions, in other words, a conflagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be necessary to start before Russia has completed the great improvements of her army and railways, and before France has brought her military organisation to perfection. But on this point there is no unanimity in high circles; Count Berchtold and the diplomatists desire at the most localised operations against Serbia. But everything must be regarded as possible. A singular fact is pointed out: generally the official telegraph agency, in its summaries and reviews of the foreign press, pays attention only to semi-official newspapers and to the most important organs; it omits all quotation from and all mention of the others. This is a rule and a tradition. Now, for the last ten days, the official agency has furnished daily to the Austro-Hungarian press a complete review of the whole Servian press, giving a prominent place to the least known, the smallest, and most insignificant papers, which, just on account of their obscurity, employ language freer, bolder, more aggressive, and often insulting. This work of the official agency has obviously for its aim the excitement of public feeling and the creation of opinion favourable to war. The fact is significant.

No. 15. M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 21, 1914.

It has come to my knowledge that the Servian representative at Berlin declared, at the Wilhelmstrasse, yesterday, that his Government was ready to entertain Austria's requirements arising out of the outrage at Serajevo, provided that she asked only for judicial co-operation in the punishment and prevention of political crimes, but that he was charged to warn the German Government that it would be dangerous to attempt through that investigation, to lower the prestige of Serbia.

In confidence I may also inform your Excellency that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at the diplomatic audience to-day mentioned this subject to Herr von Jagow. He said that he supposed the German Government now had full knowledge of the note prepared by Austria, and were therefore willing to give the assurance that the Austro-Servian difficulties

would be localised. The Secretary of State protested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that note, and expressed himself in the same way to me. I could not help showing my astonishment at a statement which agreed so little with what circumstances lead one to expect.

I have also been assured that, from now on, the preliminary notices for mobilisation, the object of which is to place Germany in a kind of "attention" attitude in times of tension, have been sent out here to those classes which would receive them in similar circumstances. That is a measure to which the Germans, constituted as they are, can have recourse without indiscretion and without exciting the people. It is not a sensational measure, and is not necessarily followed by full mobilisation, as we have already seen, but it is none the less significant.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 16. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 21, 1914.

I specially draw your attention to information of which I am in receipt from Berlin; the French Ambassador notifies the extreme weakness of the Berlin Bourse yesterday, and attributes it to the anxiety which has begun to be aroused by the Servian question.

M. Jules Cambon has very grave reason for believing that when Austria makes the *démarche* at Belgrade which she judges necessary in consequence of the crime of Serajevo, Germany will support her with her authority, without seeking to play the part of mediator.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 17. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 22, 1914.

M. Jules Cambon having questioned Herr von Jagow on the tenour of the Austrian note at Belgrade, the latter replied that he knew nothing of the text; our Ambassador expressed his great astonishment at this. He emphasizes that the weakness of the Berlin Bourse continues, and that pessimistic rumours are current.

M. Barrère also discussed the same question with the Marquis di San Giuliano, who appears disturbed by it, and gives the assurance that he is working at Vienna in order that Servia may not be asked for anything beyond what is practicable, for instance, the dissolution of the Bosnian Club, and not a judicial inquiry into the causes of the crime of Serajevo.

In present circumstances, the most favourable presumption one can make is that the Cabinet at Vienna, finding itself carried away by the press and the military party, is trying to obtain the maximum from Servia by starting to intimidate her, directly and indirectly, and looks to Germany for support in this.

I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna to use all his influence with Count Berchtold and to represent to him, in a friendly conversation

how much Europe would appreciate moderation on the part of the Austrian Government, and what consequences would be likely to be entailed by violent pressure on Servia.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 18. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

Nothing is known as to the decision which Count Berchtold, who is prolonging his stay at Ischl, is trying to obtain from the Emperor. The intention of proceeding against Servia with the greatest severity, of having done with her, of "treating her like another Poland," is attributed to the Government. Eight army corps are said to be ready to start on the campaign, but M. Tisza, who is very disturbed about the excitement in Croatia, is said to have intervened actively in order to exercise a moderating influence.

In any case it is believed that the *démarche* will be made at Belgrade this week. The requirements of the Austro-Hungarian Government with regard to the punishment of the outrage, and to guarantees of control and police supervision, seem to be acceptable to the dignity of the Servians; M. Jovanovich believes they will be accepted. M. Pashitch wishes for a peaceful solution, but says that he is ready for a full resistance. He has confidence in the strength of the Servian army; besides, he counts on the union of all the Slavs in the Monarchy to paralyse the effort directed against his country.

Unless people are absolutely blinded, it must be recognised here that a violent blow has every chance of being fatal both to the Austro-Hungarian army and to the cohesion of the nationalities governed by the Emperor, which has already been so much compromised.

Herr von Tschirscky, the German Ambassador, is showing himself a supporter of violent measures, while at the same time he is willing to let it be understood that the Imperial Chancery would not be in entire agreement with him on this point. The Russian Ambassador, who left yesterday for the country in consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has confided to me that his Government will not raise any objection to steps directed towards the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the societies which are notoriously revolutionary, but could not accept requirements which would humiliate Servian national feeling.

DUMAINE.

No. 19. M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 22, 1914.

Your Excellency has been good enough to communicate to me the impressions which have been collected by our Ambassador at Berlin with regard to the *démarche* which the Austro-Hungarian Minister is proposing to make at Belgrade.

These impressions have been confirmed by a conversation which I

had yesterday with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Ambassador, who stated to him that at Berlin a *démarche* of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Servian Government was expected. Prince Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna, but that up to the present time they had not been successful in this, and that he was not without anxiety as to the results of a *démarche* of this kind. Sir Edward Grey answered Prince Lichnowsky that he would like to believe that, before intervening at Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian Government had fully informed themselves as to the circumstances of the conspiracy to which the Hereditary Archduke and the Duchess of Hohenburg had fallen victims, and had assured themselves that the Servian Government had been cognisant of it and had not done all that lay in their power to prevent the consequences. For if it could not be proved that the Servian Government were responsible and implicated to a certain degree, the intervention of Austria-Hungary would not be justified and would arouse against them the opinion of Europe.

The communication of Prince Lichnowsky had left Sir Edward Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did not conceal from me. The same impression was given me by the Italian Ambassador, who also fears the possibility of fresh tension in Austro-Servian relations.

This morning the Servian Minister came to see me, and he shares the apprehensions of Sir Edward Grey. He fears that Austria may make of the Servian Government demands which their dignity, and above all the susceptibility of public opinion, will not allow them to accept without a protest. When I pointed out to him the quiet which appears to reign at Vienna, and to which all the Ambassadors accredited to that Court bear testimony, he answered that this official quiet was only apparent and concealed feelings which were most fundamentally hostile to Servia. But, he added, if these feelings take a public form (*démarche*) which lacks the moderation that is desirable, it will be necessary to take account of Servian public opinion, which has been inflamed by the wrong methods which the Austrian Government have used in approaching that country, and which has been made less patient by the memory of two victorious wars which is still quite fresh. Notwithstanding the sacrifices which Servia has made for her recent victories she can still put 400,000 men in the field, and public opinion, which knows this, is not inclined to put up with any humiliation.

Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, asked him to recommend his Government not to depart from the prudence and moderation necessary for avoiding new complications, not to demand from Servia any measures to which she could not reasonably submit, and not to allow themselves to be carried away too far.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 20. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Rome.

Paris, July 23, 1914.

According to information collected by the French Ambassador at Vienna, the first intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government had been to proceed with the greatest severity against Servia, while keeping eight army corps ready to start operations.

The disposition at this moment was more conciliatory; in answer to a question put to him by M. Dumaine, whom I instructed to call the attention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the anxiety aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated to our Ambassador that the tone of the Austrian note, and the demands which would be formulated in it, allow us to count on a peaceful result. In view of the customary procedure of the Imperial Chancery I do not know what confidence ought to be placed in these assurances.

In any case the Austrian note will be presented in a very short space of time. The Servian Minister holds that as M. Pashitch wishes to come to an understanding, he will accept those demands which relate to the punishment of the outrage and to the guarantees for control and police supervision, but that he will resist everything which might affect the sovereignty and dignity of his country.

In diplomatic circles at Vienna the German Ambassador is in favour of violent measures, while at the same time he confesses that the Imperial Chancery is perhaps not entirely in agreement with him on this point; the Russian Ambassador, trusting to assurances which have been given him, has left Vienna, and before his departure confided to M. Dumaine that his Government will not raise any objection to the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the revolutionary associations, but that they could not accept requirements which were humiliating to the national sentiment of Servia.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 21. M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris.

Munich, July 23, 1914.

The Bavarian press seems to believe that a peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian incident is not only possible but even probable; on the other hand official circles have for some time been assuming with more or less sincerity an air of real pessimism.

In particular the President of the Council said to me to-day that the Austrian note the contents of which were known to him (*dont il avait connaissance*) was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could be accepted by Servia, but that none the less the existing situation appeared to him to be very serious.

CHAPTER III.

THE AUSTRIAN NOTE AND THE SERVIAN REPLY.

(From Friday, July 24, to Saturday, July 25.)

No. 22. M. René Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I should be obliged if you would urgently send on to M. Dumaine the following information and instructions.

Reval, July 24, 1914, 1 a.m.

In the course of my conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs we had to take into consideration the dangers which might result from any step taken by Austria-Hungary in relation to Serbia in connection with the crime of which the Hereditary Archduke has been a victim. We found ourselves in agreement in thinking that we should not leave anything undone to prevent a request for an explanation or some *mise en demeure* which would be equivalent to intervention in the internal affairs of Servia, of such a kind that Servia might consider it as an attack on her sovereignty and independence.

We have in consequence come to the opinion that we might, by means of a friendly conversation with Count Berchtold, give him counsels of moderation, of such a kind as to make him understand how undesirable would be any intervention at Belgrade which would appear to be a threat on the part of the Cabinet at Vienna.

The British Ambassador, who was kept informed by M. Sazonof, expressed the idea that his Government would doubtless associate itself with a *démarche* for removing any danger which might threaten general peace, and he has telegraphed to his Government to this effect.

M. Sazonof has addressed instructions to this effect to M. Schebeko. While there is no question in this of collective or concerted action at Vienna on the part of the representatives of the Triple Entente, I ask you to discuss the matter with the Russian and English Ambassadors, and to come to an agreement with them as to the best means by which each of you can make Count Berchtold understand without delay the moderation that the present situation appears to us to require.

Further, it would be desirable to ask M. Paul Cambon to bring the advantages of this procedure to the notice of Sir Edward Grey, and to support the suggestion that the British Ambassador in Russia will have made to this effect to the Foreign Office. Count Benckendorff is instructed to make a similar recommendation.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 23. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, on board the "France."

Paris, July 24, 1914.

I have sent on your instructions to Vienna as urgent, but from information contained in this morning's papers it appears that the Austrian note was presented at Belgrade at 6 o'clock yesterday evening.

This note, the official text of which has not yet been handed to us by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, appears to be very sharp; it appears to aim not only at obtaining the prosecution of the Serbs, who were directly implicated in the outrage of Serajevo, but to require the immediate suppression of the whole of the anti-Austrian propaganda in the Servian press and army. It is said to give Servia till 6 o'clock on Saturday evening to make her submission.

"In sending your instructions to M. Dumaine I requested him to come to an agreement with his English and Russian colleagues as to his action.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 24. Text of the Austrian Note.

Note communicated by Count Scezsen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, on Friday, July 24, 1914, at 10.30 a. m.)

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade:—

- "On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:—

"'Servia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Servia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter.

"The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

"Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has per-

mitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction; in short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

"This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

"It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

"The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

"To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

"In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their 'Official Journal' of the 13-26 July the following declaration:—

" 'The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary—i.e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

" 'The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

" 'The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the Kingdom, that henceforward they will

proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.

"This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the 'Official Bulletin' of the army.

"The Royal Servian Government further undertake:

"(1) To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

"(2) To dissolve immediately the society styled 'Narodna Odbrana,' to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;

"(3) To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

"(4) To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

"(5) To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

"(6) To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

"(7) To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employé, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo;

"(8) To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz Ložnica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

"(9) To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

"(10) To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 5 o'clock on Saturday evening the 25th July.*

"A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note."

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations:—

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying-on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian

* The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in a private letter on the 24th July sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following correction:—

"In the copy of the dispatch which I had the honour to send to your Excellency this morning, it was said that my Government expected an answer from the Cabinet at Belgrade at latest by 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th of this month. As our Minister at Belgrade did not deliver his note yesterday until 6 o'clock in the evening, the time allowed for the answer has in consequence been prolonged to 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening."

"I consider it my duty to inform your Excellency of this slight alteration in the termination of the period fixed for the answer to the Servian Government."

Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Serbia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Serbia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a *dossier* elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Appendix.

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last has up to the present led to the following conclusions:—

(1) The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, one Milan Čiganović, and Trifko Grabez, with the assistance of Commander Voijsa Tankosić.

(2) The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež by the man Milan Čiganović and Commander Voijsa Tankosić at Belgrade.

(3) The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms depôt of the Servian army at Kragujevac.

(4) In order to ensure the success of the act, Čiganović taught Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabež in a forest near the shooting ground at Topschider.

(5) To enable Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organised by Čiganović.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabac (Rade Popović) and Ložnica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbić, of Ložnica, with the assistance of various individuals.

No. 25. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
M. René Viviani, President of the Council, on board the
"France," and to London, Berlin, Vienna, St.
Petersburgh, Rome, Belgrade.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning left me a copy of the Austrian note which was handed in at Belgrade on Thursday evening. Count Scézszen informs me that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives the Servian Government up to 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday, the 25th, for their answer.*

The note is based on the undertaking made by Servia on the 31st March 1909, to recognise the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reproaches the Servian Government with having tolerated an anti-Austrian propaganda in which officials, the army, and the press have taken part, a propaganda which threatens the security and integrity of Austria, and the danger of which has been shown by the crime of the 28th June which, according to the facts established during the investigation, was planned at Belgrade.

The Austrian Government explain that they are compelled to put an end to a propaganda which forms a permanent danger to their tranquillity, and to require from the Servian Government an official pronouncement of their determination to condemn and suppress it, by publishing in the Official Gazette of the 26th a declaration, the terms of which are given, condemning it, stating their regret, and threatening to crush it. A general order of the King to the Servian army is at the same time to make these declarations known to the army. In addition to this, the Servian Government are to undertake to suppress publications, to dissolve the societies, to dismiss those officers and civil servants whose names would be communicated to them by the Austrian Government, to accept the co-operation of Austrian officials in suppressing the subversive acts to which their attention has been directed, as well as for the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and finally to proceed to the immediate arrest of a Servian officer and an official who were concerned in it.

Annexed to the Austrian memorandum is a note which sums up the facts established by the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and declares that it was planned at Belgrade; that the bombs were provided for the murderers, and came from a dépôt of the Servian army; finally that the murderers were drilled and helped by Servian officers and officials.

On visiting the Acting Political Director immediately after making this communication, Count Scézszen, without any observations, informed him that the note had been presented. M. Berthelot, on my instructions, confined himself to pointing out to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador the feeling of anxiety which had been aroused by the information available this morning as to the contents of the Austrian note, and the painful feeling which could not fail to be aroused in French public opinion by the time chosen for so categorical a *démarche* with so short a time limit; that is to say, a time when the President of the Republic and the President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic had left St. Petersburg and were at sea, and consequently were not able to exert, in agreement with those Powers which were not directly interested, that

* See note on page 35.

soothing influence on Serbia and Austria which was so desirable in the interest of general peace.

The Servian Minister has not yet received any information as to the intentions of his Government.

The German Ambassador has asked me to receive him at 5 o'clock this afternoon.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 26. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Thiébaud, French Minister at Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, Vienna, London, Berlin, Rome, St. Petersburg.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

M. Vesnitch was this morning still without any telegram from his Government informing him as to their intentions, and did not know the contents of the Austrian note.

To a request for advice which he made to the Political Director, M. Berthelot said to him, speaking personally and for himself alone, that Serbia must try to gain time, as the limit of forty-eight hours perhaps formed rather a "*mise en demeure*" than an ultimatum in the proper sense of the term; that there might, for instance, be an opportunity of offering satisfaction on all those points which were not inconsistent with the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia; he was advised to draw attention to the fact that statements based on the Austrian investigations at Serajevo were one sided, and that Serbia, while she was quite ready to take measures against all the accomplices of a crime which she most strongly condemned, required full information as to the evidence in order to be able to verify it with all speed; above all to attempt to escape from the direct grip of Austria by declaring herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe.

I have asked at London and St. Petersburg for the views and intentions of the English and Russian Governments. It appears on the other hand from our information that the Austrian note was not communicated to Italy until to-day, and that Italy had neither been consulted nor even informed of it.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 27. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Rome.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

The French Ambassador at Vienna informs me that opinion has been startled by the sudden and exaggerated nature of the Austrian demands, but that the chief fear of the military party appears to be that Serbia may give way.

The Servian Minister in Austria thinks that his Government will show themselves very conciliatory in all that concerns the punishment of the accomplices of the crime, and the guarantees to be given as to the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda, but that they could not accept a general order to the army dictated to the King, nor the dismissal of officers who were suspected by Austria, nor the interference of foreign officials in

Servia. M. Jovanovitch considers that, if it were possible to start a discussion, a settlement of the dispute might still be arranged, with the assistance of the Powers.

Our Ambassador at Berlin gives an account of the excitement aroused by the Austrian note, and of the state of feeling of the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who thinks that a large part of opinion in Germany would desire war. The tone of the press is threatening and appears to have as its object the intimidation of Russia. Our Ambassador is to see Herr von Jagow this evening.

M. Barrère informs us that Italy is exercising moderating influence at Vienna and is trying to avoid complications.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 28. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

Herr von Schoen came to inform me of a note from his Government, of which he would not leave me a copy, but at my request he read it twice over to me.

The Note was almost word for word, as follows:—

"The statements of the Austro-Hungarian newspapers concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Pan-Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts made known must also do away with all doubt that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is, at any rate, at work there, with the connivance of members of the Government and the army.

"The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Pan-Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the moderation and far-reaching self-restraint of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic intervention of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission, of official Servia, the Pan-Servian propaganda has, since that time, continuously increased in extension and intensity. To its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to remain longer inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government

can only be regarded as justified. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Serbia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands and might even allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if they do not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them."

The German Ambassador particularly called my attention to the last two paragraphs of his note before reading it, pressing the point that this was the important matter. I noted down the text literally; it is as follows:—

"The German Government consider that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately concerned.

"The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the natural play of alliances be followed by incalculable consequences."

I called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that while it might appear legitimate to demand the punishment of all those who were implicated in the crime of Serajevo, on the other hand it seemed difficult to require measures which could not be accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia; the Servian Government, even if it was willing to submit to them, would risk being carried away by a revolution.

I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen that his note only took into account two hypotheses: that of a pure and simple refusal or that of a provocative attitude on the part of Serbia. The third hypothesis (which would leave the door open for an arrangement) should also be taken into consideration; that of Serbia's acceptance and of her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the punishment of the accomplices and full guarantees for the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they were compatible with her sovereignty and dignity.

I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could be examined; if Serbia gave obvious proof of goodwill it could not be thought that Austria would refuse to take part in the conversation.

Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third Powers, who could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take interest in Serbia, to take an attitude which was in accord with the wishes of Germany to localise the dispute.

Herr von Schoen recognised the justice of these considerations and vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked him if we should give to the Austrian note the character of a simple *mise en demeure*, which permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answered that personally he had no views.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 29. M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 24, 1914.

The delivery of the Austrian note to Servia has made a deep impression. The Austrian Ambassador declares that his Government could not abate any of their demands. At the Wilhelmstrasse, as well as in the press, the same view is expressed.

Most of the Chargés d'Affaires present in Berlin came to see me this morning. They show little hope of a peaceful issue. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires bitterly remarked that Austria has presented her note at the very moment that the President of the Republic and the President of the Council had left St. Petersburg. He is inclined to think that a considerable section of opinion in Germany desires war and would like to seize this opportunity, in which Austria will no doubt be found more united than in the past, and in which the German Emperor, influenced by a desire to give support to the monarchic principle (*par un sentiment de solidarité monarchique*) and by horror at the crime, is less inclined to show a conciliatory attitude.

Herr von Jagow is going to receive me late in the afternoon.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 30. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 24, 1914.

I asked the Secretary of State to-day, in the interview which I had with him, if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, that Austria had presented a note to the Powers on her dispute with Servia; if he had received it; and what view he took of it.

Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the note was forcible, and that he approved it, the Servian Government having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria. Moreover, he considers this question to be a domestic one for Austria, and he hopes that it will be localised.

I then said to him that not having as yet received any instructions, the views which I wished to exchange with him were strictly personal. Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.

Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said, "It is only because we are having a personal conversation that I allow you to say that to me."

"Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates himself, domestic trouble will probably break out in Servia; that will open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where you will be led by Vienna?" I added that the language of the German newspapers was not the language of persons who were indifferent to, and unacquainted with, the question, but betokened an active support. Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time limit given to Servia for submission would make an unpleasant impression in Europe.

Herr von Jagow answered that he quite expected a little excitement (*un peu d'émotion*) on the part of Serbia's friends, but that he was counting on their giving her wise advice.

"I have no doubt," I then said to him, "that Russia would endeavour to persuade the Cabinet of Belgrade to make acceptable concessions; but why not ask from one what is being asked from the other, and if reliance is being placed on advice being given at Belgrade, is it not also legitimate to rely on advice being given at Vienna from another quarter?"

The Secretary of State went so far as to say that that depended on circumstances; but immediately checked himself; he repeated that the difficulty must be localised. He asked me if I really thought the situation serious. "Certainly," I answered, "because if what is happening is the result of due reflection, I do not understand why all means of retreat have been cut off."

All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support Austria's attitude with unusual energy. The weakness which her Austro-Hungarian ally has shown for some years past, has weakened the confidence that was placed in her here. She was found heavy to drag along. Mischievous legal proceedings, such as the Agram and the Friedjung affairs, brought odium on her police and covered them with ridicule. All that was asked of the police was that they should be strong; the conviction is that they were violent.

An article which appeared in the *Lokal Anzeiger* this evening shows also that at the German Chancery there exists a state of mind to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay sufficient attention; I mean the feeling that monarchies must stand together (*sentiment de la solidarité monarchique*). I am convinced that great weight must be attached to this point of view in order to appreciate the attitude of the Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have been affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been a few days previously.

It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to every one that they were ignorant of the scope of the note sent by Austria to Serbia.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 31. M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has communicated to M. Sazonof a threatening note to Serbia.

The intentions of the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers could not be more pacific, a fact of which the President of the Republic and the President of the Council have been able to satisfy themselves directly; but the ultimatum which the Austro-Hungarian Government has just delivered to the Cabinet at Belgrade introduces a new and disquieting element into the situation.

Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer violence to Serbia. The shortness of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum renders still more difficult the moderating influence that the Powers of the Triple Entente might exercise at Vienna.

On the other hand, M. Sazonof assumes that Germany will desire to support her ally and I am afraid that this impression is correct. Nothing but the assurance of the solidarity of the Triple Entente can prevent the German Powers from emphasising their provocative attitude.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 32. M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 24, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey having discussed with me his desire to leave no stone unturned to avert the crisis, we agreed in thinking that the English Cabinet might ask the German Government to take the initiative in approaching Vienna with the object of offering the mediation, between Austria and Servia, of the four Powers which are not directly interested. If Germany agrees, time will be gained, and this is the essential point.

Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss with Prince Lichnowsky the proposal I have just explained. I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have despatched her ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin.

Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter capital by the rumours of a naval entente between Russia and England, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening of the Russian army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in Germany.

The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so she could have stopped the despatch of the ultimatum.

The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see no way of arresting the course of events.

However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt the *démarche* upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 33. M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 24, 1914.

The Servian Minister received to-night from M. Pashitch a telegram saying that the Austro-Hungarian Government had sent him their ultimatum, the time limit of which expires at 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening. M. Pashitch does not give the terms of the Austrian communication, but if it is of the nature reported in to-day's "Times," it seems impossible for the Servian Government to accept it.

In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it extremely

difficult for his Government not to support Serbia, we have been asking ourselves what intervention could avert the conflict.

Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I propose to suggest that he should ask for the semi-official intervention of the German Government at Vienna to prevent a sudden attack.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 34. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), Belgrade, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador having communicated his Government's note to Sir Edward Grey, the latter observed that no such formidable declaration had ever been addressed by one Government to another; he drew Count Mensdorff's attention to the responsibility assumed by Austria.

With the possibility of a conflict between Austria and Russia before him, Sir Edward Grey proposes to ask for the co-operation of the German Government with a view to the mediation of the four Powers who are not directly interested in the Serbian question, namely, England, France, Italy and Germany; this mediation to be exercised simultaneously at Vienna and at St. Petersburg.

I advised the Serbian Minister to act cautiously, and I am willing to co-operate in any conciliatory action at Vienna, in the hope that Austria will not insist on the acceptance of all her demands as against a small State, if the latter shows herself ready to give every satisfaction which is considered compatible with her independence and her sovereignty.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 35. M. Jules Cambon, French Minister at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

The Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of events.

He is of opinion that Austria and Germany have desired to take advantage of the fact that, owing to a combination of circumstances at the present moment, Russia and England appear to them to be threatened by domestic troubles, while in France the military law is under discussion. Moreover, he does not believe in the pretended ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's *démarche*.

He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation.

He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who has just interrupted his holiday in order to return. It looks as if Italy would be surprised, to put it no higher, at having been kept out of the whole affair by her two allies.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 36. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna.

Paris, July 25, 1914.

The German Ambassador came at 12 o'clock to protest against an article in the *Echo de Paris* which applied the term "German threat" (*menace allemande*) to his *démarche* of yesterday. Herr von Schoen told a certain number of journalists, and came to state at the *Direction Politique*, that there has been no "concert" between Austria and Germany in connection with the Austrian note, and that the German Government had no knowledge of this note when it was communicated to them at the same time as to the other Powers, though they had approved it subsequently.

Baron von Schoen added, moreover, that there was no "threat"; the German Government had merely indicated that they thought it desirable to localise the dispute, and that the intervention of other Powers ran the risk of aggravating it.

The Acting Political Director took note of Baron von Schoen's *démarche*. Having asked him to repeat the actual terms of the last two paragraphs of his note, he remarked to him that the terms showed the willingness of Germany to act as intermediary between the Powers and Austria. M. Berthelot added that, as no private information had been given to any journalist, the information in the *Echo de Paris* involved this newspaper alone, and merely showed that the German *démarche* appeared to have been known elsewhere than at the Quai d'Orsay, and apart from any action on his part. The German Ambassador did not take up the allusion.

On the other hand, the Austrian Ambassador at London also came to reassure Sir Edward Grey, telling him that the Austrian note did not constitute an "ultimatum" but "a demand for a reply with a time limit"; which meant that if the Austrian demands are not accepted by 6 o'clock this evening, the Austrian Minister will leave Belgrade and the Austro-Hungarian Government will begin military "preparations" but not military "operations."

The Cabinet of London, like those of Paris and St. Petersburg, has advised Belgrade to express regret for any complicity which might be established in the crime of Serajevo, and to promise the most complete satisfaction in this respect. The Cabinet added that in any case it was Serbia's business to reply in terms which the interests of the country appeared to call for. The English Minister at Belgrade is to consult his French and Russian colleagues, and, if these have had corresponding instructions in the matter, advise the Servian Government to give satisfaction on all the points on which they shall decide that they are able to do so.

Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky (who, up to the present, has made no communication to him similar to that of Herr von Schoen at Paris) that if the Austrian note caused no difficulty between Austria and Russia, the English Government would not have to concern themselves with it, but that it was to be feared that the stiffness of the note and the shortness of the time limit would bring about a state of tension. Under these conditions the only chance that could be seen of avoiding a conflict would consist in the mediation of France, Germany, Italy and England, Germany alone being able to influence the Government at Vienna in this direction.

The German Ambassador replied that he would transmit this sugges-

tion to Berlin, but he gave the Russian Ambassador, who is a relative of his, to understand that Germany would not lend herself to any *démarche* at Vienna.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 37. M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 25, 1914.

The German Ambassador came to the Foreign Office to state that his Government would refuse to interfere in the dispute between Austria and Servia.

Sir Edward Grey replied that without the co-operation of Germany at Vienna, England would not be able to take action at St. Petersburg. If, however, both Austria and Russia mobilised, that would certainly be the occasion for the four other Powers to intervene. Would the German Government then maintain its passive attitude, and would it refuse to join with England, France and Italy?

Prince Lichnowsky does not think so, since the question would no longer be one of difficulties between Vienna and Belgrade, but of a conflict between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Sir Edward Grey added this observation, that if war eventually broke out, no Power in Europe would be able to take up a detached attitude (*pourrait s'en désintéresser*).

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 38. M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Government is about to endeavour to obtain from the Austro-Hungarian Government an extension of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum, in order that the Powers may be able to form an opinion on the judicial *dossier*, the communication of which is offered to them.

M. Sazonof has asked the German Ambassador to point out to his Government the danger of the situation, but he refrained from making any allusion to the measures which Russia would no doubt be led to take, if either the national independence or the territorial integrity of Servia were threatened. The evasive replies and the recriminations of Count de Pourtales left an unfavourable impression on M. Sazonof.

The Ministers will hold a Council to-morrow with the Emperor presiding. M. Sazonof preserves complete moderation. "We must avoid," he said to me, "everything which might precipitate the crisis. I am of opinion that, even if the Austro-Hungarian Government come to blows with Servia, we ought not to break off negotiations."

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 39. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna.

Paris, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Government has instructed its representative at Vienna to ask the Austrian Government for an extension of the time limit fixed for Serbia, so as to enable the Powers to form an opinion on the *dossier* which Austria has offered to communicate to them, and with a view to avoiding regrettable consequences for everyone.

A refusal of this demand by Austria-Hungary would deprive of all meaning the *démarche* which she made to the Powers by communicating her note to them, and would place her in a position of conflict with international ethics.

The Russian Government has asked that you should make a corresponding and urgent *démarche* to Count Berchtold. I beg you to support the request of your colleague. The Russian Government have sent the same request to London, Rome, Berlin and Bucharest.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 40. M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 25, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey has had communicated to him this morning the instructions which require the Russian Ambassador at Vienna to ask for an extension of the time limit given to Serbia by Austria's note of the day before yesterday. M. Sazonof asked that the Russian *démarche* should be supported by the English Embassy.

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir M. de Bunsen to take the same action as his Russian colleague, and to refer to Austria's communication which was made to him late last night by Count Mensdorff, according to the terms of which the failure of Serbia to comply with the conditions of the ultimatum would only result, as from to-day, in a diplomatic rupture and not in immediate military operations.

Sir Edward Grey inferred from this action that time would be left for the Powers to intervene and find means for averting the crisis.

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 41. M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

This morning the English Chargé d'Affaires, acting under instructions from his Government, asked Herr von Jagow if Germany were willing to join with England, France and Italy with the object of intervening between Austria and Russia, to prevent a conflict and, in the first instance, to ask Vienna to grant an extension of the time limit imposed on Serbia by the ultimatum.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that directly after the receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's despatch informing him of the intentions of Edward Grey, he had already telegraphed this very morning to the

German * Ambassador at Vienna to the effect that he should ask Count Berchtold for this extension. Unfortunately Count Berchtold is at Ischl. In any case, Herr von Jagow does not think that this request would be granted.

The English Chargé d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the Austrian note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter further; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria.

Herr von Jagow having replied to him that the matter was a domestic one for Austria, he remarked that it had become essentially an international one.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 42. M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to ask the German Government to make strong representations to the Cabinet at Vienna, with a view to obtaining an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum.

Herr von Jagow not having made an appointment with him until late in the afternoon, that is to say, till the very moment when the ultimatum will expire, M. Broniewski sent an urgent note addressed to the Secretary of State in which he points out that the lateness of Austria's communication to the Powers makes the effect of this communication illusory, inasmuch as it does not give the Powers time to consider the facts brought to their notice before the expiration of the time limit. He insists very strongly on the necessity for extending the time limit, unless the intention be to create a serious crisis.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 43. M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires has, in accordance with his instructions, approached the Secretary of State with a view to securing an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. Herr von Jagow replied that he had already transmitted to Vienna a suggestion of this nature, but that in his opinion all these *démarches* were too late.

M. Broniewski insisted that if the time limit could not be extended, action at least might be delayed so as to allow the Powers to exert themselves to avoid a conflict. He added that the Austrian note was couched in terms calculated to wound Serbia and to force her into war.

Herr von Jagow replied that there was no question of a war, but of an "*exécution*" in a local matter.

* In French text by an obvious error "de la Grande-Bretagne" is printed.

The Chargé d'Affaires in reply expressed regret that the German Government did not weigh their responsibilities in the event of hostilities breaking out, which might extend to the rest of Europe; to this Herr von Jagow replied that he refused to believe in such consequences.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, like myself, has heard the rumour that Austria, while declaring that she did not desire an annexation of territory, would occupy parts of Servia until she had received complete satisfaction. "One knows," he said to me, "what this word 'satisfaction' means." M. Broniewski's impressions of Germany's ultimate intentions are very pessimistic.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 44. M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador has carried out at the Consulta the *démarche* which M. Sazonof requested the representatives of Russia at Paris, Berlin, Rome and Bucharest to undertake, the object of which was to induce these various Cabinets to take action similar to that of Russia at Vienna, with a view of obtaining an extension of the time limit imposed on Servia.

In the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, M. Salandra and M. di Martino replied that they would put themselves into communication with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that his reply could not reach them until towards 6 o'clock, that is to say, too late to take any step at Vienna.

BARRÈRE.

No. 45. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires received instructions from his Government to ask for an extended time limit for the ultimatum to Servia at the very moment that Count Berchtold was leaving for Ischl, with the intention, according to the newspapers, of remaining there near the Emperor until the end of the crisis.

Prince Koudacheff informed him nevertheless of the *démarche* which he had to carry out, by means of two telegrams *en clair*, one addressed to him on his journey and the other at his destination. He does not expect any result.

Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to whom the Prince communicated the tenour of his instructions and of his telegrams, behaved with icy coldness when it was represented to him that to submit for consideration grievances with documentary proofs without leaving time for the *dossier* to be studied, was not consonant with international courtesy. Baron Macchio replied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from being courteous.

The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humiliation on Servia; it will accept no intervention from any Power until the blow has been delivered and received full in the face by Servia.

DUMAINE.

**No. 46. M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.**

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

M. Pashitch has just acquainted me with the reply which will be sent this evening to the Austrian Minister.

The Servian Government agrees to publish to-morrow in the *Journal Officiel* the declaration which has been required of them; they will communicate it also to the army by means of an Order of the Day; they will dissolve the societies of national defence and all other associations which might agitate against Austria-Hungary; they undertake to modify the press law, to dismiss from service in the army, in the ministry of public instruction and in the other Government offices, all officials who shall be proved to have taken part in the propaganda; they only request that the names of these officials may be communicated to them.

As to the participation of Austrian officials in the enquiry, the Government ask that an explanation of the manner in which this will be exercised may be given to them. They could accept no participation which conflicted with international law or with good and neighbourly relations.

They accept all the other demands of the ultimatum and declare that if the Austro-Hungarian Government is not content with this, they are ready to refer the matter to the Hague Tribunal or to the decision of the Great Powers who took part in the preparation of the declaration of March 31, 1909.

BOPPE.

No. 47. M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

Throughout the afternoon there has been a persistent rumour that Servia had submitted to the Austrian demands. This evening the newspapers published extra editions which announce a rupture at Belgrade and the departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister.

The correspondent of the *Agence Havas* at the Wilhelmstrasse has just received confirmation of this rumour. Large crowds consisting of several hundred persons are collecting here before the newspaper offices and a demonstration of numbers of young people has just passed through the Pariser-platz shouting cries of "Hurrah" for Germany, and singing patriotic songs. The demonstrators are visiting the *Siegessäul*, the Austrian and then the Italian Embassy. It is a significant outburst of chauvinism.

A German whom I saw this evening confessed to me that it had been feared here that Servia would accept the whole Austrian note, reserving to herself the right to discuss the manner in which effect should be given to it, in order to gain time and to allow the efforts of the Powers to develop effectively before the rupture.

In financial circles measures are already being taken to meet every eventuality, for no means of averting the crisis is seen, in view of the determined support which Germany is giving to Austria.

I, for my part, see in England the only Power which might be listened to at Berlin.

Whatever happens, Paris, St. Petersburg and London will not succeed in maintaining peace with dignity unless they show a firm and absolutely united front.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 48. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Your telegram reaches me exactly at the moment when the time limit given to Serbia expires. On the other hand, I have just informed you under what conditions the Russian Chargé d'Affaires has had to carry out his *démarche*. It seems useless to support him when there is no longer any time for it.

During the afternoon a rumour spread that Serbia had yielded to the ultimatum, while adding that she was appealing to the Powers against it. But the latest news is that at the last moment we are assured that the Austrian Minister has just left Belgrade hurriedly; he must have thought the Servian Government's acceptance of the conditions imposed by his Government inadequate.

DUMAINE.

No. 49. Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note.

(Communicated by M. Vesnitch, Servian Minister, July 27.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18–31 March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school-book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible,

in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the *Journal Officiel*, on the date of the 13-26 July, the following declaration:—

The Royal Government of Serbia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 18-31 March, 1909, which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour.

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake:—

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.

The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into Article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial

and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15-28 June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and who up to the 15-28 June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitz line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks

made by their officials, whether in Serbia or abroad, in interviews, after the crime which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of the Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18-31 March, 1909.

CHAPTER IV.

FROM THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, (JULY 25, 1914), TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY AUSTRIA ON SERBIA, (JULY 28, 1914).

No. 50. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France,") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 26, 1914.

The events of Saturday can be summed up as follows:—Refusal of Austria to grant the extension of the time limit asked for by Russia,—departure of the Austrian Minister from Belgrade after receiving a reply from Serbia which was considered insufficient, although it reached the limit of any possible concession,—order for mobilisation given in Serbia, whose Government retired to Kragoujewatz, where it was followed by the French and Russian Ministers.

The Italian Government, to whom the Austrian note had been communicated on Friday, without any request for support or even advice, could not, in the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, who does not return till Tuesday, make any reply to the suggestion of the Russian Government proposing to press at Vienna for an extension of time. It appears from a confidential communication by the Italian Ambassador to M. Paléologue that at Vienna people still soothe themselves with the illusion that Russia "will not hold firm." It must not be forgotten that Italy is only bound by the engagements of the Triple Alliance if she has been consulted beforehand.

From St. Petersburg we learn that M. Sazonof has advised Serbia to ask for English mediation. At the Council of Ministers on the 25th, which was held in presence of the Emperor, the mobilisation of thirteen army corps intended eventually to operate against Austria was considered; this mobilisation, however, would only be made effective if Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Serbia, and not till after notice had been given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty being left to him to go on with negotiations even if Belgrade should be occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both politically and morally impossible for Russia to allow Serbia to be crushed.

In London the German *démarche* was made on the 25th in the same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen at Paris. Sir Edward Grey has replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if the war were to break out no Power in Europe could take up a detached attitude. He did not express himself more definitely and used very reserved language to the Servian Minister. The communication made on the evening of the 25th by the Austrian Ambassador makes Sir Edward Grey more optimistic; since the

diplomatic rupture does not necessarily involve immediate military operations, the Secretary of State is still willing to hope that the Powers will have time to intervene.

At Berlin the language used by the Secretary of State to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires is unsatisfactory and dilatory; when the latter asked him to associate himself with a *démarche* at Vienna for an extension of the time limit, he replied that he had already taken action in this sense but that it was too late; to the request for an extension of the time limit before active measures were taken, he replied that this had to do with a domestic matter, and not with a war but with local operations. Herr von Jagow pretends not to believe that the Austrian action could lead to general consequences.

A real explosion of chauvinism has taken place at Berlin. The German Emperor returns direct to Kiel. M. Jules Cambon thinks that, at the first military steps taken by Russia, Germany would immediately reply, and probably would not wait for a pretext before attacking us.

At Vienna, the French Ambassador has not had time to join in the *démarche* of his Russian colleague for obtaining an extension of the time limit fixed for Serbia; he does not regret it, this *démarche* having been categorically rejected, and England not having had time to give instructions to her representative about it.

A note from the English Embassy has been delivered to me: it gives an account of the conversation between the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg and M. Sazonof and M. Paléologue. Sir Edward Grey thinks that the four Powers who are not directly interested ought to press both on Russia and Austria that their armies should not cross the frontier, and that they should give time to England, France, Germany and Italy to bring their mediation into play. If Germany accepts, the English Government has reason to think that Italy also would be glad to be associated in the joint action of England and France; the adherence of Germany is essential, for neither Austria nor Russia would tolerate any intervention except that of impartial friends or allies.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 51. M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 26, 1914.

A telegram from Vienna which has just been received at the Consulta informs them that the diplomatic rupture between Austria and Serbia has taken place, and that Austria is proceeding to military measures.

The Marquis di San Giuliano, who is at Fiuggi, will not return to Rome till the day after to-morrow.

To-day I had an interesting conversation with the President of the Council on the situation, the full gravity of which he recognises. From the general drift of his remarks, I have carried away the impression that the Italian Government would be willing, in case of war, to keep out of it and to maintain an attitude of observation.

M. Salandra said to me on this subject: "We shall make the greatest efforts to prevent peace being broken; our situation is somewhat analogous to that of England. Perhaps we could do something in a pacific sense

together with the English." M. Salandra stated definitely to me that the Austrian note had been communicated to Rome at the last moment.

BARRÈRE.

No. 52. M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 26, 1914.

M. Sazonof yesterday told the Italian Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Russia would employ all diplomatic means to avoid a conflict, and that she did not give up hope that mediation might lead Austria to a less uncompromising attitude; but that Russia could not be asked to allow Serbia to be crushed.

I observe that the greater part of Italian public opinion is hostile to Austria in this serious business.

BARRÈRE.

No. 53. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London.

Paris, July 26, 1914.

M. Paléologue sends me the following telegram:—

"M. Sazonof advises the Servian Government to ask for the mediation of the British Government."

In concurrence with M. Paul Cambon, I think that the French Government can only say that they hope to see the English Government accept, if an offer of this kind is made to them.

Be good enough to express yourself in this sense at the Foreign Office.
BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 54. M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy perseverance to seek means to bring about a peaceful solution. "Up to the last moment," he declared to me, "I shall show myself ready to negotiate."

It is in this spirit that he has just sent for Count Szápáry to come to a "frank and loyal explanation." M. Sazonof commented in his presence on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by article, making clear the insulting character of the principal clauses. "The intention which inspired this document," he said, "is legitimate if you pursued no aim other than the protection of your territory against the intrigues of Servian anarchists; but the procedure to which you have had recourse is not defensible." He concluded: "Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee you the result."

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador showed himself moved by this language; however, while awaiting instructions, he reserves the opinion of

his Government. Without being discouraged M. Sazonof has decided to propose this evening to Count Berchtold the opening of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg on the changes to be introduced into the ultimatum.

This friendly and semi-official interposition of Russia between Austria and Servia has the advantage of being expeditious. I therefore believe it to be preferable to any other procedure and likely to succeed.

PALEOLOGUE.

No. 55. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

M. Schebeko has returned hastily from a journey to Russia; he had only undertaken it after he had received an assurance from Count Berchtold that the demands on Servia would be thoroughly acceptable.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg spoke in the same sense to M. Sazonof the evening before the delivery of the note. This procedure, which is quite usual in the diplomacy of the Monarchy, and which Baron Macchio has also employed towards me, seems to have greatly added to the irritation of the Russian Government.

M. Schebeko will make an effort, however, to profit by the delay which is indispensable for mobilisation, in order to make a proposal for an arrangement which will at least have the advantage of allowing us to measure the value of the pacific declarations of Germany.

While we were talking over the situation this evening, in company with Sir M. de Bunsen, the latter received instructions from the Foreign Office with reference to the *démarche* to be attempted by the representatives of the four Powers less directly interested. I am expecting, therefore, that we may have to consult to-morrow with the Duke d'Avarna and with M. Tschirsky, who, in order to refuse his concurrence, will almost certainly entrench himself behind the principle of localising the conflict.

My impression is that the Austro-Hungarian Government, although surprised and perhaps regretting the vigour with which they have been inspired, will believe themselves obliged to commence military action.

DUMAINE.

No. 56. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France,") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 26, 1914.

The summary of the Servian reply to the Austrian note only reached us after twenty hours delay. Although the Servian Government had given way on all points, with the exception of two small reservations, the Austro-Hungarian Minister has broken off relations, thus proving the determined wish of his Government to proceed to execution on Servia.

According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon, the English Ambassador thinks that there is a slight yielding; when he observed to Herr von

Jagow that Sir Edward Grey did not ask him to intervene between Austria and Servia, but, as this question ceased to be localised, to intervene with England, France and Italy at Vienna and St. Petersburg, the Secretary of State declared that he would do his best to maintain peace.

In the course of an interview between M. Barrère and the General Secretary of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the latter indicated that probably the Italian Government would not have approved the Austrian note; but as it was not communicated to them beforehand, the Government consider themselves by this fact relieved of all responsibility in the grave step taken by Austria.

The German Ambassador came this afternoon to make a communication to me relating to an intervention by France with Russia in a pacific sense. "Austria," he said to me, "has declared to Russia that she was not pursuing any territorial aggrandisement nor any attack on the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia; her only intention is to ensure her own tranquillity and to take police measures. The prevention of war depends on the decision of Russia; Germany feels herself identified with France in the ardent desire that peace may be maintained, and has the firm hope that France will use her influence in this sense at St. Petersburg."

I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that she had not committed any act which allowed any doubt as to her moderation, and that we were in agreement with her in seeking a peaceful solution of the dispute. It therefore appeared to us that Germany on her side ought to act at Vienna, where her action would certainly be effective, with a view to avoiding military operations leading to the occupation of Servia.

The Ambassador having observed to me that this could not be reconciled with the position taken up by Germany "that the question concerned only Austria and Servia," I told him that the mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburg could be the act of the four other Powers less interested in the question.

Herr von Schoen then entrenched himself behind his lack of instructions in this respect, and I told him that in these conditions I did not feel myself in a position to take any action at St. Petersburg alone.

The conversation ended by the renewed assurances of the Ambassador of the peaceful intention of Germany, whom he declared to be on this point identified with France.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 57. Note for the Minister.

Paris, Sunday evening, July 26, 1914.

After the visit which he paid to the Minister at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, Baron von Schoen went this evening at 7 o'clock to the *Direction Politique*, to ask that in order to avoid the appearance in the newspapers of comments intended to influence public opinion, such as that in the *Écho de Paris* of the evening before, and in order to define exactly the sense of the *démarches* of the German Government, a brief statement should be communicated to the press on the interview between the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Herr von Schoen, in order to define what he had in his mind, suggested the following terms, which the Acting Political Director took down at his dictation: "During the afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minis-

ter for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit, and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation (*sentiment de solidarité pacifique*), they examined the means which might be employed to maintain general peace."

The Acting Political Director replied at once, "Then, in your opinion, everything is settled, and you bring us the assurance that Austria accepts the Servian note or will enter into conversations with the Powers on this matter?" The Ambassador having appeared surprised and having vigorously denied the suggestion, it was explained to him that if there was no modification in Germany's negative attitude, the terms of the suggested "note to the press" were exaggerated, and of a nature to give a false security to French opinion by creating illusion on the real situation, the dangers of which were only too evident.

To the assurances lavished by the German Ambassador as to the optimistic impressions which he had formed, the Acting Political Director replied by asking if he might speak to him in a manner quite personal and private, as man to man, quite freely and without regard to their respective functions. Baron von Schoen asked him to do so.

M. Berthelot then said that to any simple mind Germany's attitude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war; a purely objective analysis of the facts and the psychology of the Austro-German relations led logically to this conclusion. In the face of the repeated statement that Germany was ignorant of the contents of the Austrian note, it was no longer permissible to raise any doubt on that point; but was it probable that Germany would have arrayed herself on the side of Austria in such an adventure with her eyes closed? Did the psychology of all the past relations of Vienna and Berlin allow one to admit that Austria could have taken up a position without any possible retreat, before having weighed with her ally all the consequences of her uncompromising attitude? How surprising appeared the refusal by Germany to exercise mediating influence at Vienna now that she knew the extraordinary text of the Austrian note! What responsibility was the German Government assuming and what suspicions would rest upon them if they persisted in interposing between Austria and the Powers, after what might be called the absolute submission of Serbia, and when the slightest advice given by them to Vienna would put an end to the nightmare which weighed on Europe!

The breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria, her threats of war, and the mobilisation which she was undertaking, make peculiarly urgent pacific action on the part of Germany, for from the day when Austrian troops crossed the Servian frontier, one would be faced by an act which without doubt would oblige the St. Petersburg Cabinet to intervene, and would risk the unloosing of a war which Germany declares that she wishes to avoid.

Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note,* and had only approved it after its delivery; she thought, however, that Serbia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to forget it, and that Austria

* Cf. No. 21. Letter from the French Minister in Munich stating that the Bavarian President of the Council said, on July 23, that he had read the Austrian note to Serbia.

Cf. also the English Blue Book, No. 95, in which Sir M. de Bunsen, English Ambassador at Vienna, states:—

"Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."

owed it to herself to put an end to a situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He declared besides that he did not know the text of the Servian reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often ill informed, represented it to be.

He insisted again on Germany's peaceful intentions and gave his impressions as to the effect that might arise from good advice given, for instance, at Vienna, by England in a friendly tone. According to him Austria was not uncompromising; what she rejects is the idea of a formal mediation, the "spectre" of a conference: a peaceful word coming from St. Petersburg, good words said in a conciliatory tone by the Powers of the Triple Entente, would have a chance of being well received. He added, finally, that he did not say that Germany on her side would not give some advice at Vienna.

In these conditions the Political Director announced that he would ask the Minister if it appeared to him opportune to communicate to the press a short note in a moderate tone.

No. 58. M. Chevalley, French Minister at Christiania, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Christiania, July 26, 1914.

The whole German fleet in Norway has received orders to put to sea. The German authorities at Bergen declare that it is to make straight for Germany.

German ships scattered in the Fjords to the north of Bergen were to join those which are in the neighbourhood of Stavanger.

CHEVALLEY.

No. 59. M. d'Annville, French Chargé d'Affairs at Luxemburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Luxemburg, July 26, 1914.

According to information which I have just received from Thionville, the four last classes set at liberty have been ordered to hold themselves at the disposition of the *Kommandatur* at any moment.

Without being completely mobilised the reservists are forbidden to go away from their place of residence.

No. 60. M. Farges, French Consul-General at Basle, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Basle, July 27, 1914.

Four days ago the German officers on leave in this district received orders to break off their leave and return to Germany.

Moreover, I learn from two reliable sources that warning has been given to persons owning motor cars in the Grand Duchy of Baden to prepare to place them at the disposal of the military authorities, two days after a

fresh order. Secrecy on the subject of this warning has been directed under penalty of a fine.

The population of Basle is very uneasy, and banking facilities are restricted.

FARGES.

No. 61. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, on board the "La France" (for the President of the Council) and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

The three steps taken by the German Ambassador at Paris seem characteristic:—On Friday he reads a note in which the German Government categorically place themselves between Austria and the Powers, approving the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and adding that "Germany warmly desires that the dispute should remain localised, since any intervention of another party must, through the play of its alliances, provoke incalculable consequences;"—the second day, Saturday, the effect having been produced, and the Powers having, on account of the surprise, the shortness of the time-limit, and the risks of general war, advised Serbia to yield, Herr von Schoen returns to minimise this step, pretending to be astonished at the impression produced, and protests that intentions are attributed to Germany which she does not harbour, "since," he says, "there was neither concert before nor threat afterwards;"—the third day, Sunday, the result having been obtained, since Serbia has yielded, as one might almost say, to all the Austrian demands, the German Ambassador appears on two occasions to insist on Germany's peaceful intentions, and on her warm desire to co-operate in the maintenance of peace, after having registered the Austrian success which closes the first phase of the crisis.

The situation at the moment of writing remains disturbing, on account of the incomprehensible refusal of Austria to accept Serbia's submission, of her operations of mobilisation, and of her threats to invade Serbia. The attitude taken up from the beginning by the Austrian Government, with German support, her refusal to accept any conversation with the Powers, practically do not allow the latter to intervene effectively with Austria without the mediation of Germany. However, time presses, for if the Austrian army crosses the frontier it will be very difficult to circumscribe the crisis, Russia not appearing to be able to tolerate the occupation of Serbia after the latter has in reality submitted to the Austrian note, giving every satisfaction and guarantee. Germany, from the very fact of the position taken up by her, is qualified to intervene effectively and be listened to at Vienna; if she does not do this she justifies all suspicions and assumes the responsibility for the war.

The Powers, particularly Russia, France and England, have by their urgent advice induced Belgrade to yield; they have thus fulfilled their part; now it is for Germany, who is alone able to gain a rapid hearing at Vienna, to give advice to Austria, who has obtained satisfaction and cannot, for a detail easy to adjust, bring about a general war.

It is in these circumstances that the proposal made by the Cabinet of London is put forward; M. Sazonof having said to the British Ambassador that as a consequence of the appeal of Serbia to the Powers, Russia would agree to stand aside, Sir Edward Grey has formulated the following sug-

gestion to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin and Rome: the French, German and Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek with Sir Edward Grey a means of resolving the present difficulties, it being understood that during this conversation Russia, Austria and Servia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who showed himself favourable to it; it will be equally well received in Paris, and also at Rome, according to all probability. Here again it is Germany's turn to speak, and she has an opportunity to show her goodwill by other means than words.

I would ask you to come to an understanding with your English colleague, and to support his proposal with the German Government in whatever form appears to you opportune.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 62. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

After his *démarche* of yesterday tending to an intervention by France at St. Petersburg in favour of peace, the German Ambassador returned, as I have informed you, to the *Direction Politique* on the pretext that it might be desirable to communicate to the press a short note indicating the peaceful and friendly sense of the conversation; he even suggested the following terms: "During the afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit, and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation, they examined the means which might be employed to maintain general peace." He was told in answer, that the terms appeared exaggerated and of a nature to create in public opinion illusions on the real situation; that, however, a brief note in the sense indicated, that is to say, giving an account of a conversation at which the means employed to safeguard peace, had been examined, might be issued if I approved it.

The note communicated was as follows:

"The German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have had a fresh interview, in the course of which they sought means of action by the Powers for the maintenance of peace."

This phrasing, deliberately terse, avoided an appearance of solidarity with Germany which might have been misinterpreted.

This morning Herr von Schoen addressed a private letter to the Political Director under pretext of resuming his interview with the Minister, and has added:

"Note well the phrase in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation. This is not an idle phrase, but the sincere expression of the truth."

The summary annexed to the letter was drawn up as follows:

"The Cabinet of Vienna has, formally and officially, caused it to be declared to that of St. Petersburg, that it does not seek any territorial acquisition in Servia, and that it has no intention of making any attempt against the integrity of the kingdom; its

sole intention is that of assuring its own tranquillity. At this moment the decision whether a European war must break out depends solely on Russia. The German Government have firm confidence that the French Government, with which they know that they are at one in the warm desire that European peace should be able to be maintained, will use their whole influence with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg in a pacific spirit."

I have let you know the reply which has been given (a French *démarche* at St. Petersburg would be misunderstood, and must have as corollary a German *démarche* at Vienna, or, failing that, mediation by the four less interested Powers in both capitals).

Herr von Schoen's letter is capable of different interpretations; the most probable is that it has for its object, like his *démarche* itself, an attempt to compromise France with Russia and, in case of failure, to throw the responsibility for an eventual war on Russia and on France; finally, by pacific assurances which have not been listened to, to mask military action by Austria in Servia intended to complete the success of Austria.

I communicate this news to you by way of information and for any useful purpose you can put it to.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 63. M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 1914.

The German Ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador allow it to be understood that they are sure that England would preserve neutrality if a conflict were to break out. Sir Arthur Nicolson has told me, however, that Prince Lichnowsky cannot, after the conversation which he has had with him to-day, entertain any doubt as to the freedom which the British Government intended to preserve of intervening in case they should judge it expedient.

The German Ambassador will not have failed to be struck with this declaration, but to make its weight felt in Germany and to avoid a conflict, it seems indispensable that the latter should be brought to know for certain that they will find England and Russia by the side of France.

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 64. M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

M. Sazonof has used conciliatory language to all my colleagues.

In spite of the public excitement, the Russian Government is applying itself successfully to restraining the press; in particular, great moderation towards Germany has been recommended.

M. Sazonof has not received any information from Vienna or from Berlin since yesterday.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 65. M. Bompard, French Ambassador at Constantinople, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Therapia, July 27, 1914.

The Austro-Servian conflict holds the attention of the Ottoman Government, and the Turks are delighted at the misfortunes of Servia, but people here generally are led to believe that the conflict will remain localised. It is generally thought that once again Russia will not intervene in favour of Servia in circumstances which would extend the armed conflict.

The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that Austria, with the support of Germany, will attain her objects and that she will make Servia follow Bulgaria and enter into the orbit of the Triple Alliance.

BOMPARD.

No. 66. M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador this morning that if Austria were to invade Servia after the Servian reply, she would make it clear that she was not merely aiming at the settlement of the questions mentioned in her note of July 23, but that she wished to crush a small state. "Then," he added, "a European question would arise, and war would follow in which other Powers would be led to take a part."

The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the postponement of the demobilisation of the fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty took this measure quietly on Friday on his own initiative; to-night, Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues decided to make it public. This result is due to the conciliatory attitude of Servia and Russia.

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 67. M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

To-day I have had a conversation with the Secretary of State on the proposal by England that Germany should join the Cabinets of London, Paris and Rome to prevent hostilities between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

I remarked to him that Sir Edward Grey's proposal opened the way to a peaceful issue. Herr von Jagow replied that he was disposed to join in, but he remarked to me that, if Russia mobilised, Germany would be obliged to mobilise at once, that we should be forced to the same course also, and that then a conflict would be almost inevitable. I asked him if Germany would regard herself as bound to mobilise in the event of Russia mobilising only on the Austrian frontier; he told me "No," and authorised me formally to communicate this limitation to you. He also attached the greatest importance to an intervention with Russia by the Powers which were friendly with and allied to her.

Finally, he remarked that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany would be obliged to attack at once on her side. The intervention proposed by England at St. Petersburg and Vienna could, in his opinion, only come

into operation if events were not precipitated. In that case, he does not despair that it might succeed. I expressed my regret that Austria, by her uncompromising attitude had led Europe to the difficult pass through which we are going, but I expressed the hope that intervention would have its effect.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 68. M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 1914.

Yesterday, in the course of a conversation between M. Sazonof, M. Paléologue and Sir. G. Buchanan, the Russian Minister said that Servia was disposed to appeal to the Powers, and that in that case his Government would be prepared to stand aside.

Sir E. Grey has taken these words as a text on which to formulate to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and Rome a proposal with which Sir Francis Bertie will acquaint your Excellency. The four Powers would intervene in the dispute, and the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek, with Sir E. Grey, a means of solving the present difficulties.

It would be understood that, during the sittings of this little conference, Russia, Austria, and Servia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who has shown himself favourable to it.

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 69. M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 1914.

The Servian Minister has not received instructions from his Government to ask for the mediation of England; it is, however, possible that the telegrams from his Government have been stopped on the way.

However, the English proposal for intervention by the four Powers intimated in my preceding telegram has been put forward, and ought I think to be supported in the first place.

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 70. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to, M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

The English Ambassador has communicated to me Sir E. Grey's proposal for common action by England, Germany, France and Italy at Vienna, Belgrade and St. Petersburg, to stop active military operations while the German, Italian and French Ambassadors at London examine, with Sir Edward Grey, the means of finding a solution for the present complications.

I have this morning directed M. Jules Cambon to talk this over with the English Ambassador at Berlin, and to support his *démarche* in whatever form he should judge suitable.

I authorise you to take part in the meeting proposed by Sir E. Grey. I am also ready to give to our representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburg and Belgrade, instructions in the sense asked for by the English Government.

At the same time I think that the chances of success of Sir E. Grey's proposal depend essentially on the action that Berlin would be disposed to take at Vienna; a *démarche* from this side, promoted with a view to obtain a suspension of military operations, would appear to me doomed to failure if Germany's influence were not first exercised.

I have also noted, during Baron Von Schoen's observations, that the Austro-Hungarian Government was particularly susceptible when the words "mediation," "intervention," "conference" were used, and was more willing to admit "friendly advice" and "conversations."

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 71. M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 1914.

I have communicated to Sir Edward Grey your adherence to his proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference at London. The British Ambassador at Vienna has received the necessary instructions to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government as soon as his French, German, and Italian colleagues are authorised to make the same *démarche*.

The Italian Government have accepted intervention by the four Powers with a view to prevent military operations; they are consulting the German Government on the proposal for a conference and the procedure to be followed with regard to the Austro-Hungarian Government. The German Government have not yet replied.

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 72. M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 27, 1914.

The Marquis di San Giuliano has returned to Rome this evening, and I saw him immediately after his arrival. He spoke to me of the contents of the Austrian note, and formally assured me that he had not had any previous knowledge of it.

He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and forcible character; but he had not suspected that it could take such a form. I asked him if it was true that he had given at Vienna, as certain papers allege, an approval of the Austrian action and an assurance that Italy would fulfil her duties as an ally towards Austria. "In no way," the Minister replied: "we were not consulted; we were told nothing; it was not for us, then, to make any such communication to Vienna."

The Marquis di San Giuliano thinks that Servia would have acted more

wisely if she had accepted the note in its entirety; to-day he still thinks that this would be the only thing to do, being convinced that Austria will not withdraw any of her claims, and will maintain them, even at the risk of bringing about a general conflagration; he doubts whether Germany is disposed to lend herself to any pressure on her ally. He asserts, however, that Germany at this moment attaches great importance to her relations with London, and he believes that if any Power can determine Berlin in favour of peaceful action, it is England.

As for Italy, she will continue to make every effort in favour of peace. It is with this end in view that he has adhered without hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London of the Ambassadors of those Powers which are not directly interested in the Austro-Servian dispute.

BARRÈRE.

No. 73. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

The English Ambassador, who returned to-day, saw the Secretary of State and discussed with him Sir Edward Grey's proposal. In his reply Herr von Jagow continued to manifest his desire for peace, but added that he could not consent to anything which would resemble a conference of the Powers; that would be to set up a kind of court of arbitration, the idea of which would only be acceptable if it were asked for by Vienna and St. Petersburg. Herr von Jagow's language confirms that used by Baron von Schoen to your Excellency.

In fact, a *démarche* by the four Powers at Vienna and St. Petersburg could be brought about by diplomatic means without assuming the form of a conference and it is susceptible of many modifications; the important thing is to make clear at Vienna and at St. Petersburg the common desire of the four Powers that a conflict should be avoided. A peaceful issue from the present difficulties can only be found by gaining time.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 74. M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

I had a conversation yesterday with the Secretary of State and gave support to the *démarche* which Sir E. Goschen had just made.

Herr von Jagow replied to me, as he had to the English Ambassador, that he could not accept the proposal that the Italian, French and German Ambassadors should be instructed to endeavour to find with Sir Edward Grey a method of resolving the present difficulties, because that would be to set up a real conference to deal with the affairs of Austria and Russia.

I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his answer, but that the great object which Sir Edward Grey had in view went beyond any question of form; that what was important was the co-operation of England and France with Germany and Italy in a work of peace; that this co-operation could take effect through common *démarches* at St. Petersburg and at

Vienna; that he had often expressed to me his regret at seeing the two allied groups always opposed to one another in Europe; that there was here an opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit, by showing four Powers belonging to the two groups acting in common agreement to prevent a conflict.

Herr von Jagow evaded the point by saying that Germany had engagements with Austria. I observed to him that the relations of Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of France with Russia, and that it was he himself who actually was putting the two groups of allies in opposition.

The Secretary of State then said to me that he was not refusing to act so as to keep off an Austro-Russian dispute, but that he could not intervene in the Austro-Servian dispute. "The one is the consequence of the other," I said, "and it is a question of preventing the appearance of a new factor of such a nature as to lead to intervention by Russia."

As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was obliged to keep his engagements towards Austria, I asked him if he was bound to follow her everywhere with his eyes blindfolded, and if he had taken note of the reply of Servia to Austria which the Servian Chargé d'Affaires had delivered to him this morning. "I have not yet had time," he said. "I regret it. You would see that except on some points of detail Servia has yielded entirely. It appears then that, since Austria has obtained the satisfaction which your support has procured for her, you might to-day advise her to be content or to examine with Servia the terms of her reply."

As Herr von Jagow gave me no clear reply, I asked him whether Germany wished for war. He protested energetically, saying that he knew what was in my mind, but that it was wholly incorrect. "You must then," I replied, "act consistently. When you read the Servian reply, I entreat you in the name of humanity to weigh the terms in your conscience, and do not personally assume a part of the responsibility for the catastrophe which you are allowing to be prepared." Herr von Jagow protested anew, adding that he was ready to join England and France in a common effort, but that it was necessary to find a form for this intervention which he could accept, and that the Cabinets must come to an understanding on this point.

"For the rest," he added, "direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg have been entered upon and are in progress. I expect very good results from them and I am hopeful."

As I was leaving I told him that this morning I had had the impression that the hour of *détente* had struck, but I now saw clearly that there was nothing in it. He replied that I was mistaken; that he hoped that matters were on the right road and would perhaps rapidly reach a favourable conclusion. I asked him to take such action in Vienna as would hasten the progress of events, because it was a matter of importance not to allow time for the development in Russia of one of those currents of opinion which carry all before them.

In my opinion it would be well to ask Sir Edward Grey, who must have been warned by Sir Edward Goschen of the refusal to his proposal in the form in which it was made, to renew it under another form, so that Germany would have no pretext for refusing to associate herself with it, and would have to assume the responsibilities that belong to her in the eyes of England.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 75. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador came to see me to hand me a memorandum which amounted to an indictment of Serbia; he was instructed by his Government to state that since Serbia had not given a satisfactory reply to the requirements of the Imperial Government, the latter found themselves obliged to take strong measures to induce Serbia to give the satisfaction and guarantees that are required of her. To-morrow the Austrian Government will take steps to that effect.

I asked the Ambassador to acquaint me with the measures contemplated by Austria, and Count Scézszen replied that they might be either an ultimatum, or a declaration of war, or the crossing of the frontier, but he had no precise information on this point.

I then called the Ambassador's attention to the fact that Serbia had accepted Austria's requirements on practically every point, and that the differences that remained on certain points might vanish with a little mutual goodwill, and with the help of the Powers who wished for peace; by fixing to-morrow as the date for putting her resolution into effect, Austria for the second time was making their co-operation practically impossible, and was assuming a grave responsibility in running the risk of precipitating a war the limits of which it was impossible to foresee.

I enclose for your information the memorandum that Count Scézszen handed to me.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

Enclosure. Memorandum of the Austro-Hungarian Government, handed by Count Scézszen to M. Bienvenu-Martin on July 27, 1914.

The Serbian agitation, which has as its object the separation from the Austrian Monarchy of the South Slav districts, in order to attach them to a great Servian state, dates from far back. This propaganda on Servian soil, always the same in its ultimate object, although varying in its means and intensity, reached its culminating point at the time of the annexation crisis. Throwing off the protecting cloak of secrecy, it then revealed its purposes openly and undisguisedly, and showed, under the patronage of the Servian Government, its intention of achieving its aims by every means in its power.

While the whole of the Servian press was calling for war against the Monarchy with shouts of rancour and by the perversion of facts, associations were being formed to foment this strife—irrespective of other means of propaganda.

The association which had become the most important was the Narodna Obrana. Having its origin in a revolutionary committee which already existed, it was constituted as a private society, although in fact it took the form of an organisation dependent upon the Foreign Office at Belgrade through military and civil officials. Amongst its founders should be specially mentioned General Buzo Jankvic, ex-Ministers Ljuba Jovanovic, Ljuba Davidovic and Valislav Valovic, Zivojin Dacic (Director of the Government Printing Establishment), and Majors (then Captains) Voja Tanovic, and Milan Pribicevic. This association adopted as its aim the creation and organisation of armed bands, with a view to the war that they

hoped for against the Monarchy. A convincing description of the activity of the Narodna Obrana at this time will be found, in particular, in the statements of Trifko Krstanovic, a Bosnia-Herzegovinian subject, in the course of his evidence before the Council of War at Serajevo; he was then at Belgrade, and had been accepted by the Narodna Odbrana, with other subjects of the Monarchy, as *comitadji*. Krstanovic had been brought, with about one hundred and forty others, to a school established for the formation of new bands at Cuprija, in the district of Jagodina, managed by Captains Voja Tankosic and Dusan Putnick. The only masters in this school were Servian officers; General Bozo Jankovic and Captain Milan Pribicevic introduced great regularity into the courses of organisation of these bands, which lasted three months.

The *comitadji* received there complete instruction in musketry, bomb throwing, mines and the destruction of railways, tunnels, bridges and telegraphs; their duty was, according to their leaders, to put into practice in Bosnia-Herzegovina the knowledge they had recently acquired.

By this action on the part of the Narodna Odbrana, carried on in the most open manner and encouraged by the Servian Government, guerilla warfare was carried on against the Monarchy. In this way the subjects of the Monarchy were led into treason against their country, and induced as Servian emissaries systematically to practise secret attacks against the means of defence of their country.

This period of aggressive aspirations ended with the announcement of the Servian Government on the 31st March, 1909, in which that Government announced that they were prepared to accept the new situation created in public law by the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and solemnly promised that they would do their best to maintain in future friendly and neighbourly relations with the Monarchy.

With this declaration it might have been expected that the agitation, which constituted a source of constant trouble to Austria-Hungary, would be brought to an end, and that means might have been found for an amicable *rapprochement* between Servia and the Monarchy. Deprived of the support of the Servian Government, and combated by that Government in accordance with its engagements, the hostile propaganda could only have continued secretly, and would have been condemned to prompt destruction. On the other hand, the ties of language, race, and culture existing between the Servian districts in the south of the Monarchy and Servia ought to have resulted in the realisation of a task of common development inspired by mutual friendship and parallel interest.

However, these hopes have not been realised. Aspirations hostile to the Monarchy have continued; and, under the eyes of the Servian Government, who have done nothing to suppress this agitation, the propaganda instituted against Austria has only increased in extent and volume. Hatred against the Monarchy has been fanned and has developed into an irreconcilable feeling. The Servian people alike by the old methods, which have been adapted to the situation, and by more thorough methods, have been called "to an inevitable struggle of annihilation" against Austria. Their secret ramifications have been systematically spread towards the Slav domains in the south of the Monarchy, whose subjects have been incited to treason.

Above all, this spirit has found constant expression in the Servian press.

Up to the present time, no fewer than 81 newspapers appearing in Servia have had to be withdrawn from postal circulation on account of their contents falling within the scope of the penal law. There is hardly

a clause protecting the sacred person of the Monarch and of the members of the Imperial Family or the integrity of the State that has not been violated by Servian papers. In Appendix I. will be found a few of the numerous instances occurring in the press, of ideas of the nature indicated above.

Without entering into a detailed examination of the points of view of Servian public opinion, it is necessary to note that the press has, in spite of the formal recognition accorded by Servia, never ceased to consider the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, both before and after the event, as a robbery committed against Servia for which reparation is due. This idea recurs not only in the papers of advanced views, but also in the *Samoprava*, which is in such close touch with the Foreign Office at Belgrade, where this idea finds expression in hardly veiled terms. (See Appendix II. (b).)

Nor can one omit to consider how the attempt made on 15th June 1910, at Serajevo, by Bogdan Zerajic against Commandant von Varesanin, Governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was applauded by the press.

It will be remembered that Zerajic killed himself immediately after his deed, and before committing it had burned all his papers. For these reasons it is impossible to throw full light upon the motive of this outrage; it has, however, been possible from a document found on his person to form the conclusion that he was a follower of the views of Kropotkin. Circumstantial evidence likewise leads to the conclusion that the attempt was of an anarchist type.

This, however, did not prevent the Servian press from proclaiming the criminal as a national Servian hero, or from praising his deed. The *Politika* even combated the idea that Zerajic was an anarchist, and declared him to be a "Servian hero whose name all Servians will repeat with respect and grief."

The *Politika* considers the 18th August of the same year, "the birthday of His Imperial and Royal Majesty," as a favourable opportunity on which to return to the subject of Zerajic, "whose name will be to the people something like that of a saint," and solemnly to praise the outrage in a poem. (Appendix No. 1.)

This is the way in which this crime, which was quite foreign to territorial aspirations against the Monarchy, has been exploited for the furtherance of this idea, and in which the murder was hailed in the most explicit way as a glorious means towards the realisation of this aim, and one worthy to be imitated in the struggle. This sanctification of murder, as a weapon fully admissible in the struggle against the Monarchy, reappears later in papers speaking of the attempt made by Jukic against the Royal Commissioner of Cujav. (Appendix I. (c).)

These newspapers, which are circulated not only in Servia, but also, as was ascertained later, illicitly in the Monarchy, by well-organised secret methods, have awakened and kept alive this mood in the masses, a mood which has provided a fruitful field for the misdeeds of the associations hostile to the Monarchy.

The Narodna Odbrana has become the centre of the agitation carried on by the associations. The same persons who were at its head at the time of the annexation still control it. They still include the very violent opponents of the Monarchy mentioned above in the capacity of active and energetic organisers. Organised on a broad and far-reaching scale and governed by a hierarchy of officials (see Appendix II., "Organisation"), the Narodna Odbrana had soon acquired about 400 members who carried on a very active agitation.

Moreover, the Narodna became closely allied with the "Shooting Federation" (762 societies), the Association of the Sokol, *Dusan Silni* (2,500 members), the Olympian Club, the Association of Horsemen, *Knez Mihajlo*, the Society of Sportsmen and the League of Development, as well as numerous other associations, all of which, under the guidance and protection of the Narodna, work on the same lines. Becoming more and more closely intermingled, these associations arrived at a complete amalgamation in such a way that to-day they are only members of the single body of the Narodna. Thus the latter has set up all over Serbia a very close network of agitation and has attracted to its principles all those who are receptive of its ideas.

The official publications of this Society demonstrate sufficiently clearly the policy of the Narodna.

In its statutes, ostensibly those of a "Development Society," concerning itself only with the spiritual and corporal improvement of the Servian population and its material progress, the Narodna discloses in its deed of amalgamation (*see Appendix II.*) the true and single motive of its existence in that which it calls its "reorganised programme."

To preach to the Servian people especially "the sacred truth by fanatical and indefatigable work" under the pretence that the Monarchy wishes "to take away Serbia's liberty, her language, and even to destroy her"; that it is an unavoidable necessity to wage against Austria-Hungary, her first and greatest enemy, "a war of destruction with rifle and cannon" and "by every means" to prepare the people for this war for the liberation of the conquered territories in which seven millions of their brothers are subject to contumely and oppression. All the efforts for progress of the Narodna are exclusively concerned with this idea simply as a means for the organisation and education of the people, with a view to the struggle of annihilation that they foresee.

All the associations affiliated to the Narodna work in the same spirit. The association of the Sokol of Kragujevac will serve as an example. (*See Appendix III.*)

As in the case of the Narodna, officers, professors and civil servants are at its head.

The speech in which its President, Major Kovacevic, opened the annual meeting of 1914 made absolutely no mention of physical training, which is the real object of the Sokol, and only spoke of "preparation for War" against a "dangerous, heartless, and odious enemy invading us from the North," who robs millions of Servian brothers of their liberties and rights, and keeps them in bondage and irons.

In the administrative reports of the association the technical work is placed entirely in the background, and only serves as headlines for the records of the real "objects of the activities of the Administration," especially "*the preparation of national development and the necessity of strengthening the oppressed nation, with the object of enabling it to carry out its incomplete programme, its unfinished task, and accomplishing that great action which is to be carried out in the near future: the liberation of brothers who are living beyond the Drina and who are suffering the martyrdom of the crucified.*"

Even the treasurer makes use of his financial reports to send forth the appeal that "hawks must be reared" capable "of bringing freedom to the brothers not yet freed."

As in the case of the aspirations of progress in the Narodna, the gymnastic activity of the Sokol is not the real object, but simply a means at

the service of the same propaganda carried on with the same intentions, not to say with the very same words.

When the Narodna makes its appeal for the struggle of annihilation against the Monarchy, it does not address itself only to the people of the Monarchy but to all the Southern Slavs. In the eyes of the Narodna the Slav regions in the South of the Monarchy belong to "our subjected Serbian territories." (See also Appendix IV.) So also the Slav subjects of the South of the Monarchy must take part in this "national work," so also this "healthy and necessary" activity must make itself felt on the other side of the Southern frontier, and even on the soil of the Monarchy the Narodna seeks its "heroes for the holy war," among whom Obilic, the murderer of Mourad, is cited as an example worthy of imitation, of sacrifice for one's country.

But in order to induce the brothers "outside Serbia" to share in "the work of private effort," the Narodna is intimately associated with the "brothers on this side of the frontier." It is not said in what way this intimate association is effected, no doubt because *it appertains to that part of the "common work"* which "for many reasons cannot and ought not to be explained."

How far this branch of its activity extends is shown by the fact that not only the central committee of the Narodna, but also certain of its local committees contain special sections for "foreign affairs."

The foreign activity of the Narodna and its affiliated branches is particularly varied.

What is relatively the less dangerous, because it can be officially controlled, consists of lecture tours undertaken by the influential members of the Narodna in the South-Western parts of the Monarchy, where they speak before various societies on national or educational subjects. These occasions give the speakers the opportunity of explaining the true aims of the association in the most receptive circles of their adherents, in language more or less veiled, which is intelligible to those who are already *au courant*.

Amongst these emissaries one of the best known is Zivojin Dacic, Director of the Government Printing Establishment, already alluded to; it was he who on the 8th of August 1909, issued an appeal to the Serbian people in which he called Austria "the enemy of Serbia" and invited Serbia to prepare herself for a war against the Monarchy. On numerous occasions he has undertaken tours of this nature. At Karlova, in 1912, he flung prudence to the winds and spoke of "the union of all the Serbs against the common enemy."

More dangerous are the relations formed by associations imbued with the spirit of the Narodna, under the cloak of common interests and of culture, with associations in the Monarchy; for the respective envoys and corporate visits of these associations, which escape all control, are utilised by the Servians for all sorts of plots against the Monarchy.

Thus, for instance, an envoy of the Narodna at the fete of Serajevo in September, 1912 (see Appendix VI.) had the effrontery secretly to recruit Bosnian adherents to his society. The sending of a representative of the Sokol of Kragujevac to this fete must have meant for the brothers of Bosnia: "We have not forgotten you, the wings of the falcon of Sumadija are still strong"—a thought which, to the initiated, will no doubt have found a quite different expression consonant with the aims of the Narodna explained above (Appendix III.). As to the events that take place at the meetings of the same kind in Serbia, it is clear that they escape all control

of the Royal and Imperial authorities, who only possess on this matter confidential information which is difficult to check. In this connection doubts must be raised regarding the visit of Agram students to Serbia (April, 1912) who received from the Servians an official reception of an almost military character, accompanied even by a parade and by a review of troops in their honour, and that in a manner so suggestive that the association of the Sokol of Kragujevac could say, "This event marks the beginning and the key of a great deed which must find its accomplishment in the near future; it is a germ which will ripen when the soul of the people bursts its bounds until there is no barrier that has not been destroyed."

It is only recently that it has come to the knowledge of the Austro-Hungarian authorities that the associations of the Servian Sokols have succeeded in making arrangements with some similar societies of the Monarchy to establish a connection with them which is up to the present secret, and the character of which is not yet quite clear; for the information on this point is still being collected. Up to the present, however, the information obtained admits of the conclusion that traces have been discovered of one of the ways by which the subversive aims of the Servian Sokols have seduced and led astray certain groups of persons in the Monarchy.

This propaganda among circles so very different assumes minor importance if it is compared with that of the "foreign work" which is conducted by the Narodna and its friends in the form of a personal agitation among individuals. It is in this field that the most melancholy results are shown.

By means of confidential and secret emissaries, it carries the poison of mutiny to the circles of men of mature age as well as those of irresponsible youth.

It is thus, for example, that the late Officers of Honved V. B. D. K. V. N. and the Lieutenant of Gendarmerie of Slav Croatia V. K., led astray by Milan Pribicevitch, left the service of the army of the Monarchy in the most suspicious circumstances and turned towards Serbia; they have seen in the meanwhile most of their hopes falsified, or at any rate in part, and are thinking of returning to the country that they have betrayed. The agitation introduced from Serbia into the middle schools of Croatia and Bosnia is unhappily so well known that it hardly needs illustration. What is less known is that people who have been expelled from the Croatian and Bosnian schools, owing to grave acts against discipline, are received in Serbia with open arms and often even protected by the State and supported as enemies of the Monarchy. The Servian schools with their masters, who, inspired by hostility towards Austria, are to a great extent members of the Narodna, are clearly establishments thoroughly adapted for training experts of this kind. A very notable case may be quoted here. Last March several pupils of the normal training college of Pakrac (Croatia) were expelled on account of a strike. They returned to Serbia, where they immediately obtained places as school masters or were admitted to training colleges. One of those who had been so expelled, and who had relations with circles unfriendly to the Monarchy, declared publicly that he and his people would express the opinion and disseminate the view during the stay of the hereditary Archduke in Bosnia, that this province is Servian territory. It should be particularly noted that during the stay of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Bosnia the prefect of the Servian district of Krajna gave to three scholars, who were thus involved, Servian passports, in which he falsely described them as Servian subjects, although

he must have known that they were Croats. With these passports the three agitators were able to enter the Monarchy without being noticed, where, however, they were eventually recognised and arrested.

But all this is not enough to give a complete representation of the "foreign" activity of the Narodna.

The Imperial and Royal Government has been informed for a long time past confidentially that the Narodna has made military preparations for the war which it desires to make against the Monarchy in the following way: it has been sending emissaries in order, as soon as hostilities broke out, to attempt in bands the destruction of the transport and to stir up revolt or panic (see Appendix VII.).

The criminal proceedings taken in 1913 by the Council of War at Serajevo against Jovo Jajlicic and his associates for espionage, confirm this confidential information. As at the time of its foundation, the preparation for war by armed bands still figures in the programme of the Narodna, to which must now further be added a complete service of espionage. It is for this reason that the programme of the Narodna, described as "reorganised" is, in reality, an *extended* programme. Acts of terrorism must finally result from an atmosphere of hatred which is publicly and secretly provoked, and from an agitation which evades all responsibility; and in order to bring them about, all means are to be regarded as good in the struggle against Austria including even, without any sense of shame, common acts of murder.

On the 8th of June, 1912, a man named Jukic shot at von Cuvaj, the Royal Commissioner at Agram, with the result that Councillor von Herwic, who was seated in the same carriage, was mortally wounded; in his flight he killed a policeman who followed him and he wounded two others.

From the subsequent investigation it appeared that Jukic was saturated with the ideas and plans of the Narodna, and that, although Jukic had for some time past been devoting himself to criminal schemes, these schemes were only matured after he had made an excursion to Belgrade, together with the Agram students, for the celebrations prepared in honour of these visitors on the 18th April, 1912; that Jukic entered into relations with several people belonging to the Narodna with whom he had had political discussions. A few days afterwards he returned to Belgrade, and there he received *from a Servian Major a bomb and from a friend a Browning pistol*, with which he carried out his crime. The bomb found at Agram came, according to experts, from a military arsenal.

Jukic's attempt had not yet been forgotten, when on the 18th August 1913, Stephan Dojcic, who had returned from America to Agram, made an attempt on the life of the Royal Commissioner, Baron Skerlec, an attempt which was the outcome of action organised by the Servians among the Southern Slavs living in America, and which was the work of the foreign propaganda of the Narodna.

A pamphlet by the Servian, T. Dimitrijevitich, printed in Chicago, with its unbridled attacks against His Imperial and Royal Majesty, and its appeal to the Servians of the Monarchy with reference to their impending "deliverance," and urging them to enter Servia, demonstrates the correspondence between the propaganda carried out unchecked by the Servians in America and that carried on from Servia in the territory of the Monarchy.

And again, scarcely a year afterwards, Agram was the scene of a new outrage, this time unsuccessful.

On the 20th May 1913, Jacob Schäffer made an attempt at the Agram theatre on the life of the Ban, Freiherr von Skerlec, an attempt which was

frustrated at the last moment by a policeman. The subsequent investigation revealed the existence of a plot inspired by Rudolf Hercigonja. From the depositions of the latter and his five accomplices, it is manifest that this crime also originated in Servia.

Having taken part in an unsuccessful attempt to liberate Jukic, Hercigonja fled to Servia (October, 1912), where together with his accomplice Marojan Jakcic he was seen in company with *comitadjis* and members of the Narodna. As frequently happens when immature minds concern themselves too early with political questions, these meetings had the worst possible result. Hercigonja returned home impressed by the dogma of Belgrade, that the Slav areas in the south of the Monarchy should be separated from it and re-united to the Servian kingdom. He had further been persuaded by the teachings of his friends that this object should be pursued by means of attempts on the lives of persons holding high office in the Monarchy.

This is the spirit in which Hercigonja influenced his friends at Agram and converted them to his ideas. Foremost among his plans was the carrying out of an attempt on the life of the heir to the throne.

A few months before Suka Alginovic had been tried for high treason. In the course of his trial three witnesses declared that Alginovic had told them that he had received one hundred dina from the Narodna and a similar sum from a secret association of students to start propaganda, but especially to carry out an attempt on the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

It is clear how far the criminal agitation of the Narodna and of those who share in its views has of late been primarily directed against the person of the hereditary Archduke.

From these facts the conclusion may be drawn that the Narodna, as well as the associations hostile to the Monarchy which were grouped around it, recently decided that the hour had struck to translate theory into practice.

It is noteworthy that the Narodna limits itself in this way to *inciting*, and where the incitement had fallen on fertile soil, to *providing means of material assistance*, but that it has confided all the dangerous part in this active propaganda exclusively to the youth of the Monarchy, which has been excited and corrupted by this organisation, which alone ought to bear the burden of this pitiful "heroism."

All the characteristics of this procedure are found in the history and origin of the profoundly regrettable outrage of the 28th June.

Princip and Grabez are examples of these young men who have been poisoned from their school days by the doctrines of the Narodna. At Belgrade, where he consorted with students imbued with these ideas, Princip busied himself with criminal plans against the hereditary Archduke (against whom was directed the particularly rancorous hatred of the elements hostile to the Monarchy), when he made his tour in the annexed territories.

He became friendly with Kabrinovitch, who mingled with the same associates, and whose radically revolutionary opinions, as he himself admits, inspired him with the same sense of hostility to the Monarchy, and brought him into the active propaganda. But however carefully this plot might have been prepared, and however determined the conspirators may have been, the attempt would nevertheless not have been carried out if people had not been found, as in the case of Jukic, to provide for the conspirators means of committing their crime; for as Princip and Kab-

rinovitch have expressly admitted, they lack the necessary arms as well as money to purchase them. It is interesting to see where the conspirators procured their arms. Milan Pribicevic and Zivogin Dacic, the two principal men in the Narodna, were the first to whom the conspirators turned as to a sure source of help in their need, doubtless because it had already become a tradition among those ready to commit crimes that they could obtain from the members of the Narodna instruments for murder. The fortuitous circumstance that these two men were not at Belgrade at the critical moment doubtless frustrated this plan; however, Princip and Kabrinovitch had no difficulty in finding other help, that of Milan Ciganovic, an ex-comitadji, and now a railway official at Belgrade and member of the Narodna. The latter and his friend Major Voja Tankosic, who has already been mentioned, and was also one of the heads of the Narodna, and who in 1908 was the head of the school of armed bands of Kuprija (Appendix V.), now appear as the moving spirits in the plot. They had only one doubt, and that but a fleeting one, namely, whether the three conspirators were really resolved to commit this act, but this doubt soon disappeared, thanks to their own suggestions. Thenceforward they were ready to give every assistance. Tankosic procured four Browning pistols and ammunition, and money for the journey. Six hand grenades from the Servian army completed the armament, a fact which recalls the case of Jukic. Anxious to be successful, Tankosic obtained shooting lessons for them, but Tankosic and Ciganovic were further anxious to insure secrecy for the plot by special means scarcely desired by the assassins. They therefore suborned Zian Kali, pointing out that the two culprits must commit suicide after the crime, a precaution which was to be specially advantageous to them because secrecy would relieve them of the slight danger which they themselves were incurring in this enterprise. *Sure death for victims of their corruption, perfect security for themselves, such is the motto, as is now known, of the Narodna.*

In order to render the execution of the crime possible, it was necessary that the arms and the bombs should arrive in Bosnia by underhand methods and without being perceived. There again Ciganovic gave all the assistance in his power; he explained to the conspirators the route which had been agreed upon, and assured them that the Servian customs authorities would help them. The way in which this journey, described by Princip as "mysterious," was organised and carried out can leave no doubt but that this route was a secret route prepared in advance and already often used for the secret designs of the Narodna. With a simplicity and assurance which could only result from long habit, the frontier guards at Sabak and Losnika lent their administrative organisation for the purpose; the secret transport with its complicated system of constantly changing guides, who could be summoned as if by magic, and were always to be found on the spot when there was need, was effected without any difficulty. Without investigating the object of this strange journey of a few very young students, the Servian authorities set this smooth machinery in motion at a word from the ex-comitadji and minor railway official Ciganovic. However, they had no need to make any inquiry, for, from the information before them, it was clear that a new mission of the Narodna was being carried out. When he saw the arsenal of bombs and revolvers, the guard, Crbic, smiled a benevolent smile of approval, showing conclusively how accustomed they were on this route to find contraband of this nature.

The Royal Servian Government have committed a serious default in allowing all this to take place.

Though bound to cultivate neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary, they have allowed the press to excite hatred against the Monarchy; they have allowed associations established on their own territory under the leadership of high officers, of public officials, of masters and of judges, to busy themselves with a public campaign against the Monarchy, instilling revolutionary ideas into the minds of its citizens; they have not prevented men with a share in the direction of the military and civil administration from poisoning the public conscience contrary to all moral sentiment, to such an extent that in this conflict vulgar and treacherous assassination appears the most praiseworthy weapon.

No. 75 (2). Official Communiqué of the Press Bureau.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

The Austrian Minister at Belgrade has returned to Vienna and presented the text of the Servian reply.

A spirit of insincerity pervades the whole of this reply; it makes it clear that the Servian Government have no serious intention of putting an end to the culpable toleration which has given rise to the anti-Austrian intrigues. The Servian reply contains such restrictions and limitations, not only with regard to the principle of the Austro-Hungarian *démarche*, but also with regard to the claims advanced by Austria, that the concessions which are made are without importance.

In particular, under an empty pretext, there is a refusal to accept the participation of the Austro-Hungarian officials in the prosecution of the authors of the crimes who are resident in Servian territory.

In the same way, the Servian reply to the Austrian demand that the hostile intrigues of the press should be suppressed, amounts to a refusal.

The demand with regard to the measures to be taken to prevent associations hostile to Austria-Hungary from continuing their activity under another name and form after their dissolution, has not even been considered.

Inasmuch as these claims constitute the minimum regarded as necessary for the re-establishment of a permanent peace in the south-east of the Monarchy, the Servian reply is considered to be insufficient.

That the Servian Government is aware of this, appears from the fact that they contemplate the settlement of the dispute by arbitration, and also from the fact that on the day on which their reply was due and before it was in fact submitted, they gave orders for mobilisation.

No. 76. M. René Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

On board the "*La France*," July 28, 1914.

I have received from Copenhagen your telegram summarising the events of Saturday; the telegram describing the last visit of the German Ambassador; that relating to the mediation which Russia advises Servia to ask for and to the English *démarches* at Berlin, as well as your telegram received this morning directly through the Eiffel Tower.

I fully approve the reply which you made to Baron von Schoen; the proposition which you maintained is self-evident; in the search for a peaceful solution of the dispute, we are fully in agreement with Russia, who is not responsible for the present situation, and has not taken any measure whatever which could arouse the least suspicion; but it is plain that Germany on her side would find it difficult to refuse to give advice to the Austro-Hungarian Government, whose action has provoked the crisis.

We must now continue to use the same language to the German Ambassador. Besides, this advice is in harmony with the two English proposals mentioned in your telegram. I entirely approve the combination suggested by Sir E. Grey, and I am myself requesting M. Paul Cambon to inform him of this. It is essential that it should be known at Berlin and at Vienna that our full concurrence is given to the efforts which the British Government is making with a view to seeking a solution of the Austro-Servian dispute. The action of the four less interested Powers cannot, for the reasons given above, be exerted only at Vienna and St. Petersburg. In proposing to exert it also at Belgrade, which means, in fact, between Vienna and Belgrade, Sir E. Grey grasps the logic of the situation; and, in not excluding St. Petersburg, he offers on the other hand to Germany, a method of withdrawing with perfect dignity from the *démarche* by which the German Government have caused it to be known at Paris and at London that the affair was looked upon by them as purely Austro-Servian and without any general character.

Please communicate the present telegram to our representatives with the great Powers and to our Minister at Belgrade.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 77. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council on board the "La France."

Paris, July 28, 1914.

In spite of the assurances given, both in Berlin and Paris by the German representatives, of the desire of their Government to assist in efforts for the maintenance of peace, no sincere action has been taken by them to hold back Austria; the English proposal, which consists in action by the four less interested Powers to obtain a cessation of military operations at Vienna, Belgrade, and St. Petersburg, and in a meeting at London of the German, French, and Italian Ambassadors under the chairmanship of Sir E. Grey, with a view of seeking a solution of the Austro-Servian difficulty, meets with objections at Berlin of such a nature as must lead to failure.

The Austrian Ambassador has proceeded to announce that his Government will to-morrow take energetic measures to compel Serbia to give to them the satisfaction and guarantees which they demand from that Power; Count Scézsén has given no explanation as to those measures; according to our Military Attaché at Vienna, mobilisation dating from July 28 appears to be certain.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 78. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I have had another visit from the German Ambassador this morning; he told me that he had no communication or official proposal to make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before, to talk over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's intentions, he declared that he did not know them, and was ignorant of the nature of the means of coercion which she was preparing.

Germany, according to Baron von Schoen, only asks that she may act with France for the maintenance of peace. Upon my observing to him that a proposal for mediation by the four Powers to which we had adhered, and which had obtained assent in principle from Italy and Germany, had been put forward by England, the Ambassador said that the German Government really only asked to associate themselves with the action of the Powers, provided that that action did not take the form of arbitration or a conference, which had been rejected by Austria.

I replied that, if it was the expression only which was an obstacle to the Austrian Government, the object might be attained by other means; the German Government are in a good position to ask Austria to allow the Powers time to intervene and find a means of conciliation.

Baron von Schoen then observed to me that he had no instructions, and only knew that Germany refused to exercise any pressure on Austria, who does not wish for a conference. He accuses the French papers of attributing to Germany an attitude which she has not taken up, alleging that she is urging Austria on; doubtless she approves Austria's attitude, but she had no knowledge of the Austrian note; she did not see her way to check her too abruptly, for Austria must have guarantees against the proceedings of the Serbs.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 79. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna.

Paris, July 28, 1914.

Through the telegrams from our Embassies, which I have forwarded to you, you are aware of the English proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference in London, as well as of our adherence to that suggestion, and of the conditional acceptance by Italy and of the reservations of Berlin.

Please keep yourself in touch on this subject with your English colleague, who has received the necessary instructions to acquaint the Austro-Hungarian Government with the English suggestion, as soon as his three colleagues have been authorised to make the same *démarche*; you will adapt your attitude to his.

No. 80. M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 28, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey yesterday received my Austro-Hungarian and German colleagues. The first continued to maintain that the Servian reply

was unacceptable. The second used language similar to that of Baron von Schoen at Paris. He emphasised the value of moderating action by Great Britain at St. Petersburg. Sir Edward Grey replied that Russia had shown herself very moderate from the beginning of the crisis, especially in her advice to the Servian Government, and that he would find it very embarrassing to give her pacific advice. He added that it was at Vienna that it was necessary to act and that Germany's help was indispensable.

On the other hand the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg has telegraphed that M. Sazonof had made a proposal to the Austrian Ambassador for a conversation on the Servian business. This information has been confirmed by the British Ambassador at Vienna, who has sent the information that the first interview between the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Count Szápáry had produced a good effect at the Ballplatz.

Sir Edward Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson told me that, if an agreement could be brought about by direct discussion between St. Petersburg and Vienna, it would be a matter for congratulation, but they raised some doubts as to the success of M. Sazonof's attempt.

When Sir George Buchanan asked M. Sazonof about the eventual meeting at London of a conference of representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, to seek a solution for the present situation, the latter replied "that he had begun *pourparlers* with the Austrian Ambassador under conditions which he hoped were favourable; that, however, he had not yet received any reply to his proposal for the revision of the Servian note by the two Cabinets." If direct explanations with the Cabinet of Vienna are impracticable, M. Sazonof declares himself ready to accept the English proposals or any other of such a nature as to bring about a favourable issue of the dispute.

In any case, at a moment when the least delay might have serious consequences, it would be very desirable that these direct negotiations should be carried on in such a way as not to hamper Sir E. Grey's action, and not to furnish Austria with a pretext for slipping out of the friendly intervention of the four Powers.

The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a determined effort to obtain Herr von Jagow's adherence to Sir E. Grey's suggestion, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it was best to await the result of the conversation which had been begun between St. Petersburg and Vienna. Sir E. Grey has, in consequence, directed Sir E. Goschen to suspend his *démarche* for the moment. In addition, the news that Austria has just officially declared war against Servia, opens a new phase of the question.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 81. M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

M. Sazonof's conversation with Count Szápáry was brought to the knowledge of Herr von Jagow by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires. The Secretary of State told him that in agreement with the remarks of the German Ambassador in Russia, since the Austrian Government did not refuse to continue their conversations with the Russian Government after the expiry of the ultimatum, there was ground for hope that Count Berch-

told on his side might be able to converse with M. Schebeko, and that it might be possible to find an issue from the present difficulties. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires takes a favourable view of this state of mind, which corresponds to Herr von Jagow's desire to see Vienna and St. Petersburg enter into direct relations and to release Germany. There is ground, however, for asking whether Austria is not seeking to gain time to make her preparations.

To-day I gave my support to the *démarche* made by my British colleague with the Secretary of State. The latter replied to me, as he did to Sir Edward Goschen; that it was impossible for him to accept the idea of a kind of conference at London between the Ambassadors of the four Powers, and that it would be necessary to give another form to the English suggestion to procure its realisation. I laid stress upon the danger of delay, which might bring on war, and asked him if he wished for war. He protested, and added that direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were in progress, and that from now on he expected a favourable result.

The British and Italian Ambassadors came to see me this morning together, to talk over with me the conversation which they had with Herr von Jagow yesterday on the subject of Sir Edward Grey's proposal. To sum up, the Secretary of State used the same language to them as to me; accepting in principle the idea of joining in a *démarche* with England, Italy, and ourselves, but rejecting any idea of a conference.

My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question of form, and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his Government that they should change the wording of their proposal, which might take the character of a diplomatic *démarche* at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to any *démarche* at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a dilemma, by asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by the Powers to avoid war could be brought about.

We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favour of peace compatible with our engagements towards our ally; but to place the responsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care to ask Germany to state precisely what she wishes.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 82. M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Government has not yet replied to the proposal of the Russian Government suggesting the opening of direct conversations between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

M. Sazonof received the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors this afternoon. The impression which he got from this double interview is a bad one; "Certainly," he said to me, "Austria is unwilling to converse."

As the result of a conversation which I have just had with my two colleagues I have the same impression of pessimism.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 83. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Count Berchtold has just declared to Sir M. de Bunsen that any intervention, aiming at the resumption of the discussion between Austria and Servia on the basis of the Servian reply, would be useless, and besides that it would be too late, as war had been officially declared at mid-day.

The attitude of my Russian colleague has never varied up to the present; in his opinion it is not a question of localising the conflict, but rather of preventing it. The declaration of war will make very difficult the initiation of *pourparlers* by the four Powers, as well as the continuation of the direct discussions between M. Sazonof and Count Szápáry.

It is held here that the formula which seemed as if it might obtain the adherence of Germany—"Mediation between Austria and Russia,"—is unsuitable, inasmuch as it alleges a dispute between those two Empires which does not exist up to the present.

Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed her on to aggressive action against Servia in order to be able herself to enter into war with Russia and France, in circumstances which she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under conditions which have been thoroughly considered.

DUMAINE.

CHAPTER V.

FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY AUSTRIA ON SERBIA (JULY 28, 1914) TO THE GERMAN ULTIMATUM TO RUSSIA (JULY 31, 1914).

No. 84. M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 29, 1914.

The Consulta considers that, in spite of the declaration of war by Austria on Serbia, there is no reason why the diplomatic efforts for calling together a conference in London with a view to mediation should be interrupted.

BARRÈRE.

No. 85. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, Belgrade.

Paris, July 29, 1914.

The Austro-German attitude is becoming clearer. Austria, uneasy concerning the Slav propaganda, has seized the opportunity of the crime of Serajevo in order to punish the Servian intrigues, and to obtain in this quarter guarantees which, according as events are allowed to develop or not, will either affect only the Servian Government and army, or become territorial questions. Germany intervenes between her ally and the other Powers and declares that the question is a local one, namely, the punishment of a political crime committed in the past, and for the future sure guarantees that the anti-Austrian intrigues will be put an end to. The German Government thinks that Russia should be content with the official and formal assurances given by Austria, to the effect that she does not seek territorial aggrandisement and that she will respect the integrity of Serbia; in these circumstances the danger of war can only come from Russia, if she seeks to intervene in a question which is well defined. In these circumstances any action for the maintenance of peace must therefore take place at St. Petersburg alone.

This sophism, which would relieve Germany from intervening at Vienna, has been maintained unsuccessfully at Paris by Herr von Schoen, who has vainly endeavoured to draw us into identical Franco-German action at St. Petersburg; it has been also expounded in London to Sir E. Grey. In France, as in England, a reply was given that the St. Petersburg Cabinet have, from the beginning, given the greatest proofs of their moderation, especially by associating themselves with the Powers in advising Serbia to yield to the requirements of the Austrian note. Russia does not therefore in any way threaten peace; it is at Vienna that action must be taken; it is from there that the danger will come, from the moment that they refuse to be content with the almost complete submission of Serbia to exorbitant demands; that they refuse to accept the co-operation of the

Powers in the discussion of the points which remain to be arranged between Austria and Servia; and, finally, that they do not hesitate to make a declaration of war as precipitate as the original Austro-Hungarian note.

The attitude at Berlin, as at Vienna, is still dilatory. In the former capital, while protesting that the Germans desire to safeguard general peace by common action between the four Powers, the idea of a conference is rejected without any other expedient being suggested, and while they refuse to take any positive action at Vienna. In the Austrian capital they would like to keep St. Petersburg in play with the illusion of an *entente* which might result from direct conversations, while they are taking action against Servia.

In these circumstances it seems essential that the St. Petersburg Cabinet, whose desire to unravel this crisis peacefully is manifest, should immediately give their adherence to the English proposal. This proposal must be strongly supported at Berlin in order to decide Herr von Jagow to take real action at Vienna capable of stopping Austria and preventing her from supplementing her diplomatic advantage by military successes. The Austro-Hungarian Government would, indeed, not be slow to take advantage of it in order to impose on Servia, under the elastic expression of "guarantees," conditions which, in spite of all assurances that no territorial aggrandisement was being sought, would in effect modify the status of Eastern Europe, and would run the risk of gravely compromising the general peace either at once or in the near future.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 86. M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

I am now in a position to assure Your Excellency that the Russian Government will acquiesce in any measures which France and England may propose in order to maintain peace. My English colleague is telegraphing to London to the same effect.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 87. M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, July 29, 1914.

I report the following impressions of my interview with M. Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact information. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies every apprehension; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian Government would have taken an initiative which would lead, according to a pre-conceived plan, to a declaration of war, without previous arrangement with the Emperor William.

The German Government stand "with grounded arms" ready to take peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but there is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and English colleagues share this feeling.

The Belgian Government are taking steps which harmonise with the

statement made to me yesterday by M. Davignon that everything will be put in readiness for the defence of the neutrality of the country.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

No. 88. M. Ronssin, French Consul-General at Frankfort, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Frankfort, July 29, 1914.

I notify you of important movements of troops yesterday and to-night. This morning several regiments in service dress arrived here, especially by the roads from Darmstadt, Cassel, and Mayence, which are full of soldiers. The bridges and railways are guarded under the pretext of preparations for the autumn manœuvres.

RONSSIN.

No. 89. M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Munich, July 29, 1914.

I am informed that the mills at Illkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) have been asked to stop delivery to their ordinary clients and to keep all their output for the army.

From Strassburg information has been received of the transport of motor guns used for firing on aeroplanes and dirigibles.

Under the pretext of a change in the autumn manœuvres the non-commissioned officers and men of the Bavarian infantry regiments at Metz, who were on leave in Bavaria for the harvest, received orders yesterday to return immediately.

ALLIZÉ.

No. 90. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

The French Consul at Prague confirms the mobilisation of the 8th army corps which had already been announced, and that of the Landwehr division of this army corps. The cavalry divisions in Galicia are also mobilising; regiments and cavalry divisions from Vienna and Budapest have already been transported to the Russian frontier. Reservists are now being called together in this district.

There is a rumour that the Austro-Hungarian Government, in order to be in a position to meet any danger, and perhaps in order to impress St. Petersburg, intend to decide on a general mobilisation of their forces on the 30th July, or the 1st August. To conclude, it is certain the Emperor will return from Ischl to Vienna to-morrow.

DUMAINE.

No. 91. M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

The direct conversation, to which the Russian Government had invited the Austro-Hungarian Government in a friendly spirit, has been refused by the latter.

On the other hand, the Russian General Staff have satisfied themselves that Austria is hurrying on her military preparations against Russia, and is pressing forward the mobilisation which has begun on the Galician frontier. As a result the order to mobilise will be despatched to-night to thirteen army corps, which are destined to operate eventually against Austria.

In spite of the failure of his proposal, M. Sazonof accepts the idea of a conference of the four Powers in London; further, he does not attach any importance to the title officially given to the discussions, and will support all English efforts in favour of peace.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 92. M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I asked the Secretary of State to-day how the question of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, which seemed to him yesterday the best means of arriving at a *détente*, stood. He answered that at St. Petersburg they seemed well disposed towards them and that he had asked Vienna to take this course. He was awaiting the reply. The British Government, after seeing the suggestion of a conference rejected, had let it be known that they would view with favour the inception of such conversations between Austria and Russia, and had asked Germany to urge Austria, which the Imperial Government are not failing to do.

I asked Herr von Jagow if he had at last received the Servian reply to Austria and what he thought of it. He replied that he saw in it a basis for possible negotiation. I added that it was just on that account that I considered the rupture by Austria, after she had received such a document, inexplicable.

The Secretary of State then remarked that with Eastern nations one could never obtain sufficient guarantees, and that Austria wished to be able to supervise the carrying out of promises made to her, a supervision which Servia refused. This, in the eyes of the Secretary of State, is the cardinal point. I answered Herr von Jagow that Servia, as she wished to remain independent, was bound to reject the control of a single Power, but that an International Commission would not have the same character. The Balkan States have more than one; for instance, the Financial Commission at Athens. One could imagine, I said, for instance, among other combinations, a Provisional International Commission, charged with the duty of controlling the police inquiry demanded by Austria; it was clear, by this instance, that the reply of Servia opened the door to conversations and did not justify a rupture.

I then asked the Secretary of State if, leaving aside direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg to which Sir E. Grey had given his adherence, he did not think that common action could be exercised by the

four Powers by means of their Ambassadors. He answered in the affirmative, adding that at this moment the London Cabinet were confining themselves to exercising their influence in support of direct conversations.

At the end of the afternoon the Imperial Chancellor asked the British Ambassador to come and see him. He spoke to him of the proposal of Sir E. Grey for the meeting of a conference; he told him that he had not been able to accept a proposal which seemed to impose the authority of the Powers on Austria; he assured my colleague of his sincere desire for peace and of the efforts he was making to that effect at Vienna, but he added that Russia was alone able to maintain peace or let loose war.

Sir E. Goschen answered that he did not agree, and that if war broke out Austria would be chiefly responsible, for it was inadmissible for her to have broken with Serbia after the reply of the latter.

Without discussing this point, the Chancellor said that he was trying his utmost to obtain direct conversations between Austria and Russia; he knew that England looked on such conversations with a favourable eye. He added that his own action would be rendered very difficult at Vienna, if it were true that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps on the Austrian frontier. He asked my colleague to call Sir E. Grey's attention to what he said.

Sir E. Goschen has telegraphed to London to this effect.

The attitude of the Chancellor is very probably the result of the last interview of Sir E. Grey with Prince Lichnowsky. Up to quite the last days they flattered themselves here that England would remain out of the question, and the impression produced on the German Government and on the financiers and business men by her attitude is profound.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 93. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

The opinion of my British, Russian and Italian colleagues agrees with mine concerning the impossibility of preventing the outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Serbia, since all attempts to avoid the collision have failed.

M. Schebeko had asked that the negotiations begun at St. Petersburg by MM. Sazonof and Szápáry should be continued and made more effective by special powers being conferred on the latter, but Count Berchtold has flatly refused. He showed in this way that Austria-Hungary does not tolerate any intervention which would prevent her from inflicting punishment and humiliation on Serbia.

The Duke of Avarna admits that it is very probable that the imminence of a general insurrection among the Southern Slav inhabitants precipitated the resolutions of the Monarchy. He still clings to the hope that, after a first success of the Austro-Hungarian arms, but not before this, mediation might be able to limit the conflict.

DUMAINE.

**No. 94. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, Vienna,
Constantinople, Belgrade.**

Paris, July 29, 1914.

The following communication was semi-officially made to me this morning by the German Ambassador:—

"The German Government are still continuing their efforts to obtain the consent of the Austrian Government to a friendly conversation which would give the latter an opportunity of stating exactly the object and extent of the operations in Servia. The Berlin Cabinet hope to receive declarations which will be of a kind to satisfy Russia. The German efforts are in no way impeded by the declaration of war which has occurred."

A similar communication will be made at St. Petersburg.

During the course of a conversation which I had this morning with Baron von Schoen, the latter stated to me that the German Government did not know what the intentions of Vienna were. When Berlin knows how far Austria wishes to go, there will be a basis of discussion which will make conversations with a view to intervention easier.

When I observed that the military operations which had been begun would not perhaps allow any time for conversation, and that the German Government ought to use their influence at Vienna to delay them, the Ambassador answered that Berlin could not exercise any pressure, but that he hoped that the operations would not be pushed forward very actively.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

**No. 95. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Constantinople,
Rome, Belgrade.**

Paris, July 29, 1914.

M. Isvolsky came to me by order of his Government to communicate a telegram addressed by M. Sazonof to Berlin. It appears from this information that, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Servia, the measures of mobilisation already taken with regard to the largest part of the Austro-Hungarian army, and finally the refusal of Count Berchtold to continue negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, Russia had decided to mobilise in the provinces of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan. While informing the German Government to this effect, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin was instructed to add that these military precautions were not in any way directed against Germany, and also did not imply aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary; furthermore, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled.

The Russian Ambassador also gave me the substance of two telegrams addressed to London by M. Sazonof: the first, after pointing out that the declaration of war on Servia put an end to the conversations of the Russian Minister with the Austrian Ambassador, asked England to exercise her influence, as quickly as possible, with a view to mediation and to the immediate cessation of Austrian military operations (the continuation of which gave Austria time to crush Servia while mediation was dragging on); the second communicated the impression received by M. Sazonof from his conversations with the German Ambassador that Germany favours

Austria's uncompromising attitude and is not exercising any influence on her. The Russian Minister thinks that the attitude of Germany is very disquieting, and considers that England is in a better position than the other Powers to take steps at Berlin with a view to exercising pressure on Vienna.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 96. M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 29, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has been officially informed by the Russian Ambassador that his Government, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria on Serbia and of the measures of mobilisation which were from this moment being taken by Austria, had given the order to mobilise in the districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan. He added that this step had no aggressive character against Germany, and that the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled.

In speaking of this communication the Marquis di San Giuliano told me that unfortunately throughout this affair Austria and Germany had been, and were still, convinced that Russia would not move. In this connection he read to me a despatch from M. Bollati reporting an interview which he had had yesterday with Herr von Jagow, in which the latter had again repeated to him that he did not think that Russia would move. He based this belief on the fact that the Russian Government had just sent an agent to Berlin to treat about some financial questions. The Austrian Ambassador at Berlin also told his English colleague that he did not believe in a general war, since Russia was not in the mood or in the condition to make war.

The Marquis di San Giuliano does not share this opinion. He thinks that if Austria contents herself with humiliating Serbia and with exacting, besides the acceptance of the note, some material advantages which do not involve her territory, Russia can still find some means of coming to an agreement with her. But if Austria wishes either to dismember Serbia or to destroy her as an independent State, he thinks that it would be impossible for Russia not to intervene by military measures.

In spite of the extreme gravity of the situation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs does not seem to me to despair of the possibility of an agreement. He thinks that England can still exercise a great deal of influence in Berlin in the direction of peace. He had yesterday, he told me, a long conversation with the British Ambassador, Sir R. Rodd, in order to show him to what extent English intervention might be effective. He said to me in conclusion, "If your Government are of the same opinion, they could on their side make representations to this effect in London."

BARRÈRE.

No. 97. M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Paris, July 29, 1914.

I should be obliged if you would ask Sir E. Grey to be good enough to see as soon as possible at Berlin, in the form which he may consider

most opportune and effective, his proposal of mediation by the four Powers, which had in principle obtained the adherence of the German Government.

The Russian Government on their side will have expressed the same desire directly to the British Government; the declaration of war by Austria on Servia, her sending of troops to the Austro-Russian frontier, the consequent Russian mobilisation on the Galician frontier have in fact put an end to the direct Austro-Russian conversations.

The explanations which the German Government are going to ask for at Vienna, in accordance with the statement of Baron von Schoen which I have reported to you, in order to learn the intention of the Austrian Government, will allow the four Powers to exercise effective action between Vienna and St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace.

I would ask you also to point out to the English Secretary of State how important it would be for him to obtain from the Italian Government the most whole-hearted continuance of their support in co-operating in the action of the four Powers in favour of peace.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 98. M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 29, 1914.

In his interview to-day with my German colleague, Sir E. Grey observed that, the overtures of M. Sazonof for direct conversations between Russia and Austria not having been accepted at Vienna, it would be well to return to his proposal of friendly intervention by the four Powers which are not directly interested. This suggestion has been accepted in principle by the German Government, but they have objected to the idea of a conference or of mediation. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has invited Prince Lichnowsky to ask his Government that they should themselves propose a new formula. Whatever it may be, if it admits of the maintenance of peace, it will be accepted by England, France and Italy.

The German Ambassador was to have forwarded Sir E. Grey's request to Berlin immediately. In giving me an account of this conversation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that Germany's reply to this communication and to that of Russia concerning the mobilisation of four army corps on the Austrian frontier would allow us to realise the intentions of the German Government. My German colleague having asked Sir E. Grey what the intentions of the British Government were, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that he had nothing to state for the present.

Sir E. Grey did not disguise the fact that he found the situation very grave and that he had little hope of a peaceful solution.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 99. M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Belgrade, July 29, 1914.

The Crown Prince, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was received, telegraphed to the Tsar to ask his help. My Russian colleague tells me that he has just communicated to M. Pashitch His Majesty's reply.

The Tsar thanks the Prince for having turned to him at so critical a juncture; he declares that everything has been done to arrive at a peaceful solution of the dispute, and formally assures the Prince that, if this object cannot be attained, Russia will never cease to interest herself in the fate of Servia.

BOPPE.

No. 100. M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

The German Ambassador came to tell M. Sazonof that if Russia does not stop her military preparations the German army will receive the order to mobilise.

M. Sazonof replied that the Russian preparations have been caused, on the one hand, by the obstinate and uncompromising attitude of Austria, and on the other hand by the fact that eight Austro-Hungarian army corps are already mobilised.

The tone in which Count Pourtales delivered this communication has decided the Russian Government this very night to order the mobilisation of the thirteen army corps which are to operate against Austria.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 101. M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at St. Petersburg and London.

Paris, July 30, 1914.

M. Isvolsky came to-night to tell me that the German Ambassador has notified M. Sazonof of the decision of his Government to mobilise the army if Russia does not cease her military preparations.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Tsar points out that these preparations were only commenced after Austria had mobilised eight army corps and had refused to arrange peacefully her differences with Servia. M. Sazonof declares that in these circumstances Russia can only expedite her arming and consider war as imminent, that she counts on the help of France as an ally, and that she considers it desirable that England should join Russia and France without loss of time.

France is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance.

She will not neglect, however, any effort towards a solution of the conflict in the interests of universal peace. The conversation entered into between the Powers which are less directly interested still allows of the hope that peace may be preserved; I therefore think it would be well that, in taking any precautionary measures of defence which Russia thinks must go on, she should not immediately take any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces.

Yesterday in the late afternoon the German Ambassador came and spoke to me of the military measures which the Government of the Republic were taking, adding that France was able to act in this way, but that in Germany preparations could not be secret and that French opinion should not be alarmed if Germany decided on them.

I answered that the French Government had not taken any step which could give their neighbours any cause for disquietude, and that their wish to lend themselves to any negotiations for the purpose of maintaining peace could not be doubted.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

[Continued in March, 1915.]

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